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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the interpretation and application of the principle of non-refoulement within 
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), a system designed to enhance the fair-sharing of 
responsibilities among European Union (EU) Member States and to enhance harmonizatio*n on 
the application of EU law. It argues that the laws and policies of the CEAS have led to an increased 
potential to violate non-refoulement. While the norm of non-refoulement itself is defined in a 
robust manner in both international and European law, the actual practice of that law is far from 
compliant with minimal standards.  
 
The thesis begins by explaining the norm of non-refoulement and situates it within both 
international and European law. It then discusses how, through the lens of containment theory, the 
EU is effectively using the laws and policies of the CEAS to deter, deflect, and contain asylum 
claimants and refugees away from the EU and to other third countries. 
 
Containment is a type of control theory which is derived from spatial and human geography and 
applied to law in the migration context. Defined as the EU’s use of legal measures to restrict, 
regulate, and control the mobility and immobility of migrants, the ‘containment’ of asylum 
claimants and refugees within the CEAS is demonstrated through the case studies of the United 
Kingdom (UK) and Germany. These containment policies are designed to shift the EU’s 
responsibility for processing asylum applications elsewhere - outside of the EU, to third countries 
deemed ‘safe’ and, in other instances, to another Member State that is assumed to be in compliance 
with relevant international and European law obligations. 
 
In the case study examples, both the UK and Germany’s practices of ‘safe’ third country and 
Dublin transfers evidence containment policies, which heighten the potential of breaching non-
refoulement. In the UK example, the use of ‘safe’ third country concepts demonstrate that the UK 
does not examine the individualized risks to asylum applications before sending claimants back to 
third countries through which they have passed and that are deemed ‘safe’. The use of ‘safe’ third 
country lists further heightens the potential for the principle of non-refoulement to be breached 
when a blanket presumption of safety and mutual trust is applied to countries on the list. In the 
Germany example, combining Dublin transfer procedures with the admissibility procedure has the 
effect of accelerating the process of determining asylum claims to the detriment of claimants whose 
claims are not adequately examined for their substance.  
 
As conflicts and other situations around the world continue to produce large flows of asylum 
claimants and refugees, now more than ever, the effects of containment policies must be 
counteracted while maintaining due respect for the principle of non-refoulement.  
 
KEYWORDS: Common European Asylum System; containment theory; non-refoulement; 
Dublin transfers; ‘safe’ third countries; responsibility-sharing; Refugee Convention.  
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SUMMARY FOR LAY AUDIENCE 
 
This thesis examines an individual’s right not to be returned to places where they may be in danger 
of serious human rights violations (termed ‘non-refoulement’). The thesis argues that EU asylum 
practices can lead to a failure to observe this important right. As dire consequences can result if 
individuals are returned to places where they may face death, torture, or other cruel treatment, the 
European asylum system must comply with non-refoulement. 
 
However, EU countries use various tactics including legal measures to ‘contain’ asylum claimants 
and refugees to other countries, and to evade their responsibilities to observe non-refoulement 
under international and European law.  
 
These ‘containment’ strategies are demonstrated in two case study examples: the United Kingdom 
and Germany. In the first example, the United Kingdom returns asylum claimants and refugees 
back to transit countries where they did not claim asylum. This method of ‘containing’ asylum 
claimants and refugees effectively increases the chances of them being indirectly returned to face 
violations of human rights.  
 
In the second example, Germany returns these claimants and refugees through transfer processes 
back to another EU country by relying solely on guarantees from national governments. This 
effectively ‘contains’ the claimants and refugees outside of Germany, again increasing the risks of 
human rights violations.  
 
As violence and conflicts persist, this thesis contributes to existing literature by providing human 
rights law analysis with a unique lens of ‘containment’. Now more than ever, the human rights of 
those seeking refuge must be safeguarded against erosion.  
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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS 
 
Accelerated Procedure A fast track procedure for unfounded asylum claims or 
where there are serious national security or public order 
concerns in the claim by introducing shorter, but reasonable 
time limits for certain procedural steps 
 
Area of Freedom, Security, Justice  An area created by Article 67 TFEU which ensures the 
absence of internal border controls and which frames a 
common policy on asylum, immigration and external border 
control, based on solidary between Member States 
 
Asylum Procedures Directive A key CEAS directive which determines the common 
procedure for granting and withdrawing international 
protection  
 
Common European Asylum System A common European asylum policy aimed at enhancing 
efficiency and harmonizing asylum standards across the EU 
 
Diplomatic Assurances  An undertaking from the receiving State to the sending State 
to the effect that the person being transferred will be treated 
in accordance with relevant international human rights 
standards 
 
Dublin III Regulation  Mechanism and criteria for determining the Member State 
responsible for processing asylum applications 
 
Dublin System The Dublin III Regulation along with key directives of the 
CEAS: the Qualification Directive, Asylum Procedures 
Directive, and the Reception Conditions Directive 
 
Dublin Transfer Transfer of the claimant from one Member State to the 
Member State deemed responsible for examining the asylum 
application based on presumption of mutual trust 
 
EUNAVFOR MED   EU Naval Force Mediterranean  
 
Eurodac    Biometric database for fingerprint collection 
 
FRONTEX    EU’s external border and coastguard agency 
 
Irregular Movement In the EU context, refers to accessing Member State 
territories to seek asylum through means other than at 
authorized checkpoints such as at border crossings 
 
v 
 
Margin of Appreciation Deference given to Council of Europe Member States by the 
ECtHR in Member States’ interpretation of international law 
and ECHR law obligations 
 
Margin of Discretion Deference given to EU Member States by the Court of 
Justice of the EU, as distinguished from the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ 
 
Member State Responsible EU Member State deemed responsible for processing 
asylum applications pursuant to Dublin III Regulation 
 
Non-Entrée  Non-admission policies which seek to deter claimants from 
reaching territory of States to access asylum 
 
Presumption of Mutual Trust The presumption that EU Member States all comply with 
their relevant international and EU law obligations 
 
Primacy of EU Law All EU law has absolute and unconditional precedence and 
should always be given precedence over all conflicting 
provisions of national law 
 
Primary Legislation A source of EU law at the top of the hierarchy which consists 
of EU treaties and general principles of EU law 
 
Principle of Mutual Recognition The recognition by each Member State of the decisions of 
courts from other Member States with minimum procedure 
and formality 
 
Qualification Directive  A key CEAS directive which determines the minimum 
standards for the qualification of international protection for 
Third Country Nationals and stateless persons  
 
Reception Conditions Directive A key CEAS directive which determines the standards for 
reception of applicants for international protection 
 
Responsibility-Sharing A legal principle binding upon all EU Member States which 
requires them to implement EU policies by sharing the 
responsibility for the implementation of such policies 
between the Member States 
 
Safe Third Country A country which the applicant for international protection 
has passed through where they should have claimed for 
asylum but they did not. The onus is upon the claimant to 
prove on a rebuttable presumption that they do not have a 
connection with the ‘safe third country’ to prevent return.  
 
vi 
 
Secondary Legislation A source of EU law superseded by primary legislation which 
consists of legislative acts, delegating acts, and 
implementing acts 
 
Secondary Movement In the EU context, refers to activities such as smuggling and 
trafficking 
 
Subsidiary Protection Complementary protection to the Refugee Convention that 
qualifies individuals who face a ‘serious harm’ upon return, 
but who do not meet the refugee definition 
 
Suspensive Recourse Non-removal of an asylum claimant from the country of 
asylum pending the outcome of an appeal 
 
Take Back Request A request by the sending Member State to the Member State 
responsible to take back the applicant who has withdrawn 
the application under examination or whose application has 
been rejected and made an application in another Member 
State 
 
Example: When an applicant has already applied for asylum 
in another Member State  
 
Take Charge Request A request by the sending Member State to the Member State 
responsible to take charge of the applicant who has lodged 
an application in a different Member State  
 
 Example: When an applicant has stayed in another Member 
State before entering the Member State which he/she first 
applied for asylum  
 
Third-Country National A person who does not benefit from the right to freedom of 
movement within the EU and who is also not an EU citizen 
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PREFACE 
 
At the time of writing, the Syrian civil war has brought a large number of asylum claimants and 
refugees into and across the European Union (EU) in search of refuge. 
 
At the EU level, negotiations for reforms to the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) have 
begun to take place, with proposed changes to the Dublin III Regulation, including recasting the 
current key instruments from ‘directives’ into binding ‘regulations’ to further promote compliance.  
 
At the same time, various countries within the EU are adopting measures to cope with the mass 
influx. In the United Kingdom (UK), plans for exiting the CEAS, following Brexit, are underway. 
In Germany, the ‘open door’ policy under Chancellor Angela Merkel has seen diminishing support.  
 
EU countries are continuing to sign bilateral and multilateral agreements with third countries with 
the aim of reducing secondary asylum claimant movements and preventing ‘forum-shopping’. 
Measures to curtail irregular migration continue to take place daily, especially along the 
Mediterranean Sea route, where asylum claimants and refugees make perilous journeys to access 
asylum. During this time, the number of claimants being returned to non-EU countries deemed 
‘safe’ continues to rise.  
 
In addition to these developments, the use of migration control mechanisms is steadily increasing, 
with measures including the criminalization of migrants, securitization of borders, and the 
externalization of border control.  
 
Against this backdrop, this thesis examines the protection of non-refoulement within the EU and 
its implications for the protection of those most at risk for serious human rights abuses.  
 
 
  
xi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract ………………………………………………………………………………….  ii 
Summary for Lay Audience …………………………………………………………….  iii 
Key Terms ……………………………………………………………………………….  iv 
Abbreviations …………………………………………………………………………….  vii 
Tables and Figures ……………………………………………………………………….  viii  
Acknowledgement……………………………………………………………………….  ix 
Preface …………..……………………………………………………………………….  x 
Table of Contents ……………………………………………………………………….  xi 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction: Setting the Stage…………………………………………… 1  
1.  Introduction  
 1.1 Objectives of the Thesis and Key Concepts …………………………………… 4 
 1.2 Methodology …………………………………………………………………… 13 
 1.3 Structure of the Thesis …………………………………………………………. 24 
 1.4 Contributions to Existing Literature and Limitations ………………………….. 27 
 1.5 Concluding Remarks …………………………………………………………… 33 
 
Chapter 2: Non-Refoulement Protection under International and European  
Refugee Law ……………………………………………………………………………. 35 
2. Introduction 
 2.1 History of Non-Refoulement ……………………………………………………. 36 
 2.2 The Current Conception of Non-Refoulement under International Refugee Law .. 46 
 2.3 The Current Conception of Non-Refoulement Under International Human Rights 
  Law ………………………………………………………………………………. 56 
 2.4 Non-Refoulement in European Law ……………………………………………… 64 
 2.5 Conclusions on the Principle of Non-Refoulement ………………………………. 73  
 
Chapter 3: The Common European Asylum System and Non-Refoulement ………… 75 
3.  Introduction 
 3.1 The European Legal Order ………………………………………………………. 77 
  3.1.1 EU Law …………………………………………………………………  78 
  3.1.2 ECHR Law …………………………………………………………….. 92 
 3.2 Claiming Asylum in the EU ……………………………………………………....  101 
  3.2.1 Dublin III Regulation and the Determination of the Member State  
   Responsible ……………………………………………………………..  101  
  3.2.2 Qualifying for International Protection and Relevant Asylum  
   Procedures ………………………………………………………………  103 
 3.3 Gaps Between Law and Practice with Respect to Non-Refoulement within the  
  EU …………………………………………………………………………………  108 
  3.3.1 The ‘Margin of Discretion’ and Non-Refoulement ……………………...  108 
  3.3.2 The Presumption of Mutual Trust within the EU ……………………….  116 
 3.4 Concluding Remarks ……………………………………………………………...  120 
 
 
xii 
 
Chapter 4: Containment in Europe ……………………………………………………….  123 
4. Introduction 
 4.1 Theories of Containment ………………………………………………………..…  124 
 4.2 Containment in the Common European Asylum System ………………………….  135 
 4.3 Containment and Non-Refoulement ……………………………………………….  150 
 4.4 Concluding Remarks ………………………………………………………………  159 
 
Chapter 5: The United Kingdom and Non-Refoulement .……………………………..…  161 
5. Introduction 
 5.1 UK Refugee Law ………………..…………………………………………………  164 
 5.2 The UK Domestic Asylum System: Institutional Structure ……………………….  182 
 5.3 Claiming Asylum in the UK ……………………………………………………….  184 
 5.4 Containment by the UK through Procedural Methods and Evidentiary Thresholds..  192 
 5.5 Concluding Remarks ……………………………………………………………….  209 
 
Chapter 6: Germany and Non-Refoulement …………………………………..…………..  212 
6. Introduction 
 6.1 German Refugee Law ………………………………………………………………  214 
 6.2 The German Domestic Asylum System ……………………………………………. 225 
 6.3 Non-Refoulement in Germany …………………………………………………........ 234 
 6.4 Containment in Germany as Illustrated by the Presumption of Mutual Trust …… 247 
 6.5 Concluding Remarks ……………………………………………………………….. 253 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion: Protecting Non-Refoulement …………………………………….  256 
7. Introduction 
 7.1 Situating Non-Refoulement within the Domestic: Comparing UK and German  
  Practices ……………………………………………………………………………. 259 
 7.2 The Future of Non-Refoulement Protection in International Refugee Law ………  272 
  7.2.1 Strengthening Procedural Guarantees ……………………………………. 273 
  7.2.2 Reshaping the Presumption of Mutual Trust ……………………………..  280 
  7.2.3 Re-evaluating the Use of Diplomatic Assurances to Facilitate ‘Safe’ 
   Third Country and Dublin Transfers ……………………………………..  287 
  7.2.4 Periodic Monitoring and Judicial Review of Transfers …………………..  293 
 7.3 Conclusion: Future Directions for Non-Refoulement ………………………………  298 
 
Chapter 8: Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………. 300 
8.  
 8.1 Treaties and International Conventions …………………………………………….  300 
  8.1.1 UN Treaties ………………………………………………………….…... 300 
  8.1.2 European Primary Legislation ……………………………………..……. 301 
  8.1.3 European Secondary Legislation ……………………………………….. 302 
  8.1.4 UK Legislation ………………………………………………………..…. 303 
  8.1.5 German Legislation ………………………………………………..…..... 304 
 8.2 Jurisprudence ………………………………………………………………..…..… 304 
  8.2.1 International Court of Justice ……………………………………..……..  304 
  8.2.2 European Court of Human Rights ………………………………………..  305 
xiii 
 
  8.2.3 Court of Justice of the EU ………………………………………………  307 
  8.2.4 Committee Against Torture ……………………………………………   308 
  8.2.5 Human Rights Committee ………………………………………………  309 
  8.2.6 Domestic Jurisprudence (United Kingdom) ……………………………  309 
  8.2.7 Domestic Jurisprudence (Germany) ……………………………………  311 
  8.2.8 Domestic Jurisprudence (Other) ……………………………………….  313 
 8.3 Secondary Material: Monographs and Edited Collections ……………………….  313 
 8.4 Secondary Material: Chapters in Edited Collection ………………………………  316 
 8.5 Secondary Material: Journal Articles …………………………………………….  321 
 8.6 Secondary Material: Other ……………………………………………………….  329 
  8.6.1 Online Sources ………………………………………………………….  329 
  8.6.2 Nongovernmental Organization Documents ……………………………  358 
  8.6.3 European Commission Documents ……………………………………..  360 
  8.6.4 UN Documents …………………………………………………………  361 
  8.6.5 Soft Law Policy Documents ……………………………………………  367 
 
Curriculum Vitae …………………………………………………………………………  368 
 
 
 
  
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction: Setting the Stage 
1. Introduction 
One person is forcibly displaced every two seconds as a result of conflict or persecution.1 An 
unprecedented 79.5 million people are forcibly displaced around the world today, and 26 million 
of them, or almost 35%, are refugees.2 In 2011, the Syrian armed conflict began.3 That civil war 
has led to the forced displacement of millions of people into neighbouring countries and regions, 
including the European Union (EU).4 As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) has confirmed in official numbers, the situation is unprecedented: the number of people 
displaced as a result of the Syrian conflict has surpassed the number of people displaced in the 
post-World War II era.5 The high number of forcibly displaced persons during this period has 
created an urgent need for a fair and efficient method of processing asylum applications and it has 
tested the limits of domestic asylum systems in EU Member States. In particular, the Common 
 
1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Figures at a Glance”, https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-
glance.html; See, also: Anadolu Agency, “World now has nearly 80 million refugees: UN”, 18 June 2020, 
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/world-now-has-nearly-80-million-refugees-un/1881306; United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019” (Denmark: UNHCR Global Data 
Service, 2020) at 2. 
2 Ibid.  
3 BBC News, “Syria Profile - Timeline”, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995.  
4 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Syria Emergency”, 19 April 2018, https://www.unhcr.org/syria-
emergency.html.  
5 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Forced Displacement Worldwide at its Highest in Decades”, 19 
June 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2017/6/5941561f4/forced-displacement-worldwide-its-highest-
decades.html.  
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European Asylum System (CEAS), which aims to establish common asylum procedures within 
the EU, has been put under constant strain.6  
At the same time, the protection of the human rights of those forcibly displaced, including asylum 
claimants and refugees, must be monitored and scrutinized, so that instances of ill-treatment are 
less likely to occur. While international law obliges States to comply with relevant international 
human rights law principles, including the prohibition against refoulement, States are nonetheless 
free to accept or reject the granting of refugee status under their domestic laws and to set external 
border controls within the boundaries of these obligations.7 Defined as the prohibition against 
forced return to persecution, non-refoulement is a cardinal principle of international refugee law.8 
A violation of non-refoulement means sending someone to face the risk of death, torture, or other 
forms of ill-treatment as well as returning them to territories where there are often consistent 
patterns of gross, flagrant, or mass violations of human rights.9 Violations of non-refoulement not 
only take place when States send asylum claimants to a situation in which they are at risk of serious 
human rights abuses, they also occur when States cooperate internationally to deter or prevent 
asylum claimants and refugees from accessing the asylum-granting State’s territory and its asylum 
procedures.10  
There is an ongoing trend towards more restrictive migration controls in the EU and elsewhere. 
These controls are carried out through various tactics such as visa regimes, carrier sanctions, and 
‘pushback’ operations by border authorities of EU Member States to discourage asylum claimants 
 
6 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Common European Asylum System”, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en [CEAS].  
7 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) at art 33(1) 
[Refugee Convention]. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Convention Against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1465 UNTS 85 
(adopted 10 December 1984; entered into force 26 June 1987) at art 3(2) [CAT].  
10 See, for example: James C Hathaway and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, “Non-Refoulement in a World of 
Cooperative Deterrence” (2014) Law & Economics Working Papers, 1-64 [Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen]. 
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and refugees from entering into Member State territories to access asylum procedures.11 These 
controls are also instituted through ‘protection elsewhere’ regimes.12 ‘Protection elsewhere’ 
regimes send claimants elsewhere to seek international protection or involve measures which 
return them to other EU Member States, and which exclude and deter them from entering a 
Member State’s territory to access territorial asylum.13 For example, many EU Member States use 
‘safe’ third country concepts - countries deemed ‘safe’ which asylum claimants have passed 
through and where the Member State believes they should have applied for asylum, but did not, 
and to which they may be returned.14 ‘Safe’ third country concepts not only do not have a legal 
basis under international law, they also rely heavily upon blanket diplomatic assurances from 
receiving States that purport to guarantee that asylum procedures are in place to permit claimants 
to access international protection for refugee status.15 EU Member States misuse ‘safe’ third 
 
11 Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen supra note 10 at 12; The term ‘visa regimes’ refers to ‘a visa not being offered 
for the purpose of seeking refugee protection’, the term ‘carrier sanctions’ refers to ‘significant fines imposed on 
transporting persons without valid visas, and includes impounding aircraft or other vessels’, and the phrase 
‘‘pushback’ operations at sea’ refers to ‘the interception and push back of any migrant boat, regardless of whether it 
is in need of rescue’, see: Migrants At Sea, “NATO Expands Aegean Sea Migrant Patrols into Turkish and Greek 
Territorial Waters”, 7 March 2016, https://migrantsatsea.org/tag/push-back-practice.  
11 Daria Davitti and Marlene Fries, “Offshore Processing and Complicity in Current EU Migration Policies: Parts 1 & 
2” EJIL!Talk Blog, https://www.ejiltalk.org/offshore-processing-and-complicity-in-current-eu-migration-policies-
part-2 [Davitti and Fries]. 
12 See, for example: Michelle Foster, “Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek 
Protection in Another State” (2007) 28:2 Michigan Journal of International Law 223-286; Bill Frelick, Ian M Kysel, 
and Jennifer Podkul, “The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other 
Migrants” (2016) 4:4 Journal of Migration and Human Security, 190-220 at 193. 
13 Ibid.  
14 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Safe Third Country”, https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/safe-third-country_en [Europa STC]. 
15 Note, however, that the reliance upon diplomatic assurances has been cautioned against by both the UNHCR and 
the Committee Against Torture; For UNHCR commentary, see: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
“UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances and International Refugee Protection”, August 2006,  
4 
 
country concepts when they knowingly return claimants to countries where these claimants do not 
actually have adequate access to international protection for refugee status.16 All of these migration 
control policies have the ultimate goal of ‘containing migratory flows and tackling irregular 
migration through enhanced border management [as well as fighting] against smuggling and 
trafficking’.17  
Containment policies represent a twofold failure: first, of EU Member States to put into practice 
the strong statements of law on non-refoulement they have adopted through various international 
and regional instruments, and second, of EU Member States to share responsibility for refugees. 
EU law and policy have been crafted to encourage a ‘fair’ distribution of responsibility for 
processing asylum applications and the sharing of ‘burdens’ among EU Member States in a 
cooperative manner when they implement the CEAS within domestic law, but this approach is not 
always reflected in actual practice.18  
1.1 Objectives of the Thesis and Key Concepts 
There is a ‘paradox’ at the heart of refugee law and policy: EU Member States have committed to 
a robust understanding of asylum rights, including non-refoulement, but the actual implementation 
 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/44dc81164.html at 12-15; For the Committee Against Torture, see: Committee 
Against Torture, “General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context 
of article 22”, 9 February 2018, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a903dc84.html at paras 19-20. 
16 TI v United Kingdom, Application No 43844/98, (ECHR, 7 March 2000) at 18 [TI]. 
17 See, for example: Annalisa Buscaini, “When Will the Time Be Ripe for a European Legal Migration Policy?”, 
September 2018, https://eu.boell.org/en/2018/09/14/when-will-time-be-ripe-european-legal-migration-policy 
[Buscaini]; For more on EU’s agenda to tackle irregular migration and secondary movements such as smuggling 
activities, see: European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda on 
Migration”, COM(2015) 240 final, 13 May 2015 [European Agenda]. 
18 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version), OJ C326/47, 26 October 2012 at art 80 
[TFEU]. 
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of these commitments is narrowed and constrained due to containment policies and practices.19 
This thesis advances the claim that this paradox needs to be addressed: that, in particular, the gap 
between non-refoulement law and practice must be significantly reduced or even eliminated in 
order for the legal norm to provide effective protection. It therefore examines this paradox, as it 
relates to non-refoulement, through different levels of legal interpretation: from the international 
to the domestic, from conceptualization to actual practice.  
This thesis advances two key arguments to illustrate the paradox. The first argument is that both 
international and European regional law recognize non-refoulement as a fulsome protective norm 
and a key legal principle. International refugee law has developed a fairly settled understanding of 
the principle of non-refoulement as prohibiting the transfer of an asylum claimant to a country 
where he or she is at risk of a future threat of serious personal danger.20 However, the protection 
is not absolute: individuals who are deemed to have committed a serious crime or would endanger 
the community of the country of refuge may be refouled.21 International human rights law has 
adopted a slightly different approach to non-refoulement, applying the protective norm to everyone 
without exception, and focusing on prohibiting returns raising the risk of death, torture and cruel 
treatment.22 The two branches of international law are intrinsically intertwined, as explained in 
Chapter Two, with each filling the gaps of the other, resulting in a robust norm.23 This dual and 
robust existence of non-refoulement is repeated at the regional level in the EU, and this dualist 
 
19 Dallal Stevens and Maria O’Sullivan, “States, the Law and Access to Refugee Protection: Concluding Reflections”, 
in Maria O’Sullivan and Dallal Stevens (eds) States, the Law and Access to Refugee Protection: Fortresses and 
Fairness (Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2017) at 297 [Stevens].  
20 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 33(1). 
21 Ibid at art 33(2). 
22 CAT supra note 9 at art 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976) at arts 6 and 7 [ICCPR]. 
23 Jane McAdam, “The Refugee Convention as a rights blueprint for persons in need of international protection”, 
Research Paper No 125, July 2006 at 4 [McAdam Research Paper]. 
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version of the principle is the one against which the practice of EU Member States must be 
measured.  
The second central argument of this thesis is that the legal promise of non-refoulement is not being 
realized in practice within the EU due to the use of containment policies - policies used to keep 
asylum claimants moving, constrained or immobile. The EU employs policies of containment in 
two main ways: by excluding asylum claimants and refugees from accessing territorial asylum 
within the EU, and by shifting the responsibility of processing the asylum application elsewhere. 
This responsibility is transferred to countries outside the EU deemed ‘safe’ on the assumption that 
they comply with relevant international and EU law obligations.24 The responsibility is also shifted 
internally, within the EU, when EU Member States send asylum claimants to other EU Member 
States deemed ‘responsible’.25 The principle of non-refoulement is breached when these tactics to 
exclude claimants and to shift the responsibility to process asylum applications elsewhere 
effectively prevent the claimants from accessing international protection for refugee status. 
Examples of these responsibility-shifting tactics within the EU include the use of Dublin transfers 
- transfers to other EU Member States - and reliance on ‘safe’ third country concepts. Case studies 
on the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany illustrate how, in both countries, an ongoing trend of 
a narrower interpretation of the principle has occurred.26 These trends and methods demonstrate 
 
24 For academic critiques on the use of ‘safe third country’ concepts, see, generally: Violeta Moreno-Lax, “The 
Legality of ‘Safe Third Country’ Notion Contested: Insights from the Law of Treaties” in Guy S Goodwin-Gill and 
Philippe Weckel (eds) Migration & Refugee Protection in the 21st Century: Legal Aspects – The Hague Academy of 
International Law Centre for Research (Martinus Nijhoff, 2015) 665-721 [Violeta STC]; The use of ‘safe third 
country’ concepts is set out under the Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), OJ L180/60, 29 June 2013 
at art 38 [Asylum Procedures Directive] . 
25 See, for example: Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person 
(recast), OJ L180/31, 29 June 2013 at art 3(1)  [Dublin III Regulation]. 
26 For the UK, see: Chapter Five; For Germany, see: Chapter Six.  
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that strategies of containment are at work within the EU. (The import of the UK example for the 
EU, post-Brexit, is explained below.)  
These arguments are brought together to reiterate the centrality of non-refoulement as a cardinal 
principle of refugee protection, and to analyze changes that should be made within the CEAS to 
better conform to that principle. To reduce the disjuncture between the law of non-refoulement and 
the practice of that law, this thesis argues that four changes are needed: procedural guarantees 
should be strengthened in order to ensure access to asylum justice; the determination of mutual 
trust should be reshaped; the use of diplomatic assurances in transfer cases should be re-evaluated; 
and periodic review coupled with a judicial review mechanism should be implemented. 
It is important to provide some brief remarks on key terminology that underlies the discussion in 
this thesis: ‘refugee’, ‘asylum claimant’, ‘right to seek asylum’, the cardinal principle of non-
refoulement, and the exception to non-refoulement protection. This will set the stage for the 
remainder of the chapter.  
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) entered into force on 
April 22, 1954, after World War II in order to protect people in Europe fleeing from the war.27 The 
Refugee Convention is a widely-ratified international human rights instrument protecting the rights 
 
27 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 33(1); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267 (adopted 
31 January 1967, entered into force 4 October 1967) [Refugee Protocol]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
217A(III), 10 December 1948 at art 14 [UDHR]; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Introductory 
Note: By the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)” at 2. 
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of refugees.28 Currently, there are 145 ratifications.29 Under Article 1A(2), a ‘refugee’ is defined 
as someone who: 
[…] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his [or her] former habitual residence as 
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.30  
The refugee definition contains five important elements, namely: ‘well-founded fear of 
persecution’, ‘for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion’, ‘is outside of his [or her] country of nationality’, is unable or unwilling to avail 
him or herself of State protection, and owing to such fear, is unable or unwilling to return to his or 
her country of origin.31  
 
28 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at introductory note; United Nations Treaty Collection, “Chapter V: Refugees 
and Stateless Persons. 2. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Geneva, 28 July 1951”, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-
2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en.  
29 As of June 2020: United Nations Treaty Collection, “Chapter V: Refugees and Stateless Persons. 5. Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees: New York, 31 January 1967”, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=V-5&chapter=5&lang=en.  
30 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 1A(2).  
31 Ibid; Article 1A of the Refugee Convention also imposed geographical and temporal limitations upon the definition 
of a ‘refugee’. The geographical limitation refers to applying the criteria for determining refugee status only to 
individuals fleeing Europe from a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and the temporal limitation imposed refers to 
individuals fleeing as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951. The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees was later adopted to remove the geographical and temporal limits of the Refugee Convention to avail 
protection to all those who fit the definition of a ‘refugee’ under Article 1A. 
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In contrast with the term ‘refugee’, an ‘asylum claimant’ is an individual who is in the process of 
seeking asylum, and who has not yet been determined to meet the definition of a ‘refugee’ defined 
under Article 1A of the Refugee Convention.32 An ‘asylum claimant’ includes individuals seeking 
asylum whose claim has yet to be processed or adjudicated.33 The distinction between a ‘refugee’ 
and an ‘asylum claimant’ is an important one in some contexts as, under international law, the 
Refugee Convention provides the bare minimum standards of protection for refugees but not to 
those seeking asylum.34 An individual is a ‘refugee’ and is entitled to the protections codified under 
the Refugee Convention from the moment in time he or she meets the definition, de facto, under 
Article 1A.35 This also means that the individual need not have formally commenced refugee status 
determination procedures or have officially been granted the status of a ‘refugee’ by the UNHCR 
or the State to benefit from Convention protection.36 Therefore, refugee status is declaratory in 
nature, so that the individual does not become a refugee because of recognition (for example, 
through an asylum process), but is endowed with this status because he or she meets the definition 
in the Refugee Convention as a matter of fact.37  
The right to seek asylum, although guaranteed under Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) is not the same as the right to be granted asylum, which is at the discretion 
 
32 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Asylum-Seekers”, https://www.unhcr.org/asylum-seekers.html.   
33 Ibid.  
34 Certain protections are also available to asylum claimants, such as the prohibition against refoulement as found 
under Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention; Note, however, that the principle of non-refoulement applies equally 
to both asylum claimants and to refugees.  
35 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 1A.  
36 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees”, 
December 2011, UN HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3 at para 28 [UNHCR Handbook].  
37 Ibid.  
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of the sovereign State.38 Article 14(1) of the UDHR provides that ‘everyone has the right to seek 
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’.39 The ‘right to seek asylum’ means that 
individuals fleeing from persecution may seek asylum from countries on arrival at their borders or 
in transit zones. However, this right to seek asylum does not correspond to a guarantee or an 
international law obligation to be granted asylum from the State where asylum is sought.40 
Sovereign States are also not obliged under international law to admit the individual to their 
territories and to grant the individual refugee status, which is different and to be distinguished from 
the requirement to grant the individual access to territory and to asylum procedures.41  
International law requires sovereign States, at a minimum, to comply with relevant international 
human rights law such as providing the claimant with fair and efficient access to asylum 
procedures and to the State’s territory.42 This means having access to minimum procedural 
standards that would guarantee ‘fairness’ for the individual asylum claimant and refugee.43 
Examples of procedural fairness include having access to legal counsel without cost, access to an 
interpreter in a language spoken by the claimant, timely access to reasons for rejected decisions, 
the right to be heard in both oral and written formats, and non-removal from the territory of the 
 
38 UDHR supra note 17 at art 14.   
39 Ibid at art 14(1).  
40 Guy S Goodwin-Gill, “The Dynamic of International Refugee Law” (2014) 25:4 International Journal of Refugee 
Law 651-666 at 654.  
41 Ibid; While States are not obliged under international law to grant refugee status to the asylum claimant, they are, 
at the minimum, bound by international human rights law to grant asylum claimants with access to asylum procedures 
and to territory for the purpose of seeking asylum. The distinction is between the actual granting of asylum per State 
discretion and internal law, and the opportunity to seek asylum which is a right of the claimant.  
42 This is the position of the UNHCR, see: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Fair and Efficient 
Asylum Procedures: A Non-Exhaustive Overview of Applicable International Standards”, 2 September 2005, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/432ae9204.html [Fair and Efficient Access].  
43 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Procedural Guarantees”, https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/content/procedural-guarantees_en.  
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asylum State pending the outcome of asylum decision or on appeal.44 The duty of Member States 
to provide access to territory means that individuals seeking asylum must be provided with access 
to, at a minimum: a common registration system, reunification with family members, accelerated 
and simplified procedures for asylum determination, a common approach to unaccompanied and 
separated children, and an efficient system for voluntary return.45 However, the duty of Member 
States to provide asylum claimants with access to their territories does not mean a requirement to 
admit these individuals to their territories, since only citizens have the right to freedom of 
movement within their territories under international law.46  
While the terms ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum claimant’ are two separate categories under international 
law, for the purpose of this thesis, the distinction is not material. Therefore, both terms are used in 
this thesis, as well as the term ‘claimant’, to indicate individuals who are the focus of attention for 
the application of the non-refoulement norm. The distinction between ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum 
seeker’ is not significant in this thesis because both refugees and asylum seekers are the subject of 
the non-refoulement norm: under international and EU regional law, neither category of individual 
may be returned to a situation in which they are at risk of serious human rights violations.  
 
44 See, generally: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Procedural Safeguards for Refugee Status 
Determination under UNHCR’s Mandate”, https://www.unhcr.org/4317223c9.pdf.   
45 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Better Protecting Refugees in the EU and Globally”, December 
2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/114503/unhcr-better-protect.pdf at 3; The right of family reunification 
is guaranteed in the EU under the EU Charter, see: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 
C326/391, 26 October 2012 at art 7 [EU Charter], which provides for ‘respect for private and family life’.   
46 Note, however, that the opposite is true for those granted with refugee status, namely, that refugees are granted the 
freedom of movement within the territory of the State where asylum is granted, see: Refugee Convention supra note 
7 at art 26: ‘Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of 
residence and to move freely within its territory, subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same 
circumstances’. 
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As mentioned, the cardinal principle of non-refoulement protects both asylum claimants and 
refugees alike.47 While this concept is explored in detail in Chapter Two, it is important to note 
that the principle is codified under Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention, which provides that: 
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.48 
The right to seek asylum has little meaning without corresponding protection from refoulement 
because the individual being granted asylum could, without non-refoulement protection, be 
forcibly returned to face persecution or ill-treatment.49 As commentators have observed: ‘the right 
to seek asylum guarantees the right to life, liberty and security of an asylum seeker in an absolute 
way by allowing them to remain, not expelling them, or restricting their liberty. This defines the 
principle of non-refoulement’.50  
The principle of non-refoulement is widely held to have risen to the level of customary 
international law.51 The principle may be violated directly or indirectly. It is violated directly when 
States return, send back, or deport an asylum claimant or refugee to his or her country of origin or 
a third country where there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the asylum claimant or refugee may 
 
47 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Note on Migration and the Principle of Non-Refoulement” (2018) 
International Review of the Red Cross 1-13 at para 1. 
48 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 33(1).  
49 See, for example: Selin Esen, “The Principle of Non-Refoulement as a Constitutional Right of Asylum Seekers in 
Turkey”, 26 July 2016, https://verfassungsblog.de/the-principle-of-non-refoulement-as-a-constitutional-eight-of-
asylum-seekers-in-turkey.  
50 Ibid. 
51 This is the view of the UNHCR, see: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Note on Non-
Refoulement”, November 1997, https://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html [UNHCR NR Note]. 
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face persecution, the death penalty, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.52  
The principle can also be violated indirectly. In the context of the EU, the principle is violated 
indirectly when Member States send the claimant or refugee back to the Member State deemed 
responsible for the processing of the asylum application, where the sending Member State knows 
or ought to know of the deficient asylum system in the receiving EU State, which is likely to then 
lead to refoulement from that receiving State to the claimant’s country of origin (also called onward 
refoulement).53 Indirect refoulement may also occur with the use of third country agreements in 
the context of the EU, in cases where EU Member States return claimants by agreement to third 
countries deemed ‘safe’ without first ensuring that these individuals would, in practice, be able to 
access international protection in those third countries or be subjected to onward refoulement.54 
The principle of non-refoulement is considered essential to safeguarding the human rights of 
asylum claimants and refugees, and results in a positive duty on States.  
1.2 Methodology 
The aims of this thesis are three-fold. First, this thesis aims to demonstrate that the international 
and legal principle of non-refoulement is robust and relatively far-reaching. It is this version of the 
principle that States, including the Member States of the EU, profess to respect. The second aim 
of this thesis is to demonstrate that there is a gap between the principle of non-refoulement as set 
out under international and regional law and the actual practice within the EU, and that this gap 
can be explained through the theory of containment. EU Member States have imposed, on top of 
the humanitarian aims of a fair and efficient common asylum system, goals of controlling and 
containing migrant movement toward and within the EU. This is demonstrated through an analysis 
 
52 Ibid at D.  
53 Moira Sy, “UNHCR and Preventing Indirect Refoulement in Europe” (2015) 27:3 International Journal of Refugee 
Law, 457 at 478 [Moira Sy]. 
54 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Scope of the Principle of Non-Refoulement in Contemporary 
Border Management: Evolving Areas of Law” at 36 [FRA NR Report]. 
14 
 
of a number of EU policies, and of domestic practice by the United Kingdom and Germany. The 
third aim of this thesis is, therefore, to propose ways to reduce the gap between the law and practice 
of non-refoulement to strengthen respect for the principle. In order to achieve these aims, this thesis 
adopts the central methodology of legal doctrinal analysis, supplemented and informed by 
containment theory (from the field of geography and its subfield of migration studies), and aspects 
of the comparative approach. 
The primary methodology used in this thesis is legal doctrinal analysis. This form of analysis is 
used to consider the content and breadth of the international refugee and human rights law principle 
of non-refoulement, and how that norm is implemented and practiced at the international, regional 
(EU) and domestic (UK55 and Germany) levels. Legal doctrinal analysis provides the means to 
identify the contours of the law on non-refoulement and contrast the legal norm with its actual 
application. 
Legal doctrinal research is defined as ‘research which provides a systematic exposition of the rules 
governing a particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas of 
difficulty and, perhaps, predicts future developments’.56 It has also been described as ‘research 
that is directed at the construction of legal doctrine in a particular legal system’.57 It involves a 
‘critical analysis and synthesis of the law’.58 This form of research is ‘the dominant legal method’ 
employed in common law countries.59 The main purpose of legal doctrinal research is ‘to provide 
explicit normative comment (‘how things should be’)’ for the purposes of devising ‘needed 
 
55 The issue of the status of the UK as having exited the EU in 2020 is addressed below. 
56 David Weisbrot, Australian Lawyers (Longman Cheshire, 1999) at chapter 5; See, also: Terry Hutchinson and Nigel 
Duncan, “Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrine Legal Research” (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 83-119 
at 101.  
57 Theunis Robert Roux, “The Incorporation Problem in Interdisciplinary Legal Research” (2015) Erasmus Law 
Review 55-64 at 55. 
58 Terry Hutchinson, “The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law” (2015) 
8(3) Erasmus Law Review 130 at 130 [Hutchinson]. 
59 Ibid at 131. 
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proposals for improvement’.60 The conceptual and analytical tools used in legal doctrinal analysis 
are textual analysis, practical argumentation, and principled or structured reasoning and 
interpretation.61 In using these tools, legal doctrinal scholarship ‘does not treat the law as the mere 
object of scholarly reflection: the normative content of the law also provides the conceptual 
framework that one must rely on to make sense of the legal practice’.62 This insight propels this 
thesis: the normative content of non-refoulement provides, it is argued, the conceptual framework 
against which the actual practice of EU Member States is assessed and found wanting. This is why 
the thesis ends by proposing reforms, so as to propose how asylum law practice can ‘act and reason 
without subverting its integrity’63 with respect to the conceptual framework of non-refoulement. 
The focus of legal doctrinal analysis within the field of public international law (within which 
international refugee and human rights law fall) is on primary sources64 such as treaties, customary 
international law, and general principles of law, with secondary sources as ‘subsidiary means’ for 
the determination of rules of law.65 In this thesis, the key primary sources examined are 
 
60 Andria Naude Fourie, “Expounding the Place of Legal doctrinal Methods in Legal-Interdisciplinary Research” 
(2015) Erasmus Law Review 95-110 at 96 [Fourie], citing J. Vranken, ‘Exciting Times for Legal Scholarship’, 2 Recht 
en Methode in Onderzoek en Onderwijs 42 at 43 (2012). 
61 Ibid at 43-44 (2012); See also: Matyas Bodig, “Legal Doctrinal Scholarship and Interdisciplinary Engagement” 
(2015) Erasmus Law Review 43-54 at 46 [Bodig]; On the role of interpretation, see Rene Brouwer, “The Study of Law 
as an Academic Discipline” (2017) 13(3) Utrecht Law Review 41-48 at 45. 
62 Bodig supra note 61 at 46. 
63 Bodig supra note 61 at 47. 
64 Koskenniemi outlines the challenges inherent in the methodology of analyzing these primary sources, such as 
customary international law: Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Methodology of International Law’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law at paras 7-13. 
65 The classic definition of sources of international law is found in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, 33 UNTS 993, 18 April 1946: ‘The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. […]  judicial 
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international treaties; international, regional and domestic court judgments; and European and 
domestic legislation. The main international treaties that this thesis examines include the Refugee 
Convention, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CAT),66 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).67 
The main judgments that are examined are from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). This thesis also considers the concluding observations 
from the Committee Against Torture and the Human Rights Committee, both United Nations treaty 
bodies.68 However, its analysis goes further: as Fourie notes, public international law norms are 
also evident in more ‘atypical’ secondary forms, such as written reports, organizational documents, 
State and other explanations, protocols, and papers.69 Therefore, this thesis also analyzes ‘soft law’ 
documents that explain, scrutinize and contextualize the primary documents, to enhance the 
analysis of primary sources.70 The main ‘soft law’ instruments that this thesis examines include 
 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.’ 
66 CAT supra note 9. 
67 ICCPR supra note 22. 
68 While these are not judgments per se, as they are non-binding on States, they are considered to be highly influential 
and States do act on these recommendations, see, for example: Cathryn Costello, “Hard Protection through Soft 
Courts? Non-Refoulement before the United Nations Treaty Bodies” (2020) 21(3) German Law Journal 355-384 at 
358, which states: ‘UNTBs [United Nations Treaty Bodies] act both as norm consolidators and gents of fragmentation 
in the interpretation of non-refoulement, in particular for the European compliance constituents […] UNTBs as soft 
courts are largely complementary to the ECtHR, yet, they also offer alternative forms of accountability in some 
respects than the ECtHR’ [Costello GLJ NR]. 
69 Fourie supra note 60 at 97, citing J. Vranken, ‘Exciting Times for Legal Scholarship’, 2 Recht en Methode in 
Onderzoek en Onderwijs 42, at 43 (2012). 
70 ‘Soft law’ instruments refer to instruments that provide important and persuasive interpretations to international  
treaties; See, for example: John H Currie, Joanna Harrington, Craig Forcese, Valerie Oosterveld (eds) International 
Law: Doctrine, Practice, and Theory (Irwin Law, 2014) at 151: ‘which refers to principles of a political, practical, 
humanitarian, or moral nature that can influence state behaviour, but that do not, strictly speaking, correspond to extant 
legal obligations or rights. The use of soft law at the international level is similar to the use by domestic courts of non-
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UNHCR guidance instruments.71 Additionally, the thesis explores other secondary sources - such 
as books and articles by well-respected international refugee law scholars, and literature from 
reputable nongovernmental organizations such as the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch - that consider, evaluate and interpret the primary 
sources. The aim of this part of the doctrinal analysis is to reinforce, or question, the interpretations 
stemming from the inquiry into primary sources. 
In studying these sources of law, legal scholars examine ‘how the elements of the law fit together 
in their respective fields’, assess ‘whether current developments can be reconciled with the given 
normative structures of law’, and propose how to ‘reorder and ‘remap’ the doctrinal structures of 
law’ in light of ‘major legislative reforms or groundbreaking judicial decisions’.72 Legal doctrinal 
scholarship also addresses ‘contested matters on the exact normative scope of legal materials’,73 
which is the focus of part of this thesis in its analysis of the scope of the principle of non-
refoulement. Additionally, the legal doctrinal method covers engagement ‘with issues of 
institutional design’, including policy content as it relates to law,74 which is the focus of the latter 
part of this thesis in identifying approaches to lessen the gap between the law and actual State 
practice regarding non-refoulement. As noted by Bodig, ‘these activities can be usefully 
understood as manifestations of the epistemological profile of a distinctive disciplinary 
perspective’.75 
 
legally binding materials, such as policy statements, guidelines, manuals, and handbooks, to guide the exercise of 
statutory discretion’ [Currie et al]. 
71 See, for example: UNHCR NR Note supra note 51.  
72 Bodig supra note 61 at 45.  
73 Bodig supra note 61 at 46. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
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As Hutchinson indicates, ‘legal academics are increasingly infusing evidence (and methods) from 
other disciplines into their reasoning to bolster their reform recommendations’.76 This 
interdisciplinary use of approaches helps to better inform law. Henrard observes that the ‘recurring 
criticisms of decisions by public authorities and (international) courts that affect fundamental 
rights of minorities [including asylum seekers], as failing to do justice to the complexities involved 
and the related multitude of relevant interests, point to the limits of pure legal doctrine in this 
respect’.77 In other words, when conducting legal doctrinal research, considering non-legal 
research can ‘improve the identification and weighing of all relevant interests for the analysis of 
minorities’ rights’.78 This is particularly important when international law itself does not itself 
possess the explanation for action or inaction, as other disciplines can help to ‘fill in’ the gap in 
understanding.79 It is for this reason that this thesis examines, in Chapter Four, the theory of 
containment, which stems from the field of geography, including its sub-field of migration studies. 
As explained in that chapter, containment theory, as expressed in the fields of spatial and human 
geography, suggests that migrants are kept on the move and that migratory movements are 
contained. The field of migration studies adds to this approach by examining the movement of 
people, including the study of both mobility and immobility. These approaches are 
complementary, and assist, in the context of this thesis, in explaining why there is such significant 
discontinuity between the positive law on non-refoulement and the practice of that law by EU 
Member States. Containment theory thus serves as an explanatory theory for international refugee 
law. In referring to containment theory, this thesis applies a non-legal theory to doctrinal research 
 
76 Hutchinson supra note 58 at 130. 
77 Kristin Henrard, “Exploring the Potential (Contribution) of Multi-Disciplinary Legal Research for the Analyssi of 
Minorities’ Rights” (2015) Erasmus Law Review 111-122 at 111 [Henrard]. 
78 Ibid.  
79 Henrard states: ‘Multi-disciplinary legal research investigates the extent to which non-legal disciplines can function 
as auxiliary disciplines to guide the interpretation of the legal norms and thus ‘fill in’ the legal framework’: Henrard 
supra note 77 at 112-113, citing S Taekema and B Van Klink, ‘On the Border: Limits and Possibilities of 
Interdisciplinary Research’ in B Van Klink and S Taekema (eds.) Law and Method; Mohr Siebeck (2011) at 11. 
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in a manner which ‘necessarily occurs on law’s terms’.80 In this manner, the containment theory 
is used to explain a doctrinal dissonance, in order to promote the ‘coherent and socially efficacious 
development of the law’.81 
Aspects of the comparative legal approach also inform this thesis to an extent, though this is not a 
comparativist thesis. Comparative law methodology is described as having the aim ‘to understand 
the legal rules and patterns of order that drive a given society’.82 The comparative law methodology 
involves certain rules, namely: considering underlying concepts, beliefs and reasons that underlie 
the law and that helps drive and structure law; comparing the law of one country against that of 
another country with the aim of considering the similarities and differences; and understanding the 
forces that lie beneath the surface of the law.83 While this thesis does not fully pursue or fulfill 
these three rules, it does compare the similarities and differences between the international refugee 
law regime, the European law regime and two domestic regimes (the UK and Germany) related to 
the principle of non-refoulement. It does so in order to identify overlaps and differences within the 
three levels of legal interpretation of the norm. These overlaps show where there is agreement on 
the interpretation of the norm, while the differences tend to demonstrate deviance from the norm 
in actual practice. 
In order to undertake these comparisons, this thesis confronts three main issues in order to situate 
international law on non-refoulement in relation to EU law. First, this thesis considers the 
autonomy of the EU legal system relative to the international law system. Here, ‘autonomy of EU 
law’ means the doctrine of EU primacy - the idea that the EU legal order is sui generis and 
 
80 Roux supra note 57 at 59.  
81 Ibid. 
82 Edward J Eberle, “The Methodology of Comparative Law” (2011) 16:51 Roger Williams University Law Review at 
58. 
83 Ibid at 60-61, 63.  
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autonomous.84 Second, it explains the constitutionality of the EU legal system, so that the area of 
shared competence between the EU and Member States in the ‘Area of Freedom, Security, and 
Justice’ concerning asylum law is examined.85 Third, this thesis explores the centrality of 
fundamental rights - in this case, non-refoulement - within the operation of individual Member 
States’ legal systems. It is important to discuss these three issues together because they are central 
to analyzing the relationship between international and European law, which is important to 
ascertain in order to understand how the two legal regimes mutually influence one another.   
This thesis examines international and regional treaty-monitoring bodies and their decisions on the 
principle of non-refoulement. In particular, this thesis examines the observations of international 
treaty-monitoring bodies such as the Committee Against Torture and the Human Rights 
Committee and considers whether their approaches are reflected in regional decisions. The 
Committee Against Torture issues ‘concluding observations’, which are recommendations to 
States Parties of the CAT.86 The Human Rights Committee issues ‘individual communications’ 
 
84 The principle of primacy of EU law is an essential feature of the EU legal order - rules of national law, even of a 
constitutional order, cannot be allowed to undermine the effectiveness of EU law on the territory of that Member State, 
see: European Asylum Support Office, “An Introduction to the Common European Asylum System for Courts and 
Tribunals: A Judicial Analysis”, August 2016 at 77-78 [EASO CEAS Handbook]. 
85 European Commission, “FAQ on the EU Competences and the European Commission Powers”, which states: 
‘‘Shared competence’ means that both the EU and its member states may adopt legally binding acts in the area 
concerned. However, the member states can do so only where the EU has not exercised its competence or has explicitly 
ceased to do so’; See, also: TFEU supra note 18 at art 4(2)(j).  
86 United Nations, Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Human Rights Treaty Bodies – Individual 
Communications”, which states: ‘the Committee’s decision represents an authoritative interpretation of the treaty 
concerned. They contain recommendations to the State party’, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/tbpetitions/Pages/IndividualCommunications.aspx; See, also: United Nations, 
Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No 3: The Obligations of States Parties under the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, 5 November 2008 , UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/33 at para 11: 
‘While the function of the Human Rights Committee in considering individual communications is not, as such, that 
of a judicial body, the views issued by the Committee under the Optional Protocol exhibit some important 
characteristics of a judicial decision. They are arrived at in a judicial spirit, including the impartiality and independence 
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that are persuasive but non-legally binding to States Parties of the ICCPR and also issues 
‘concluding observations’ after examining the compliance of each States Party with the ICCPR.87 
The regional treaty-monitoring bodies that are scrutinized in this thesis include the ECtHR and the 
CJEU, both European regional courts. These regional courts were selected for comparison because 
they issue binding decisions on Council of Europe Member States (for the ECtHR) and EU 
Member States (for the CJEU). The ECtHR monitors the interpretation and implementation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) obligations among Council of Europe Member 
States, while the CJEU monitors the interpretation and implementation of EU law obligations 
among EU Member States.88 Both sets of States are obligated to respect the norm of non-
refoulement.89  
This thesis also studies how the UK’s common law system addresses non-refoulement and 
compares it to how the German civil law system does the same. A comparison of both systems 
reveals similarities and differences in the interpretation and implementation of international and 
EU law on non-refoulement within these legal systems. In comparing the two systems, this thesis 
considers a monist legal tradition (Germany) and a dualist legal tradition (the UK).90 Monist 
systems are those in which the State incorporates international law obligations automatically 
within its domestic legislation without requiring any legislative amendment process.91 In dualist 
 
of Committee members, the considered interpretation of the language of the Covenant, and the determinative character 
of the decisions’. 
87 Ibid.  
88 Council of Europe Member States consist of the 28 EU Member States and 19 other States, see: Council of Europe, 
“47 Member States”, https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/47-members-states.  
89 See, for example: TFEU supra note 18 at art 78.  
90 It has been suggested by academic commentators that the German constitution, the Basic Law, is neither monist or 
dualist, but that it has obvious features towards monism. However, the German Federal Constitutional Court has 
shown some tendencies towards the dualist model, see: Daniel Lovric, “A Constitution Friendly to International Law: 
Germany and its Volkerrechtfreundlichkeit” (2006) 25 Australian Yearbook of International Law at 75.  
91 Madeline Chiam, “Monism and Dualism in International Law”, 27 June 2018, 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0168.xml.   
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systems, the State does not automatically incorporate international law obligations within the 
domestic legislation.92 Rather, the State must undertake a legislative amendment process to 
incorporate its international law obligations into domestic law.93 The UK and Germany were 
selected as case studies because they are among the countries that received, and continue to 
receive, the highest numbers of asylum applications in the region.94 Both the UK and Germany 
have ratified the CAT and the ICCPR.95 Under both treaties, non-refoulement protection appears 
as the prohibition against torture and the right to life.96  
For the chapter on the UK, the jurisprudence is drawn mainly from the Immigration Tribunals, 
namely the First Tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) as 
well as the UK Supreme Court. The First Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum) is responsible 
for handling appeals against some decisions made by the Home Office relating to permission to 
stay in the UK, deportation from the UK, and entry clearance to the UK.97 The Upper Tribunal 
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) is responsible for handling appeals against decisions made 
by the First-Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum) relating to visa applications, asylum 
 
92 Ibid.  
93 Ibid.  
94 As explained in Chapter Five, while the UK exited the EU on January 31, 2020 and is no longer officially a part of 
the EU, it is currently in a transition period until December 31, 2020, during which time the CEAS rules and Dublin 
transfers still apply. Until it left the EU, the UK was one of the top six recipients of asylum applicants in the EU. 
95 United Nations Treaty Collection, “Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment”, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en;  
United Nations Treaty Collection, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND [UNTC]. 
96 CAT supra note 9 at art 3; ICCPR supra note 22 at arts 6 and 7.  
97 UK Home Office, Visas and Immigration, “First-Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum): What We Do”, 
https://www.gov.uk/courts-tribunals/first-tier-tribunal-immigration-and-asylum.  
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applications, and the right to enter or stay in the UK.98 The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and 
Asylum Chamber) is also responsible for handling applications for judicial review of certain 
decisions made by the Home Office as they relate to immigration, asylum and human rights 
claims.99 The UK chapter also refers to ‘soft law’ guidance instruments for asylum officers issued 
by the UK Home Office, Visas and Immigration division to make decisions on asylum 
applications.100 
For the chapter on Germany, the jurisprudence is drawn mainly from the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (BverG) (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany) and the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BverWG) (Federal Administrative Court of Germany). The ‘soft law’ 
guidance instruments that are used include publications issued by the Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees of Germany (BAMF) and nongovernmental organizations such as Pro Asyl. Also, 
given the lack of access to English translations of German case law, some German case law is 
supplemented by English summaries of the same cases published by the European Database of 
Asylum Law, an online database containing case law from 17 EU Member States interpreting 
refugee and asylum law.101 This database is a reputable database compiled by the European 
Council on Refugees and Exiles, an alliance of 101 nongovernmental organizations across 41 
European countries working to enhance protection and advance the rights of asylum claimants and 
refugees in the EU.102 The database is used by decision-makers at all levels, policy makers, 
nongovernmental organizations, legal practitioners and employees of relevant Member States, 
 
98 UK Home Office, Visas and Immigration, “Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)”, 
https://www.gov.uk/courts-tribunals/upper-tribunal-immigration-and-asylum-chamber.  
99 Ibid.   
100 UK Home Office, Visas and Immigration, “Asylum Decision Making Guidance (Asylum Instructions)”, 11 June 
2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/asylum-decision-making-guidance-asylum-instructions.   
101 European Database of Asylum Law, “About EDAL European Database of Asylum Law”, 
http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/about-edal-european-database-asylum-law [EDAL]. 
102 European Council on Refugees & Exiles, “Our Work”, https://www.ecre.org/our-work.  
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European and international bodies and agencies.103 National experts are recruited in each Member 
State to select appropriate cases, summarize, and upload them onto the database.104 National 
experts are selected for their in-depth knowledge of national jurisprudence, laws and procedures 
of their respective countries and general familiarity with EU asylum law and jurisprudence.105   
In sum, the central methodology used in this thesis is legal doctrinal analysis. It is the main 
methodology used in the legal academic field, and is well-accepted as a valid form of inquiry and 
exploration. This methodology is supplemented by reference to containment theory, which stems 
from the field of geography and its sub-field migration studies. Containment theory is used as an 
explanatory theory in order to situate the practice of EU Member States with respect to transfers 
to EU or third party States and other means of moving and controlling migrants within the EU. 
Finally, aspects of the comparative legal approach are drawn upon in the consideration of the 
international, regional and domestic interpretations of the principle of non-refoulement, though the 
thesis does not follow a full-fledged comparativist methodology.   
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured so as to present building blocks of the overall thesis statement described 
above. While each chapter examines a discrete issue, it also serves a larger role: providing the 
underlying legal analysis required in order to consider the dissonance between the legal 
understanding of non-refoulement and the actual application of that principle within asylum 
systems. This section summarizes the approach of each chapter, in order to illustrate the interlinked 
nature of the thesis structure.  
Chapter Two introduces the international and regional EU law framework on non-refoulement. It 
begins with the drafting history of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention on non-
refoulement protection, as well as the inclusion of a related provision in the ICCPR and the CAT. 
It explains the subsequent dual life of the non-refoulement norm, existing simultaneously in 
 
103 EDAL supra note 101.  
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
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international refugee law and international human rights law. While the norm co-exists in both 
areas of law, its contours are different within each. For example, in refugee law, non-refoulement 
protection is provided to asylum claimants and refugees, while in human rights law, its scope is 
widened to include protection from torture for everyone. Under refugee law, the principle of non-
refoulement is not guaranteed to everyone without limits: those who have been deemed to be a 
danger to the community of the country of refuge are excluded from its reach. However, this 
exception does not exist in international human rights law, as the prohibition against torture 
protects everyone regardless of their legal or political status. As well, within both international 
refugee and human rights law, the principle applies both territorially as well as outside of the 
territories of a State, including over persons or areas where the State can exercise its effective 
authority and control. This chapter also explains the codification of non-refoulement under the 
ECHR, the EU Charter, the Dublin III Regulation, and key directives. The law on non-refoulement 
within Europe is quite robust, reflecting the simultaneous application of both the international 
refugee law and international human rights law approaches. Additionally, non-refoulement 
protection under the ECHR has expanded to be applicable outside of a State’s territory, including 
on the high seas, as well as in situations involving risk of harm to health. That said, the actual 
practice with respect to this norm has been constrained and contained. This is explored further in 
Chapters Three and Four. 
Chapter Three explains in more detail the EU law applicable to the principle of non-refoulement, 
including in treaties and other binding documents. The ECtHR and the CJEU have interpreted and 
applied the prohibition against refoulement, resulting in somewhat disparate case law. The 
legislative and jurisprudential picture that emerges shows that non-refoulement is a fundamental 
and widely protective norm under European law. However, this chapter also demonstrates that the 
actual practice of some EU Member States has been to adopt a narrower understanding of non-
refoulement, one that is limited through domestic interpretation as a result of the ‘margin of 
discretion’ allowed to Member States when transposing directives, and limited through the 
presumption of mutual trust when transferring asylum claimants to other EU Member States.  
Chapter Four describes the theory of containment, derived from the fields of human and spatial 
geography and migration studies. Containment policies seek to control, divide, and discipline 
‘unruly’ migration (as perceived by States). While rarely applied within public international law 
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and specifically international refugee law, the theory of containment holds particular significance 
as an explanatory theory for these fields. The theory suggests that policies of containment are 
methods used by EU Member States to circumvent their international refugee law and human 
rights law obligations, including non-refoulement. Containment theory provides a rationale for the 
differences between the fulsome statements of non-refoulement law in, for example, treaties and 
the actual constricted interpretation and application of that law through EU policies such as Dublin 
transfers, ‘safe’ third country agreements, the interception of asylum seekers prior to reaching 
Europe, migrant tracking, narrow interpretations of the Refugee Convention, and deterrence 
policies.  
Chapter Five on the UK examines the domestic law and procedures for claiming asylum in the 
UK, how international protection is granted or withdrawn from these claimants, and the points in 
the system during which the possibilities of refoulement are considered. It also explores how the 
principle of non-refoulement has been interpreted in the UK in a restrictive manner, particularly 
with respect to the presumption of mutual trust among EU Member States and the burden placed 
on the claimant to rebut that presumption.  
Chapter Six on Germany describes domestic German refugee law, including on non-refoulement, 
and the procedures for claiming asylum in Germany. While German legislation appears to adopt a 
more liberal reading of non-refoulement than the UK (in line with international law), the mixed 
jurisprudence suggests that the application of non-refoulement requires refinement and 
modification for a more consistent approach to interpreting the norm. The final part of this chapter 
reviews evidence of containment theory at work in Germany, including Germany’s interpretation 
of the presumption of mutual trust in Dublin transfers.  
Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter. It reiterates the centrality of non-refoulement as a cardinal 
principle of refugee protection. It begins with a focus on the domestic level, comparing the UK 
and Germany’s practices on non-refoulement, particularly with respect to ‘safe’ third country 
concepts and Dublin transfers. It then considers recommended changes at the regional level that 
would help to align the expansive norm on non-refoulement with the actual application of the 
principle at the domestic and regional levels. This thesis therefore proposes four main ways to 
address and to counteract containment policies in order to strengthen the implementation of the 
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non-refoulement norm: strengthening procedural guarantees in order to ensure access to asylum 
justice; reshaping the determination of mutual trust; re-evaluating the use of diplomatic assurances 
in transfer cases; and the implementation of periodic review coupled with a judicial review 
mechanism. 
In total, this thesis involves a ‘critical analysis and synthesis of the law’ of non-refoulement, which 
is in line with the aims of legal doctrinal analysis.106 In particular, it considers the contours and 
substance of the legal understanding of non-refoulement, compares and contrasts this 
understanding with the actual practice within the EU, and engages ‘with issues of institutional 
design’107 to identify approaches to lessen the gap between the law and actual State practice 
regarding the principle. 
1.4 Contributions to Existing Literature and Limitations 
Despite scholarly work on non-refoulement, including the well-known study by Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem,108 there is recognition that the evolution or actual procedural application of this 
principle is undertheorized.109 This is particularly the case with regional analysis: while the 
 
106 Hutchinson supra note 58 at 130. 
107 Bodig supra note 61 at 46. 
108 Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Behlehem, “The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: 
Opinion” in Erika Feller, Volker Turk and Frances Nicholson (eds) Refugee Protection in International Law: 
UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
[Lauterpacht]; See also: Kees (Cornelis) Wouters, “International Legal Standards for the Protection from 
Refoulement” (Leiden: Intersentia, 2009) [Wouters]; Fanny De Weck, Non-Refoulement under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the UN Convention Against Torture: The Assessment of Individual Complaints by 
the European Court of Human Rights under Article 3 ECHR and the United Nations Committee Against Torture under 
Article 3 CAT (Netherlands: Brill Nijhoff, 2017); Eman Hamdan, The Principle of Non-Refoulement under the ECHR 
and the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(Netherlands: Brill Nijhoff, 2016).  
109 See, for example: Vijay Padmanabhan, “To Transfer or Not to Transfer: Identifying and Protecting Human Rights 
Interests in Non-Refoulement” (2011) 80(1) Fordham Law Review 73-123 at 80. 
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international law history and content of non-refoulement has received some attention in scholarly 
literature, the principle as interpreted at a regional level has received less focused attention.110 This 
thesis aims to contribute to the literature by analyzing the legal norm of non-refoulement as 
constructed internationally, regionally and at the domestic level in two European countries (one - 
the UK - now in the process of being separated from the EU system). In doing so, it examines the 
procedural infrastructure supporting (or not) the legal norm, an area Ramji-Nogales has identified 
as underdeveloped.111  
This thesis also adds to existing international law literature by applying the theory of containment 
from the field of spatial and human geography and the sub-field of migration studies to 
international law. This is rarely done in the spheres of public international law and international 
refugee law,112 and this thesis argues that there is value in doing so. The application of the theory 
of containment to non-refoulement enhances existing literature for its explanatory power: it helps 
to explain the underlying reasons for EU Member States’ non-compliance with non-refoulement.  
 
110 This is not to say that the principle has not received focus: indeed, there is literature on non-refoulement in Europe, 
especially around the pushback and other regimes implemented at Europe’s Mediterranean Sea borders, see, for 
example: Jenny Poon, “Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement: Triggering the Prohibition on the High Seas” 
(2020) 4 Refugee Review, 114-128. Rather, the larger picture of the contours and content of non-refoulement as a legal 
norm has received less academic attention. However, the principle has been discussed in detail by European Union 
agencies, see, for example: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Scope of the principle of non-
refoulement in contemporary border management: evolving areas of law”, 
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2016-scope-non-refoulement-0_en.pdf; See, also: European 
Asylum Support Office, “Judicial Analysis: Asylum Procedures and the Principle of Non-Refoulement”, 
https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/asylum-procedures-ja_en.pdf; For nongovernmental organizations, 
see:  Jenny Poon, “Non-Refoulement Obligations in EU Third Country Agreements”, 28 March 2018, 
https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/journal/non-refoulement-obligations-eu-third-country-agreements.  
111 Ramji-Nogales argues that the legal principle itself is relatively well-developed, but the procedural infrastructure 
in which it sits is very underdeveloped: Jaya Ramji-Nogales, “Migration Emergencies” (2017) 68 Hastings Law 
Journal 609-656 at 633.  
112 Few legal scholars have applied the theory in their legal analysis. For an example of where this has been done, see, 
for example: Cathryn Costello, “Overcoming Refugee Containment and Crisis” (2020) 21 German Law Journal, 17-
22 at 17 [Costello Containment].  
29 
 
This thesis also contributes a study of how two domestic systems - those of the UK and Germany 
- apply the principle of non-refoulement. Analysis of the principle of non-refoulement in the 
current literature does not generally involve a study focusing on specific EU Member States’ 
interpretation and implementation of the principle of non-refoulement in their domestic legal 
systems. This type of domestic analysis of the UK and Germany together has not been done before. 
The UK was selected as a case study example for several reasons. First, it receives a substantial 
number of asylum claims each year, and is within the top five States within Europe in this 
respect.113 Second, UK case law on non-refoulement is considered influential in the EU asylum 
law context.114 Further, the UK has opted into the Dublin III Regulation and Phase I of the CEAS. 
This means that the UK’s actions regarding its interpretation and application of domestic law can 
be used to illustrate compliance with non-refoulement at the domestic level. When this thesis was 
begun, in 2015, the UK was solidly a part of the EU. The UK exited the EU as of January 31, 2020. 
While this change in status is important, it is not determinative in terms of evaluating the UK’s 
practice in terms of non-refoulement, for three reasons: first, the UK is in a transition period until 
December 31, 2020, during which time the CEAS rules and inter-EU transfers still apply.115 
Second, UK caselaw on non-refoulement will continue to influence the EU for years to come 
because the UK is still bound by the ECHR, under which many non-refoulement cases are 
 
113 According to EuroStat, in 2019, the UK ranked 5th out of all the countries in the EU as the top asylum application-
receiving country with 44,315 first-time applications being made in the UK. The number of asylum applications in 
the UK for that year is 6.7% of the total of all EU Member States (657,295), see: EuroStat, “Asylum and first time 
asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded)”, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/MIGR_ASYAPPCTZA [EuroStat 2019]. 
114 The importance of UK case law to EU refugee law is especially prevalent through the case law referral system of 
the ECtHR, see, for example: European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, ETS 5 (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) at 
art 32(1), which states: ‘The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34, 46 and 
47’ [ECHR]. 
115 Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European 
Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, at Article 32 and Chapter 6, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12019W/TXT(02)&from=EN.  
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litigated.116 Third, the lessons learned from the UK’s practices will remain relevant for some time, 
as they have similarities to the practices of a number of EU Member States. 
Germany was selected as a case study to compare with the UK as a civil law country and as the 
highest asylum application-receiving country within the EU.117 Germany, as the number one 
country in this regard, has opted into the Dublin III Regulation and the CEAS.118 This is important 
because the Dublin III Regulation details the criteria for determining responsibility for the 
processing of asylum applications among EU Member States.119 German practice, therefore, 
determines almost a quarter of all asylum claims made in the CEAS and therefore influences how 
asylum law is interpreted in the CEAS and the development of asylum policy. Germany is also 
 
116 The ECtHR, for example, maintains a dialogue with the UK national courts by first giving the national courts an 
opportunity to review the case in question prior to considering it, see, for example: Merris Amos, “The Dialogue 
Between United Kingdom Courts and the European Court of Human Rights” (2012) 61:3 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 557-584 at 560, which states: ‘The ECtHR’s openness to dialogue is also a strong part 
of its jurisprudence. When determining the interpretation and application of Convention rights, its subsidiary role has 
been expressed in a variety of ways. It has held on a number of occasions that the machinery of protection established 
by the Convention ‘is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights’ […] For example, 
inAvUK,19when considering if the UK derogation from Article5 to allow indefinite detention of terrorist suspects 
without charge, met the requirements of Article 15, the ECtHR stated that it should‘ in principle follow the judgment 
of the House of Lords on the question of the proportionality of the applicants’ detention, unless it can be shown that 
the national court misinterpreted the Convention or the Court’s case law or reached a conclusion which was manifestly 
unreasonable’. 
117 EuroStat 2019 supra note 113; Germany has the highest number of asylum applications received in 2019, with 
142,510 asylum applications, which is 21.7% of all of the asylum applications received in the EU.  
118 Asylum Information Database, “Country Report: Germany: 2018 Update”, 
https://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_de_2018update.pdf at 124, which states 
that the Dublin III Regulation is directly applicable on (and transposed) on 20 July 2013.  
119 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 3(2).  
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influential in EU asylum law and practice as the cases referred to the ECtHR, for example, often 
set precedent for other EU Member States to follow.120  
While this thesis arguably contributes to the international refugee law literature on non-
refoulement, at the same time, there are limitations to this thesis. The first limitation is the 
geographical scope of the thesis. This thesis deliberately focuses only on non-refoulement within 
the EU. The EU was chosen as it is a region which has been subjected to a significant and highly-
publicized strain on its asylum system due to pressures caused by the mass influx of asylum 
claimants, termed a ‘crisis’ in recent years.121 Given that other significant refugee-receiving 
countries also not on the direct periphery of refugee-producing states - such as Canada, the United 
States, and Australia - have not been subjected to the same numerical pressures over a relatively 
short period of time, the EU appeared to be an ideal focus allowing for a detailed inquiry of non-
refoulement. Therefore, this thesis does not consider serious non-refoulement concerns related to, 
for example, the Canada-United States Safe Third Country Agreement or offshore processing 
agreements between Australia and Nauru island.122 It also does not analyze in detail non-
 
120 ECtHR case law is binding upon EU Member States per Article 46(1) of the ECHR, which states: ‘The High 
Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties’; For a 
discussion of the distribution of jurisdiction (competencies) between Germany and the ECtHR, see, for example: 
Matthias Hartwig, “Much Ado About Human Rights: The Federal Constitutional Court Confronts the European Court  
of Human Rights” (2005) 6(5) German Law Journal 869-894 at 876; See, also: Dorothee Post and Arne Niemann, 
“The Europeanisation of German Asylum Policy and the “Germanisation” of European Asylum Policy: The Case of 
the “Safe Third Country” Concept”, Paper presented at the conference of the European Union Studies Association, 
May 2007 at 32, who claims that the EU ‘safe’ third country concept was exported from German law. 
121 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Refugee Crisis in Europe”, 
https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/refugee-crisis-in-europe, which states: ‘By the end of 2016, nearly 5.2 
million refugees and migrants reached European shores, undertaking treacherous journeys from Syria, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and other countries torn apart by war and persecution’.  
122 For an analysis of the Canada-United States Safe Third Country Agreement, see, for example: Audrey Macklin, 
“Citizenship, Non-Citizenship and the Rule of Law”, 69 University of New Brunswick Law Journal, 19-56; For an 
analysis of Australian Offshore Processing, see, for example: Jane McAdam, “Australia and Asylum Seekers” (2013) 
25(3) International Journal of Refugee Law 435-448; The concerns expressed in this thesis might also be applicable 
to these non-EU regions, and may form the focus of future research by the author. 
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refoulement issues arising from European practices outside of the EU region, such as the Italy-
Libya Memorandum of Understanding123 or the arrangement between the EU and Turkey in the 
EU-Turkey statement.124  
The second limitation is the temporal scope of the thesis. While Chapter Two of this thesis 
addresses the history of the adoption of the principle of non-refoulement within international law, 
for the most part, the thesis focuses on the position and understanding of the principle within the 
CEAS within a limited timeframe, spanning from the onset of the Syrian war (2011) to the time of 
writing (2015-20). This period was selected because it coincides with the mass influx of refugees 
through Mediterranean routes into the EU, and therefore with what has been termed a ‘refugee 
crisis’ or ‘migration crisis’ within the EU.125 This phenomenon prompted the increased use of 
 
123 This issue was further explored in: Jenny Poon, “Libya-EU Memorandum of Understanding: Implications for Non-
Refoulement and Compliance with International Human Rights Law?”, Cambridge Journal of International Law Blog, 
2 December 2017, http://cilj.co.uk/2017/12/02/libya-eu-memorandum-of-understanding-implications-for-non-
refoulement-and-compliance-with-international-human-rights-law; See, also: Jenny Poon, “Non-Refoulement 
Obligations in the EU-Turkey Deal and Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding”, International Law Blog, 20 
June 2019, https://internationallaw.blog/2019/06/20/non-refoulement-obligations-in-the-eu-turkey-deal-and-italy-
libya-memorandum-of-understanding. 
124 This issue was further explored in: Jenny Poon, “Non-Refoulement Obligations in Offshore Detention Facilities”, 
E-International Relations Blog, 16 October 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/10/16/non-refoulement-obligations-in-
offshore-detention-facilities. While this thesis does not specifically focus on the details of the EU-Turkey statement, 
it is mentioned in Chapter Four as it relates to containment policies.  
125 See, for example: Florian Trauner, “Asylum Policy: the EU’s ‘crises’ and the looming policy regime failure” (2016) 
38(3) 311-325 at 311; Collett and Le Coz at 4, also noting on the same page that some have critiqued the ‘crisis’ label, 
see, for example: Jane Freedman, “A Gendered Analysis of the European Refugee “Crisis”” in Cecilia Menji var, 
Marie Ruiz, Immanuel Ness (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Migration Crises (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 
705-720; Nick Perre, Myrthe De Vries, Hannah Richards, and Mariana Gkliati, “Refugee Crisis: Three Perspectives 
on the Makings of a Crisis”, 6 June 2018, https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2018/04/16/refugee-crisis-three-perspectives-on-
the-makings-of-a-crisis.  
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containment strategies within the EU, leading to increased questioning about the EU’s compliance 
with the principle of non-refoulement.126    
A further limitation of this thesis is the focus upon doctrinal analysis rather than empirical research 
with fieldwork data. As mentioned, this approach was chosen in order to pursue ‘critical analysis 
and synthesis of the law’.127 That said, the choice to focus on doctrinal analysis without fieldwork 
data means that this thesis does not overtly incorporate refugee voices, which can add an important 
dimension and perspective. However, insofar as organizations and other scholars have 
incorporated refugee perspectives in their analysis of non-refoulement risks, this thesis has taken 
them into account.128  
1.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has outlined the objectives, methodology, structure and limitations of this thesis. This 
thesis is meant to contribute to the understanding of non-refoulement internationally and within 
the EU by highlighting the gap between the statement of the law and the practice of that law and 
proposing ways to bridge that gap. The principle of non-refoulement is absolutely central to 
international refugee law. Described as the cornerstone of international refugee protection, access 
to asylum has little meaning without corresponding protection from refoulement. This centrality 
of the principle of non-refoulement requires that States do not send back claimants or refugees to 
 
126 See, for example: Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nikloas Feith Tan, “Beyond the deterrence paradigm in global 
refugee policy” (2016) 39(3) Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 637; Nikolas Feith Tan and Thomas Gammeltoft-
Hansen, “A Topographical Approach to Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Migration Control” (2020) 
21(3) German Law Journal, 335-354; Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and James C Hathaway, “Non-Refoulement in a 
World of Cooperative Deterrence” (2014) 53 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 235; Annick Pijnenburg, “From 
Italian Pushbacks to Libyan Pullbacks: Is Hirsi 2.0 in the Making in Strasbourg?” (2018) 20 European Journal of 
Migration and Law 396-426.  
127 Hutchinson supra note 58 at 130. 
128 See, for example, the volume on “Refugee Voices” published by Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees (2016) 
Volume 32 No 1; Leslie Groves, “Strengthening the voices of refugees in UNHCR planning” (2006) Forced Migration 
Review, 64-66. 
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frontiers of territories where they may face threats to life or freedom. This obligation is an active 
duty upon the Member State and incorporates the essence of international refugee law: to provide 
the widest protection available to those who deserve it. As well-respected international refugee 
law experts acknowledge, non-refoulement has shaped the current system of international 
protection by becoming the guiding principle for States to provide minimum protection for 
claimants.129 This bare minimum protection offered for claimants in the form of the prohibition 
against torture or the prevention of being sent back to face the death penalty or other gross, massive 
or flagrant violation of human rights can mean the difference between life and death for some. 
While international refugee law and European refugee law codifies the principle, practice from 
Member States has shown that the domestic interpretation and implementation of this norm is far 
from consistent. This thesis highlights the divergence between Member States and their courts in 
applying the principle of non-refoulement through case law. The domestic law of the UK and 
Germany demonstrate that there is still room for improvement.  
The following chapter sets the stage for the focus of the thesis by providing the history and current 
understanding of the principle of non-refoulement in international law. It illustrates the content of 
the norm, and how it is recognized both in international refugee and international human rights 
law. It is the fact of this dual recognition which provides the principle with its scope and wide 
applicability within the international legal system. 
 
  
 
129 Guy S Goodwin-Gill, “The International Law of Refugee Protection” in Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, 
Katy Long, and Nado Sigona (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), which states: ‘Today, the principle of non-refoulement is not only the essential foundation 
for international refugee law, but also an integral part of human rights protection, implicit in the subject matter of 
many such rights, and a rule of customary international law’ [Goodwin-Gill]. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Non-Refoulement Protection under International and European Refugee Law 
2. Introduction 
The principle of non-refoulement plays a vital role in the international refugee law regime. The 
principle is widely regarded as a cornerstone of international refugee law by the UNHCR, 
academic commentators, and States Parties of the Refugee Convention.130 This doctrine protects 
asylum claimants and refugees from being returned to territories where their lives or freedom 
would be threatened.131  
International and European law provide the standards that are to be implemented by national 
asylum systems within the European Union (EU) through domestic asylum procedures. Therefore, 
this chapter introduces the principle of non-refoulement as it is currently articulated in international 
and European law, in order to set the stage for the next chapter, which discusses how EU Member 
States interpret and apply the principle within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). 
The first part of this chapter considers the history of the principle of non-refoulement. The second 
part of the chapter discusses the principle of non-refoulement under international refugee law and 
international human rights law. Next, the chapter situates the principle of non-refoulement in 
European law.  
This thesis is centered around the foundational legal norm of non-refoulement and the ways in 
which it is meant to protect refugees and asylum seekers. Therefore, this chapter sketches out the 
parameters of the principle and concludes that there is a crucial difference between the way in 
which international and European refugee laws define the scope of the obligation of States not to 
refoule individuals versus the manner in which international and European human rights law 
 
130 See, for example: Note on Non-Refoulement supra note 51 at A; Németh v Canada [2010] 3 SCR 281 at para 1; 
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, “There’s No Place Like Home: States’ Obligations in Relation to Transfers of Persons” 
(2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 871, 703-750 at 704.   
131 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 33(1).  
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articulate the right of individuals not to be refouled. In particular, international and European 
human rights laws are absolute in their prohibition, while international and European refugee laws 
permit exceptions to non-refoulement. Some scholars therefore argue that the definition of non-
refoulement in human rights law must displace the definition in refugee law because it is broader 
in nature (as it applies to all human being, regardless of their status) and bridges the gap that 
refugee rights may not cover.132 However, others contend that human rights law and refugee law 
do not interact in this manner; that they are intrinsically intertwined and one does not act as a 
surrogate for the other.133 This discussion and others on the principle of non-refoulement in this 
chapter sets the stage for the next chapter, which discusses how EU Member States interpret and 
apply the principle within the CEAS.  
2.1 History of Non-Refoulement 
A discussion of the principle of non-refoulement involves examining the origins of the principle 
in international refugee law. This section therefore provides the history of the principle of non-
refoulement, beginning with a discussion of the originating sources of international refugee law 
and the development of non-refoulement through treaty law. In the 1920s, over one million Russian 
refugees were forcibly displaced and removed along the border of the former Russian empire.134 
 
132 Vincent Chetail, “Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations Between 
Refugee Law and Human Rights Law in Ruth Rubio-Marin (ed) Human Rights and Immigration (Oxford Scholarship 
Online) at 19-72 at 22; James C Hathaway, “Refugees and Asylum” in B. Opeskin, R. Perruchoud, and J. Redpath-
Cross (eds) Foundations of International Migration Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) at 190, where 
James Hathaway argued that: “[…] general human rights norms do not address many refugee-specific concerns (such 
as non-rejection at the frontier, or non-penalisation for illegal entry)” in suggesting that human rights law norms are 
in general, broader than refugee rights, and sometimes do not encompass the specific concerns addressed by refugee 
law. A general overview of the discussion on the interaction between international refugee and human rights law is 
further explored in: Jenny Poon, “Non-Refoulement in the International Refugee Law Regime: A Lex Specialis?” 
(2017) 3 Cornell International Law Journal Online 31-33 [Poon Cornell Article]. 
133 See, generally: McAdam Research Paper supra note 23.  
134 Claudena M Skran, “Background, Historical Development of International Refugee Law” in Andreas Zimmermann 
(ed) 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) at 6 [Skran].  
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Some countries surrounding the former Russian empire opened up their borders to accept these 
refugees but, generally, these refugees were not accepted by other countries.135 In 1922, the High 
Commissioner for Russian Refugees appointed by the League of Nations, Fridtjof Nansen, was 
given the task of securing the assistance and legal protection of these refugees.136 Governments 
gathered together in Geneva to unanimously accept the issuance of certificates to grant legal status 
to Russian refugees.137 This arrangement was referred to as the Arrangement with Respect to the 
Issue of Certificates of Identity to Russian Refugees, also commonly known as the 1922 
Arrangement.138 These certificates were later known as the ‘Nansen Passport’, which acted as 
identity certificates for refugees to travel across international borders, and was the beginning of 
the international refugee law system.139  
Following this development, the principle of non-refoulement was developed and amended 
through three significant treaties concerning refugee protection: the 1933 Convention Relating to 
the International Status of Refugees (1933 Convention), the 1938 Convention Concerning the 
Status of Refugees coming from Germany (1938 Convention), and the 1951 Refugee Convention.  
The 1933 Convention represented the first explicit recognition of non-refoulement as a norm under 
international treaty law.140 By the 1920s, the piecemeal approach of the Nansen Passport had 
 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid at 7.  
137 Ibid. 
138 League of Nations, “Russian Refugees: Report by Dr. Nansen, High Commissioner of the League of Nations”, 
1922 LNOJ at 927.  
139 Skran supra note 134 at 8; Paul Weis, “The Development of Refugee Law” (1982) 3:1 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 27-42 at 28: ‘The earliest international instruments dealing with refugees, established at the 
initiative of Dr. Nansen, therefore provided for the issuance of a travel document to refugees which has become known 
as the ‘Nansen passport’’ [Weis MJIL]. 
140 Gilbert Jaeger, “On the History of the International Protection of Refugees” (2001) 83:843 International Review of 
the Red Cross 727-736 at 730 [Jaeger]. 
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become unreliable, which triggered the need for a more comprehensive approach to the issue of 
refugees.141 The 1933 Convention formally codified the rights granted to refugees.142 It was drafted 
as a result of the gathering of representatives from Belgium, Bulgaria, Egypt, France, and Norway 
under the framework of the League of Nations in response to the situation of Russian and Armenian 
refugees post World War I.143 Article 3 of the 1933 Convention provides that: 
Each of the States Parties undertakes not to remove or keep from its territory by 
application of police measures, such as expulsions or non-admittance at the 
frontier (refoulement), refugees who have been authorized to reside there 
regularly, unless the said measures are dictated by reasons of national security or 
public order. It undertakes in any case not to refuse entry to refugees at the frontier 
of their countries of origin […].144 
The 1933 Convention was ratified by nine States, including France and the UK, which were the 
most powerful States of that time.145 However, three of these States ratified the 1933 Convention 
 
141 Skran supra note 134 at 11. 
142 Ibid.   
143 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees CLIX LNTS 3663, 28 October 1933 at art 3 [1933 
Convention]; Jaeger supra note 140 at 728-730; See, also: Robert J. Beck, “Britain and the 1933 Refugee Convention: 
National or State Sovereignty?” (1999) 11:4 International Journal of Refugee Law 597-624 [Beck].  
144 1933 Convention supra note 15 at art 3; See, also: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Commentary 
on the Refugee Convention 1951, Articles 2-11, 13-37”, October 1997 at 14 [UNHCR on CSR51]: ‘Article 3 of the 
1933 Convention contained the rule of ‘non-refoulement’ to a country of persecution which is also set forth in Article 
33(1) of the present Convention, but the former did not contain the exceptions to the rule which are found in Article 
33(2) of the present Convention. It seems fair to imply that Article 33 of the present Convention does not impair the 
absolute right of non-refoulement which a person who qualified as a refugee under the terms of the 1933 Convention 
could claim by virtue of Article 3 of that Convention, which means that Article 33(2) is not applicable in his [or her] 
case’. 
145 Jaeger supra note 140 at 730. 
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with reservations and declarations: .146 Although the first of its kind and more comprehensive than 
the piecemeal approach of the Nansen Passport of the 1920s, the 1933 Convention was limited in 
its scope of application.147 For instance, the 1933 Convention did not apply to refugees outside of 
the interwar period (1918-1939).148 
From 1933 until the beginning of World War II, about 400,000 refugees fled from Germany.149 
The 1938 Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees coming from Germany was created to 
arrange ‘a system of legal protection’ for these refugees.150 This treaty incorporated key provisions 
and elements from the Nansen Passport system and the 1933 Convention.151 Article 4(1) of the 
draft 1938 Convention contained a provision which stipulated that, in all cases, if a refugee is 
required to leave, ‘he [or she] shall be granted a suitable period to make the necessary 
arrangements’ and for those refugees given authorization to be in the country, Article 4(2) states 
that they should not be expelled unless required by ‘national security or public order’.152 Most 
importantly, a form of the principle of non-refoulement was incorporated in Article 4(3), which 
provided that even when expulsion or return at the frontier is warranted by reasons of national 
security or public order, ‘refugees shall not be sent back across the frontier of the [German-
occupied territory] unless they have been warned and have refused to make the arrangements 
 
146 The reservations and declarations included an emphasis on the retention of sovereign competence in the matter of 
expulsion, with the United Kingdom expressly objecting to the principle of non-rejection at the frontier: Guy S 
Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2007) at 202 
[Goodwin-Gill and McAdam]. 
147 Skran supra note 134 at 24. 
148 Ibid.  
149 Ibid; League of Nations, “Supplementary Report: Submitted to the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly 
of the League of Nations by Sir Herbert Emerson, GCIE, KCSI, CBE, High Commissioner for Refugees”, 20 October 
1939, LN Doc A18(a) at 2.  
150 Skran supra note 134 at 27.  
151 Ibid.  
152 Ibid.  
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necessary to proceed to another country’.153 Together, the 1933 Convention and the 1938 
Convention formed the basis for the drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention.154  
The aftermath of World War II produced over 30 million displaced persons, including refugees, 
who were forced to leave their homes in Europe.155 By the end of the war, there were over 10 
million refugees.156 The mass influx of refugees to neighbouring countries led to the need for the 
creation of an international refugee convention which would solidify legal protections for 
refugees.157 This situation prompted the process of drafting the 1951 Refugee Convention, which 
began with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 8(I) of February 12, 1946, and 
concluded with the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries adopting the treaty on July 28, 
1951.158 (This treaty was later supplemented with the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1967 Protocol).159 
 
153 Ibid; However, in Article 5(3)(a) of the 1938 Convention, the prohibition against ‘reconduction’ (referring to 
present day non-refoulement protection to a country of persecution) was qualified in certain respects, namely: ‘The 
High Contracting Parties undertake not to reconduct refugees to German territory unless they have been warned and 
have refused, without just cause, to make the necessary arrangements to proceed to another territory or to take 
advantage of the arrangements made for them with that object’ in UNHCR on CSR51 supra note 144 at 135.  
154 Ibid; The 1951 Refugee Convention has been described as ‘at the universal level, the most comprehensive legally 
binding international instrument, defining standards for the treatment or refugees’ in United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, “The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux Preparatoires Analysed with a 
Commentary by Dr Paul Weis” at 4 [Weis].  
155 Terje Einarsen, “Background, Drafting History of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol” in Andreas 
Zimmermann (ed) The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 43.  
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid at 48.  
158 Ibid.  
159 Refugee Convention supra note 7; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 606 UNTS 267 (adopted 31 January 
1967, entered into force 4 October 1967) [Refugee Protocol]. 
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Most notably, the 1951 Refugee Convention defined the term ‘refugee’ as well as codified the 
cardinal principle of non-refoulement.160 The principle of non-refoulement is defined under Article 
33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.161 Article 33(1) is one of only two Articles within the 
Refugee Convention to which States Parties are not permitted to make reservations.162 Article 
33(1) of the Refugee Convention provides:  
No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.163 
The preparatory works, or the travaux préparatoires, to the 1951 Refugee Convention reveal States 
Parties’ intentions during drafting negotiations.164 In 1946, the UN Ad Hoc Committee on 
Statelessness and Related Problems (Ad Hoc Committee) was tasked with drafting a convention 
 
160 Ibid; Weis MJIL supra note 139 at 31: ‘The most important principle of non-refoulement […] This principle, 
enunciated in Article 33, can be regarded as the cornerstone of refugee law. It has acquired the character of a general 
principle of law or of a rule of customary international law; it is, by some, even considered as jus cogens’. 
161 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 33(1). 
162 Katy Long, “No Entry! A Review of UNHCR’s Response to Border Closures in Situations of Mass Refugee Influx”, 
June 2010 at paras 58 and 61, http://www.unhcr.org/4c207bd59.pdf [Long]; This point is important because 
reservations for a treaty permits a State, ‘when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty […] to 
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State’ in Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331 (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) at 
art 2(1)(d) [VCLT]. 
163 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 33(1).  
164 Under the VCLT, the preparatory works during treaty negotiations may be a supplementary means of determining 
the intention of drafters, see: VCLT supra note 162 at art 32: ‘Recourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm 
the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according 
to article 31: (a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable’. 
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relating to the international status of refugees and stateless persons.165 It first proposed the 
incorporation of Article 3 of the 1933 Convention on non-refoulement based on a working paper 
drafted by the UN Secretary-General.166 The result was that the first iteration of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention incorporated the principle in draft Article 24(3), which stated: 
Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes in any case not to turn back 
refugees to the frontiers of their country of origin, or to territories where their life 
or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality or 
political opinions.167 
This absolute prohibition on refoulement was proposed in 1950.168 The provision, which was 
slightly amended,169 became present-day Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention and was 
adopted by a vote of 21 in favour and none against, with two abstentions.170 
 
165 Walter Kälin, Martina Caroni and Lukas Heim, “Article 33, para. 1 (Prohibition of Expulsion or Return 
(‘Refoulement’)” in Andreas Zimmermann (ed) The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 1338 [Kälin]; United Nations Economic and 
Social Council, “Resolution 248 (IX) B of 8 August 1949”.  
166 Skran supra note 134 at para 10; Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 1950 UN Doc 
E/AC.32/2 Annex at 45.  
167 Ibid.  
168 United Nations Economic and Social Council, “Summary Record of the Twentieth Meeting: Ad Hoc Committee 
on Statelessness and Related Problems, First Session”, UN Doc E/AC.32/SR.20, 1950 at paras 54 and 55; See, also: 
Guy S Goodwin-Gill, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees”, 
United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law at 5. 
169 As mentioned above, the text of Article 33(1) reads: ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’: Refugee 
Convention supra note 7 at art 33(1). 
170 Conference of Plenipotentiaries, 1951 UN Doc A/CONF.2/SR.35 at 25.  
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During a meeting of the Ad Hoc committee, the representative from the UK suggested that an 
exception be added on the grounds of national security.171 In the end, the Ad Hoc Committee 
accepted the draft of Article 24(3) without the amendment suggested by the UK.172 Then, in 1951, 
at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, the representative of the UK, Sir Leslie Brass, expressed 
his concern over the potential absoluteness of the non-refoulement principle and again proposed 
an amendment.173 This proposal was supported by Switzerland, with the United States, France and 
Denmark arguing against.174 Despite the proposal not initially gaining traction, the representatives 
from France and the UK suggested adding this new paragraph: 
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee 
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he [or she] is residing, or who, having been lawfully convicted in 
that country of particularly serious crimes or offences, constitutes a danger to the 
community thereof.175 
 
171 Sir Leslie proposed to add the words ‘unless the said measures are dictated by reasons of national security’ at the 
end of the paragraph for Article 24(3) in Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 1950 UN Doc 
E/AC.32/SR.20 at paras 10-12; See, also: Kälin supra note 165 at 1338.  
172 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, 1950 UN Doc E/AC.32/L.32 at 12.  
173 Goodwin-Gill supra note 9 at 204; See also: Skran supra note 134 at para 11. 
174 Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, 1950 UN Doc E/AC.32/SR.40 at 30.   
175 Conference of Plenipotentiaries, 1951 UN Doc A/CONF.2/69; See, also: Kälin supra note 165 at 1340.  
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This amendment, which was slightly changed,176 was adopted by 19 votes to none, with three 
abstentions, and incorporated in the Refugee Convention as Article 33(2).177 Thus, the prohibition 
against refoulement is not absolute under international refugee law.178 Note, however, that this 
exception has since been interpreted even more narrowly than drafted in Article 33(2): in 2007, 
the UNHCR issued an advisory opinion indicating that this exception must be read in conjunction 
with international human rights law’s prohibition on refoulement to torture, discussed further 
below.179 
The Conference of Plenipotentiaries also discussed the concepts of ‘expel’ and ‘return’.180 The 
representative from Switzerland opined that the text of the non-refoulement prohibition covered 
only refugees who had already entered a country and States were accordingly not obliged to admit 
large groups of persons claiming refugee status at the border.181 It argued that the word ‘expel’ 
seems to refer to refugees residing lawfully in the country, while the word ‘return’ seems to refer 
 
176 Article 33(2) states: ‘The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there 
are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been 
convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country’: 
Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 33(2). 
177 The abstentions were not recorded in the original document; Statement by Chance (Canada) and Hoeg (Denmark), 
1951 UN Doc A/CONF.2/SR.16 at 8.  
178 This exception to non-refoulement must be applied with great caution, however, and this provision is to be read 
restrictively, see: UNHCR NR Note supra note 51 at para 14; More discussion on the connection between non-
refoulement and the national security exception provided for under Article 33(2) is further explored in: Jenny Poon, 
“The Protection Nexus between Non-Penalisation and National Security Exception under the Refugee Convention” 
(2019) 3 Philippe Kirsch Institute Global Justice Journal 37 [Poon PKI Journal]. 
179 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Advisory Opinion the Extraterritorial Application of Non-
Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol”, 26 
January 2007 at para 11: ‘the host State would be barred from removing a refugee if this would result in exposing him 
or her, for example, to a substantial risk of torture’ [UNHCR Advisory Opinion]. 
180 Kälin supra note 165 at 1341.  
181 Ibid.  
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to refugees who had already entered the country but were not yet resident there.182 The 
representatives from France, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Germany, and Belgium all agreed 
with this interpretation, with France and Belgium stressing that situations of mass influx of 
refugees were not covered by the provision.183 This debate shows that the text of the principle of 
non-refoulement was not easily ascertained and brings the discussion to the present day dilemma 
surrounding the question of lex specialis between international refugee and human rights law.  
Another item that was debated during the drafting of Article 33 was the issue of non-admittance 
of refugees at the border. The Secretariat of the League of Nations at the time of translating 
(unofficially) the text of the 1933 Convention was quite clear that the prohibition against 
refoulement did not cover ‘non-admittance at the frontier’ (meaning the ‘refusal of leave to land’, 
and ‘exclusion’).184 Thus, during the negotiation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Swiss 
representative was of the opinion that Article 33 ‘could not […] be applied to a refugee who had 
not yet entered the territory of a country. The word ‘return’ used in the English text, gave that idea 
exactly […] That Article 33 forbids return and not ‘non-admittance’ is also made clear by the 
words ‘to the frontiers of territories’ in the English text and even more so by the words ‘sur les 
frontiers des territories’ in the French text’.185 This controversy is still present today as the question 
of whether non-refoulement applies extraterritorially has been a matter of debate among scholars.  
 
182 Ibid.  
183 Note, however, that subsequently in 1981, it is the view of the UNHCR Executive Committee that: ‘In situations 
of large-scale influx, asylum seekers should be admitted to the State in which they first seek refuge and if that State is 
unable to admit them on a durable basis, it should always admit them at least on a temporary basis… In all cases the 
fundamental principle of non-refoulement – including non-rejection at the frontier – must be scrupulously observed’ 
in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee, “Conclusion No. 22”, 1981 at paras 
II.A.1-II.A.2; See, also: Statements of Chance (Canada) and Hoeg (Denmark), 1951 UN Doc A/CONF.2/SR.16 at 6.  
184 UNHCR on CSR51, supra note 144 at 136. 
185 Dennis McNamara, “Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951 Articles 2-11, 13-37 Published by the Division 
of International Protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees”, 1997, 
https://www.unhcr.org/3d4ab5fb9.pdf at 136 [McNamara]; Weis MJIL supra note 139 at 37 and 38: ‘The Convention 
is unclear on the question of whether the principle of non-refoulement applies to refugees who have not yet been 
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As can be seen in the historical development of non-refoulement, the development of Article 33 is 
not without controversy and debate among the States. The next section discusses the current 
understanding of the principle of non-refoulement.  
2.2 The Current Conception of Non-Refoulement under International Refugee Law 
The current meaning of Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention is best understood by 
understanding the phrases used in that provision. A textual analysis of the provision - ‘No 
Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion - reveals the 
scope, temporal requirements and jurisdictional application of the principle of non-refoulement.  
The first phrase in the article is ‘no Contracting State’, which refers to States Parties that have 
ratified the Refugee Convention.186 The Refugee Convention is a widely-ratified international 
human rights instrument, currently with 146 ratifications.187 States Parties to the 1967 Protocol188 
that are not parties to the Refugee Convention (namely the United States, Cabo Verde, and 
Venezuela) are also bound by the principle of non-refoulement, as paragraph 1 of the Protocol 
requires all States Parties to the Protocol to apply Articles 2-34 of the Refugee Convention.189 
Therefore, Article 33 binds the vast majority of States in the world. It should be mentioned that 
 
admitted into a country of asylum […] Other countries have provisions in their aliens’ legislation that either explicitly 
or de facto, as a result of the prohibition of refoulement, including rejection at the frontier, establish a right to asylum’.  
186 Kälin supra note 165 at 1357.  
187 Status as at June 2020; United Nations Treaty Collection, “Chapter V: Refugees and Stateless Persons, 2. 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July 1951”,  
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=V-2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en 
[UNTS CSR51].  
188 There are 147 States Parties to the Protocol as of June 2020: United Nations Treaty Collection, “Chapter V: 
Refugees and Stateless Persons, 5. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, New York, 31 January 1967”,  
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=V-5&chapter=5&clang=_en [UNTS Protocol]. 
189 Refugee Protocol supra note 159 at art 1; See also: Lauterpacht supra note 108 at 87 and 108.  
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States that are not States Parties to either the Refugee Convention or the Protocol will nonetheless 
be obliged not to refoule under customary international law, regional refugee law instruments, 
other international human rights law instruments, international humanitarian law, and extradition 
law.190 Thus, while they are not legally bound under the treaty phrase ‘no Contracting State’, they 
cannot avoid the norm as a result. 
The Refugee Convention uses the phrase ‘shall expel or return’ to explain ‘refouler’, but does not 
otherwise define the term. The term ‘refouler’ is also not defined in any of the other treaties 
discussed above. Therefore, the meaning of the term must be determined using the rules for the 
interpretation of international treaties found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).191 Under the VCLT, there are two ways of ascertaining the meaning of a treaty provision. 
The general rules of interpreting the meaning of a treaty provision is by its ordinary meaning and 
through the object and purpose of the provision as determined by the preamble and annexes of an 
international treaty.192.  
The term ‘refoulement’ is derived from the French word ‘refouler’ meaning, in its ordinary 
meaning, ‘to drive back’ or ‘to repel’.193 In a number of jurisdictions such as the UK, the United 
States, and Australia, dictionaries have been used to determine the plain meaning of certain terms 
 
190 For international humanitarian law, see: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War (Geneva Convention IV) 75 UNTS 287 (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) at art 
45(4); For extradition law, see: European Convention on Extradition ETS 24 (adopted 13 December 1957, entered 
into force 18 April 1960); Inter-American Convention on Extradition (adopted 25 February 1981, entered into force 
28 March 1992). 
191 VCLT supra note 162 at art 31.  
192 Ibid at art 31(1). As a supplementary means of treaty interpretation, the meaning of a treaty provision may be 
ascertained by the preparatory works or the travaux préparatoires during negotiations as well as the circumstances of 
its conclusion: Ibid at art 32. The negotiation history is discussed above. 
193 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam supra note 146 at 201.  
48 
 
within the Refugee Convention.194 For instance, the dictionary definition of the term ‘refouler’ as 
used in Article 33(1) has been interpreted to mean ‘repulse’, ‘repel’, and ‘drive back’.195 The word 
‘refouler’ has also been described to mean ‘the act of returning refugees to a place where they may 
be persecuted’.196 . The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Sale v. Haitian Centers 
Council Inc, held that the repatriation of Haitian asylum claimants back to Haiti by the United 
States Coast Guard on the high seas was clearly prohibited by the ordinary understanding of the 
term ‘return’ under Article 33(1).197 The case concerned vessels traveling with passengers from 
Haiti to the United States that were intercepted on the high seas.198 The passengers were forced to 
flee Haiti as a result of a military coup in 1991.199 The United States Coast Guard interdicted over 
34,000 Haitians who were then sent to be detained at the Guantanamo Bay United States military 
base.200 The Respondents in the case, an organization representing the interdicted Haitians, argued 
that the word ‘return’ referred to the destination to which the refugee would be removed or sent 
 
194 Jane McAdam, “Interpretation of the 1951 Convention” in Andreas Zimmermann (ed) The 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 
87 [McAdam CSR51 Interpretation].  
195 Sale v Haitian Centers Council Inc 509 US 155 (US) at 191 [Sale].  
196 Sophie H Pirie, “Note: The Need for a Codified Definition of ‘Persecution’ in United States Refugee Law” (1986) 
39:1 Stanford Law Review 187-234 at 187; Andrew G Pizor, “Sale v. Haitian Centres Council: The Return of Haitian 
Refugees” (1993) 17:4 Fordham International Law Journal 1062-1114 at 1063 [Pizor]. 
197 McAdam CSR51 Interpretation supra note 194 at 87.   
198 Sale supra note 195 at 162.  
199 Ibid.  
200 Ibid at 166.  
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back.201 However, the Supreme Court did not accept this approach, holding that that this definition 
of the word ‘return’ was expansive and would make the word ‘deport’ redundant.202  
The meaning of ‘refouler’ can also be ascertained pursuant to the object and purpose of the treaty 
as found in the preamble.203 The preamble of the Refugee Convention states that: 
considering that the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its 
profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure refugees the widest 
possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms (emphasis added).204 
According to the preamble, the purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention is to ensure the widest 
possible protection for refugees.205 The word ‘refouler’ refers to States’ obligation to protect 
refugees from being returned to territories where they may experience persecution.206 Reading the 
two together, ‘offering the widest possible’ protection may involve not only protection from being 
sent back to persecution, but corresponding access to asylum procedures, including the right to 
seek asylum as enshrined in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.207  
 
201 Thomas David Jones, “Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.” (1994) 88:1 American Journal of International Law 
114-126, at 120. 
202 Sale supra note 195 at 174; Pizor supra note 196 at 1093: ‘The [US] government relied on the plain meaning of 
the 1951 Convention’s text. The government argued that the word ‘expel’ in Article 33(1) referred to aliens in the 
territory of a States Party, and that ‘expel’ is one translation of ‘refouler’. The government concluded that the phrase 
‘return (‘refouler’)’ merely refers to its territorial use’.  
203 VCLT supra note 162 at art 31(1).  
204 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at preamble.  
205 Ibid at preamble.  
206 Ibid at art 33(1).  
207 UDHR supra note 27 at art 14.  
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Thus, the ordinary meaning of the term ‘refouler’ includes ‘return’ (‘to send back’ or ‘to bring, 
send, or put back to a former or proper place’), ‘repulse’, ‘repel’, and ‘drive back’.208 This 
understanding is uncontroversial. An approach to defining ‘refouler’ based on the object and 
purpose of the Refugee Convention is less well-developed, but indicates that non-refoulement may 
include a negative obligation on States not to send individuals back to certain situations,209 
logically coupled with a positive duty on States to determine whether the individual in question is 
at risk of serious human rights violations on return, plus an additional positive duty to ensure access 
of asylum seekers to asylum procedures.  
In contrast to the widespread understanding of ‘return’ and ‘refouler’ as synonyms, there is some 
debate over the meaning of the word ‘expel’. During treaty negotiations, the Swiss Government 
was of the view that the term ‘expel’ applied to a refugee who had already been admitted to the 
territory of a country, while the term ‘refouler’ could not be applied to a refugee who had not yet 
entered the territory of a country.210 The French representative also agreed with the Swiss 
Government’s view.211 While this view has been challenged, the Swiss and French interpretation 
has since been revived in response to the mass influx of refugees into Europe prompted by the 
Syrian armed conflict.212   
 
208 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 10th Edition; Sale v Haitian Ctr Council, Inc, 509 US 155 (1993). 
209 However, this would logically coupled with a positive duty on States to determine whether the individual in 
question is at risk of serious human rights violations on return. 
210 Weis MJIL supra note 139 at 236. 
211 Ibid. 
212 The Swiss Government’s view was that the term ‘refouler’ could not apply to a refugee who had not yet entered 
the territory of a country and would only be applicable to refugees who have already been admitted to the territory of 
a country. From the viewpoint of the States, the provision implied that there were two categories of refugees: “refugees 
who were liable to be expelled, and those who were liable to be returned”. This is controversial at the time because 
the Swiss Government took the viewpoint that the meaning of the word “return” “applied solely to refugees who had 
already entered a country, but were not yet resident there”. The reason for adopting this definition was unknown, see 
Weis MJIL supra note 139 at 236.  
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Article 33 uses the term ‘refugee’, which is defined in Article 1A of the Refugee Convention. As 
described in Chapter One, this is an individual with a well-founded fear of persecution who, for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, ‘membership of a particular social group’ or political opinion 
is outside of his or her country of nationality, is unable or unwilling to avail him or herself of State 
protection, and owing to such fear is unable or unwilling to return to his or her country of origin.213 
However, the definition of ‘refugee’ in Article 1A does not apply to those who have committed a 
‘crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity’, ‘a serious non-political crime in 
the country of refuge’, and/or ‘acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’ 
under Article 1F.214 Additionally, the protection against refoulement also does not apply to 
refugees who fall under the cessation clauses (Article 1C) (defining when protection is no longer 
needed) , those who receive protection and assistance from United Nations organs and agencies 
other than the UNHCR (Article 1D), and individuals who are recognized by the country of refuge 
as its nationals (Article 1E).215 Therefore, under the Refugee Convention there is a specifically 
delimited category of people who are endowed with non-refoulement protection. Despite these 
restrictions, individuals falling outside of the protection scope of Article 33(1) may invoke human 
rights law protection offered by the Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, as explained below.216 The human rights protection offered by these 
instruments protect everyone - not only refugees - from being deprived of the right to life and 
freedom from torture.217  
The words ‘in any manner whatsoever’ clarify the breadth of the prohibition on refouling refugees: 
Contracting States cannot use non-admittance at the frontier of territories or extradition as 
 
213 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 1A.  
214 Ibid at art 1F.  
215 Ibid at art 1C, 1D, and 1E.  
216 Kälin supra note 165 at 1350-1352.  
217 CAT supra note 9 at art 3; ICCPR supra note 22 at arts 6 and 7.  
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alternative means of sending refugees back to situations of serious personal danger.218 However, 
the words ‘in any manner whatsoever’ do not translate to a right to be granted asylum for the 
individual claiming asylum and do not preclude instances where the admitting State may decide 
to expel the claimant to another State willing to accept him or her.219 The travaux préparatoires 
are also clear in that the Refugee Convention provision supersedes any previous extradition 
agreements concluded privately between States Parties to the Refugee Convention.220 Therefore, 
non-refoulement protection entails protecting the asylum claimant or refugee from being returned 
to territories where his or her life or freedom is threatened, regardless of any extradition agreements 
previously agreed upon between States Parties of the Refugee Convention. Further, the phrase ‘to 
expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever’ indicates that non-refoulement obligations 
arise regardless of the State’s conduct or where the expelling or return occurs.221  
The phrase ‘frontiers of territories’ means the territory of the country of origin or last habitual 
residence.222 The term not only includes territories where the refugee may face a future risk of 
refoulement but also the territory of a State where authorities of concern, such as security service 
or military personnel, are present.223 An example of this is in the context of an occupation where 
one part of the territory of a State may be occupied by enemy forces.224 Also, the legal status of 
 
218 Weis MJIL supra note 139 at 245; See, also: Wouters supra note 108 at 99: ‘The premise of protection from 
refoulement is an evaluation of a future threat to life or freedom. Consequently, every time a State wants to remove a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever the State must evaluate the risk of his [or her] being persecuted after removal, 
thereby taking into account all relevant information, including new or previously unrecognised facts’; See, also: James 
C Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 320.  
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Wouters supra note 108 at 50. 
222 Kälin supra note 165 at 1380.  
223 Ibid at 1381.  
224 Ibid.  
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the place to which the refugee may be sent is not material in considering whether Article 33(1) 
protection applies, given that the word ‘territories’ was used by the drafters of the Refugee 
Convention rather than ‘countries’ or ‘States’.225 
The phrase ‘frontiers of territories’ also denotes territorial scope.226 There has been some debate 
over the meaning of this phrase.227 Some States argue that non-refoulement obligations and 
corresponding responsibility for the claimant only trigger when the individual concerned is within 
the territory of the State deemed responsible (as mentioned above).228 However, academic 
commentators interpret the phrase to mean that it is exercised wherever the State has ‘effective 
authority and control’ over the individual, including on the high seas.229 The latter approach is 
supported by a plain language reading of the term, as per the VCLT. 230 This idea is supported by 
the ECtHR, the Human Rights Committee, the International Court of Justice, and the Committee 
 
225 Ibid; See, also: Wouters supra note 108 at 134.  
226 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 33(1).  
227 UNHCR Advisory Opinion supra note 179 at paras 34 and 35. 
228 Seunghwan Kim, “Non-Refoulement and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: State Sovereignty and Migration Controls at 
Sea in the European Context” (2017) Leiden Journal of International Law 30, 49-70 at 50 [Kim]: ‘Regrettably, major 
refugee-intake countries have denied [the principle of non-refoulement’s] extraterritorial applicability in the conduct 
of external migration controls such as interdiction or interception of refugees on the high seas’.  
229 Ibid at 69-70.  
230 VCLT supra note 162 at art 31(1). 
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Against Torture.231 Moreover, the UNHCR is of the view that the principle of non-refoulement 
applies wherever a State exercises its jurisdiction.232 
The words ‘where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened’ have the same meaning as the 
phrase ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ under Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention.233 This 
threat to life or freedom is an anticipation of a future threat, so that every time a State wishes to 
remove a refugee, the removing State must evaluate the risk of the refugee being persecuted after 
removal, by taking into account all relevant information including any new or previously 
 
231 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy App no 27765/09 (ECHR, 23 February 2012) [Hirsi]; By analogy to the ICCPR: 
Human Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, United States of America”, 3 
October 1995, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.50 at para 284; Human Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations of the 
Human Rights Committee, United States of America”, 18 December 2006, UN Doc CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 at 
para 10; By analogy to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: International Court of Justice, Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Gen List 
No 131, 9 July 2004 at para 109 and 111; International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda), ICJ Gen List No 116, 19 December 2005 at para 216; Committee Against 
Torture, “Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture concerning the Second Report of the 
United States of America”, 25 July 2006, UN Doc CAT/C/USA/CO/2 at para 14; Pursuant to the VCLT, where the 
meaning of the provision within a treaty is ambiguous or otherwise bring the meaning of the treaty into absurdity, the 
travaux préparatories may also be used as supplementary means of interpretation, see: VCLT supra note 162 at art 
32.  
232 UNHCR Advisory Opinion supra note 179 at para 9.  
233 Wouters supra note 108 at 245; Refugee Convention supra note 7 at 1A(2): ‘As a result of events occurring before 
1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to return to it. In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term ‘the country of his 
nationality’ shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking 
the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not 
availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national’. 
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unrecognized facts.234 The obligation of non-refoulement is designed to protect certain human 
rights violations from occurring and is therefore prospective in nature, rather than an obligation to 
right past wrongs.235 Further, the obligation on the prohibition against refoulement applies 
regardless of whether or not the threat to life or freedom materializes.236 For instance, the 
prohibition against refoulement applies regardless of whether or not certain human rights are 
violated in actuality.237  
In sum, the current understanding of the prohibition on refoulment under international refugee law 
is multifaceted, and is reflected not only in treaty law, but also in customary international law.238 
 
234 Ibid at 119; James C Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2005) at 320 [Hathaway]. 
235 DJ Miller, “Holding States to their Convention Obligations: The United Nations Convention against Torture and 
the Need for a Broad Interpretation of State Action” (2003) 17 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 299-323 at 303. 
236 Wouters supra note 108 at 25. 
237 Ibid; An example is the argument that non-refoulement itself is an independent human right and should not depend 
on whether the removing State has violated the human rights of the person being removed, see: Wouters supra note  
108 at 25; This issue was further explored in: Jenny Poon, “Reframing Non-Refoulement as an Individual Right under 
International Law?”, Refugee Law Initiative Blog, 18 July 2017, https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2017/07/18/reframing-non-
refoulement-as-an-individual-right-under-international-law.  
238 This is the view of the UNHCR, see: UNHCR NR Note supra note 51 at A, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html: ‘The principle of non-refoulement is the cornerstone of asylum and 
of international refugee law. Following from the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution, 
as set forth in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this principle reflects the commitment of the 
international community to ensure to all persons the enjoyment of human rights, including the rights to life, to freedom 
from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to liberty and security of person. These and 
other rights are threatened when a refugee is returned to persecution or danger’; In interpreting whether non-
refoulement obligations are binding upon all States, the view of the UNHCR is that non-refoulement is a customary 
norm which is binding upon all States regardless of whether they are States Parties to the Refugee Convention; This 
view has been criticized by a small number of academic commentators, see: Cathryn Costello and Michelle Foster, 
“Non-Refoulement as Custom and Jus Cogens? Putting the Prohibition to the Test” (2016) Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law 46, 273-327 [Costello and Foster].  
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Individuals cannot be refouled (returned) by Contracting States back to the territory of the country 
or entity of origin or last habitual residence if they satisfy the definition of ‘refugee’ and do not 
fall into any of the exceptions to that definition. Extradition or non-admittance cannot be used by 
States in an attempt to avoid the duty not to refoule. The prohibition on refoulment applies to States 
acting both within and outside of their own territory, where they exercise effective authority and 
control. Finally, the evaluation of the threat to the refugee if returned is forward-looking in time. 
2.3 The Current Conception of Non-Refoulement under International Human Rights Law 
While the principle of non-refoulment originated in international refugee law, as outlined above, 
it has since evolved to simultaneously have meaning within international human rights law. This 
section explains this joint existence by explaining non-refoulement under international human 
rights law.  
Both the Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
codify non-refoulement protection in their respective treaties. For the CAT, the prohibition against 
refoulement is formulated as the prohibition against torture under Article 3, while for the ICCPR, 
the prohibition against refoulement is codified as both the prohibition against torture and the 
prohibition on denying an individual his or her right to life respectively under Articles 6 and 7.239  
Article 3 of the CAT states that: 
1. No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture.  
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent 
authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where 
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.240 
 
239 CAT supra note 9 at art 3; ICCPR supra note 22 at arts 6 and 7.  
240 CAT supra note 9 at art 3. 
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Article 3 explicitly prohibits States from refouling an individual to another State when there is a 
serious risk of torture in that State, and this prohibition has been confirmed by the Committee 
Against Torture, the CAT treaty monitoring body.241 The definition of ‘torture’ for the purpose of 
Article 3 is codified under Article 1 of the CAT.242 The prohibition against torture under Article 3 
does not include an obligation upon States Parties of the CAT to prohibit other forms of cruel 
treatment.243 Instead, the prohibition against cruel treatment is found under Article 16, which 
obliges States ‘to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in Article 1’.244  
The Committee Against Torture has indicated that the prohibition against torture is a right which 
cannot be taken away or compromised.245 The Committee stated that the principle of non-
 
241 Wouters supra note 108 at 425. 
242 CAT supra note 9 at art 1: ‘the term ‘torture’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information 
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain 
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental 
to lawful sanctions’.  
243 Wouters supra note 108 at 438. 
244 Ibid at 518; CAT supra note 9 at art 16: ‘Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its 
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as 
defined in article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 
12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture of references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’.  
245 Committee Against Torture, “General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention 
in the context of article 22”, 4 September 2018, UN Doc CAT/C/GC/4 at para 8 [CAT NR Comment]: “The Committee 
recalls that the prohibition of torture, as defined in article1 of the Convention, is absolute. Article 2(2) of the 
Convention provides that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal 
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture”. The Committee 
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refoulement is a core concept and fundamental principle of international refugee law, and, in the 
form of human rights law, there is no derogation from such right as the prohibition against 
torture.246 Further, the Committee is of the view that the principle of non-refoulement should not 
be used as a loophole to circumvent international refugee law protection, especially in the instances 
of diplomatic assurances.247 In such instances, sending States are cautioned against the use of 
political undertakings from receiving States to guarantee the human rights of individuals being 
received.248 
Unlike the CAT’s explicit reference to non-refoulement, the ICCPR contains implicit references 
to the principle. Article 6 of the ICCPR declares that “Every human being has the inherent right to 
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”.249  In 
similarly absolute language, Article 7 says “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without 
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation”.250 While both provisions do not refer 
specifically to non-refoulment, they have been interpreted as prohibiting refoulement to situations 
in which life may be deprived or in which torture may occur. For example, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee - the treaty-monitoring body of the ICCPR - commented on the jus 
cogens nature of non-refoulement.251  
 
further recalls that other acts of ill-treatment are equally prohibited and that the prohibition of ill-treatment is likewise 
non-derogable”.  
246 Ibid at para 8.  
247 Ibid at para 20.  
248 Ibid. 
249 ICCPR supra note 22 at art 6. 
250 Ibid at art 7.  
251 United Nations, Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 24 (52)” (1994), UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 2 November 1994 at para 10: “this underlines the great importance of non-derogable rights. 
But not all rights of profound importance, such as articles 9 and 27 of the Covenant, have in fact been made non-
derogable. One reason for certain rights being made non-derogable is because their suspension is irrelevant to the 
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Some scholars argue that the principle of non-refoulement is a jus cogens norm, from which no 
derogation is permitted.252 The first mention of non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm is from the 
Executive Committee of the UNHCR in 1982.253 Along the same lines, in 1996, the UNHCR’s 
Executive Committee concluded that the ‘principle of non-refoulement is not subject to 
derogation’, and thus had achieved jus cogens status.254 Others do not go this far, maintaining that 
non-refoulement is not necessarily a jus cogens norm at present, but that it is in the midst of 
crystallizing in that direction. They posit that non-refoulement is steadily acquiring the status of 
jus cogens over time, and recognition of this has been affirmed by State practice, particularly 
 
legitimate control of the state of national emergency (for example, no imprisonment for debt, in article 11). Another 
reason is that derogation may indeed be impossible (as, for example, freedom of conscience). At the same time, some 
provisions are non-derogable exactly because without them there would be no rule of law. A reservation to the 
provisions of article 4 itself, which precisely stipulates the balance to be struck between the interests of the State and 
the rights of the individual in times of emergency, would fall in this category. And some non-derogable rights, which 
in any event cannot be reserved because of their status as peremptory norms, are also of this character - the prohibition 
of torture and arbitrary deprivation of life are examples”.  
252 Cathryn Costello and Michelle Foster, “Non-refoulement as Custom and Jus Cogens? Putting the Prohibition to the 
Test” (2016) 46 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 273-327; Jean Allain, “The jus cogens Nature of non-
refoulement” (2001) 13(4) International Journal of Refugee Law, 533-558 at 538, which states: ‘What remains 
uncertain is whether that norm [of non-refoulement] has achieved the status of jus cogens’ [Allain]. 
253 Allain supra note 252 at 539; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee: “General 
Conclusion on International Protection No. 25 (XXXIII) – 1982”, 20 October 1982 at para (b), which states: 
‘Reaffirmed the importance of the basic principles of international protection and in particular the principle of non-
refoulement which was progressively acquiring the character of a peremptory rule of international law’ (emphasis 
added).  
254 Allain supra note 252 at 539; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee: “General 
Conclusion on International Protection No. 79 (XVLII) - 1996”, 11 October 1996 at para (i), which states: ‘Distressed 
at the widespread violations of the principle of non-refoulement and of the rights of refugees, in some cases resulting 
in loss of refugee lives, and seriously disturbed at reports indicating that large numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers 
have been refouled and expelled in highly dangerous situations; recalls that the principle of non-refoulement is not 
subject to derogation’ (emphasis added).  
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within Latin America on the basis of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees.255 The 
approach of the scholars suggesting that non-refoulement is progressing towards the status of jus 
cogens is more persuasive as the status of the principle as a peremptory norm is still lacking 
consensus among scholars and States. 
In sum, international human rights law takes an activity-specific approach to defining who cannot 
be refouled: anyone who faces torture or deprivation of life on return to another State where that 
individual is under serious threat. In contrast, refugee law examines the rights of those forcibly 
displaced by protecting asylum seekers or refugees from being returned to places where they may 
be subjected to threats of death or persecution linked to a Convention ground. In other words, 
while human rights law can be said to be activity-specific in setting the parameters for non-
refoulement, refugee law is concerned with the civil and political rights of the refugees. Further, 
refugee law is limiting in that it applies to only asylum seekers and refugees.256 As well, non-
refoulement as interpreted under refugee law is narrower than human rights law as a result of 
exceptions to the principle. For instance, the exception to non-refoulement found under Article 
33(2) of the Refugee Convention provides that refugees who otherwise are protected from 
refoulement cannot be granted such protection where they are deemed to have committed a serious 
crime or would endanger the community of the country of refuge.257 
 
255 Allain supra note 252 at 539-540; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (adopted on 19 November 1984; entered 
into force 22 November 1984), which states, at para 5: ‘[…] the importance and meaning of the principle of non-
refoulement (including the prohibition of rejection at the frontier) as a corner-stone of the international protection of 
refugees. This principle is imperative in regard to refugees and in the present state of international law should be 
acknowledged and observed as a rule of jus cogens’.  
256 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 33(1). 
257 Ibid at art 33(2): “The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are 
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been 
convicted by a final judgment of a particular serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country”; 
For a more in-depth discussion of the exception to non-refoulement and national security issues, see: Poon PKI Journal 
supra note 178.   
61 
 
The dual existence of non-refoulement within international refugee and human rights law, and the 
different levels of protection under each strand of law, raise the question of which approach to 
non-refoulement applies and when. On this, there are differing views and no clear resolution. 
McAdams argues that this lack of clarity is due to the ‘general reluctance by States, academics and 
institutions to view human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law as branches of an 
interconnected, holistic regime’.258 Some scholars have argued that the wider human rights law 
definition of non-refoulement displaces the narrower refugee law definition of non-refoulement.259 
In other words, they posit that the definition of non-refoulement in human rights law must set aside 
or override the definition in refugee law because it is broader in nature (as it applies to all human 
beings, regardless of their status, without exception) and bridges the gap that refugee rights may 
not cover.260 Under this conception, the human rights version of the prohibition on refoulement is 
the central version. However, others contend that human rights law and refugee law do not interact 
in this manner; that they are intrinsically intertwined and one does not act as a surrogate for the 
other.261 They maintain that the refugee and human rights law definitions of non-refoulement do 
not displace one another, but instead work to complement the protection offered by the two 
regimes.262 As one commentator indicates, the two regimes operate and develop together, with 
 
258 McAdam Research Paper supra note 23 at 1. 
259 Vincent Chetail, “Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations between 
Refugee Law and Human Rights Law” in Ruth Rubio-Marín (eds) Human Rights and Immigration (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014) [Chetail].  
260 Ibid at 22; James C Hathaway, “Refugees and Asylum” in B. Opeskin, R. Perruchoud, and J. Redpath-Cross (eds) 
Foundations of International Migration Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) at 190, where James 
Hathaway argued that: ‘[…] general human rights norms do not address many refugee-specific concerns (such as non-
rejection at the frontier, or non-penalisation for illegal entry)’ in suggesting that human rights law norms are in general, 
broader than refugee rights, and sometimes do not encompass the specific concerns addressed by refugee law. A 
general overview of the discussion on the interaction between international refugee and human rights law is further 
explored in: Poon Cornell Article supra note 132. 
261 McAdam Research Paper supra note 23.  
262 Ibid at 4. 
62 
 
each area of the law informing the other: ‘The framers’ unambiguous reference in the Preamble of 
the 1951 Convention to the UDHR indicates a desire for the refugee definition to evolve in tandem 
with human rights principles’ (emphasis added).263 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem state that this co-
existence means that international human rights law is ‘an essential part of [the Refugee 
Convention’s] framework’.264 For the norm of non-refoulement, this means that the interpretation 
in the Refugee Convention is accompanied by the human rights law interpretation, so they are 
applied together when considering the risk to asylum claimants. A branch of this approach argues 
for refugee law to be viewed as lex specialis.265 In this view, refugee law, as the specialized law 
(lex specialis) applying to asylum claimants and refugees, normally prevails, taking priority over 
the generalist rule (lex generalis). However, when there is a conflict of norms between 
international refugee and human rights law, ‘such a conflict is resolved in favour of the most 
protective treatment essentially provided by human rights law, without regard to the alleged 
speciality of the prevailing norm’.266 This is because refugee law does not exist in a ‘normative 
vacuum’ and ‘no legal regime is fully self-contained’.267  
 
263 MR von Sternberg, The Grounds of Refugee Protection in the Context of International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law: Canadian and United States Case Law Compared (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague 2002) at 314, 
as cited in McAdam Research Paper supra note 23 at 8. 
264 Lauterpacht supra note 108 at 75. 
265 The International Law Commission considers the relationship between lex specialis and general law in International 
Law Commission, “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission: Finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi”, 13 April 2006, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682; The issue of lex specialis and non-refoulement law is further 
explored in: Jenny Poon, “Non-Refoulement as Lex Specialis?” (2017) London School of Economics and Political 
Science Human Rights Blog, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/humanrights/2017/07/07/non-refoulement-as-lex-specialis 
266 Vincent Chetail, “Armed Conflict and Forced Migration: A Systematic Approach to International Humanitarian 
Law, Refugee Law, and International Human Rights Law” in Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 2.  
267 International Law Commission, “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission: Finalized by 
Martti Koskenniemi”, 13 April 2006, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 at 7 and 10. 
63 
 
The ambiguous nature of the roles of refugee law and human rights law means that privileging 
certain interpretations may create a normative conflict or a normative gap in situations where an 
individual’s protection is at stake. Norm conflicts arise when the same issues are governed by two 
different set of rules, and there is a potential for different outcomes for the refugee claimant based 
on how those different sets of rules are interpreted and applied by States. For instance, a norm 
conflict can arise in the situation where the individual in question is being faced with a return to a 
territory where the endangerment is greater than persecution but does not rise to the level of a 
threat to life or a threat of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.268 In this situation, some 
states may argue that refugee law is the primary law applicable because it is lex specialis over 
human rights law, which is lex generalis.269 In this example, this refugee would not be able to be 
refouled, but under a pure primacy approach for international human rights law, the same refugee 
may be returned since the individual being contemplated for return is not facing a risk to life or of 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. On the other hand, normative gaps can 
occur when a State interprets either refugee law or human rights law in a manner to exclude 
protection, without resorting to the other area of law to see if protection might apply. Normative 
conflicts and normative gaps can be eliminated by adopting an approach in which both areas of 
law are considered to apply at all times. Under this approach, one set of rules complements and 
adds onto the other such that return to persecution or threat of life or torture, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment are all considered to violate the norm of non-refoulement, an 
approach considered in more detail in subsequent chapters.   
Despite the fact that there is no single agreed approach on the interaction between international 
refugee law and international human rights law on non-refoulement, this debate does not impact 
upon the analysis in this thesis: this is because EU law adopts the approach that both forms of non-
refoulement exist together, and that the widest approach envelops the narrower approach, thus 
avoiding both norm conflicts and gaps, as explained in the next section and more fully in Chapter 
Three.  
 
268 See CAT NR Comment supra note 245 at para 8.  
269 See, Poon Cornell Article supra note 132 at 33.  
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2.4 Non-Refoulement in European Law 
The principle of non-refoulement is also found in European law, namely EU law and European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) law. While Chapter Three provides a detailed explanation 
of the European asylum system and its relation to non-refoulement, this section briefly describes 
the presence of non-refoulement law within the EU, in order to compare it to the international law 
explained above. Therefore, this section explains where the principle of non-refoulement is found 
under EU law and ECHR law.  
EU law is the corpus of law that binds EU Member States.270 The EU acquis is ‘the body of 
common rights and obligations that are binding on all EU countries’.271 The EU acquis is 
comprised of EU primary and secondary law.272 EU primary law consists of treaties, which form 
the basis or ground rules for all EU action.273 EU secondary law includes regulations, directives, 
and decisions, and are derived from the principles and objectives set out in the treaties.274 Examples 
of EU primary law relevant to non-refoulement include the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(TFEU) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (EU Charter).275 Examples of EU 
secondary law relevant to non-refoulement include the Dublin III Regulation and its key directives, 
 
270 The EU is comprised of 27 Member States. The UK withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020: European Union, 
‘Countries’, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en.  
271 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, “Acquis”, 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en.  
272 The acquis refers to ‘the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all the EU members […] it is 
constantly evolving’, see: European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations”, 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en.  
273 European Union, “EU Law”, 28 January 2019, https://europa.eu/european-union/law_en.  
274 Ibid.  
275 TEFU supra note 18; EU Charter supra note 45. 
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namely: the Qualification Directive, Asylum Procedures Directive, and the Reception Conditions 
Directive.276 (Each of these secondary laws are discussed further in Chapter Three.) 
Although the EU is itself not a State Party to the Refugee Convention, EU primary law - namely 
Article 78 of the TFEU - requires that the EU establish a common asylum policy which is in 
compliance with the Refugee Convention, including the principle of non-refoulement.277 As 
primary law, all EU Member States are obliged to follow this treaty regardless of their pre-existing 
domestic asylum procedures.278 The EU Charter is also primary law. It does not have an explicit 
provision mentioning the term ‘non-refoulement’; instead, an iteration of the principle is 
formulated as the right to life and the prohibition against torture under Articles 2 and 4 respectively 
and Article 19 on protection from removal.279 Article 2 of the EU Charter states: ‘1. Everyone has 
the right to life. 2. No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed’.280 Article 4 says: 
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.281 
Article 19 indicates that ‘[n]o one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there 
is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’.282 Further, Article 18 of the EU Charter guarantees the right 
to asylum with ‘due respect for the rules of the [Refugee] Convention’, which includes non-
 
276 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform 
status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast) 
(2011) OJ L337/9 [Qualification Directive]; Asylum Procedures Directive supra note 24; Directive 2013/33/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for 
international protection (recast), OJ L180/96, 29 June 2013 [Reception Conditions Directive]. 
277 TFEU supra note 18 at art 78.  
278 EU primary law is comprised of treaties concluded at the international level.  
279 EU Charter supra note 45 at arts 2 and 4. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid at art 4.  
282 EU Charter supra note 45 at art 19. 
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refoulement.283 While the prohibition on refoulement is implicitly included in Articles 2, 4, and 
19, both the UNHCR and the CJEU also view Article 18 as incorporating protection from 
refoulement, and that this protection sets the common minimum standard which EU Member States 
are to follow.284 Thus, both the international refugee law and international human rights law 
conceptions of non-refoulement are included in EU primary law, through the TFEU and the EU 
Charter. They co-exist, creating a combined - and therefore robust - legal norm.  
Under EU secondary law, the recital of the Dublin III Regulation mentions the importance of 
safeguarding the principle of non-refoulement.285 Recital 3 of the Reception Conditions Directive 
mirrors this provision, reiterating that Member States are to follow and respect the principle of 
non-refoulement.286 Additionally, Article 21(1) of the Qualification Directive has a specific 
provision on the protection from refoulement.287 Article 21(1) states: ‘Member States shall respect 
 
283 Ibid at art 18.  
284 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee, “Conclusion No. 82 (XLVIII)”, 1997 at 
para d; HT v Land Baden-Württemberg, C-373/13 at paras 65-68.  
285 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at recital 3: ‘The European Council, at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 
and 16 October 1999, agreed to work towards establishing the CEAS, based on the full and inclusive application of 
the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as supplemented by the New York Protocol 
of 31 January 1967 (‘the Geneva Convention’), thus ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining 
the principle of non-refoulement. In this respect, and without the responsibility criteria laid down in this Regulation 
being affected, Member States, all respecting the principle of non-refoulement, are considered as safe countries for 
third-country nationals’. 
286 Reception Conditions Directive supra note 276 at recital 3: ‘At its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 
1999, the European Council agreed to work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based on the 
full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as 
supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967 (‘the Geneva Convention’), thus affirming the principle 
of non-refoulement. The first phase of a Common European Asylum System was achieved through the adoption of 
relevant legal instruments, including Directive 2003/9/EC, provided for in the Treaties’.  
287 Qualification Directive supra note 276 at art 21.  
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the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with their international obligations’.288 Article 
21(2) of the Qualification Directive mirrors Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, providing 
an exception to the prohibition on refoulement.289 The Asylum Procedures Directive also addresses 
an aspect of non-refoulement, particularly in Article 38, which provides for the ‘safe’ third country 
concept.290 Under Article 38, the Directive indicates that procedural safeguards must be in place 
for a non-EU (or ‘third’) country to be deemed ‘safe’, so that claimants who have demonstrated a 
‘sufficient connection’ with the ‘safe’ third country may be returned without contravening the 
principle of non-refoulement.291  
The principle of non-refoulement as reflected in these primary and secondary laws has been 
litigated before the Court of Justice of the EU, based in Luxembourg. The CJEU is tasked with 
monitoring Member States’ application of EU law and to ensure that EU law has been applied 
uniformly throughout the EU.292 The CJEU is comprised of two courts, namely the Court of Justice 
 
288 Ibid at art 21(1).  
289 Ibid at art 21(2): ‘Where not prohibited by the international obligations mentioned in paragraph 1, Member States 
may refoule a refugee, whether formally recognised or not, when: (a) there are reasonable grounds for considering 
him or her as a danger to the security of the Member State in which he or she is present; or (b) he or she, having been 
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that Member 
State’. 
290 Asylum Procedures Directive supra note 24 at art 38: ‘1. Member States may apply the safe third country concept 
only where the competent authorities are satisfied that a person seeking international protection will be treated in 
accordance with the following principles in the third country concerned: (a) life and liberty are not threatened on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; (b) there is no risk 
of serious harm as defined in Directive 2011/95/EU; (c) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention is respected; (d) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected; and (e) the possibility exists to 
request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention’.  
291 Ibid at art 38(2)(a).  
292 European Union, “Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)”, 21 February 2019, https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en#what-does-the-cjeu-do.   
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and the General Court.293 The Court of Justice handles requests for preliminary rulings from 
domestic courts of EU Member States, and is therefore the tribunal handling non-refoulement cases 
from individuals,294 while the General Court is tasked with ruling on actions dealing mainly with 
competition law, State aid, trade, agriculture, and trademarks.295 The CJEU has indicated that the 
CEAS is based on, inter alia, the guarantee that no one will be sent back to a territory where that 
person is at risk of being persecuted.296 The CJEU has waded directly into the debate about how 
the refugee and human rights law conceptions of non-refoulement fit together. The Court 
recognized that the Refugee Convention permits States to derogate from the principle of non-
refoulement in cases in which a refugee has committed a serious crime and presents a threat to the 
nation, or if the refugee presents a serious threat to society and that EU law transposed this, 
therefore permitting refoulement in these circumstances.297 At the same time, the Court found that 
EU law must conform with the EU Charter, which prohibits exposure to torture and inhuman or 
degrading punishment or treatment.298 Therefore, Member States cannot return refugees to their 
home States if there is a possibility that they will face such treatment.299 In this way, the CJEU has 
reaffirmed the dual and simultaneous application of the refugee and human rights approaches 
within the EU to non-refoulement, thereby providing claimants with the widest possible 
protections. 
ECHR law has two strands: the content of the ECHR itself, and the jurisprudence created by the 
ECtHR in its interpretation and application of the ECHR. The ECHR does not contain a specific 
 
293 Ibid. 
294 Ibid.  
295 Ibid.  
296 NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department and ME and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner and 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 21 December 2011 at para. 75 [NS/ME]. 
297 M, X and X, C-391/16, C-77/17, C-78/17, Judgment of 14 May 2019 at para 110. 
298 Ibid at para 110. 
299 Ibid. 
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provision on non-refoulement. Like the ICCPR and the CAT, however, it contains the right to life 
in Article 2 and a prohibition on torture in Article 3. The prohibition against torture under Article 
3 of the ECHR is absolute and without derogation, exclusion, or exception, even if there are 
concerns on national security grounds, unlike the Refugee Convention.300 The ECHR applies to 
all persons falling under the jurisdiction of any State Party to the ECHR, regardless of the 
nationality or legal status of the person in question.301 Therefore, unlike the Refugee Convention, 
the ECHR also applies to persons who have not yet left their country of origin or habitual 
residence.302 Thus, and perhaps not surprisingly, the conception of non-refoulement under the 
ECHR reflects international human rights law. 
The ECtHR is a court that monitors and scrutinizes the Council of Europe Member States’ 
implementation of the ECHR and is based in Strasbourg.303 The Council of Europe, an 
international organization and a separate entity from the EU, is comprised of 47 Member States, 
including the current 27 EU Member States that are a part of, and have acceded to, the ECHR.304 
All 27 EU Member States are, as a result of their membership within the Council of Europe, also 
members of the ECtHR.305 Parties to a case before the ECtHR must abide by the judgments of the 
ECtHR and take necessary measures to comply with them.306  
 
300 Saadi v Italy, App No 37201/06 (ECHR, 28 February 2008) [Saadi].  
301 ECHR supra note 114 at art 1.  
302 Fadele v the United Kingdom, App No 13078/87 (ECHR, 12 February 1990).  
303 Council of Europe, “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005.  
304 Council of Europe, “Our Member States”, https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/our-member-states.   
305 Ibid.  
306 ECHR supra note 114 at art 1. 
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The ECtHR has developed a significant body of non-refoulement case law based on the prohibition 
of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of the ECHR,307 
which it has indicated is an absolute, non-derogable right.308 Broader than the non-refoulement 
protection offered by the Refugee Convention, and in line with international human rights law, the 
ECtHR has interpreted Article 3 of the ECHR to be applicable to both State and non-State actors, 
to cover indirect refoulement, and to apply to all forms of removal from the host State to another 
State (to countries inside and outside of the CEAS).309 Importantly, the returning State (and not 
only the receiving State) are considered to be responsible for refoulement where there are 
 
307 Anja Klug, “Regional Developments: Europe” in Andreas Zimmermann (ed) The 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 124 [Klug]; 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees, The Case Law of the European Regional Courts: the Court of Justice 
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United Kingdom, No. 14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989 [Soering]; Cruz Varaz and others v Sweden, Series A, No 
201 [Cruz]; Vilvarajah and Others v the United Kingdom, Nos. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87 and 
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of 15 November 1996 at 1831-1874 [Chahal]. 
308 Soering supra note 307 at para 88; Chahal v the United Kingdom, No. 22414/93, Judgment [Grand Chamber] of 
15 November 1996 at paras 80-81; D v the United Kingdom, No. 30240/96, Judgment of 2 May 1997 at para 47; Saadi 
supra note 296 at para 138; Auad v Bulgaria, No. 46390/10, Judgment of 11 October 2011, at para 101; MSS v Belgium 
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note 308 at para 347; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v Turkey, No. 30471/08, Judgment of 22 September 2009, at para 88. 
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being exposed to ill-treatment through being forcibly transferred by any person to another State, it has an obligation 
to take ‘within the scope of [its] powers, such preventive operational measures that, judged reasonably, might be 
expected to avoid that risk’: Savriddin Dzhurayev v Russia, No. 71386/10, Judgment of 25 April 2013, at paras 177-
185; Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v Russia, no. 31890/11, Judgment of 03 October 2013 at paras 136-139; Ermakov v Russia, 
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substantial grounds for believing that the person concerned faces a real risk of torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment upon return or extradition.310 In terms of evaluating the risk 
of harm, the ECtHR has held that the harm may come from both State and non-State actors, and 
that, while the risk is usually intentionally inflicted, it could also arise in other circumstances 
(including in poor living conditions).311 The claimant only need be exposed to a ‘real risk’ of ill-
treatment, but it must be higher than a ‘mere possibility’ and lower than ‘more likely than not’.312 
The Court noted the particular vulnerability of asylum claimants as a factor to be considered when 
assessing the risk and severity of ill-treatment.313 Notably, the Court has indicated that assurances 
by the third State that the claimant will not be ill-treated are not, on their own, sufficient to 
demonstrate lack of risk: the quality and reliability of these assurances must be evaluated.314 The 
Court has also held that non-refoulement applies in cases involving returns to countries in which a 
substantial and foreseeable risk of the death penalty or execution exists.315 As well, the ECtHR has 
also held in its decisions that the ECHR takes precedence over other EU law obligations for EU 
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the United Kingdom, No. 45276/99, Judgment of 6 March 2001, at para 60.  
311 HLR v France, No. 24573/94, Judgment [GC] of 29 April 1997 at para 40; Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, No. 
1948/04, Judgment of 11 January 2007 at para 147; D v the United Kingdom, No. 30240/96, Judgment of 2 May 1997 
at para 49; MSS supra note 308 at paras 367 and 254. 
312 Vilvarajah supra note 307 at para 111; Saadi supra note 300 at para 140. 
313 MSS supra note 308 at para 232. 
314 Othman (Abu Qatada) v the United Kingdom, No. 8139/09, Judgment of 17 January 2012 at paras 187 and 189 
[Othman]; Chahal supra note 303 at para 105; Baysakov and Others v Ukraine, No. 54131/08, Judgment of 18 
February 2010 at paras 51-52. 
315 Bader and Kanbor v Sweden, App No 13284/04 (ECHR, 8 November 2005) [Bader and Kanbor]; Al Nashiri v 
Poland, No. 28761/11, 24 July 2014; AL (XW) v Russia, App No 44095/14 (ECHR, 29 October 2015). 
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Member States,316 thus reinforcing the human rights lens of non-refoulement and essentially 
confirming the widest protection approach of the CJEU.  
The ECtHR has indicated that non-refoulement protections are incorporated into ECHR rights 
other than Article 3. As mentioned above, the ECHR contains, in Article 2, a provision on the right 
to life. Since applicants have often argued non-refoulement concerns under both Article 2 and 3, 
the ECtHR has generally opted to examine the merits of the complaint under Article 3.317 However, 
in recent years, the Court has pronounced itself on non-refoulement considerations under Article 
2, finding that return to a serious risk of ‘a flagrant denial of a fair trial … the outcome of which 
was or is likely to be the death penalty’ is a violation of that principle.318 Other cases have 
considered the link between non-refoulement and Article 5, on the right to liberty and security of 
person, finding that, in principle, ‘a flagrant breach of Article 5 would occur only if, for example, 
the receiving State arbitrarily detained an applicant for many years without any intention of 
bringing him or her to trial … or if an applicant would be at risk of being imprisoned for a 
substantial period in the receiving State, having previously been convicted after a flagrantly unfair 
trial’.319 Similarly, cases have found a link between non-refoulement and Article 6, on the right to 
a fair trial for similar reasons: when there are ‘substantial grounds for believing that … [the 
applicant] would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to a flagrant denial of justice’.320 
 
316 TI supra note 16; See, also: Klug supra note 307 at 125.  
317 See, for example: Said v Netherlands, No. 2345/02, Decision of 5 October 2004 and Judgment of 5 July 2005; NA 
v The United Kingdom, No. 25904/07, Judgment of 17 July 2008.  
318 Bader and Kanbor supra note 315 at para 42. See also Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v The United Kingdom, No. 
61498/08, Judgment of 2 March 2010 at paras 118 and 123; and Öcalan v Turkey, No. 46221/99, Judgment of Grand 
Chamber of 12 May 2005 at para 166, which required a risk of an unfair trial, not a trial that was flagrantly unfair. 
The case of Kaboulov v The Ukraine, No. 41015/04, Judgment of 19 November 2009 indicated that the test was 
whether ‘there are substantial grounds to believe that the person in question, if extradited, would face a real risk of 
being liable to capital punishment in the receiving country’ or whether the sending State ‘knowingly puts the person 
concerned at such high risk of losing his life as for the outcome to be a near certainty’ at para 99. 
319 Othman supra note 314 at para 233. 
320 Ibid at para 261. 
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The full contours of the European understanding of non-refoulement are explored in Chapter 
Three, but this summary indicates the extent to which the EU conception reflects the international 
human rights law approach, and the intertwining of the principle as stated in the Refugee 
Convention with that approach. 
2.5 Conclusions on the Principle of Non-Refoulement  
International and European refugee law protects asylum seekers and refugees against refoulement 
while international and European human rights law protects all human beings regardless of their 
legal or political status against refoulement.321 The activities that are prohibited under refugee law 
include return to a place where persecution or death or where the asylum seeker or refugee’s life 
or freedom would be threatened, while in human rights law, the individual is protected against 
return to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.322 The obligation to protect 
asylum seekers, refugees, and other individuals from refoulement triggers both within a State’s 
territory and outside of the State’s territory. For example, the obligation of non-refoulement can 
trigger when an individual has not yet arrived in the territory of a State and has not yet been 
subjected to individual refugee status determination processes.323  
 
321 See analysis by Vincent Chetail and James Hathaway at footnotes 259 and 260 respectively on the discussion 
regarding the distinction between refugee law and human rights law.  
322 Ibid; For refugee law, see: Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 33(1); For human rights law, see: ICCPR supra 
note 22 at arts 6 and 7; CAT supra note 9 at art 3; Poon Cornell Article supra note 132 at 32-33.  
323 This topic is explored further in: Jenny Poon, “Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement: Triggering the 
Prohibition on the High Seas” (2020) 4 Refugee Review 114-128 [Poon Refugee Review]; Hirsi supra note 231 at 69; 
The test to determine State responsibility for protecting individuals from refoulement entails examining whether the 
State exercises effective authority and control over the individual: Hirsi supra note 231 at 69: “under international 
law concerning the protection of refugees, the decisive test in establishing the responsibility of a State was not whether 
the person being returned was on the territory of a State but whether that person fell under the effective control and 
authority of that State”; In the context of the high seas, once it can be shown that a State is exercising effective authority 
and control, by extension through the actions or omissions of that State’s agents, over the asylum claimants arriving 
in boats towards the shore of a State’s territory, non-refoulement obligations are triggered: For the test of effective 
authority and control, see: Bankovic et al v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States App no 52207/99 (ECHR, 12 
December 2001) (Admissibility Decision) at 37-38 [Bankovic].  
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Despite the distinctive nature of refugee law and human rights law in their application to asylum 
seekers, refugees, and individuals, the two branches of international law are clearly intrinsically 
intertwined. However, the exact manner of that interaction is still ambiguous. Refugee law protects 
a specific group of individuals, namely asylum seekers and refugees, and human rights law either 
fills in the legal gap by protecting those who do not fall under the definition of a refugee or protects 
everyone, including refugees. Some scholars argue that refugee law acts as a surrogate in the sense 
that it protects refugees who are unable to obtain protection from their host State.324 Other scholars 
argue that human rights law acts as complementary protection to refugee law instead of displacing 
the latter.325 Yet others argue that the role of human rights law is not merely complementary to 
refugee law, but is normatively superior to refugee law.326 While this debate has relevance at the 
international level, it is of less concern at the EU level due to the simultaneous application of both 
refugee law and human rights law conceptions of non-refoulement for asylum claimants and 
refugees.  
The principle of non-refoulement is a principle of central importance to refugee and human rights 
law given that its role is to protect those who are at risk of being returned to situations where their 
life or bodily integrity may be threatened. Given the complexity of the norm of non-refoulement 
and its application within Europe, the next chapter therefore explores the CEAS, also referred to 
as the Dublin System, in more detail. It highlights the history and challenges of the Dublin System, 
in particular how EU Member States’ non-refoulement obligations are undermined as a result of 
certain policies implemented within the EU to contain and control the flow of refugees. 
 
  
 
324 James C Hathaway, “Refugees and Asylum” in B Opeskin, R Perruchoud, and J Redpath-Cross (eds) Foundations 
of International Migration Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 7.2.6 [Hathaway Refugees and 
Asylum]. 
325 See more on this: McAdam Research Paper supra note 23.  
326 Chetail supra note 259.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Common European Asylum System and Non-Refoulement 
3. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is a destination region for many asylum claimants, with over 600,000 
asylum applicants arriving in EU Member States in 2019.327 Germany is currently the EU country 
with the most asylum applicants, with roughly 473,000 first-time asylum applications filed 
between January and September 2019.328 The mass influx of refugees into Europe began with the 
Syrian conflict in 2011, peaked in 2015 to 2016, and has shifted over time, but the issue of mass 
influx is still a European reality and a source of contention.329 This is evident in recent 
developments at the EU-Turkey border, when Turkey announced that it will ‘no longer be 
preventing refugees and migrants from crossing the border into Europe. [However] Greek 
authorities have responded by announcing that they will not allow people to seek asylum and will 
be sending people back to Turkey’.330  
 
327 Eurostat, “Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex: Monthly data (rounded)”, 5 May 
2020, https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctzm&lang=en. 
328 InfoMigrants, “Seeking Asylum in Europe in 2019: Facts and Figures”, 
https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/21810/seeking-asylum-in-europe-in-2019-facts-and-figures. 
329 Collett and Le Coz summarize it this way: “In late 2013, governments were alerted to increasing flows and 
significant loss of life along the central Mediterranean route. After a particularly notable tragedy in which at least 800 
migrants drowned, and emergency European Summit was held in April 2015 …the impact at this stage was largely 
confined to a single EU Member State: Italy. However, during the summer of 2015, the number of sea arrivals from 
Turkey and Greece rose exponentially, followed by a mass movement of asylum seekers and migrants through the 
Western Balkans and onwards to a wide range of EU Member States [totalling 1 million in 2015]. This shift in flow 
changed the nature of the crisis, and its depth … the scale of the phenomenon in the eastern Mediterranean challenged 
the European Union’s ability to respond on multiple fronts.” Elizabeth Collett and Camille Le Coz, ‘After the Storm: 
Learning from the EU Response to the Migration Crisis’ (Migration Policy Institute Europe, June 2018) at 4. 
330 Norwegian Refugee Council, “Q&A: What does the Turkish border situation mean for Europe?”, 
https://www.nrc.no/news/2020/march/q--a-refugees-and-migrants-to-europe.  
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The purpose of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is to harmonize asylum standards 
across the EU and to create efficient access to asylum procedures.331 Despite established EU law 
specifying the minimum standards of procedural safeguards for these applicants - including on 
non-refoulement - the Dublin System332 has been critiqued by academic commentators, the 
UNHCR, nongovernmental organizations, and Member States as ineffective and deficient.333  
This chapter aims to explain the law - written law, case law, and procedural law - applied in the 
EU regarding the refugee law principle of non-refoulement. It does so in order to illustrate the 
obligations EU Member States are meant to implement with respect to non-refoulement, and the 
gap that exists between obligations and actual practice. Therefore, this chapter begins by 
examining the sources and hierarchy of EU law and ECHR law in order to provide a background 
as to the where non-refoulement is derived under European law. Given the discussion in Chapter 
Two of the relationship between international refugee law and international human rights law, the 
 
331 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Common European Asylum System”, 11 June 2019 
[CEAS]. 
332 While often used interchangeably with the term 'CEAS' in this thesis, the Dublin System refers to a particular part 
of the CEAS: the Dublin III Regulation of 2013, which replaced the earlier Dublin II Regulation of 2003 and the 
original Dublin Convention of 1990. Essentially, the Dublin System is a mechanism in the EU which identifies which 
EU country is responsible for processing the asylum application of someone belonging to a non-EU country or a 
stateless person. Usually, this is the first EU member state that the claimant enters. The Regulation also strives to 
ensure that each application gets a fair examination in one EU country. Signatories to the Dublin III Regulation include 
the EU’s 27 Member States, and Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. 
333 For example: Olga Ferguson Sidorenko, The Common European Asylum System: Background, Current State of 
Affairs, Future Direction. (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2007) at 16 [Olga]; Guy S Goodwin-Gill, Jane McAdam, 
The Refugee in International Law (3rd ed) (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2007) [Goodwin-Gill]; UNHCR, 
“Moving Further Toward a Common European Asylum System: UNHCR’s statement on the EU asylum legislative 
package” Bureau for Europe, June 2013; MSS supra note at 308; TI supra note at 16; French President Francois 
Hollade has publicly condemned the Dublin System: “Frankly, the Dublin process, in its present form, is obsolete” in 
Daniel Thym, “Beyond Dublin – Merkel’s Vision of EU Asylum Policy”, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and 
Policy, 26 October 2015; Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto of Hungary stated: “The Dublin system is dead” in Marton 
Dunai, “Hungary says EU’s Dublin rules ‘dead’; won’t leg migrants come back”, Ruth Pitchford (ed), Thomson 
Reuters UK, 11 November 2015. 
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interrelationship between EU law and ECHR law is crucial and, as will be seen, results in a 
relatively robust norm prohibiting refoulement. The chapter then discusses the asylum process 
within the CEAS, followed by an exploration of gaps between the way the norm of non-
refoulement is articulated in EU legal documents and how it is observed in practice, particularly 
as a result of the EU’s ‘margin of discretion’ when implementing refugee law at the domestic level 
and the presumption of mutual trust between EU Member States.334 Finally, it ends with 
concluding remarks on the meaning of these gaps.  
3.1 The European Legal Order 
EU law and ECHR law establish the obligations of EU Member States with respect to refugee law 
and, more specifically, the principle of non-refoulement. This subsection therefore begins by 
explaining the sources and hierarchy of EU law, before launching into a discussion of the scope 
and content of EU law as it relates to non-refoulement. Next, it examines the sources, hierarchy, 
scope and content of ECHR law in the same manner. Both discussions illustrate the multi-layered 
nature of refugee law within Europe, particularly as it relates to non-refoulement. 
 
 
 
 
334 Note that the ‘margin of discretion’ is similar but not the same as the ‘margin of appreciation’, which is a concept 
created by the European Court of Human Rights. The ‘margin of discretion’ is the discretionary room of EU Member 
States when interpreting and applying legal norms under EU law. The ‘margin of appreciation’ is the discretionary 
room of Council of Europe Member States when they interpret and apply legal norms under ECHR law. The distinction 
between the ‘margin of discretion’ under EU law and the ‘margin of appreciation’ under ECHR law is an important 
one, as, although similar, the ‘margin of appreciation’ is a well-developed doctrine in ECHR law that has a body of 
jurisprudence signaling its application. On the other hand, the ‘margin of discretion’ concerns an EU Member State’s 
discretionary room when interpreting and applying a provision of EU law and is within the purview of the Court of 
Justice; For more on the ‘margin of discretion’ in EU law, see, generally: TB v Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal 
(Case C-519/18), CJEU, 5 September 2019; For more on the ‘margin of appreciation’ in ECHR law, see: Steven Greer, 
The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2000), 1-60.  
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3.1.1 EU Law  
EU law is comprised of both primary and secondary law.335 The EU was established by a number 
of treaties, namely: The Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The Treaty of Maastricht (or, formally, the Treaty on European Union) officially established the 
EU, and subsequent treaty amendments, detailed below, expanded the powers of the EU in its 
relations with Member States.336 The Treaty of Maastricht was adopted on February 7, 1992, which 
also created a single European currency, the Euro.337 The Treaty of Amsterdam (or, formally, the 
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts) was signed on October 2, 1997 and made 
substantive changes to the Treaty of Maastricht, in which EU Member States agreed to defer 
certain powers under immigration, civil and criminal laws, and foreign security policies, to the 
European Parliament.338 The Treaty of Lisbon (or, formally, the Treaty of Lisbon Amending the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Treaty of 
Lisbon) was signed on December 13, 2007. This treaty amended the Treaty of Maastricht and the 
Treaty of Rome (the treaty which created the European Economic Community, the precursor to the 
EU).339 
 
335 European Union, “Sources and Scope of European Union Law: Fact Sheets on the European Union – 2016”, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.2.1.pdf at 1 [EU Sources]. 
336 European Union, “The History of the European Union”, 18 November 2016, https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/history_en.  
337 Ibid; See also: Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht, 7 February 1992, OJ 
C325/5, 24 December 2002, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39218.html [TEU].  
338 European Parliament, “Fact Sheets on the European Union: The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties”, October 
2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.1.3.html; See also: Treaty on 
European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Amsterdam (adopted 2 October 1997, entered into force 1 May 
1999), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dec906d4.html.  
339 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 
Treaty of Lisbon, 13 December 2007, 2007 C306/01, http://www.refworld.org/docid/476258d32.html.  
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The sources of EU law are primary and secondary legislation. Examples of primary legislation are: 
the Treaty of the EU (TEU), Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), and international 
agreements.340 EU treaties and general principles of EU law are known as primary legislation and 
are at the top of the legal EU hierarchy.341 Examples of primary EU treaties that are relevant to 
this thesis include: the TEU, TFEU, and the EU Charter.342 Next in the legal hierarchy are 
international agreements concluded by the EU, which are subordinate to primary legislation.343 At 
the bottom of the legal hierarchy of the EU is secondary legislation.344 Primary legislation 
supersedes secondary legislation, and secondary legislation is only valid if it is consistent with the 
acts and agreements which have precedence over it.345 
Secondary legislation is made up of legislative acts, delegated acts, and implementing acts.346 
Legislative acts are ‘legal acts which are adopted through the ordinary or a special legislative 
procedure’.347 Delegated acts are ‘non-legislative acts of general application which supplement or 
amend certain non-essential elements of a legislative act’.348 Implementing acts are ‘generally 
 
340 EU sources supra note 335 at 1. 
341 Ibid. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid; See, also: Kadi II, C-584/10P, C-593/10P, C-595/10P, Judgment of 18 July 2013 at para 119 [Kadi II]: ‘the 
Court of Justice thus seems to have regarded the constitutional framework created by the EC Treaty as a wholly 
autonomous legal order, not subject to the higher rules of international law – in this case the law deriving from the 
Charter of the United Nations’ (emphasis added). 
344 Ibid. 
345 Ibid. 
346 EU Sources supra note 335 at 2 
347 Ibid. 
348 Ibid. 
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adopted by the Commission […] Implementing acts are a matter for the Council only in specific 
cases which are duly justified and in areas of common foreign and security policy’.349  
Legislative acts include regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions.350 
Regulations are binding legislative acts that must be applied in their entirety across the EU.351 
Directives, on the other hand, are legislative acts that set out a goal that all EU Member States 
must achieve, but it is up to the individual Member States to devise their own laws on how to 
achieve these goals.352 Decisions are binding on only those to whom they are addressed, including 
EU Member States and natural or legal persons, and are directly applicable.353 Recommendations 
are not binding, but allow the EU institutions to make their views known and suggest a line of 
action without imposing any legal obligation on EU Member States.354 Opinions are instruments 
that allow EU institutions to make a statement in a non-binding fashion without imposing any legal 
obligation on those to whom they are addressed.355  
The EU is comprised of a number of institutions. The most important EU institutions are the EU 
Parliament, the EU Commission, and the EU Council. The EU Parliament is a directly-elected EU 
body with legislative, supervisory, and budgetary responsibilities.356 The EU Commission 
promotes the general interests of the EU by proposing and enforcing legislation and implementing 
 
349 Ibid. 
350 Ibid. 
351 Europa, “Regulations, Directives and Other Acts”, 12 November 2016, https://europa.eu/european-
union/law/legal-acts_en.  
352 Ibid. 
353 Ibid. 
354 Ibid. 
355 Ibid. 
356 Europa, “EU Institutions and Other Bodies”, 12 November 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/institutions-bodies_en.  
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policies and the EU budget.357 The EU Council defines the general political direction and priorities 
of the EU.358   
Now that the general structure of EU law has been explained, it is important to explain EU law on 
the principle of non-refoulement. The scope of EU law on non-refoulement is evident in the 
relevant EU primary and secondary legislation on asylum, the legally-binding force of these pieces 
of legislation, and the application of the Schengen Area in relation to the freedom of movement of 
non-EU nationals.  
Primary and secondary legislation such as the TFEU, EU Charter, and the Qualification Directive 
(recast) define the scope of the application of non-refoulement in EU law. Although the EU is itself 
not a States Party to the Refugee Convention or the Protocol, all of the EU Member States are 
signatories to, and have ratified, both treaties and the EU itself is bound by the TFEU.359 Article 
78 of the TFEU provides the legal basis for the EU to comply with the principle of non-
refoulement: this Article obliges EU Member States to establish a common European asylum 
policy which complies with the Refugee Convention and the Protocol. Additionally, the principle 
of non-refoulement articulated as the prohibition against return to torture is found under Article 
19(2) of the EU Charter, which states that:  
no one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious 
risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.360  
 
357 Ibid. 
358 Ibid. 
359 European Parliament, “Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union: Directorate B, Policy Department, 
Briefing Paper: Current Challenges for International Refugee Law, with a Focus on EU Policies and EU Co-Operation 
with the UNHCR”, December 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/433711/EXPO-
DROI_NT(2013)433711_EN.pdf at 6; TFEU supra note 18 at art 78. 
360 EU Charter supra note 45 at art 19(2).  
82 
 
The principle of non-refoulement is therefore violated when an EU Member State removes a 
person if there is a real risk of ill-treatment in the receiving State, whether or not the removed 
person is actually ill-treated in the receiving State.361 Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive 
(recast) similarly recognizes the importance of the principle of non-refoulement and extends 
‘subsidiary protection’ - in other words, complementary protection - for asylum claimants who do 
not meet the definition of ‘refugee’ under Article 1A of the Refugee Convention.362  Under Article 
15(b), ‘subsidiary protection’ may be provided to those facing ‘serious harm’, consisting of ‘torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin’.363  
The legally-binding nature of EU primary and secondary legislation determines how this 
legislation is applied in the EU. For example, EU Member States are automatically bound by EU 
regulations and decisions on the date they take effect.364 Directives, however, must first be 
incorporated into domestic legislation by EU Member States.365 The EU Commission monitors 
whether EU Member States have correctly applied EU law and the CJEU ensures that EU laws are 
interpreted and applied uniformly across all EU Member States.366 The clauses concerning non-
refoulement in both primary and secondary EU law all use the terms ‘no one’, ‘any person’, or ‘no 
person’, so that asylum claimants, refugees and all Third-Country Nationals are protected under 
 
361 Eman Hamdan, The Principle of Non-refoulement under the ECHR and the UN Convention Against Torture 
(Leiden: Brill, 2016) at 16 [Hamdan]. 
362 See, generally: Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007); Qualification Directive supra note 276 at art 15(b); Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 
1A; See, also: Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2007) at chp 2 [McAdam Complementary Protection]. 
363 Qualification Directive supra note 276 at art 15(b). 
364 European Commission, “Applying EU Law”, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/applying-eu-
law_en.  
365 Ibid; However, it is up to the Member State in question to incorporate the directors into their domestic law.  
366 European Union, “Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)”, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en.   
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those provisions.367 (A ‘Third-Country National’ is an individual who is a non-EU citizen who is 
also not a person enjoying the EU right to free movement).368 
The Schengen Area and its application to freedom of movement define the scope of EU law as it 
is applied to Third-Country Nationals. Under EU law, States have the sovereign right to control 
the entry and presence of non-nationals in their territories.369 However, EU law and the ECHR 
impose certain limitations on this sovereignty, namely, that rejections at the border of individuals 
at risk of persecution or other serious harm in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement is 
not permitted.370 The Schengen acquis establishes ‘a unified system for maintaining external 
border controls and allows individuals to travel freely across borders within the Schengen Area’.371 
The Schengen Area guarantees freedom of movement for EU nationals and those who are legally 
present.372 The Schengen Area was established in 1985 when the Governments of the States of 
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the French Republic signed the 
 
367 Violeta Moreno-Lax, “EU Non-Refoulement (The Irrelevance of) Territoriality and Pre-Border Controls” in 
Accessing Asylum in Europe: Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under EU Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017) at 289 [Moreno-Lax]; See, also: EU Charter supra note 45 at arts 4 and 19(2). 
368 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Third-Country National”, https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/content/third-country-national_en.   
369 Council of Europe, “Handbook on European Law Relating to Asylum, Borders and Immigration”, 2014, 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/handbook-law-asylum-migration-borders-2nded_en.pdf at 26 [EU Handbook]. 
370 Ibid; For the protection from refoulement under EU law, see: Qualification Directive supra note 276 at art 15(b); 
For the Council of Europe, see: ECHR supra note 114 at art 3. 
371 EU Handbook supra note 369 at 27. 
372 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Schengen Area”, 29 January 2016, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/index_en.htm [Schengen 
Area]. 
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Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 1985.373 The Schengen Area ‘entitles every 
EU citizen to travel, work and live in any EU country without special formalities’.374 The Schengen 
Area encompasses the very idea of freedom of movement as guaranteed under Article 45 of the 
EU Charter.375 The Schengen Area applies to most EU Member States except for Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.376 As a result of Brexit, the United Kingdom has reached 
an agreement with the Council of the European Union and the EU Parliament to include the United 
Kingdom in Part 1 Annex II of Regulation 2018/1806 on possession of visas for third country 
nationals.377 This means that, although after Brexit, ‘the Treaties and Directive 2004/38/EC, along 
with the right to enter the territory of the Member States without a visa or equivalent formalities, 
will cease to apply to nationals of the United Kingdom who are British citizens’, including the 
United Kingdom in the annex of Regulation 2018/1806, British citizens will be exempt from the 
visa requirement.378 Article 21 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement provides 
that Third-Country Nationals who hold ‘uniform visas and who have legally entered the territory 
of a Schengen state may freely move within the whole Schengen Area while their visas are still 
 
373 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of States of the 
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of 
checks at their common borders, OJ 2000 L249/19.  
374 Schengen Area supra note 372. 
375 EU Charter supra note 45 at art 45. 
376 EU Handbook supra note 369 at 27. 
377 Council of the European Union, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of 
visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, as regards the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union – Confirmation of the final compromise text with a view to 
agreement”, 2018/0390(COD), 2 April 2019 at 6, para 3.  
378 Ibid.  
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valid’.379 The Schengen Area was at risk of collapse due to the mass influx of asylum claimants 
into and across Europe since the beginning of the Syrian war in 2011, leading to the temporary 
reinstatement of border controls by some EU Member States within the Schengen Area.380 This is 
examined in more detail in the next chapter. 
The content of EU law in the asylum context is found in the key instruments comprising the CEAS 
and its procedures. The history of the CEAS began in 1999 when the European Commission started 
working with Member States to create a common asylum policy.381 The central aim of the CEAS 
is to establish a harmonized, fair, and effective asylum procedure to process asylum claims across 
EU Member States, while complying with international law obligations to protect asylum 
claimants fleeing from persecution.382 The CEAS was established under Article 78 of the TFEU, 
which provides that the CEAS must respect EU Member States’ obligations under the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol (which includes the prohibition on refoulement).383 The CEAS also has 
related aims, expressed in different ways. For example, the European Council indicates that the 
CEAS is meant to assist with the development of the EU as ‘an area of freedom, security and 
justice’.384 Additionally, the European Commission’s Policy Plan on Asylum in 2008 stated that 
the CEAS is meant to: harmonize the standards of protection by aligning EU Member States’ 
asylum legislation; enhance effectiveness and support practical cooperation among EU Member 
States on matters relating to asylum; and increase solidarity and responsibility-sharing among EU 
 
379 EU Handbook supra note 365 at 29; Third Country Nationals are defined as ‘anyone who is not a citizen of an EU 
country’ in EUR-Lex, “Non-EU Nationals – Rules for Long-Term Residence”, 23 August 2016, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al23034.   
380 Library of Congress, “Refugee Law and Policy: European Union”, 21 June 2016, 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/europeanunion.php.  
381 CEAS supra note at 331.  
382 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 1A; CEAS supra note 331.  
383 TFEU supra note 18 at art 78. 
384 EUR-Lex, “Justice, Freedom and Security”, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/justice_freedom_security.html?root_default=SUM_1_CODED=23.  
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Member States and between EU and non-EU Member States.385 With all of these goals in mind, 
the instruments comprising the CEAS are meant to create clarity in determining the EU Member 
State responsible for processing asylum applications, set common standards for a fair and efficient 
asylum procedure, indicate common minimum conditions of reception of asylum applicants, and 
establish the rules on recognition and granting of refugee status.386 They create a minimum 
standard for EU Member States, although the instruments provide room for State interpretation as 
to how substantive and procedural CEAS rules are implemented into domestic legislation.387 
The CEAS has been reformed in three phases. Phase I of the CEAS, from 1999-2003, focused on 
the adoption of legislation necessary to implement common minimum standards for asylum,388 
including on the reception of asylum claimants, qualification of claimants for international 
protection, the content of the protection granted, and procedures for granting and withdrawing 
refugee status.389 The first phase involved the drafting and adoption of the Qualification Directive, 
the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive, the Dublin Convention, the 
Eurodac Regulation, the Temporary Protection Directive and the Family Reunification 
 
385 Ibid; See also: Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: 
Policy Plan on Asylum”, Brussels, 17 June 2008, COM(2008) 360 Final, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0360:FIN:EN:PDF at 4. 
386 Ibid. 
387 Ibid at 31; TEU supra note 337 at art 63(1) and (2)(a). 
388 CEAS supra note 331.  
389 European Asylum Support Office, “An Introduction to the Common European Asylum System for Courts and 
Tribunals”, August 2016 at 15.  
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Directive.390 The second phase took place from 2004-2013.391 Phase II reformed Phase I of the 
CEAS and involved five main measures: recasting the Qualification Directive from 2004 to 
2011/95/EU, recasting the Asylum Procedures Directive from 2005 to 2013/32/EU, recasting the 
Reception Conditions Directive from 2003 to 2013/33/EU, recasting the Dublin II Regulation from 
2003 to Dublin III Regulation (604/2013), and recasting the Eurodac Regulation from 2000 to 
2013.392 The CEAS is currently in its third phase, and is now being discussed before the European 
Council.393 The first package of the third phase to reform the CEAS was presented in May 2018, 
which included a proposal to recast the Qualification Directive and the Asylum Procedures 
Directive from directives into binding regulations, a recast of the Reception Conditions Directive, 
and a ‘Dublin IV’ Proposal.394 This work is still ongoing.  
Of all of the instruments mentioned, the central instruments of the CEAS are the Dublin 
Convention (1990), the Dublin II Regulation (2003), the Dublin III Regulation (2013), and three 
key directives: Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU), the Asylum Procedures Directive 
(2013/32/EU), and the Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU), which together are known 
as the ‘Dublin System’.395 The Dublin III Regulation is an instrument which sets out the criteria 
 
390 Statewatch, “Analysis: The second phase of the Common European Asylum System: A Brave New World – or 
lipstick on a pig?”, 8 April 2013 at 2-3, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-220-ceas-second-phase.pdf; See, also: 
Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of 
a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving 
such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, OJ L212/12, 7 August 2001; Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 
September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L251/12, 3 October 2003. 
391 Ibid at 16.  
392 Ibid.  
393 Ibid. 
394 European Council, “Timeline: Reform of EU Asylum Rules”, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/ceas-
reform/ceas-reform-timeline.   
395 Dublin III Regulation supra note at 25; Qualification Directive supra note 276 at art 15(b); Asylum Procedures 
Directive supra note 24 at recital 12; Reception Conditions Directive supra note 276 at art 1. 
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which determines the Member State responsible for determining asylum applications for Third-
Country Nationals and stateless persons.396 Under the Dublin III Regulation, Article 3(2) allows 
Member States to send the asylum claimant back to the Member State responsible as determined 
by the Regulation based on a set criterion (termed ‘Dublin transfer’).397 For instance, the practice 
in some Member States such as Germany is that, a ‘personal conversation’ takes place to allow the 
asylum claimant to explain to the asylum official any reasons why a deportation to another Dublin 
State could be impeded, such as the existence of relatives in Germany. The Qualification Directive 
sets out the procedures for determining Third-Country Nationals and stateless persons who qualify 
for international protection and for subsidiary protection.398 The Asylum Procedures Directive sets 
out the standards which Member States are to follow in the granting and withdrawing of 
international protection.399 Finally, the Reception Conditions Directive sets out the standards 
which Member States are to follow for the reception conditions - the conditions under which 
applicants for international protection live within the host state.400  
Of these CEAS documents, as mentioned earlier, Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive 
(recast) directly recognizes the importance of the principle of non-refoulement. As well, non-
refoulement is also formulated under Articles 28(2), 35(b), 39(4), 41, and Annex I (c) of the 
 
396 Ibid; The UK has opted into the Dublin III Regulation, see, for example: Cathryn Costello, “Policy Primer: The 
UK, the Common European Asylum System and EU Immigration Law”, 2 May 2014 at 5, which states: ‘the UK has 
opted in to the Dublin III Regulation, which purports to address some of the problems outlined above. In particular, 
the reform provides for crisis-prevention and cooperation measures between Member States, places limits on detention 
of asylum seekers, and prevents transfer of a person where there is a real risk of violating a fundamental right’ [Costello 
Policy Primer]. 
397 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 3(2).  
398 Qualification Directive supra note 276. 
399 Asylum Procedures Directive supra note 24.  
400 Reception Conditions Directive supra note 276. 
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Asylum Procedures Directive.401 The recitals of the three key directives of the CEAS, although 
non-binding as they are not the operative provisions of the directive, also reiterate some form of 
non-refoulement.402 Apart from these explicit references to non-refoulement, the common 
procedures created by the Dublin System are meant to provide a shared framework which fulfills 
EU Member States’ obligations under the Refugee Convention and protect claimants against 
violations of their rights, including the right not to be refouled.  
The above-mentioned ongoing negotiations for Phase III of the reforms of the CEAS include 
proposals to recast the Qualification Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive from 
directives into regulations; this phase also includes the proposal to reform the Dublin III 
 
401 Asylum Procedures Directive supra note 24 at art 28(2) states: ‘Member States shall ensure that such a person is 
not removed contrary to the principle of non-refoulement’; Article 35(b) states: ‘he or she otherwise enjoys sufficient 
protection in that country, including benefiting from the principle of non- refoulement […]’; Article 38 states: ‘the 
principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is respected’; Article 39(4) states: ‘The 
Member States concerned shall lay down in national law the modalities for implementing the provisions of paragraph 
1 and the consequences of decisions pursuant to those provisions in accordance with the principle of non-refoulement, 
including providing for exceptions from the application of this Article for humanitarian or political reasons or for 
reasons of public international law’; Article 41 states: ‘Member States may make such an exception only where the 
determining authority considers that a return decision will not lead to direct or indirect refoulement in violation of that 
Member State’s international and Union obligations’; Annex I (c) states: ‘respect for the non-refoulement principle in 
accordance with the Geneva Convention’.   
402 See, for example: Asylum Procedures Directive supra note 24 at recital para 3, which states: ‘The European 
Council, at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999, agreed to work towards establishing a Common 
European Asylum System, based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967 (‘the Geneva Convention’), 
thus affirming the principle of non-refoulement and ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution’; For the binding 
nature of EU directives, see: Case C-162/97, Nilsson [1998] ECR I-7477 at para 54: ‘the preamble to a Community 
act has no binding legal force and cannot be relied on as a ground for derogating from the actual provisions of the act 
in question’; See, also: Robert Baratta, “EU Legislative Drafting: Views from those applying EU law in the Member 
States”, 19th Quality of Legislation Seminar, 2014, Brussels,  
https://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/seminars/20140703_baratta_speech.pdf.  
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Regulation into ‘Dublin IV’.403 Both proposals could be a positive step towards deeper respect for 
the principle of non-refoulement. A ‘directive’ of the EU is a legislative act establishing a goal that 
all EU countries must achieve, but requires domestic legislation in order to transpose the provisions 
within each EU country.404 A ‘regulation’ of the EU, on the other hand, is a binding legislative act, 
which must be applied in its entirety across the EU.405 Recasting the key instruments of the CEAS 
from directives to regulations results in directly imposing asylum policies of the EU upon Member 
States, rather than requiring Member States to transpose them into domestic legislation. Requiring 
Member States to transpose their EU law obligations into domestic law through directives 
potentially leaves each country a wide ‘margin of appreciation’ or ‘margin of discretion’ in the 
transposition of such provisions and could lead to the circumvention of international law, including 
non-refoulement obligations, in instances when a Member State’s interpretation of non-
refoulement obligations are overly narrow.406 Thus, the Phase III reforms could help to eliminate 
the variability in EU Member States’ interpretations of the prohibition against refoulement. 
The proposal to improve the Dublin III Regulation, termed ‘Dublin IV’, is currently underway, but 
the proposal has already received criticism from various academic commentators and 
 
403 See, generally: Cathryn Costello, “The UK, the Common European Asylum System and EU Immigration Law”, 2 
May 2014, https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/primers/the-uk-the-common-european-asylum-system-
and-eu-immigration-law [Costello Migration Observatory]; European Parliament, “The Common European Asylum 
System – Third Reform”, 28 February 2017, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/PERI/2017/580866/IPOL_PERI(2017)580866_EN.pdf.  
404 European Union, “Regulations, Directives and Other Acts”, 24 May 2018, https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-
law/legal-acts_en.  
405 Ibid.  
406 This issue was explored in more detail in: Jenny Poon, “Is the Margin of Appreciation Accorded to European Union 
Member States Too Wide, Permitting Violations of International Law?” Opinio Juris, 16 August 2016, 
http://opiniojuris.org/2016/08/16/emerging-voices-is-the-margin-of-appreciation-accorded-to-european-union-
member-states-too-wide-permitting-violation-of-international-law [Poon MOA]; See above for an explanation of the 
distinctions between a ‘margin of appreciation’ and a ‘margin of discretion’. 
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nongovernmental organizations.407 Among the critiques is the claim that the ‘Dublin IV’ proposal, 
in contrast with the Dublin III Regulation, intends to determine responsibility for examining 
asylum applications based on a formula calculated using the Member States’ population size as 
well as Gross Domestic Product.408 The problem with this formula is that the uneven ‘burden’ 
faced by Member States geographically situated near the external borders of the EU, including the 
burden of ensuring individuals are not refouled, is not considered.409 
In sum, EU law contains several important protections against refoulment of individuals. Article 
78 of the TFEU obliges EU Member States to establish a common European asylum policy which 
complies with the Refugee Convention and the Protocol, including the prohibition on refoulement. 
Article 19(2) of the EU Charter prohibits an individual being sent to a country where there is a 
serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive (recast) also 
 
407 See, for example: Steve Peers, “The Orbanisation of EU Asylum Law: The latest EU asylum proposals”, 6 May 
2016, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.ca/2016/05/the-orbanisation-of-eu-asylum-law.html; Marcello Di Filippo, 
“Dublin ‘reloaded’ or time for ambitious pragmatism?”, 12 October 2016, http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/dublin-
reloaded; International Commission of Jurists, “Procedural rights in the proposed Dublin IV Regulation”, 27 
September 2016, http://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/EU-Dublin-IV-Regulation_Comment-Advocacy-
Analysis-Brief-2016-ENG.pdf; European Council on Refugee and Exiles, “ECRE Comments on the Commission 
Proposal for a Dublin IV Regulation, COM(2016) 270”, October 2016, http://www.ecre.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/ECRE-Comments-Dublin-IV.pdf.  
408 The formula variables are: the population, total Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the average number of asylum 
applications over the 5 preceding years per million inhabitants with a cap of 30% of the population and GDP, and the 
unemployment rate with a cap of 30% of the population and GDP of the EU Member State in European Commission, 
“Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a crisis relocation mechanism 
and amending Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national or a stateless person”, 
2015/0208 (COD), Brussels, 9 September 2015 at 10-13. 
409 This issue is further explored in: Jenny Poon, “ESIL Reflection: The EU Commission on ‘Dublin IV’: Sufficient 
Safeguards for Asylum Claimants?” (2016) 5:9 European Society of International Law, Reflections 1-10, http://esil-
sedi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ESIL-Reflections-Jenny-Poon-Nov-2016-Revision-20161109-clean_1.pdf.  
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recognizes the importance of the principle of non-refoulement. Another direct mention of non-
refoulement within the EU Directives is found in paragraph 3 of the recital of the Reception 
Conditions Directive (recast).410 The CEAS itself also creates the framework of agreed rules which 
establish common procedures for asylum across the EU - procedures which are meant to more 
generally assist EU Member States in meeting their refugee law obligations, including protection 
against non-refoulement.411 Although heavily referenced within key EU directives of the CEAS, 
the practice of EU law often reveals procedural and substantive gaps within the interpretation and 
implementation of non-refoulement in reality. Given the centrality of the principle of non-
refoulement in international refugee law, it is important that the interpretation and implementation 
of non-refoulement in EU law is in line with the minimum international standards set by the 
Refugee Convention.  
EU law and the CEAS framework co-exist with ECHR law, described in the next subsection. When 
considering the content of the principle of non-refoulement within Europe, it is important to 
consider both EU law and ECHR law together.   
3.1.2 ECHR Law  
The Council of Europe is a separate entity from the EU and is an international organization focused 
on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, comprised of the 47 Member States that acceded 
 
410 Reception Conditions Directive supra note 276 at recital para 3: ‘At its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 
October 1999, the European Council agreed to work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based 
on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as 
supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967 (‘the Geneva Convention’), thus affirming the principle 
of non-refoulement. The first phase of a Common European Asylum System was achieved through the adoption of 
relevant legal instruments, including Directive 2003/9/EC, provided for in the Treaties’.  
411 CEAS supra note 331.  
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to the ECHR.412 All current 27 EU Member States are members of the Council of Europe.413 A 
main body of the Council of Europe is the ECtHR, located in Strasbourg, which is tasked with 
monitoring Council of Europe Member States’ compliance with the ECHR.414  
The ECtHR creates jurisprudence stemming from interpretations of the ECHR. Article 3 of the 
ECHR is important in the asylum context because it codifies non-refoulement protection in the 
form of the prohibition against torture in ECHR law.415 Article 3 states: ‘no one shall be subjected 
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.416 The ECtHR has been 
‘characterized as the vanguard institution on non-refoulement […] substantively leading the 
development of international law’ on this principle.417 A foundational case in this respect is 
Soering v. the United Kingdom, in which the Strasbourg court decided that, although States Parties 
to the ECHR have the right to control the entry, residence, and expulsion of aliens through 
domestic legislation, this right is not absolute and is restricted by their obligations under the ECHR, 
such as the requirement to comply with the prohibition against torture under Article 3.418 This 
prohibition against torture is an absolute prohibition, as indicated by the ECtHR in other cases 
 
412 Council of Europe, “Values: Human Rights, Democracy, and Rule of Law”, http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-
us/values. 
413 Europe in Strasbourg, “Member States of the European Union and the Council of Europe”, http://en.strasbourg-
europe.eu/member-states,44987,en.html.   
414 Council of Europe, Migration and Human Rights “European Court of Human Rights”, 
http://www.coe.int/t/democracy/migration/bodies/echr_en.asp.  
415 ECHR supra note 114 at art 3. 
416 Ibid.  
417 Basak Cali, Cathryn Costello, and Stewart Cunningham, “Hard Protection through Soft Courts? Non-Refoulement 
before the United Nations Treaty Bodies” (2020) 21 German Law Journal 355-384, at 357 [Cali et al].   
418 Soering supra note 307 at para 85. 
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such as Ireland v. the United Kingdom.419 It has also been held by the ECtHR that the obligation 
of non-refoulement under Article 3 of the ECHR extends to cases where there is a real risk of cruel 
treatment in the receiving State.420 The ECtHR has interpreted Article 3 to include acts that may 
give rise to potential future breaches of the principle upon removal to another country.421  
As determined by the case law of the ECtHR, Article 3 involves interpreting two prohibited acts, 
namely: ‘torture’ and ‘inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment’.422 In The Greek Case, 
the European Commission on Human Rights held that: 
All torture must be inhuman and degrading treatment, and inhuman treatment [is] 
also degrading. The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as 
deliberately [causing] severe suffering, mental or physical, which, in the particular 
situation, is [unjustifiable. Torture] has a purpose, such as the obtaining of 
information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment, and it is generally an 
aggravated form of inhuman treatment. Treatment or punishment of an individual 
may be said to be degrading if it grossly humiliates him [or her] before others or 
drives him [or her] to act against his [or her] will or conscience.423 
According to The Greek Case, therefore, the distinction between ‘torture’ and ‘inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment’ is that the former is ‘an aggravated form of inhuman 
 
419 Ireland v the United Kingdom, Application No 5310/71, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 18 
January 1978 at para 163. 
420 Soering supra note 307 at para 88 and 91. 
421 Moreno-Lax supra note 367 at 267.  
422 See, for example: Debra Long, “Guide to Jurisprudence on Torture and Ill-Treatment: Article 3 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights”, June 2002 <https://www.apt.ch/content/files_res/Article3_en.pdf> 
accessed 2 August 2018 [Debra Long].  
423 European Commission of Human Rights, The Greek Case, App nos 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67 (1969) 
Yearbook of European Convention on Human Rights at 186; See, also: Debra Long supra note 4122 at 14.   
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treatment’, while the latter would involve deliberately causing treatment that may not amount to 
‘torture’ but is nonetheless unjustifiable in the particular situation.424 
The judgments from the ECtHR are binding upon the States Parties concerned.425 Some EU 
Member States have directly incorporated provisions of the ECHR within their domestic law or 
have added provisions within their domestic law to enforce rights provided under the ECHR.426  
The scope of ECHR law, especially Article 3 on non-refoulement protection in the form of the 
prohibition against return to torture, includes the application of the provision both territorially and 
extraterritorially. The obligation of non-refoulement arises at the moment in time when an asylum 
claimant is at the border of an EU Member State, which includes both territorial waters and transit 
zones.427 However, this obligation does not arise unless the State exercises jurisdiction.428 A State 
may exercise its jurisdiction over a person or a territory.429 With respect to exercising jurisdiction 
over a person, Article 1 of the ECHR guarantees its rights and freedoms to ‘everyone’.430 The 
 
424 Ibid. 
425 ECHR supra note 114 at art 46(1); See, also: European Court of Human Rights, “The ECHR in 50 Questions”, 
February 2014, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf at 9.  
426 See, for example: Human Rights Act [1998] c 42 at s 2(1): ‘A court or tribunal determining a question which has 
arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account any […] judgment, decision, declaration or 
advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights […] whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of 
the court or tribunal, it is relevant to the proceedings in which that question has arisen’; Durham University, “Are UK 
Courts bound by the European Court of Human Rights?”, Law School Research Briefing No 10, 
https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/law/research/AreUKCourtsboundbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights.pdf at 1.  
427 Council of Europe, Handbook on European Law relating to Asylum, Borders and Immigration (Strasbourg: Council 
of Europe Publishing, 2014) at 35 [COE Handbook]. 
428 Hamdan supra note 361 at 35. 
429 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th ed, Oxford University Press, 2012) at 462 
[Crawford]. 
430 ECHR supra note 114 at art 1. 
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protection against refoulement therefore is guaranteed to all individuals regardless of their status 
under the law, in contrast with Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention, which protects only 
asylum claimants and refugees.431 ECHR case law and the UN Committee Against Torture both 
apply the principle to protect those without status under the law, including refused asylum 
claimants and those deprived of protection under Article 1F of the Refugee Convention.432  
Extraterritorial application of non-refoulement under Article 3 of the ECHR has been affirmed by 
ECHR case law, particularly in Bankovic et al v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States.433 In 
that case, the ECtHR held that there are two grounds for extraterritorial application of non-
refoulement, namely: the State, through its agents, over an individual outside of its territory, and 
the State over an area outside of its national territory.434 The jurisdiction clause under Article 1 of 
the ECHR is the norm, which states that ‘the High States Parties shall secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention’ (emphasis 
added).435 There are three exceptions to the norm as interpreted by the ECtHR. First, a State 
exercises jurisdiction extraterritorially through its diplomatic and consular agents.436 Where a 
State’s diplomatic and consular agents exercise authority and control over individuals, that State 
then has jurisdiction over those individuals, through the acts or omissions of the State’s agents.437 
 
431 Hamdan supra note 361 at 36-37. 
432 See, for example: Committee Against Torture, SV et al v Canada, Communication No 48/1996, 15 May 2001; 
Jabari v Turkey, Application No 40035/98, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 11 July 2000. 
433 Bankovic supra note 323 at para 132; This view is supported by the UNHCR, for more, see: UNHCR Advisory 
Opinion supra note 179.  
434 Ibid; See also: Ralph Wilde, “Compliance with Human Rights Norms Extraterritorially: ‘Human Rights 
Imperialism’?” in L Chazournes, M Kohen (eds) International Law and the Quest for its Implementation (Boston: 
Brill, 2010) at 324. 
435 ECHR supra note 114 at art 1. 
436 WM v Denmark, Application No 17392/90, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 14 October 1992. 
437 Bankovic supra note 323 at para 73; Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom, Application No 55721/07, Council 
of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 7 July 2011 at para 134 [Al-Skeini]. 
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Whether the act or omission of a State’s agent constitutes effective control is a matter of fact, 
determined in light of the circumstances of each case.438 Second, in some cases, the use of force 
by a State’s agents outside of the State’s territory may bring an individual under the control of 
these agents into the State’s jurisdiction.439 For instance, where an individual is in the custody of 
a State’s agent extraterritorially, the State’s jurisdiction extends to the acts of the State’s agent, so 
that the State is under an obligation not to refoule the individual in custody to torture or other cruel 
treatment.440 Third, through consent, invitation or acquiescence of a foreign State’s government, a 
State may exercise all or some of the public powers normally exercised by that foreign State’s 
government.441 For example, the jurisdiction of the State will extend to the acts or omissions of 
immigration border officers checking travel documents for asylum claimants outside the State’s 
territory.442 
Relevant to the consideration of jurisdiction as envisioned by Article 1 of the ECHR, are three 
conceptual models examined by scholars.443 First, scholars contend that the first such conceptual 
model is the Spatial Model, which sees the exercise of ‘public powers’ as, in its entirety, amounting 
to jurisdiction. For example, where there is exercise of ‘public powers’, the State exercises 
jurisdiction. The exercise of ‘public powers’ is not a factor to consider nor is it a prerequisite to 
State jurisdiction - rather, it is automatic in that, once it can be established that ‘public powers’ are 
exercised by the Government of a Member State, such Member State has jurisdiction over the 
 
438 Hirsi supra note 231 at para 73. 
439 Al-Skeini supra note 437 at para 134. 
440 Hamdan supra note 361 at 48; See also: Ocalan v Turkey Application No 6221/99, Council of Europe: European 
Court of Human Rights, 12 May 2005 at para 88. 
441 Bankovic supra note 323 at para 71. 
442 Hamdan supra note 361 at 50. 
443 Cedric Ryngaert, “Clarifying the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights” 
(2012) 28:74 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 57-60 at 58-59. 
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territory and individuals in question.444 The second conceptual model regarding State jurisdiction 
pondered by Article 1 of the ECHR is the Personal Model. In this model, scholars maintain that 
the exercise of ‘public powers’ is relevant to the consideration of State jurisdiction. For instance, 
the exercise of ‘public powers’ is a factor to consider when determining jurisdiction and is not in 
itself conclusive. Even in situations where an official or State agent exercises ‘public powers’, the 
State may or may not exercise jurisdiction.445 In the third conceptual model when considering State 
jurisdiction as contemplated by Article 1 of the ECHR, scholars suggest that the exercise of ‘public 
powers’ is a prerequisite to the consideration of State jurisdiction. As a requirement, there must 
be an exercise of ‘public powers’ before a determination can be made with regards to jurisdiction. 
Hence, if the official or State agent does not exercise ‘public powers’ over the individual or 
territory, the State does not exercise jurisdiction.446 
The protection against refoulement under Article 3 of the ECHR as developed by Strasbourg case 
law is wider than that provided by Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention.447 Subsequent 
expulsion cases by the ECtHR have reaffirmed this position.448 The protection from refoulement 
guaranteed under Article 3 of the ECHR is also wider than the protection against torture as required 
under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, in that Article 3 of the ECHR not only protects 
 
444 Bankovic supra note 323. 
445 Al-Skeini supra note 437. 
446 MN and Others v Belgium, Application No 3599/18, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 5 
May 2020 [MN]; For analysis on MN, see: Vladislava Stoyanova, “MN and Others v Belgium: no ECHR protection 
from refoulement by issuing visas”, 12 May 2020, http://ejiltalk.org/m-n-and-others-v-belgium-no-echr-protection-
from-refoulement-by-issuing-visas.  
447 Ahmed v Austria, Application No 25964/94, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 17 December 
1996 at para 41; N v Finland, Application No 38885/02, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 26 
July 2005 at para 159. 
448 D v the United Kingdom, Application No 30240/96, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 2 May 
1997 at para 48. 
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individuals from being returned where a real risk of torture exists, but also offers individuals 
protection from being expelled where there is a real risk of cruel treatment.449  
Additionally, the ECtHR has recognized that non-refoulement applies in a wider number of 
circumstances than identified in the Refugee Convention. For instance, the return of claimants to 
situations where they may not be able to access the right to fair trial, situations where the return 
would cause material deprivations due to scarce resources, or situations in which the claimants 
will suffer from severe and targeted discrimination (for example, against persons with disabilities), 
all constitute a violation of non-refoulement under EU law and ECHR law.450 Where a low 
recognition rate means a lesser likelihood for an individual claimant to be recognized as a refugee, 
the result may lead to unfairness rising to the level of a ‘flagrant denial of justice’.451 Although the 
phrase ‘flagrant denial of justice’ has not been precisely defined by the ECtHR, the ECtHR has 
indicated that certain forms of unfairness could amount to a ‘flagrant denial of justice’.452 These 
forms of unfairness include conviction in absentia with no subsequent possibility of a fresh 
determination of the merits of the charge, detention without any access to an independent and 
 
449 David Weissbrodt and Isabel Hörtreiter, “The Principle of Non-refoulement: Article 3 of the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Comparison with the Non-refoulement 
Provisions of other International Human Rights Treaties”, (1999) 5:1 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 1-74 at 50 
[Weissbrodt and Hörtreiter]; A Duffy, “Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-refoulement in International Law”, (2008) 
20:3 International Journal of Refugee Law 373-390 at 379. 
450 See, for example: Cathryn Costello, “The Search for the Outer Edges of Non-Refoulement in Europe: 
Exceptionality and Flagrant Breaches” in Bruce Burson and James Cantor (eds) Human Rights and the Refugee 
Definition (Netherlands: Brill, 2016) 180-209 [Costello Outer Edges]; EU Charter supra note 45 at art 47; ECHR 
supra note 114 at art 6. 
451 Othman supra note 314; D v United Kingdom App no App no 30240/96 (ECHR, 2 May 1997); SHH v United 
Kingdom App no 60367/10 (ECHR, 29 January 2013).  
452 European Court of Human Rights, “Guide on Article 6 of the Convention – Right to a fair trial (criminal limb)”, 
31 August 2018, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_criminal_ENG.pdf at para 498.  
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impartial tribunal to have the legality of the detention reviewed, and deliberate and systematic 
refusal of access to a lawyer.453  
A discussion of the content of ECHR law includes examining the burden and standard of proof of 
establishing treatment that is contrary to Article 3. The burden of proof is upon the individual 
asylum claimant to establish individualized or particularized risk of treatment contrary to the 
prohibition against torture upon expulsion.454 The standard of proof for the individual asylum 
claimant to prove is substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be exposed to a real risk 
of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on return, contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.455 
The nature of ‘risk’ to be proven by the asylum claimant is that of ‘risk of inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’.456 As mentioned earlier, non-refoulement in the form of the prohibition 
against torture is an absolute prohibition, so that even where the individual claimant is found to 
have been guilty of committing any of the remunerated crimes under Article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention, the claimant cannot be returned to face torture.457 Under the ECHR, any individual 
who wishes to make a claim for protection under Article 3 of the ECHR can do so at the ECtHR, 
regardless of that individual’s legal status, which means the individual need not be seeking asylum 
or be recognized as a refugee to benefit from this protection.458 
 
453 Einhorn v France App no 71555/01 (ECHR, 16 October 2001) at para 33; Al-Moayad v Germany App no 35865/03 
(ECHR, 20 February 2007) at para 101.  
454 COE Handbook supra note 427 at Chapter 3. 
455 Ibid at 75. 
456 Ibid. 
457 On the absolute prohibition against torture, see: Saadi v Italy, Application No 37201/06, Council of Europe: 
European Court of Human Rights, 28 February 2008 at para 138 and Committee Against Torture, MBB v Sweden, 
Application No 104/1998 at para 6.4; For exclusion of international protection for persons who do not deserve it, see: 
Qualification Directive supra note 276 at arts 12 and 17. 
458 ECHR supra note 114 at art 1. 
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In sum, the principle of non-refoulement under EU law and ECHR law, formulated as the 
prohibition against return to torture, is absolute in nature such that no derogation from the principle 
is permitted. The principle of non-refoulement is also applicable both within the territory of the 
sending State, as well as extraterritorially, as an exception to the general rule provided for under 
Article 1 of the ECHR. 
3.2 Claiming Asylum in the EU 
The above subsections examined the structure and content of EU law and ECHR law as well as 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR courts relevant to the principle of non-refoulement. 
In order to understand the context in which the principle of non-refoulement arises in the EU 
context, it is vital to understand the procedures involved in claiming asylum within the EU. This 
section therefore details the procedures for claiming asylum within the EU. It begins by 
introducing the Dublin III Regulation, the current instrument for determining the Member State 
responsible for processing asylum applications. It then discusses the process for qualifying for 
international protection. Next, it explains the procedures and standards for the granting and 
withdrawing of international protection. Finally, it ends by exploring the standards for reception 
conditions for applicants of international protection. The application of the principle of non-
refoulement is discussed at each stage. 
3.2.1 Dublin III Regulation and the Determination of the Member State Responsible 
The Dublin III Regulation (604/2013) is the current CEAS instrument determining the Member 
State responsible for the processing of asylum applications.459 It sets out the criteria and 
mechanisms for making such a determination.460 It provides that a single Member State is 
responsible for processing an asylum application when it is deemed responsible.461 Where no 
Member State is designated as responsible for the processing of the asylum application on the basis 
 
459 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25.  
460 Ibid.  
461 Ibid at art 3(1).  
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of the criteria listed in the Dublin III Regulation, the Member State responsible shall be the first 
Member State in which the application for international protection has been lodged.462  
The criteria for determining the Member State responsible for the processing of asylum 
applications are set out based on a hierarchy.463 First, where the applicant is an unaccompanied 
minor, the Member State responsible shall be the Member State where a family member or a 
sibling of the unaccompanied minor is legally present.464 In the absence of a family member or a 
sibling or relative, the Member State responsible shall be the Member State where the 
unaccompanied minor has lodged his or her application for international protection, provided that 
it is in the best interests of the child.465 Second, where the applicant is in possession of a valid 
residence document, the Member State which issued the residency document shall be responsible 
for the examination of the asylum application.466 Where the applicant is in possession of a valid 
visa, the Member State responsible for the processing of the asylum application shall be the 
Member State which issued the visa.467 Where the applicant is in possession of more than one valid 
residence document or visa issued by more than one Member State, the Member State responsible 
shall be the Member State which issued the residence document or visa having the latest expiry 
date.468 Third, where the applicant has irregularly crossed the border into a Member State by land, 
sea or air having come from a third country, the Member State deemed responsible for the 
processing of the asylum application shall be the Member State he or she first entered.469 Fourth, 
 
462 Ibid at art 3(2).  
463 Ibid at chp III.  
464 Ibid at art 8; This is to be done in accordance with the best interests of the child international standard.  
465 Ibid at art 8(4).  
466 Ibid at art 12(1).  
467 Ibid at art 12(2).  
468 Ibid at arts 12(3)(a) and 12(3)(b).  
469 Ibid at art 13(1).  
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where the applicant made the application for international protection in the international transit 
area of an airport of a Member State, that Member State where the application was made shall be 
responsible for the processing of the asylum application.470 The responsible EU Member State 
identified through this process is the Member State bearing the responsibility to enforce the 
principle of non-refoulement.  
The following flowchart depicts the above description of the Dublin III process for determining 
the Member State responsible for processing asylum applications: 
 
Figure 3.1 Determining the Member State responsible under Dublin III 
The section below examines the process for qualifying for international protection and the asylum 
procedures involved.  
3.2.2 Qualifying for International Protection and Relevant Asylum Procedures 
Once the responsible Member State is designated, the Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU) 
requires that Member State to ensure minimum common standards for applicants of international 
 
470 Ibid at art 15.  
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protection to qualify for refugee and subsidiary protection.471 The Asylum Procedures Directive 
(2013/32/EU) also determines the common minimum standards and procedures for the granting 
and - crucially for the principle of non-refoulement - withdrawing of international protection.472 
The minimum common standards referenced in the Qualification Directive and the Asylum 
Procedures Directive are the bare minimum standards which EU Member States are to follow when 
they implement relevant EU law in domestic practice.473 Therefore, it is important to first ascertain 
what the common minimum standards are before turning to the core non-refoulement rights 
granted by both directives under EU law.  
In order to understand the points at which the principle of non-refoulement may become an issue, 
it is important to first ascertain the different stages from registration to appeal for an asylum 
application under the Asylum Procedures Directive (recast). These are illustrated in the following 
flowchart:474   
 
471 Qualification Directive supra note 276. Subsidiary protection is protection that is complementary in nature to 
refugee status for individuals who cannot meet the refugee definition under Article 1A of the Refugee Convention: 
McAdam supra note 23 at chp 2. 
472 Asylum Procedures Directive supra note 24. 
473 See, for example: CEAS supra note 331, which states: ‘Asylum is a fundamental right and granting it is an 
international obligation, stemming from the 1951 Geneva Convention on the protection of refugees. Those who seek, 
or have been granted, protection do not have the right to choose in which Member State they want to settle. To this 
end, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) provides common minimum standards for the treatment of all 
asylum seekers and applications”.  
474 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, EU Bureau, “Fair and Fast: UNHCR Discussion Paper on 
Accelerated and Simplified Procedures in the European Union”, May 2018 at 17; European Asylum Support Office, 
“Judicial Analysis: Asylum Procedures and the Principle of Non-Refoulement”, 2018 at 1.4.  
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Figure 3.2 Asylum Procedures Directive (recast)  
At the first stage of the asylum process, EU Member States are obliged to assess the relevant 
elements of each application for international protection, which consists of: ‘documentation 
regarding the applicant’s age, background including relatives, identity, nationality(ies), 
country(ies) and place(s) of previous residence, previous asylum applications, travel routes, travel 
documents and the reasons for applying for international protection’.475 At the second stage of the 
asylum process, applicants are triaged into caseload streams, and analysis is begun based on 
country of origin information.476 As the application of these processes at Stages 1 and 2 do not 
contemplate return of the individuals, the principle of non-refoulement is not engaged. However, 
proper fulfilment of information collection at both stages is crucial, as incorrect information 
 
475 Ibid at art 4(2).  
476 European Asylum Support Office, “EASO Report on Asylum Procedures Directive and Non-Refoulement” at 23, 
which states: ‘The first stage relates to the Dublin procedure for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application which may, if applicable, be a precondition for access to asylum procedures at the 
administrative level’, https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/asylum-procedures-ja_en.pdf [EASO Report].  
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collection can heighten the chances of an applicant later being denied protection and therefore the 
risk of being refouled based on flawed assumptions. The standardized process within the CEAS is 
therefore designed with the aim of ensuring adequate information collection. 
Stages 3 and 4 are central to the asylum determination process. During Stage 3, an initial 
assessment is conducted to determine whether the asylum claimant is admissible. During this stage, 
and depending on the specific situation of where the asylum claimant has applied for asylum (i.e. 
at the border or in the territory), a specific procedure will be used.477 During Stage 4, the asylum 
application is assessed and a decision is made with a list of possible outcomes.478 In order for an 
applicant to qualify for refugee status, an act of persecution must ‘be sufficiently serious by its 
nature or repetition as to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights’ and ‘be an 
accumulation of various measures, including violations of human rights which is sufficiently 
severe as to affect an individual’.479 If an applicant does not meet that test, the individual may 
instead qualify for subsidiary protection if serious harm is present.480 Serious harm consists of: ‘(a) 
the death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of 
an applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person 
by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict’.481 If 
a person is found not to qualify for refugee status and is not granted subsidiary protection, whether 
 
477 Ibid at 22-23, which states: ‘The second stage refers to the actual examination procedure, which can be preceded 
by an initial admissibility procedure, at the administrative level. The APD (recast) permits Member States to operate 
two types of examination procedure. The examination procedure may take the form of a regular procedure (Article 31 
APD (recast)) or an accelerated procedure (Article 31(8) APD (recast)). Both of these procedures may comprise an 
initial admissibility procedure, based on Articles 33 and 34 APD (recast), to determine the admissibility of the 
application; that is, whether the Member State is required to examine qualification for international protection. The 
accelerated procedure may be conducted in-territory or at the border’.  
478 Ibid at 23.  
479 Ibid at art 9(1).  
480 Ibid at art 15.  
481 Ibid.  
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at an accelerated border procedure or through a regular procedure, the potential for refoulement 
arises, because the applicant does not have a legal right to remain.  
Applicants who are unsuccessful at Stage 4 may appeal at Stage 5. The appeal process concerns 
applications that have been denied at the procedural stage. Once an appeal process has begun, 
suspensive effect takes place, meaning that the asylum claimant has a right under EU law to stay 
in the territory of the EU pending the results of the appeal proceedings without being subjected to 
removal.482 Again, if they are unsuccessful on appeal, the potential for refoulement arises as the 
individuals are usually deported. This is why ‘most of the non-refoulement cases [brought under 
EU and human rights tribunals] are brought by rejected asylum-seekers’:483 The risk of refoulement 
crystallizes at the point of exhaustion of domestic decision-making and appeals. However, non-
refoulement is considered as a result of the automatic suspensive effect as discussed above 
requiring Member States to permit asylum claimants to remain in their territory pending the results 
of the appeal.484  
In sum, consideration of the potential for, and steps to avoid, refoulement are intended to be built 
into all stages of the standardized CEAS asylum process. However, the adequacy of these 
safeguards has been questions, as explained in the next section.     
 
482 EASO Report supra note 476 at 137, which states: ‘The APD (recast) regulates the minimum standard concerning 
the right to remain in the ter-ritory during the appeals phase (Article 46(5)-(9)). In cases where derogations are pos-
sible from the automatic suspensive effect of appeal Member States shall as a minimum allow applicants to remain in 
the territory pending the outcome of the procedure to rule whether or not the applicant may remain on the territory’ 
(Article 46(8)). 
483 Cali et al supra note 417 at 358. 
484 EASO Report supra note 476 at 157, which states: ‘the right to remain during the appeals procedure is a corollary 
of states’ international obligation to comply with the principle of non-refoulement, which is reflected in Article 21 QD 
(recast)’.  
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3.3 Gaps Between Law and Practice with Respect to Non-Refoulement within the EU 
The ‘compliance pull of norms [such as non-refoulement] depends in some measure on their 
coherence and clarity’.485 Despite clear statements of the applicable EU law on non-refoulement - 
such as in Article 19(2) of the EU Charter and Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive - many 
EU Member States interpret the principle differently, including very narrowly, thus affecting 
compliance. This section will provide two overarching and interlinked examples of how the 
‘compliance pull’ of non-refoulement is weakened through practice within the EU that undermines 
the norm: first, through negative exercise of the ‘margin of discretion’ within EU asylum processes 
and, second, through the presumption of mutual trust relied upon by the EU Member States. 
3.3.1 The ‘Margin of Discretion’ and Non-Refoulement 
In the application of EU law in the context of asylum policies in the CEAS, EU Member States 
are given a wide ‘margin of discretion’ by the regional courts, such as the CJEU, when 
implementing EU law norms.486 Application of this ‘margin of discretion’ by EU Member States 
has resulted in disparate practices in the national implementation of EU asylum policies, resulting 
in widely varying interpretations of the non-refoulement obligation. One significant reason for 
these differing practices stems from the difference within the EU between ‘regulations’ and 
‘directives’. When a piece of EU legislation is in the form of a regulation, such as the Dublin III 
Regulation, the Member State must directly apply the regulation in its entirety at the domestic 
level without change or re-interpretation. On the other hand, an EU directive, such as the 
Qualification Directive (recast) (which recognizes the importance of the principle of non-
refoulement in Article 15b), only becomes effective when transposed into domestic law. EU 
Member States exercise their margin of discretion when they conduct domestic transpositions of 
 
485 Ibid at 357. 
486 Poon MOA supra note 406.  
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EU law.487 The transposing process has resulted in different EU Member States adopting widely 
varying understandings of directives or failing to transpose at all. Where the domestic transposition 
of directives does not take place, or does not adequately take place, the procedural safeguards 
required by the directives may not be effective in providing protection for asylum claimants and 
refugees against refoulement.488 The problem of ineffective transposition has been recognized by 
the European Commission.489 
The reality is that the ‘margin of discretion’ has led some countries to bend the principle of non-
refoulement “to their will and choose the more convenient interpretation”.490 EU Member States 
have done so in a number of ways, often by creating various barriers to successfully claiming 
asylum. One such barrier results from external border and immigration controls, which may 
involve a combination of strict visa regimes, carrier sanctions, ‘pushback’ operations at sea, and 
cooperation with third countries through bilateral or multilateral agreements (jointly referred to as 
‘migration controls’).491 These State practices, which will be explored in more detail in Chapter 4, 
prevent asylum claimants and refugees from reaching the shores of the EU in search of safety, thus 
 
487 European Commission, “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down 
minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (recast)”, COM(2008) 815 final, 2008/0244 (COD), 3 
December 2008 at explanatory memorandum.  
488 In particular, the ‘safe’ third country concept as defined under Article 28 of the Asylum Procedures Directive 
(recast) has not been transposed into German law; See, for example: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
“Section 12: The Safe Third Country Concept”, 1-39, https://www.refworld.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=4bab55e22; For example, in the case of Germany, where the 
current Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) has not yet been transposed into its national legislation [UNHCR STC]. 
489 For example, the European Commission’s proposal for the Reception Conditions Directive (recast) tabled to the 
European Parliament and European Council stated that ‘the level of reception conditions for asylum seekers […] 
mainly results from the fact that the Directive currently allows Member States a wide margin of discretion concerning 
the establishment of reception conditions at the national level’; Ibid. 
490 Cathryn Costello, The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2016) at 357 [Costello Monograph]. 
491 Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen supra note 10 at 9. 
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disallowing these individuals from accessing territorial asylum - the principle that asylum may be 
sought and granted when the claimant is on the territory of the asylum-granting State.492 These EU 
migration control mechanisms have been critiqued because they have resulted in refoulement.493 
Some Member States create legally unwarranted barriers for asylum claimants and refugees 
seeking international protection by enacting certain procedural requirements.494 For example, 
some countries add a procedural requirement to require the asylum claimant to rebut the 
presumption of mutual trust - the presumption that EU Member States are ‘safe’ destinations to 
which claimants can return simply because they are Member States of the EU - that is above and 
beyond the onus to prove a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’.495 This additional procedural 
requirement increases the burden placed upon individual claimants to bear the onus of proof, 
 
492 Daria Davitti and Marlene Fries, “Offshore Processing and Complicity in Current EU Migration Policies: Parts 1 
& 2” EJIL!Talk Blog, https://www.ejiltalk.org/offshore-processing-and-complicity-in-current-eu-migration-policies-
part-2 [Davitti and Fries]. 
493 See, for example: Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nikolas Feith Tan, “The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? 
Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy” (2017) Journal on Migration and Human Security 28-56, which 
provides a comprehensive overview of shifts in paradigm on deterrence policies relevant to migration control, for 
example, at 41, citing the EU-Turkey Statement: ‘Given the number of reports suggesting violations of both the non-
refoulement principle and fundamental shortcomings in the implementation of other refugee rights, legal challenges 
seem unavoidable’. 
494 See, for example: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria 
and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), COM(2016) 
270 final, 2016/0133 (COD), Brussels, 4 May 2016 at art 4 [Dublin IV Proposal], where an additional procedural 
requirement for asylum claimants is required, such as requiring them to adhere to strict deadlines. 
495 For a definition of the ‘presumption of mutual trust’, see: Sacha Prechal, “Mutual Trust before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union” (2017) 1(2) European Papers 75-92 at 76 [Prechal], which states: ‘[the presumption of mutual 
trust is] based on mutual confidence and a presumption of compliance, by other Member States, with European Union 
law and, in particular, fundamental rights’; See, also: NS/ME supra note 296 at para 83. 
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making the recognition of refugee status a more onerous process.496 Unnecessarily onerous 
processes result in more unnecessarily rejected applicants and therefore an increased potential for 
returns and refoulement. It is therefore concerning that a proposed addition in the ‘Dublin IV’ 
proposal allows such an additional procedural requirement.497  
A second example of a legally unwarranted barrier is the expectation that an asylum claimant 
possesses proper documentation to establish identity.498 This requirement is not realistic for 
individuals fleeing from a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’, and also potentially permits Member 
States to evade their responsibility to process asylum applications by rejecting applications on the 
basis of insufficient documentation.499 Moreover, Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention 
precludes asylum claimants from being penalized for their irregular entry such as through means 
other than at regular border crossings.500 The UNHCR’s position regarding asylum claimants 
without proper documentation is that claimants need not prove every element of their case and 
 
496 Strict deadlines for asylum claimants are not encouraged, as stated in the UNHCR Handbook, which noted that 
asylum officials, in their substantive evaluation of refugee status, should weigh the ‘general credibility’ of the claimant 
where the information (such as a passport) cannot be obtained within a reasonable time, see: UNHCR Handbook supra 
note 36 at para 93.   
497 Dublin IV Proposal supra note 494 at art 4.  
498 For example, in EU law, documentation is required otherwise entry will be unauthorized until formally authorized 
by the asylum official regarding entry to EU territory for asylum seekers, see: European Agency for Fundamental 
Rights, “Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration” at 41, 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/greece/resource/static/files/handbook-on-european-law-relating-to-asylum--borders-
and-immigration.pdf.  
499 Ibid.  
500 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 31(1), which states: ‘Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on 
account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom 
was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they 
present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence’. 
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they are to be given the ‘benefit of the doubt’ when officers assess their asylum applications.501 
When asylum applications are rejected on technical grounds, such as on the basis of insufficient 
identity documentation, this raises the risk that they will be returned to their country of origin 
without a proper evaluation of their claim or the potential for refoulement. 
In a similar vein, some countries create barriers to asylum claimants by removing (as opposed to 
adding) procedural safeguards. For example, prior to being transferred from one EU country to 
another under the Dublin procedure (also known as ‘Dublin transfers’), some claimants are not 
provided with an opportunity to be heard, even though an interview would allow the claimant to 
provide reasons for why a deportation should be impeded.502 This is despite the fact that the 
UNHCR’s Handbook on Refugee Status Determination states that an individual interview 
is required for the asylum officer to properly assess the applicant’s eligibility for refugee status.503 
This barrier is particularly of concern where claimants are subjected to transfer to EU countries 
with less developed asylum systems lacking fundamental safeguards for claimants or extremely 
high rejection rates.504 Where the asylum claimant is not given an opportunity to be heard, the 
 
501 UNHCR Handbook supra note 36 at para 203-204: ‘after the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate 
his story there may still be alack of evidence for some of his statements. As explained above (paragraph 196), it is 
hardly possible for a refugee to “prove” every part of his case and, indeed, if this were a requirement the majority of 
refugees would not be recognized. it is therefore frequently necessary to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt’. 
502 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 3(2).  
503 UNHCR Handbook supra note 36 at para 200. Although not legally binding, UNHCR commentaries and guidelines 
are considered authoritative by States Parties to the Refugee Convention. Further, States Parties to the Refugee 
Convention are required to cooperate with the office of the UNHCR in the implementation of provisions of the 
Refugee Convention, see: Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 35(1). The UNHCR Handbook states that where 
asylum claimants provide basic information ‘in the first instance, by completing a standard questionnaire … [s]uch 
basic information will normally not be sufficient to enable the examiner to reach a decision, and one or more personal 
interviews will be required’ (emphasis added): UNHCR Handbook supra note 36 at para 200. 
504 Discrepancies in recognition rates are problematic in that, regardless of the factors leading to a high or a low 
recognition rate, variations occur frequently even for claimants originating from refugee-producing countries such as 
Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq: Ibid at 8. In fact, the divergencies for recognition rates from EU Member States for 
claimants originating from these countries ranged between 0 and 100%: Ibid. Variation in recognition rates of refugee 
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claimant may be prevented from challenging a transfer decision, contrary to established EU case 
law, potentially resulting in refoulement.505 These Dublin transfer practices evidence EU Member 
States’ strategy to ‘contain’ unruly migrants and refugees in an attempt to shift responsibility 
outward, away from the EU, and to third countries deemed ‘safe’. 
An additional concern is that, in these transfer cases, EU Member States often rely upon diplomatic 
assurances from the receiving country (the ‘responsible’ EU Member State) that the individual will 
not be subject to refoulement.506 This is particular worrisome when EU Member States rely upon 
blanket assurances that third countries are ‘safe’, even when these countries do not have procedural 
safeguards to ensure that claimants are able to access international protection for refugee status.507 
 
status may also be due to a lack of harmonization in decision-making practices among Member States, which may be 
a result of differences in the assessment of country of origin situations, differences in interpretation of legal concepts, 
and/or differences in national jurisprudence: Ibid. Since low recognition rates of refugee status in any given Member 
State may mean that the individual claimant seeking refugee status is less likely to receive a positive decision for their 
application for international protection, a large variance in recognition rates from Member State to Member State may 
potentially result in situations where the claimant is not likely to be recognized as a refugee in certain Member States 
while very likely to be recognized as a refugee in others. While many factors may combine to contribute towards low 
recognition rates, including those aforementioned, low recognition rates in a certain Member State may potentially 
encourage claimants to apply for international protection elsewhere, thus increasing instances of forum-shopping and 
other secondary movements such as smuggling activities, contrary to the stated aim of the CEAS: CEAS supra note 
327.  
505 Mehrdad Ghezelbash v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, C-63/15, CJEU, 7 June 2016 at paras 46 and 61 
[Ghezelbash].  
506 Evelien Brouwer, “Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU and the 
Burden of Proof” (2013) 9:1 Utrecht Law Review 135-147 at 145.  
507 The use of diplomatic assurances can also be found in some countries’ ‘safe’ third country practices, see, for 
example: MH v Serbia, App No 62410/17, 4 March 2019, “Written Submissions on behalf of the Interveners (Advice 
on Individual Rights in Europe), Dutch Council for Refugees, and European Council on Refugees and Exiles)” at para 
23, which states: ‘The interveners submit that in the situations where reliance on diplomatic assurances is appropriate 
and may secure a person’s rights guaranteed by the Convention, these assurances must not only be tested against 
detailed and reliable information but also examined in light of the context in which such assurances are given. 
Importantly, for such assurances to be reliable they should be individualised, precise and cover the particular needs of 
the person whose Convention rights may be violated. The interveners consider that in countries where conditions 
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The UN Committee Against Torture is ‘highly resistant’ to the acceptance of diplomatic 
assurances, and does not ‘accept them as effective risk mitigation’ against refoulement.508 The 
Committee has warned against relying on diplomatic assurances:  
diplomatic assurances from a State party to the Convention to which a person is to 
be deported should not be used as a loophole to undermine the principle of non-
refoulement as set out in Article 3 of the Convention, where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he/she would be in danger of being subjected to torture 
in that State (emphasis added).509 
Both the UK and Germany have been warned against the usage of and reliance upon diplomatic 
assurances in their practice of returning claimants to another EU Member State. For the UK, the 
Committee Against Torture ‘notes with concern the [UK’s] reliance on diplomatic assurances to 
justify the deportation of foreign nationals suspected of terrorism related offences to countries in 
which the widespread practice of torture is alleged’ contrary to Articles 3 and 13 of the CAT’.510 
The Committee Against Torture further cautioned the UK that:  
 
rapidly change, where numbers of people in need of protection are higher than the capacity of the asylum system may 
handle, inadequate reception conditions and deficiencies in an asylum system, general assurances cannot be relied 
upon at all. Any assurances given by a State with a domestic system which has reported shortcomings and previous 
violations of Convention rights will inevitably struggle to satisfy the requirements of specificity or practicality’, 
https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/sites/default/files/aldfiles/M.H.%20v%20Serbia%20TPI.pdf; See, also: Jenny 
Poon, “Rethinking the Common European Asylum System: Protection or Containment?” (2020) Rethinking Refuge, 
University of Oxford, Department of International Development, Refugee Studies Centre, 
https://www.rethinkingrefuge.org/articles/rethinking-emergency-and-crisis; One needs to look no further than the 
judgment of MSS v Belgium and Greece to see that the Dublin II Regulation allows EU Member States to exercise 
their discretion as ‘a way out’ of the Regulation by evading responsibility to process asylum applications. A similar 
issue seems to persist in the Dublin III Regulation, whereby EU Member States are permitted to exercise their 
discretion to interpret specific terms within the Regulation which are purposely left ambiguous.  
508 Cali et al supra note 417 at 372. 
509 CAT NR Comment supra note 245 at para 20. 
510 Committee Against Torture, “Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the United Kingdom, adopted 
by the Committee at its fiftieth session (6-31 May 2013) – Advance Unedited Version” at para 18. 
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The more widespread the practice of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment is, the less likely it will be that a real risk of such treatment can be avoided 
by diplomatic assurances, however stringent any agreed follow-up procedure may 
be. Therefore, the Committee considers that diplomatic assurances are unreliable 
and ineffective and should not be used as an instrument to modify the determination 
of the Convention.511 
The Committee Against Torture recommends that the UK ‘recognize that diplomatic assurances 
and monitoring arrangements will not be relied upon to justify transfers when such substantial risk 
of torture exists’.512 For Germany, the Committee Against Torture specifically requested Germany 
to ‘clarify to the Committee [the] steps taken to ensure that the use of diplomatic assurances is 
only employed in exceptional cases’.513 In contrast, the UN Human Rights Committee accepts that 
EU Member States might use diplomatic assurances, but must ensure a thorough assessment of 
their quality and reliability, coupled with a robust monitoring mechanism within both states.514 
The issue has been that not all EU Member States undertake thorough assessments of the quality 
and reliability of the diplomatic assurances and do not possess robust monitoring mechanisms, 
thereby increasing the risk of refoulement resulting from the Dublin transfers.515 Thus, they rely 
on diplomatic assurances to solve their asylum issues, without ensuring adequate protection against 
refoulement. 
 
511 Ibid.  
512 Ibid at para 19.  
513 Committee Against Torture, “List of issues to be considered during the examination of the fifth periodic report of 
Germany”, 23 June 2011, UN Doc CAT/C/DEU/5 at para 19.  
514 Cali et al supra note 417 at 373. 
515 For EU Member States and their practices on applying the principle of non-refoulement in the context of Dublin 
Transfers, see: International Commission of Jurists, “Non-Refoulement in Europe after M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece”, July 2011 at 3-6, http://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Non-refoulement-Europe-summary-of-
the-workshop-event-2011-.pdf.   
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In sum, the ‘margin of discretion’ afforded to EU Member States has resulted in differing 
approaches to asylum procedures. That margin has been used in some cases to limit the ability of 
individuals to make asylum claims, or to limit procedures with the outcome of reducing successful 
asylum cases. The different approaches not only undermine the CEAS’ goal of harmonization, 
they also widen the possibility of refoulement. Interlinked with this outcome is another EU policy, 
the presumption of mutual trust.  
3.3.2 The Presumption of Mutual Trust within the EU 
The presumption of mutual trust is a well-recognized principle in EU law which presumes that all 
EU Member States comply with relevant EU and international law obligations in their exercise of 
EU law obligations, particularly concerning fundamental rights.516 The Dublin System is founded 
on the presumption of mutual trust, where the system is ‘grounded on the presumption that all 
Member States and the States bound by the regulation by virtue of bilateral agreements observe 
EU law, particularly EU fundamental rights and freedoms’.517 As a fundamental right, this 
presumption applies to the principle of non-refoulement: the Dublin III Regulation prevents the 
transfer of an individual back to the responsible Member State where there are ‘substantial grounds 
for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions’ 
of the Member State, resulting in a risk of that individual being exposed to inhuman or degrading 
treatment. 518 The presumption of mutual trust assumes that EU Member States will or have already 
complied with relevant EU and international law norms without requiring a sending State to 
examine the merits of an individual’s application before returning that individual.519  
 
516 Prechal supra note 495.  
517 Ibid at 55. 
518 Giulia Vicini, “The Dublin Regulation between Strasbourg and Luxembourg: Reshaping Non-Refoulement in the 
Name of Mutual Trust?” (2015) 8(2) European Journal of Legal Studies, 50-72 at 55 
https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/38608/EJLS_2015_Vicini.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Vicini]; 
Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 3(2). 
519 Ibid.  
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The ECtHR and the CJEU have both examined the presumption of mutual trust in the context of 
Dublin transfers and the principle of non-refoulement. This has resulted in contradictory 
interpretations of the principle, in particular regarding when the presumption might be rebutted 
and the consequences of this rebuttal.520 These contradictions are important. When an EU Member 
State does not respect or ensure the fundamental guarantee to non-refoulement, ‘Member States 
cannot safely return an asylum seeker to its territory’.521 In other words, the ‘return cannot be 
executed even though the Dublin regulation designates such State as the only Member State 
competent to assess his/her asylum claim’.522 While the ECtHR and the CJEU agree that this is the 
outcome, they differ in how to evaluate whether or not a Member State does not respect or ensure 
the fundamental principle.  
The CJEU has adopted a test of ‘systemic deficiencies’ as a precondition for opposing a Dublin 
transfer, or, in other words, a precondition for rebutting the presumption of mutual trust.523 The 
CJEU requires claimants to prove that there are ‘systemic deficiencies’ existing in the asylum 
procedures and reception conditions of the Member State in order to rebut the presumption of 
mutual trust to prevent a removal under the Dublin transfer procedures. In the case of N.S., it held 
that a Member State should be aware of the ‘systemic deficiencies’ before transferring an 
individual asylum claimant to the Member State responsible under the Dublin transfer procedure: 
Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be 
interpreted as meaning that the Member States, including the national courts, may 
not transfer an asylum seeker to the ‘Member State responsible’ within the meaning 
of Regulation No 343/2003 where they cannot be unaware that systemic 
deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum 
 
520 Ibid at 51.  
521 Vicini supra note 518 at 52. 
522 Ibid. 
523 Anna Lübbe, “‘Systemic Flaws’ and Dublin Transfers: Incompatible Tests before the CJEU and the ECtHR?” 
(2015) 27:1 International Journal of Refugee Law 135-140 at 135 [Lübbe].  
118 
 
seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the 
asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading 
treatment within the meaning of that provision (emphasis added).524 
Although the case of N.S. introduced the concept of ‘systemic deficiencies’, the concept was not 
further elaborated upon in that judgment. However, ‘systemic deficiencies’ may imply that 
‘various flaws that cause an individual risk to a human being within the asylum process have to 
reach a point of becoming conceptually one flaw that makes the whole system deficient’.525 Other 
proposals have suggested that ‘systemic flaw’ may mean ‘a lack of a structure, a structural void - 
that, for cases passing through this part of the system, leads to an error’.526 Alternatively, ‘systemic 
flaws’ may mean flaws which are produced regularly and can be ‘averted by changes in the regular 
procedures of the system’.527  
The ECtHR, on the other hand, requires claimants to rebut the presumption of mutual trust on the 
threshold of ‘individual assessments’, so that the applicant’s claim in view of the specific situation 
of the applicant is considered rather than the existence of deficiencies in the system. The ECtHR 
formulated the test of ‘individual assessments’ in the case of Tarakhel v. Switzerland. The case 
concerned eight Afghan nationals, who alleged that, if they were returned to Italy, they would be 
exposed to inhuman and degrading treatment which would violate, inter alia, Article 3 of the 
ECHR.528 In citing the decision by the CJEU in the case of N.S., which established the criterion 
for ‘systemic deficiencies’, the ECtHR held that: 
In the present case the Court must therefore ascertain whether, in view of the overall 
situation with regard to the reception arrangements for asylum seekers in Italy and 
 
524 NS/ME supra note 296 at para 106.  
525 Eliana Barrera and Friederike Vetter, “‘Systemic Deficiency’: Legal Standard Setting, Human Rights, and Its Effect 
on the Individual in the Common European Asylum System” (2013) 2:2 Spectra Journal. 
526 Lübbe supra note 523 at 137.  
527 Ibid at 138.  
528 Tarakhel v Switzerland, App No 29217/12 (ECHR, 4 November 2014) at paras 2 and 3 [Tarakhel]. 
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the applicants’ specific situation, substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that the applicants would be at risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 if 
they were returned to Italy (emphasis added).529  
Therefore, the ECtHR has deviated from the approach taken by the CJEU to consider the 
applicant’s claim in view of the specific situation of the applicant, rather than the presence of 
‘systemic deficiencies’ within Italy’s asylum as the primary consideration. The ECtHR decision 
in Tarakhal was referred to in another case, A.M.E. v. the Netherlands, in which the ECtHR held 
that the applicant was not able to establish ‘a sufficiently real and imminent risk of hardship severe 
enough to fall within the scope of Article 3’, which concluded in the applicant’s claim being held 
to be unfounded.530  
The difference between the CJEU and ECtHR approaches to the rebuttal of the presumption of 
mutual trust in non-refoulement cases is important: The CJEU approach gives more prominence 
to systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedures and reception conditions of the asylum-receiving 
Member State, while the ECtHR approach considers the individual’s circumstances as having more 
importance.531 This difference illustrates a gap between the law on non-refoulement and the actual 
practice within the EU.  
The UK courts have adopted a compromise between the two different approaches of the 
Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts. In E.M. and M.A., the UK Court of Appeal held that: ‘the 
assessment of risk on return is seen by the Strasbourg court as depending on a combination of 
personal experience and systemic shortcomings which in total may suffice to rebut the presumption 
of compliance’.532 The compromise of the UK Court of Appeal may be a way to reconcile the 
different approaches taken by the CJEU and the ECtHR on the threshold to rebut the presumption 
of mutual trust, and still adequately ensure protection against refoulement.  
 
529 Ibid at para 105.  
530 AME v the Netherlands, App no 51428/10 (ECHR, 5 February 2015) at paras 28 and 35.  
531 Vicini supra note 518. 
532 EM and MA [2013] 1 WLR 576 at para 39 [EM/MA].  
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3.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has explained the EU law applicable to the principle of non-refoulement, including 
its multi-layered aspects. It has also examined how the ECHR and two European courts - the 
ECtHR and the CJEU - interpret and apply the prohibition against refoulement. The legislative and 
jurisprudential picture that emerges is of a relatively robust norm. Under EU law, non-refoulement 
applies within the EU Charter, as well as within the framework of the CEAS, specifically within 
the key directives: the Qualification Directive, Asylum Procedures Directive, and Reception 
Conditions Directive. Under ECHR law, non-refoulement applies extraterritorially as reaffirmed 
by case law from the ECtHR. The prohibition against non-refoulement under EU law is applicable 
based on the territorial scope of the EU Charter, which is governed by Article 51(1).533 The EU 
Charter applies ‘whenever the institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies of the Union exercise their 
powers’.534  
However, this chapter has also indicated that the actual practice of some EU Member States has 
been to adopt a narrower understanding of non-refoulement, one that is limited through domestic 
interpretation as a result of the ‘margin of discretion’ allowed to Member States when transposing 
directives, and limited through the presumption of mutual trust when transferring asylum claimants 
to other (‘responsible’) States. Shortcomings of relying upon the presumption of mutual trust in 
Dublin transfers include the assumption that all EU Member States are in compliance with relevant 
international and European law obligations, including the protection against refoulement. Often, 
State practice has shown that the reliance upon diplomatic assurances and the presumption of 
mutual trust do not translate into actual protection for claimants, but instead have the countereffect 
of permitting EU Member States to shift their responsibility for processing asylum applications 
 
533 EU Charter supra note 45 at art 51(1), which states: ‘The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States 
only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and 
promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of 
the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties’. 
534 Ibid; See, also: Violeta Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe: Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee 
Rights under EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) at 290 [Violeta Monograph]. 
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elsewhere - outside of the EU to third countries deemed ‘safe’, or to another Member State within 
the EU. The shifting of responsibility outside of the EU to third States deemed ‘safe’ as a 
destination for the asylum claimant is not in itself a violation of international law.535 However, the 
curtailment of human rights of the claimants when adequate procedural safeguards such as access 
to individual assessments prior to being transferred is a violation.  
Unfortunately, these gaps between law and practice are likely to continue for the foreseeable 
future: the use of the words ‘should’ instead of ‘shall’ in the ‘Dublin IV’ Proposal may result in 
the implementation of minimum procedural guarantees, or less.536 For example, one key recital 
provides that there should be personal interviews for the asylum claimants (recital 23), while 
another recital provides that there should be legal safeguards and the right to effective remedy 
(recital 24).537 This approach arguably leave too much room for Member States to interpret the 
clauses as they wish, basing their discretion on State interests.538 This wide ‘margin of discretion’ 
is likely to translate into more difficulties for asylum claimants to have their applications properly 
 
535 It should be noted, however, that ‘safe’ third country practices are derived from the omission of the Refugee 
Convention to include it as permissible or prohibited. The UNHCR does not oppose to its use, however, the concept 
of ‘safe’ third country has no legal basis under international law, see, for example: United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, “Legal Considerations regarding access to protection and a connection between the refugee and the third 
country in the context of return or transfer to safe third countries”, April 2018, 
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5acb33ad4.pdf. 
536 Dublin IV Proposal supra note 494 at recitals 23 and 24.  
537 Ibid; In these examples, the word ‘should’ is used instead of ‘shall’, which permits the member state discretion in 
decision-making. It is important to note also, that, while the Dublin III Regulation determines which EU member state 
is responsible for examining individual asylum applications, in some member states such as Germany, the Dublin 
procedure does not refer to a separate procedure in domestic German law. Rather, in the German context, the Dublin 
procedure refers to the shifting of responsibility for an asylum application within the administration, for instance, the 
assumption of responsibility by the ‘Dublin units’ of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) of 
Germany; See, for example: Asylum Information Database, “Dublin: Germany”, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/asylum-procedure/procedures/dublin [AIDA]. 
538 See, for example: Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Sierra Leonean refugees in 
Guinea) v Guinea, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication No 240/02, December 2004. 
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processed on their merits, resulting in a higher likelihood of rejection, and potentially increasing 
the possibility of refoulement.539  
The next chapter considers an explanation for the actions of EU Member States in limiting, in 
practice, the principle of non-refoulement: the theory of containment.   
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
539 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 33(1).  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Containment in Europe 
4. Introduction 
Chapters Two and Three outlined the international and regional law governing non-refoulement 
within the European Union (EU). They demonstrated that the principle prohibiting refoulement is 
quite robust, particularly when one considers the norm in a complementary manner taking into 
account its meaning and application under international refugee law and international human rights 
law. At the same time, Chapter Three indicated that the full content of the principle is not always 
respected in practice within the EU. For example, some EU Member States restrict procedural 
safeguards, add procedural barriers, or adopt overly narrow interpretations of non-refoulement in 
domestic law when exercising the ‘margin of discretion’ they are permitted under EU law, thereby 
weakening the underlying safeguards that help to protect against refoulement. Some EU Member 
States rely upon the presumption of mutual trust to transfer responsibility for asylum seekers 
without ensuring adequate processes exist in the other Member States to prevent refoulement. 
These actions result in a gap between the written and customary international and regional law of 
non-refoulement and actual practices regarding the norm. This Chapter proposes an explanation of 
why this gap exists: the theory of containment and the adoption of containment policies. The goal 
of examining the theory of containment is to provide crucial context for the recommendations 
articulated in Chapter Seven. 
The theory of containment is exactly what it sounds like: a theory on how States contain or control 
the mobility or immobility of migrants within or outside of their borders.540 The theory of 
containment is not exclusive to the field of international, regional and domestic refugee law or to 
 
540 Dartmouth College Library, “A Short Definition for Migration Studies”, which states: ‘The movement of groups 
and individuals from one place to another, involving a change of usual residence. Migration is usually distinguished 
from mobility in general by conventions of spatial and temporal scale. For example, by convention international 
migration requires crossing a national boundary for an actual or intended period of at least one year’, 
https://researchguides.dartmouth.edu/human_geography/migration; See, also: Noel Castree, Rob Kitchin, Alisdair 
Rogers, “Migration” in A Dictionary of Human Geography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 315-316.  
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the field of international human rights law. In fact, this theory originated outside of the legal 
sphere, and in recent years has been applied within the fields of spatial and human geography and 
migration studies. This chapter begins by explaining containment theories in these two fields. 
Next, it demonstrates that the theory of containment is applicable to certain policies and practices 
within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), such as Dublin transfers and ‘safe’ third 
country agreements. The chapter turns to a discussion of how containment policies and practices 
in the EU affect the protection of asylum seekers from refoulement. Finally, the chapter ends with 
concluding remarks on the place of containment theory within the field of refugee law and 
international law. This chapter shows that, while the law of containment itself is not a violation of 
international law, the policies and practices surrounding the application of that law are of concern: 
containment arises not because of the law itself, but in the misuse and misapplication of that law. 
4.1 Theories of Containment 
There is not one single unified theory of containment, as the theory has emerged from a number 
of different disciplines. Rather, there are multiple theories of containment. For example, in the 
field of political science, the term ‘containment’ or ‘strategies of containment’ was used in the past 
to describe ‘the appropriate American strategy to counter the threat of Soviet expansionism in the 
aftermath of World War II and the advent of the Cold War’.541 This chapter focuses on theories of 
containment in two specific areas: geography and migration studies.542 Migration studies can be 
categorized - at least in part - as a subset of the field of human and spatial geography, and therefore 
the theories of containment in both geography and migration studies intersect.  
 
541 Robert S Litwak, “Containment” in Joel Krieger (ed) The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004).  
542 Martina Tazzioli, “Rethinking Containment through the EU-Libya Migration Deal” Völkerrechtsblog, 23 October 
2017, https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/rethinking-containment-through-the-eu-libya-migration-deal [Tazzioli]. 
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The field of spatial and human geography involves the study of human populations and their 
interactions with spaces and the environment.543 For example, the geography of migration has been 
described as ‘a spatio-temporal process that evolves over space and time[;] [it] involves the 
continual reshaping of places as persons move between various origins and destinations’.544 In the 
field of spatial and human geography, the term ‘containment’ is used to refer to ‘discourse[s], laws 
or policies, and technologies of control – such as detention – […] as global disciplinary strategies 
attempting to differentially shape migrant mobility’.545 The theory of containment, as expressed in 
the field of spatial and human geography, has two main characteristics. First, the theory of 
containment suggests that migrants are kept on the move.546 Mobility of migrants is restricted, 
contained, and confined to a specific sphere of movement. This can be done through refugee 
camps, transfers between detention facilities, and regulating the movement of asylum claimants 
and refugees through biometric data collection by border authorities.547 Second, the theory 
 
543 Dartmouth College Library, “A Short Definition of Human Geography”, 
https://researchguides.dartmouth.edu/human_geography/main, which states: ‘The study of the interrelationships 
between people, place, and environment, and how these vary spatially and temporally across and between locations’. 
544 Wei Li, Emily Skop, Adriana Morken, “Geography of Migration”, Oxford Bibliographies, 23 August 2017, which 
states: ‘Geographers are especially interested in the process because of the interconnections and spatial linkages that 
are formed when people move. The numbers of flows and channels that are created as a result of migration have risen 
dramatically in the past two centuries, and the result is the constant transformation both of sending and receiving areas. 
The patterns, causes, and consequences of migration are innumerable and include complicated, multiscalar economic, 
political, cultural, and demographic effects, all of which are studied by geographers’, 
https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199874002/obo-9780199874002-0038.xml. 
545 Alison Mountz, Kate Coddington, R Tina Catania, and Jenna M Loyd, “Conceptualizing Detention: Mobility, 
Containment, Bordering, and Exclusion” (2013) 37:4 Progress in Human Geography 522-541, at 526 [Mountz].  
546 Ibid. 
547 Ibid; See, also: Henk Van Houtum, “Human Blacklisting: The global apartheid of the EU’s external border regime” 
(2010) 28(6) Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 957-976 at 958-959, which states: ‘at the external 
borders of the EU [there] consists of waiting zones, camps, new fences, and new biometric methods of patrol. Hence, 
an EUscape with increasingly defensive external borders is being erected’ [Houtum].  
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suggests that migratory movements are contained.548 Scholars have also asserted that ‘the borders 
of the European Union are conceptualized as both tightening and filtering, employing biometric 
and passport technologies to select individuals to be detained or deported.549 In other words, 
containment is possible where migrants are simultaneously kept on the move and contained outside 
of the countries where they are seeking asylum, rather than being contained within a specific, 
confined area.550 Scholars have maintained that mobility can also be highly regulated through the 
transfers of those detained to and from detention centres, which is also a method of regulating, 
restricting, and controlling migratory movement through containment strategies.551 ‘Containment’ 
can also be achieved through detention of migrants.552 For instance, scholars have argued that 
containment may ‘also be a consequence of other restrictions on refugees’ movement (including, 
but by no means limited to, border security, visa controls, and immigration detention), or a failure 
 
548 Ibid. 
549 Ibid; See, also: Houtum supra note 547 at 971, which states: ‘For the EU, then, the installation of camps is a form 
of concentration and containment, of ‘stocking’ the people without papers in order to facilitate and manage more 
efficiently the daily biopolitical control of their whereabouts’ (emphasis added).  
550 Tazzioli supra note 542. 
551 Mountz supra note 545 at 528-530, which states: ‘Even as detention contains migrant bodies, it simultaneously 
makes those same bodies more mobile in controlled ways through dispersal, transfers, and deportation. Rationales for 
detention often assert that detention is necessary to prevent migrants from absconding, yet, in order to prevent migrants 
from moving (or removing themselves from state oversight), detention continuously moves them around. Frequent 
transfers among detention facilities are common in the United States, Australia, Italy, and other countries’; see, also: 
Izabella Majcher, “Border Securitization and Containment vs. Fundamental Rights: The European Union’s ‘Refugee 
Crisis’”, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Conflict & Security Blog, 20 March 2017,  
https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/border-securitization-and-containment-vs-fundamental-
rights-the-european-unions-refugee-crisis.  
552 Mountz supra note 545 at 522, which states: ‘processes of detention and confinement have been relatively neglected 
by geographers. This is surprising because these social practices of immobilization are fundamental reliant on spatial 
tactics, or the use of space to control people, objects, and their movement’.  
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to facilitate lasting durable solutions that enable refugees and [internally displaced persons] to 
escape their conditions’.553 Scholars have also contended that containment refers to: 
any effort to localize or internalize forced migration in countries or regions of 
origin. Visa requirements, carrier sanctions, return of asylum seekers to ‘countries 
of first asylum’, the creation of ‘safe havens’, and ‘humanitarian’ intervention are 
among the methods of containment.554 
Containment, therefore, is a practice of control of the movement, or lack of movement, of migrants 
- of the geographic spaces in which they reside. 
Strategies of geographic containment are often facilitated by law. One example of this is through 
the use of national deterrence laws.555 National deterrence laws include laws that create barriers, 
whether politically or legally, which reduce, restrict, or deter the movement of asylum claimants 
 
553 Kirsten McConnachie, “Camps of Containment: A Genealogy of the Refugee Camp” (2016) 7 (3) Humanity: An 
International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, 397-412 at 398, which states: 
‘containment has been used to describe a shift from asylum predicated on protecting mobility to asylum predicated on 
managing mobility, with the latter goal primarily achieved by containment in migrants’ region or even country of 
origin’; See, also: Andrew Shacknove, “From Asylum to Containment” (1993) 5(4) International Journal of Refugee 
Law, 516-533 at 527, which states: ‘Containment takes many forms and serves many purposes. For example, visa 
requirements and carrier sanctions are intended primarily to regulate illegal immigration […] A policy of containing 
forced migration is likely to erode further the political and legal justification for distinguishing between refugees and 
the internally displaced […] A second justification for a sustained commitment to asylum is that efforts to contain 
victims of human rights abuses within zones of conflict, even  where doing so is possible, may be contrary to 
international stability’ [Shacknove].   
554 Shacknove supra note 553 at 516, the author concludes with: ‘A preference for containment, in itself or coupled 
with other forms of intervention, must proceed with caution […] Containment is justifiable only under limited 
conditions. A policy of good governance worthy of its name entails commitments from both donors and aid-
receiving States’.  
555 Mountz supra note 545 at 526.  
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and refugees into and across that State’s territory.556 Another example can be seen in ‘refugees in 
orbit’ situations, where refugees find themselves in legal limbo: rejected from the country where 
they are seeking refuge, yet not able to or unwilling to return to their country of origin.557 While 
laws - or, specifically, narrow or self-serving interpretations of law by States - can create ‘refugees 
in orbit’ situations, it should be noted that such situations are against the established intention of 
the drafters of the Refugee Convention and contrary to the purpose of the institution of asylum, 
which seeks to safeguard the right to seek asylum from persecution and non-refoulement 
protection.558 This is explored further below.  
Migration studies examines the movement of people, including the study of both mobility and 
immobility, and therefore uses a somewhat different lens than the one described above for the field 
of spatial and human geography.559 Geographers who study migration question the containment 
efforts by the EU in their research. For example, scholars have argued that the EU has utilized 
geographies of exclusion as a method of containing asylum claimants and refugees including by:  
isolating migrants in remote locations, States restrict access to territories where they 
might make refugee claims or take up residency illegally. Articulated sequentially, 
 
556 Ibid; For example, these laws and policies may use detention and deportation as tools and methods to regulate 
migration and to deter those who may not have legal status within the country from entering the territories of the State 
to claim asylum; Mountz supra note 545 at 527, which states: ‘while detention serves to contain and isolate individual 
detainees, it simultaneously reconstitutes contained individuals as mobile collective threats’. 
557 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at preamble; Moreover, it must be clear that the denial of entry does not lead to 
a situation of refugees in orbit who cannot find protection because every State relies on the potential protection by 
another State. 
558 Also see Travaux Prépraratories of the Refugee Convention, Weis supra note 154. 
559 Dartmouth College Library, “A Short Definition for Migration Studies”, which states: ‘The movement of groups 
and individuals from one place to another, involving a change of usual residence. Migration is usually distinguished 
from mobility in general by conventions of spatial and temporal scale. For example, by convention international 
migration requires crossing a national boundary for an actual or intended period of at least one year’, 
https://researchguides.dartmouth.edu/human_geography/migration; Tazzioli supra note 542. 
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these trends suggest an exclusionary series of maneuvers on the part of nation-states 
to exercise control (emphasis added).560  
Experts on the Common European Asylum System have also cited to the practices and policies of 
refugee containment. For instance, some scholars have contended that the CEAS is ‘destined to 
remain a policy failure, an ethical sore, and political tinderbox’ if refugee containment is not 
properly addressed.561 However, these studies have focused mainly on the costs of containment 
rather than on the causes of containment and the sources and origin of the concept in refugee 
law.562 Other experts have asserted the role of containment theories in public emergencies which 
threaten the life of the nation.563 The main arguments of these scholars suggest that a theory of 
containment can explain the extent of the powers, and its limits, of a nation in a state of emergency 
to constrain and contain external threats.564  
Within migration studies, one area of containment theory focus is on European ‘hotspots’: places 
at the external borders of Europe where large numbers of migrants arrive, such as the islands of 
 
560 Jennifer Hyndman and Alison Mountz, “Refuge or Refusal: The Geography of Exclusion” in Derek Gregory and 
Allan Pred (eds) Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror, and Political Violence (New York: Routledge, 2007), 77-92 at 
85, which states: ‘Acknowledging international legal commitments but generating nonsovereign spaces of exception 
to them. Those fleeing spaces of political violence in their home countries are consistently conflated with those who 
represent a security threat elsewhere, creating new spaces of political violence in the form of exclusion, detention, and 
the suspension of civil and human rights’. 
561 Costello Containment supra note 112 at 17 and 22. 
562 For example, Costello mentions in her article that: ‘Refugee containment is not only a European practice, but many 
of the policies and practices that are central to refugee containment are of fairly recent European origin […] 
Containment contributed to the events styled as the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe, yet the crisis has generated a more 
intensified set of containment practices, also likely to backfire’, and further, that: ‘This Article identifies the costs of 
this refugee containment, not only for refugees and asylum-seekers, but also for Europe itself, its politics, and its 
adherence to the rule of law in particular’, see Costello Containment supra note 112 at 17. 
563 Karin Loevy, Emergencies in Public Law: The Legal Politics of Containment (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016).  
564 Ibid at 6. 
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Greece and Italy.565 The geographical position of these hotspots along the Mediterranean Sea route 
serves to control the entry of migrants and to contain them away from the mainland.566 Within 
these hotspots, a so-called EU ‘hotspot approach’ has evolved,  
where the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol and Eurojust work on the ground with the 
authorities of frontline EU Member States which are facing disproportionate 
migratory pressures at the EU’s external borders to help to fulfill their obligations 
under EU law and swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants.567  
The EU’s hotspot approach on the islands of Greece and Italy has been described as ‘the 
‘immediate response’ to increased arrivals into Europe of refugees crossing the Mediterranean 
Sea’.568 Frontline EU Member States assume a heavier share of responsibility to process asylum 
applications and use island hotspot infrastructures in order to enforce migration containment.569 
This very fact of hotspots as places where containment approaches are put under strain results in 
frontline EU Member States bearing the heaviest responsibility, contrary to the legally-binding 
principle of responsibility sharing among EU Member States.570 The European Commission 
emphasized that: 
 
565 Martina Tazzioli and Glenda Garelli, “Containment Beyond Detention: The Hotspot System and the Disrupted 
Migration Movements Across Europe” (2018) Society and Space 1-19, 2 [Tazzioli and Garelli].  
566 Ibid.  
567 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Hotspot Approach”, https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/content/hotspot-approach_en.  
568 Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli, “Beyond Detention: Spatial Strategies of Dispersal and Channels of Forced 
Transfer”, Society & Space, 8 November 2016, https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/beyond-detention-spatial-
strategies-of-dispersal-and-channels-of-forced-transfer at 4 [Beyond Detention].   
569 Ibid at 2765.  
570 TFEU supra note 18 at art 80.  
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the experience of recent years has shown that, especially in situations of mass influx 
along specific migratory routes, the current system places responsibility, in law, for 
the vast majority of asylum seekers on a limited number of individual Member 
States, a situation which would stretch the capacities of any Member State.571 
Amnesty International has critiqued the use of island hotspots because these areas also are areas 
where multiple abuses of force take place and maltreatment of asylum claimants occurs.572 Since 
these island hotspots are part of the EU’s strategy of containing migratory movement away from 
the mainland, some scholars have labeled the EU’s hotspot approach as ‘shrinking spaces of 
asylum’.573 They do so because migration is essentially funnelled to these hotspots, such as on the 
Lesbos Islands in Greece, where the movements of asylum seekers are restricted due to 
geography.574 Further, island hotspots function as isolated mechanisms to exclude those who are 
‘unwanted’, while allowing only those who are considered eligible for asylum claims into the 
system.575 The ‘unwanted’ are often individuals who are deemed to be ‘outsiders’ or ‘the other’: 
those who do not have legal documentation or who otherwise arrived on the territories of the 
 
571 Ibid.  
572 Amnesty International, “Hotspot Italy: How EU’s Flagship Approach Leads to Violations of Refugee and Migrant 
Rights”, 3 November 2016, which states: ‘Amnesty International is deeply concerned that the procedures applied by 
Italian authorities to issue expulsion orders […] were not in line with international law, including European human 
rights law, and that they may have therefore breached the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of collective 
expulsions’, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR3050042016ENGLISH.PDF.  
573 Alison Mountz, “The enforcement archipelago: Detention, haunting, and asylum on islands” (2011) Political 
Geography 30(3): 118-128 at 126. 
574 Transnational Institute, “The shrinking space for solidarity with migrants and refugees” September 2018, which 
states: ‘Premised on providing support for member states dealing with large influxes of people, it is primarily designed 
to ensure that identification, registration and fingerprinting is systematically implemented, with security screening if 
necessary […] Hotspots like the one in Moria on Lesbos effectively turned into long-term detention centres where 
people waited to be returned to Turkey, in pitiful conditions and with severe overcrowding’, 
https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/web_theshrinkingspace.pdf at 12 [TI Report]. 
575 Beyond Detention supra note 568 at 4.   
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Member State through irregular means.576 Those labeled ‘unwanted’ are often coerced to stay 
behind in detention or worse - deported to third country destinations deemed ‘safe’ but that often 
do not have adequate procedural safeguards for claimants to access international protection.577 The 
hotspot approach is also a method of migration control, whereby entry to the mainland (as opposed 
to island hotspots) to claim asylum is obstructed.578 The movements of these claimants are often 
obstructed through administrative detention, or through highly regularized travel restraints such as 
police checkpoints where identity papers are sought.579 
As observed above in the field of spatial and human geography, there is also a link between law 
and containment in migration studies. Scholars have observed that strategies related to making and 
keeping migrants mobile or immobile are often facilitated by laws: for example, Tazzioli observes 
that States take legal terrain away from migrants in the same way they restrict access to physical 
terrain.580 Sometimes the legal and physical terrains coincide, such as with laws restricting the 
movements of migrants into, within, and from a State.581 Containment through law can occur 
 
576 TI Report supra note 574 at 16, which states: ‘It is important to stress the rupture being forced upon Italian society 
by policies implemented within the framework of the European Agenda on Migration. Italy is in the difficult position 
of having to deal with the EU’s unwanted migrants with little more than coercion and deportation’.  
577 Ibid.  
578 Ibid. 
579 Martina Tazzioli, “Containment through Mobility: Migrants’ Spatial Disobediences and the Reshaping of Control 
through the Hotspot System” (2018) 44:16 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 2764-2779 at 2766: ‘hotspots 
[work] as a lens for analysing modes of migration control through mobility and for bringing attention to migrants’s 
[sic] spatial disobediences against the restrictions imposed by the EU policies of asylum’; See, also: TI Report supra 
note 574 at 25, which states: ‘[there are] unprecedented restrictions, including threats and acts of violence, criticism 
in the media and criminalization’ [Tazzioli Journal]. 
580 Tazzioli supra note 542.  
581 Oxford Dictionary of Economics, “Immobile Factors” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Where primary 
policies and laws refer to the stated goals of the CEAS - to harmonize asylum policies across the EU and to enhance 
efficiency in the processing of asylum applications.  
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through administrative or legislative measures by the government to regulate and create barriers 
for migratory movements.582  
Together, spatial and human geography and migration studies explore the interactions and 
movements of human populations with spaces and places - both in the form of mobility and 
immobility. The theories of containment expressed in both spatial and human geography and 
migration studies are clearly interlinked. That said, Tazzioli notes that: ‘the notion of 
“containment” has surprisingly remained quite under-theorised both in the field of migration 
studies and in geography scholarship’, requiring further conceptualization.583 Given the linkages 
to law, it can also be said that containment theory in legal analysis is also under-theorized, though 
there has been some recognition by scholars such as Costello.584 
As a type of control theory which explicates spatial confinement, the containment theory applied 
in the migration context is an explanatory theory: it explains exclusion or inclusion of migrants 
 
582 Tazzioli Journal supra note 579 at 2765, ‘migration movements are obstructed in their autonomy not only by 
generating immobility and conditions of strandedness, nor through constant surveillance but through administrative, 
political and legal measures that use (forced) mobility as a technique of government. Containment refers to the ways 
in which migrants’ movements and presence are troubled, subjected to convoluted or hectic movements and to 
protracted moment of strandedness. Thus, containment can involve both spatial and temporal hindrances that end up 
in troubling migrants’ stay and mobility’. 
583 Tazzioli and Garelli supra note 565 at 3; See, also: Tazzioli supra note 542.  
584 Costello Containment supra note 112 at 17-20, which states: ‘Refugee containment is not only a European practice, 
but many of the policies and practices that are central to refugee containment are of fairly recent European origin […] 
Containment contributed to the events styled as the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe, yet the crisis has generated a more 
intensified set of containment policies, also likely to backfire’; Further, that: ‘Containment evidently has an immense 
cost in human lives […] The EU now supports a network of places of detention and containment at the EU’s periphery 
in order to prevent would-be refugees from seeking asylum beyond’; Also: ‘Europe had several years to address the 
potential of that Syrians would seek protection in Europe, and it effectively chose to hope that containment would 
work […] Due to containment practices, refugee arrivals are unpredictable and invariably look like a crisis’. 
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through tactics to keep them out (migration control policies) or lock them in (detention policies).585 
However, the theory of containment need not be binary in nature, explaining only exclusion and 
inclusion, or mobility and immobility.586 Containment policies may also involve tactics to keep 
migrants on the move, creating the ‘refugees in orbit’ situation. A warning, however: as an 
explanatory theory, containment theory should not be viewed ‘as an overarching analytical grid’ 
toward which countries should aim.587 Rather, it is a geographical concept with spatial effects 
(physical, social, economic, and legal) that States generally try to avoid admitting they fulfill. 
Instead, they use obfuscatory language to indicate otherwise, such as when the EU justifies its 
secondary policies and laws as having the ultimate goal of ‘containing migratory flows and 
 
585 Tazzioli supra note 542; The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘control’ as ‘the power to influence or direct 
people’s behaviour or the course of events’, ‘the restriction of an activity, tendency, or phenomenon’, and ‘a means 
of limiting or regulating something’, as applied to the migration context of the EU, a theory about control involves a 
theory which explains EU’s power to influence, direct, restrict, limit, and regulate migratory movements, see: Oxford 
English Dictionary, “Control”, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/control. 
586 Ibid.  
587 Tazzioli supra note 542. 
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tackling irregular migration through enhanced border management and the fight against smuggling 
and trafficking’ (emphasis added).588 At its core, containment is a theory about control.589  
Having explained containment theory as developed in the fields of spatial and human geography 
and migration studies, the next section will examine how containment in the broadest sense - not 
only limited to confinement or detention, but also including calculated movement of migrants - is 
evident in the CEAS in a legal and policy sense.  
4.2 Containment in the Common European Asylum System 
The aims of the CEAS are to harmonize the standards of protection by aligning the EU Member 
States’ asylum legislation, support cooperation among EU Member States on the implementation 
 
588 Buscaini supra note 17; The term ‘irregular’ is used rather than ‘illegal’ because the latter term connotates 
criminality, when there are many reasons and factors contributing to asylum claimants’ decisions to enter the EU 
through irregular means. For example, incentives for irregular migration may include the inability to access legal and 
safe routes through migration control mechanisms, see: See, for example: United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, “Desperate Journeys: Refugees and Migrants Arriving in Europe and at Europe’s Borders”, September 
2018, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/65373#_ga=2.259362563.824522296.1546209771-
1257371235.1536847062 at 15: ‘Measures this year to try to further reduce the number of arrivals in Europe, in 
addition to the limited access to Italian ports for refugees and migrants rescued at sea since June, included further 
restrictions on the work of NGOs involved in search and rescue off the Libyan coast, and additional support to Libyan 
authorities to prevent sea crossings to Europe. These are in addition to other existing measures, such as the provisions 
of the EU-Turkey Statement concerning those crossing the sea from Turkey to Greece’; Moreover, an individual’s 
choice (or lack of choice) to enter a State’s territory to claim asylum through irregular means should not be penalized; 
this requirement is found in Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention; There are many negative consequences which 
may result from the prevention of irregular migration into Europe. Most notably, individuals who are unable to enter 
the EU through regular, legal routes are often forced to make perilous journeys across the Mediterranean Sea or 
through other routes in order to seek safety. However, some scholars have made the argument that it is the operation 
of law-enabled non-entrée (non-admission) restrictions which sometimes incentivizes the use of irregular routes to 
reach safety, see: Ralph Wilde, “‘Let Them Drown’: Rescuing migrants at sea and the non-refoulement obligation as 
a case study of international law’s relationship to ‘crisis’: Part I & II”, EJIL:Talk! Blog, https://www.ejiltalk.org/let-
them-drown-rescuing-migrants-at-sea-and-the-non-refoulement-obligation-as-a-case-study-of-international-laws-
relationship-to-crisis-part-i.  
589 Ibid; For example, hotspots in Greece evidence EU’s attempt to regain control over migration movements. 
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of asylum policies, and to increase solidarity and responsibility among EU Member States.590 
These aims exist uneasily beside certain practices within the CEAS that amount to forms of 
containment of migrants, including asylum seekers. The EU’s asylum policies have been described 
as: 
actions directed at both attenuating causes of departure and reducing cross-border 
movements [including the use of] ‘source control’ measures, such as conflict 
prevention, development assistance, trade partnerships and political dialogue[,] 
increasingly deployed in order to lessen the migration pressure towards the EU.591 
In other words, the EU actively endeavours to prevent the departure of individuals wishing to 
migrate to Europe, and to reduce cross-border movements toward Europe through actions in the 
countries or regions of origin for migrants. The activities of the EU’s High Level Working Group 
on Asylum and Migration (Working Group) are crucial in this regard. The Working Group is a 
central forum set up in 1998 for strategic discussions with the aim of ‘[establishing] a common, 
integrated, cross-pillar approach targeted at the situation in the most important countries of origin 
of asylum-seekers and migrants’.592 The significance of this High Level Working Group is that it 
marks the ‘most concrete manifestation of the attempt to institutionalize centralized responsibility 
and a concerted framework of action for all relevant EU institutions dealing with asylum and 
migration policies’.593 The usage of the term ‘containment’ to describe or explain the EU’s asylum 
policies is therefore not new.594 
 
590 CEAS supra note 331.  
591 Ibid.  
592 European Union, The Council, “Terms of reference of the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration; 
preparation of action plans for the most important countries of origin and transit of asylum-seekers and migrants”, 13 
January 1999, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5264-1999-INIT/en/pdf at 1.  
593 See, for example: Channe Lindstrøm, “European Union Policy on Asylum and Immigration. Addressing the Root 
Causes of Forced Migration: A Justice and Home Affairs Policy of Freedom, Security and Justice?” (2005) 39(6) 
Social Policy & Administration 587-605 at 595 [Lindstrøm].  
594 Lindstrøm supra note 593 at 593.   
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Key CEAS containment policies include the use of Dublin transfers, ‘safe’ third country 
agreements, the interception of asylum seekers prior to reaching Europe, migrant tracking, narrow 
interpretations of the Refugee Convention, and deterrence policies. Each of these approaches will 
be discussed in turn.  
As explained in Chapter Three, Dublin transfers are transfers of asylum seekers from one EU 
country to another EU country deemed ‘responsible’ for those asylum seekers. Responsibility is 
determined based on a hierarchy of considerations summarized in that chapter. The goal of the 
Dublin transfer regime ‘not to spread refugees equitably among Contracting Parties, but to 
introduce a set of criteria to swiftly assign responsibility among them’ (emphasis added).595 These 
transfers take place on the presumption of mutual trust, also explained in Chapter Three: 
The system is based on the fundamental assumption that member states may be 
considered ‘safe’ countries for asylum seekers, and for that reason, it is presumed 
that transfers from one member state to another do not violate the principle of non-
refoulement.596 
This approach reduces the ‘refugees in orbit’ problem, but it also reinforces the control and 
containment of migrants at the external borders of the EU, particularly in the hotspots described 
above. As well, as described in Chapter Three, Dublin transfers based on the presumption of 
mutual trust can also return asylum seekers to EU countries that do not have, in actuality, adequate 
refugee processing systems and therefore adequate protections against refoulement.597  
 
595 Roberto Cortinovis, “Asylum: The Role and Limits of the Safe Third Country Concept in EU Asylum”, July 2018 
at 4 [Cortinovis]. 
596 Ibid. 
597 For example, nongovernment organizations have raised concerns about asylum laws, policies and practices in 
Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia, Hungary and Bulgaria: ‘Rather than being places of safety, countries on the Western 
Balkan route have failed to offer protection or due process to many new arrivals and instead have pushed them back 
to their previous country of transit or even another country, without giving them a chance to claim asylum’ thereby 
raising serious concerns about refoulement, see: Oxfam, Belgrade Centre for Human Rights and Macedonian Young 
Lawyers Association, A Dangerous 'Game': the Pushback of Migrants, including Refugees, at Europe’s Borders, 5 
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A related strategy with the aim of restricting migratory movements is related to registration and 
the notion of ‘first country of asylum’. The Dublin III Regulation restricts movements of claimants 
and refugees who are in search of international protection by requiring them to register at the first 
EU Member State of arrival.598 Where the claimant is found to have already registered in an EU 
Member State in which international protection for claiming refugee status is sought, but 
subsequently moved onward to another Member State, the individual will be sent back to the 
Member State responsible for processing the asylum application through the Dublin III 
Regulation.599 This shifts the responsibility for processing the asylum application from one EU 
Member State to another Member State (via Dublin transfers).600  
EU Member States’ use of ‘safe’ third country agreements provides another example of 
containment policies in action. Like Dublin transfers, ‘safe’ third country agreements are diversion 
policies ‘designed to shift to other States the responsibility for those asylum-seekers who manage 
to arrive at the borders of the European Union’.601 ‘Safe’ third country are agreements in which an 
EU Member State provides another country (outside of the EU) with an overarching, or blanket, 
recognition of that country as a safe place to which to send asylum claimants. ‘The safe third 
country notion rests on the assumption that an asylum applicant could have obtained international 
protection in another country and therefore the receiving state is entitled to reject responsibility for 
the protection claim’.602 If the responsible country is deemed ‘safe’, then the transfer can happen 
efficiently without an inquiry into the specific situation of each asylum claimant. Where the 
claimant or refugee is found to have passed through a ‘safe’ non-EU country, that individual will 
 
April 2017, https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bp-dangerous-game-pushback-migrants-
refugees-060417-en_0.pdf at 2, 9, and 12.  
598 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 3(1) and 3(2); A further discussion of the hierarchy of criteria which 
determines the Member State responsible for processing the asylum application is in Chapter 4.  
599 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 3(2).  
600 Court of Justice of the EU, “Opinion 2/13”, 18 December 2014 at para 191; Prechal supra note 495.  
601 Ibid at 19(ii). 
602 Cortinovis supra note 595 at 3. 
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be returned to that third country, as the country deemed to be responsible for processing the asylum 
application.603 ‘Safe’ third country recognition and Dublin transfers are provided for under the 
Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) and the Dublin III Regulation respectively.604  
EU Member States use the ‘safe’ third country concept to shift the responsibility for processing 
asylum applications elsewhere, that is, from the Member State deemed responsible for examining 
the application based on the Dublin III Regulation, to a non-EU country deemed ‘safe’.605 At the 
same time, claimants who have been sent back to non-EU countries deemed ‘safe’ pursuant to the 
Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) are not allowed to re-enter the Member State that returned 
the claimant to the third country.606 This approach keeps claimants from returning to the EU, and 
therefore contains migrants outside of the EU. For example, under Article 46(5) of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive (recast), EU Member States are allowed to not grant suspensive recourse (the 
right to remain in the country of asylum pending outcome of appeal) to persons whose application 
was initially considered unfounded or manifestly unfounded.607 An ‘unfounded’ application for 
international protection means that the applicant does not qualify for international protection, while 
a ‘manifestly unfounded’ application means that the applicant for international protection does not 
qualify for refugee status due to reasons including fraud or deception during the application 
process.608 This means that asylum claimants whose applications were initially considered 
 
603 Asylum Procedures Directive supra note 24 at art 38. 
604 Ibid; Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at chp VI.  
605 Ibid.  
606 European Association for the Defence of Human Rights, International Federation for Human Rights, and EuroMed 
Rights, “Safe’ Countries: A Denial of the Right of Asylum”, May 2016, 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/MHR/ReportLargeMovements/FIDH2%20.pdf at 9 [FIDH].  
607 Asylum Procedures Directive supra note 24 at art 46(5).  
608 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Manifestly Unfounded Application for International 
Protection”: ‘In the EU context, an unfounded application for international protection that is considered under national 
legislation of EU Member States to manifestly unfounded in one of the following circumstances: the applicant has 
only raised issues that are not relevant for the qualification as beneficiary of international protection; the applicant is 
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unfounded or manifestly unfounded may be forced to return to their country of origin or forced to 
leave the territory of the Member State, without the possibility of return. One result of ‘safe’ third 
country policies is an increased chance of refoulement: in the event of an unfounded or manifestly 
unfounded asylum application, the claimant will be without any recourse against a rejected asylum 
application, thus the claimant’s non-refoulement protection may be violated if he or she is returned 
without the ability to appeal against a wrongful determination.609 
EU Member States also facilitate the use of ‘safe’ third country lists, which are lists of countries 
which the EU has predetermined to be ‘safe’ for claimants.610 The use of predetermined ‘safe’ 
third country lists is problematic because it may potentially increase instances of refoulement. 
First, predetermined ‘safe’ third country lists do not take into account the changing political 
situation and human rights record in the third country.611 Therefore, the use of predetermined ‘safe’ 
third country lists may increase the potential for refoulement in situations where claimants are 
returned to territories with unstable or rapidly-changing political or human rights situations, where 
 
from a safe country of origin; the applicant is, for serious reasons, considered a danger to the national security or 
public order or the application is based on deliberate deception or an abuse of the procedure for international 
protection’.  
609 For a discussion on how the use of ‘safe’ third country concepts may lower standards of protection including 
violating the principle of non-refoulement, see generally: Gloria Fernandez Arribas, “The EU-Turkey Agreement: A 
Controversial Attempt at Patching up a Major Problem” (2016) 1:3 European Papers, 1097-1104 [Arribas]. 
610 ‘As regards the EU list of safe third countries, the latest Presidency compromise provides that it is to be adopted 
via a Regulation modifying the Asylum Procedure Regulation (Article 46(1)) and that national lists may continue to 
exist in parallel (a sunset clause for such lists existed in the original Commission proposal)’ in Council of the European 
Union, “Reform of the Common European Asylum System – The Safe Countries Concept”, 8 May 2018 at 4 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-council-safe-countries-concept-8735-18.pdf.  
611 For example, the UNHCR has reiterated that ‘best practice involves an assessment that is indeed a repeated 
application in which there are no significant substantive changes to the asylum-seeker’s individual situation or to the 
circumstances in the country of origin’ (emphasis added) in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
“Asylum Procedures (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures)”, 31 May 2001, UN Doc EC/GC/01/12 at para 31 
[UNHCR Asylum Procedures].  
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their lives or freedom would be threatened.612 Second, predetermined ‘safe’ third country lists 
accelerate the asylum procedure for the claimant by sending him or her back to the third country 
deemed responsible for processing the claimant’s application.613 In practice, access to asylum 
procedures in the third country may not be adequate and may not meet international law standards, 
including the requirement to provide the claimant with fair and efficient access to those 
procedures.614 As the UNHCR stated, non-refoulement is violated when the country of asylum 
denies the claimant’s access to fair and efficient asylum procedures, for example, by not examining 
his or her particular circumstances and refusing the claimant an opportunity to rebut the 
presumption of safety.615 The UNHCR has cautioned against the use of predetermined ‘safe’ third 
country lists and has requested that ‘procedures in such cases should explicitly provide for return 
to be effected only if the individual will be readmitted to the [‘safe’ third] country, will be able to 
access fair asylum procedures and, if recognized, will be able to enjoy effective protection 
there’.616 
Another containment strategy adopted by the EU is the prevention of certain migrants from 
reaching Europe’s external borders, albeit often with State discourse ‘about protecting migrants 
from traffickers and from dangerous crossing’.617 These are termed ‘non-arrival policies’: policies 
 
612 Ibid.  
613 The concept of ‘safe’ third country is defined as ‘a non-EU country through which the asylum seeker has transited 
and to which h/she may be returned, as the Member State considers the asylum application should have been lodged 
there. The application for asylum is therefore examined not by the Member State but by the ‘safe’ third country in 
question’ in FIDH supra note 606 at 5. 
614 UNHCR Asylum Procedures supra note at 611. 
615 Ibid at paras 13 and 14: ‘The third State needs actually to implement appropriate asylum procedures and systems 
fairly. Any list-based general assessment of safety of the third country needs to be applied flexibly, and ensure due 
consideration of that country’s safety for the individual asylum-seeker’. 
616 Ibid at para 15; See, also: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee, “Note on 
International Protection”, UN Doc A/AC.96/914 at para 19.  
617 Tazzioli supra note at 542. 
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‘aimed at preventing, interrupting or stopping improperly documented aliens, including potential 
asylum-seekers, from ever reaching Europe’.618 In 2015, the European Commission to the 
European Parliament, the European Council, and the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions tabled a report that initiated the use of the language of 
securitization and reliance on efforts to reduce irregular migration, including through the increase 
of border management.619 Titled ‘A European Agenda on Migration’, the 22-page document 
details the EU’s efforts to respond to the increase in the number of individuals crossing the 
Mediterranean Sea in search of safety and a better life.620 This Agenda was presented by the 
European Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, and the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions to ‘address immediate 
challenges and equip the EU with the tools to better manage migration’.621 This policy was later 
adopted by European heads of State and governments in the European Council on June 25-26, 
 
618 Ibid at 19(i). 
619 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda on Migration, 
COM(2015) 240 final, 13 May 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf [European Agenda on Migration]. 
For example, the Agenda states: ‘The robust fight against irregular migration, traffickers and smugglers, and securing 
Europe's external borders must be paired with a strong common asylum policy as well as a new European policy on 
legal migration. … A clear and well implemented framework for legal pathways to entrance in the EU (both through 
an efficient asylum and visa system) will reduce push factors towards irregular stay and entry, contributing to enhance 
security of European borders as well as safety of migratory flows’, at 6. It also discusses fighting criminal networks 
of smugglers and traffickers abroad as a form of border management, at 2 and 8. 
620 Ibid at 2; Oxfam, “Beyond ‘Fortress Europe’: Principles for a Humane EU Migration Policy”, October 2017, 
https://d1tn3vj7xz9fdh.cloudfront.net/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bp-principles-humane-eu-migration-policy-
111017-en.pdf at 2 [Oxfam].  
621 Ibid; See, also: European Commission, “European Agenda on Migration”, https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration_en.  
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2015, and since then has become the basis for the European policy on irregular migration.622 The 
term ‘irregular migration’ refers to migration through routes that are not at authorized checkpoints 
such as border crossings by boat, on foot, or through other means.623  
Some nongovernmental organizations such as Oxfam asserted that the European Agenda on 
Migration’s main aim is to curtail or deter irregular migration into Europe, so that individuals 
arriving irregularly by boat or on foot are prevented from entering into EU Member State 
territories.624 Scholars have contended that the underlying rationale and belief of deterrence 
paradigms - that is, policies to deter migrants from entering sovereign territories to claim asylum 
- such as the European Agenda on Migration is to allow ‘developing states can successfully 
insulate themselves from taking on a substantive and proportional responsibility in regard to 
refugee protection’, in essence, permitting ‘wealthy states to have their cake and eat it too: 
maintaining a formal commitment to international refugee law, while at the same time largely 
being spared the associated burdens’.625 The UNHCR is worried that the use of ‘non-arrival’ 
 
622 Oxfam supra note 620 at 2. 
623 The term irregular migration has no universal definition, but one definition is formulated by the International 
Organization for Migration as: ‘Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and 
receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective 
of destination countries it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required 
under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in 
cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not 
fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country. There is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the 
term "illegal migration" to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons’ in International Organization 
for Migration, “Key Migration Terms”, https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms.  
624 Ibid; See, also: Human Rights Watch, “Towards an Effective and Principled EU Migration Policy: 
Recommendations for Reform”, June 2018, 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/hrw_eu_migration_policy_memo_0.pdf.   
625 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nikolas Feith Tan, “The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for 
Global Refugee Policy” (2017) 5(1) Journal on Migration and Human Security 28-56 at 31, which states: ‘It allows 
wealthy states to have their cake and eat it too: maintaining a formal commitment to international refugee law, while 
at the same time largely being spared the associated burdens’ [Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan].  
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policies by EU Member States may lead to a general practice of not distinguishing between forced 
migrants (i.e. refugees and asylum claimants) and other migrants (i.e. economic migrants).626 Such 
policies may ‘inhibit the entry and access to asylum procedures of persons who would otherwise 
seek and enjoy asylum from persecution in their country’.627 In sum, the European Commission’s 
European Agenda on Migration aims to curtail migration into and across Europe, while the 
UNHCR and other nongovernmental organizations are concerned that the continuing trend with 
migration control in the EU can potentially infringe on the human rights of those seeking to gain 
access to international protection in EU Member States.  
Non arrival strategies include shifting of the national borders outward, so that migrants are kept 
out of national territories of the EU.628 One example of this is ‘pushback’ operations on the high 
seas to prevent claimants from reaching the territories of Member States.629 For instance, on the 
Mediterranean Sea route, migrants on boats (including asylum claimants and refugees) are 
intercepted on the high seas by Libyan coastguard officials and pushed back toward their place of 
origin or otherwise are sent to Libyan detention facilities for further processing.630 Another 
example of a non arrival strategy used by EU Member States is the use of offshore processing 
 
626 Ibid at para 27. 
627 Ibid.  
628 Luiza Bialasiewicz, “Off-shoring and out-sourcing the borders of Europe: Libya and EU border work in the 
Mediterranean” (2012) Geopolitics 17, 843-866; I Ashutosh and A Mountz, “Migration management for the benefit 
of whom? Interrogating the work of the International Organization for Migration” (2012) Citizenship Studies 15, 21-
38; I Ashutosh and A Mountz, “The geopolitics of migrant mobility: Tracing state relations through refugee claims, 
boats, and discourses” (2012) Geopolitics 17, 335-354; M Collyer and R King, “Producing transnational space: 
International migration and the extra-territorial reach of state power” (2015) Progress in Human Geography 39, 185-
204.  
629 Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen supra note 10. 
630 For example, see: Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan supra note 625 at 37, which states: ‘In 2015, the European Union 
thus launched a military operation to seize and dispose boats used for human smuggling in international waters off the 
Libyan Coast’ in an effort to prevent secondary movement such as migrant smuggling and trafficking. 
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facilities to contain migrants outside of the EU.631 Offshore detention facilities have been used by 
the EU in which ‘thousands of migrants are languishing in detention centers in Libya, nominally 
run by the government there. Many of them were intercepted by Libya’s EU-backed coast guard 
while attempting to cross the Mediterranean’.632 Another example of externalization of migration 
control is the use of ‘consensual containment’, which is a practice by third countries on behalf of, 
or for the benefit of, EU Member States to reduce the number of arrivals to Europe.633 These types 
of ‘consensual containment’ practices include collaborations between the third country and the EU 
to discourage departures, carry out effective exit controls, and halt new arrivals on EU Member 
State territory.634 Examples of the collaboration between the EU and a third country to deter 
migrants include the Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding and the EU-Turkey statement.635 
The former agreement between Italy and Libya involves the collaboration between Italy and Libya 
 
631 This issue is further explored in: Jenny Poon, “Non-Refoulement Obligations in Offshore Detention Facilities”, E-
International Relations Blog, 16 October 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/10/16/non-refoulement-obligations-in-
offshore-detention-facilities.  
632 Jessica Brandt and Claire Higgins, “Europe wants to process asylum seekers offshore – the lessons it should learn 
from Australia”, Brookings Institute, Order from Chaos, 31 August 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-
from-chaos/2018/08/31/europe-wants-to-process-asylum-seekers-offshore-the-lessons-it-should-learn-from-
australia; See, also: European Council, “Note from the General Secretariat of the Council to Delegations, Conclusions 
of the European Council meeting on 28 June 2018”, Brussels, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35936/28-
euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf at para 3.   
633 Violeta Moreno-Lax and Mariagiulia Giuffré, “The Raise of Consensual Containment: From ‘Contactless Control’ 
to ‘Contactless Responsibility’ for Forced Migration Flows” in Savinder Juss (ed) Research Handbook on 
International Refugee Law (Edward Elgar, 2016) at 15 [Moreno-Lax and Giuffré]. 
634 Ibid.  
635 This topic is explored further in: Jenny Poon, “Libya-EU Memorandum of Understanding: Implications for Non-
Refoulement and Compliance with International Human Rights Law?”, Cambridge International Law Journal Blog, 
2 December 2017, http://cilj.co.uk/2017/12/02/libya-eu-memorandum-of-understanding-implications-for-non-
refoulement-and-compliance-with-international-human-rights-law; See, also: Jenny Poon, “EU-Turkey Deal: 
Violation of, or Consistency with, International Law?” (2016) 1:3 European Papers (Forum), 1195-1203, 
http://europeanpapers.eu/en/system/files/pdf_version/EP_EF_2016_I_054_Jenny_Poon.pdf.  
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in order to ‘ensure the reduction of illegal migratory flows.636 The latter agreement is a statement 
of collaboration between the EU and Turkey, a non-EU country, which aims to take back a Syrian 
from Turkey for every Syrian Turkey admits from the Greek Islands (termed the 1:1 scheme).637  
It should be noted that non arrival strategies have had unintended consequences. Although one aim 
of the CEAS is to reduce secondary movements such as smuggling activities, non arrival strategies 
make access to international protection for claiming refugee status more difficult and actually 
incentivize human smuggling in the absence of safe and regular pathways.638 This is because such 
policies make access to crossing borders contingent upon resources and means, and push more 
people to use covert and more dangerous routes in the search for protection.639 
Another way in which EU Member States attempt to control migrant access to EU countries is 
through the restrictive application of the Refugee Convention. In particular, some countries ‘define 
away’ from the scope of the refugee definition certain categories of refugee claimants, such as 
victims of non-State agents of persecution, gender-related persecution, or localised persecution.640 
Scholars have argued that containment policies have ‘in effect contributed to further blurring the 
 
636 Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the fields of development, the fight against illegal immigration, 
human trafficking and fuel smuggling and on reinforcing the security of borders between the State of Libya and the 
Italian Republic (English translated version), Odysseus Network, translated by: Sandra Uselli, revised by Marcello 
Di Filippo, Elena Marati, and Anja Palm, http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/MEMORANDUM_translation_finalversion.doc.pdf.  
637 European Council, Statement of the EU Heads of State or Government, 7 March 2016, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/08/eu-turkey-meeting-statement.  
638 Ibid at 5.  
639 Ibid.  
640 Ibid at 19(iii). 
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distinction between refugee and economic migrant, a phenomenon for which the terms “asylum- 
migration nexus” or “mixed migration” have been coined’.641 
Control of migrants is also enforced through infrastructures or systems designed to contain, 
partition, and discipline mobility.642 The implementation of the Eurodac Regulation established 
new and enhanced measures to monitor and track claimants and refugees who have entered the EU 
through irregular means as a method of containment.643 First, claimants and refugees are required 
to be fingerprinted through the Eurodac Regulation.644 Second, the Eurodac database which stores 
fingerprint information is connected with local law enforcement authorities and EUROPOL, which 
share data with each other.645 These methods and practices of fingerprint collection forced upon 
claimants and refugees lead to instances of criminalizing irregular migration as well as penalizing 
irregular entry, which is against the protection standards codified under international law.646 
 
641 See, for example: Erika Feller, “Asylum, Migration and Refugee Protection: Realities, Myths and the Promise of 
Things to Come” (2006) 18(3) International Journal of Refugee Law 509-536 at 515; See, also: Agnes G. Hurwitz, 
The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 19.  
642 Sandro Mezzadra and Brent Neilson, Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor. (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2013).  
643 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the establishment 
of Eurodac for the comparison of fingerprints for effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on 
request for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law 
enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European agency for the 
operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (recast), OJ L180/1, 29 
June 2013 [Eurodac Regulation]. 
644 Ibid; See, also: Tazzioli Journal supra note 579 at 2771.  
645 Eurodac Regulation supra note 643. 
646 Contrary to the prohibition against non-penalization under the Refugee Convention, see: Refugee Convention supra 
note 7 at art 31(1).  
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One final example of containment theory in action in the EU is the use by some EU Member States 
of post-arrival dissuasion policies. These are policies ‘such as detention, denial of or [provision 
of] inadequate means of subsistence, and restrictions on family reunification even after granting 
refugee status’.647 In practice, the UK Home Office uses detention to ‘effect removal; initially to 
establish a person’s identity or basis of claim; or where there are reasons to believe that the person 
will fail to comply with any condition attached to the grant of temporary admission or release’.648 
Despite these reasons for detaining asylum claimants and refugees, there are ‘problems with age 
assessment or identification of specific groups such as victims of trafficking or torture’.649 For 
example, women who are pregnant and those who have severe mental health problems have been 
detained by the UK despite being identified as part of a vulnerable group.650 
The UNHCR has expressed concern over the EU’s use of non-arrival policies, diversion policies, 
restrictive applications of the Refugee Convention, and deterrence policies.651 It has warned that 
the use of these strategies of containment has ‘served to seriously undermine the foundations of 
the refugee protection regime’.652 It is concerned that the EU’s containment policies circumvent 
international law obligations such as non-refoulement and evade responsibilities owed to refugees 
pursuant to treaty and customary international law.653 Filippo Grandi, the United Nations High 
 
647 Ibid at 19(iv).  
648 See, for example: Philippe De Bruycker, Alice Bloomfield, Evangelia (Lilian) Tsourdi, Joanna Petin (eds) 
Alternatives to Immigration and Asylum Detention in the EU: Time for Implementation (Brussels: Odysseus Academic 
Network Publishing, 2015) at 148.  
649 Ibid at 149-150.  
650 Ibid.  
651 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Asylum in the Industrialized World”, 
https://www.unhcr.org/3ebf9bb10.pdf at 161 [UNHCR Asylum]. 
652 Ibid.  
653 UNHCR Asylum supra note 651 at para 49. 
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Commissioner for Refugees, stated in a speech to an audience at the European Policy Centre in 
Brussels that:  
The failure of [the EU] to implement a humane, organised, collective response to 
the large-scale arrivals in 2015, and the resort to policies of containment rather than 
shared responsibility, with even the relevance of the 1951 Convention being called 
into question by some, has already set a negative example – there is certainly a link 
between recent policies by industrialised states and more restrictive refugee policies 
in the developing world (emphasis added).654 
More specifically, Grandi commented on the EU’s ‘narrowing of access to Europe […] with 
measures restricting entry by Syrians, for example, to neighbouring countries, leaving them 
displaced and trapped inside Syria as conflict intensifies’.655 The UNHCR’s concerns, therefore, 
illustrate the consequences of containment policies within Europe as well as the importance of 
addressing these policies at the macro-level, with European governments working together in 
solidarity to adopt a proper strategy to address refugee flows.656  
 
654 Filippo Grandi, “Protecting Refugees in Europe and Beyond: Can the EU rise to the Challenge?”, European Policy 
Centre, Brussels, 5 December 2016, https://www.unhcr.org/admin/hcspeeches/58456ec34/protecting-refugees-
europe-beyond-eu-rise-challenge.html.  
655 Ibid; See, also: Florian Trauner, “Asylum Policy: the EU’s ‘crises’ and the looming policy regime failure” 38(3) 
Journal of European Integration 311-325 at 319, which states: ‘With the gap between the legal EU asylum regime 
and the actual practices of member states becoming wider, the EU has been compelled to engage in a process of policy 
reform. In May and September 2015, the European Commission proposed a series of measures under the title 
‘European Agenda on Migration’. The agenda includes a common list of ‘safe countries of origin’, plans to install a 
more efficient EU return policy, and strategies to tackle the root causes for migration in Africa and to solve the conflict 
causing people to flee’. Further, Trauner states in her article that: ‘the Dublin system builds upon the assumption that 
comparable rules and procedures exist throughout the EU. Regardless of the EU’s efforts to harmonise these rules in 
the Common European Asylum System, national asylum systems and procedures have continued to exhibit substantial 
differences’. 
656 Ibid.  
150 
 
In sum, EU containment policies not only exclude, deter, dissuade and contain, they also keep 
migrants on the move.657 Moving migrants back and moving refugees around seem to be the two 
main methods which the EU is employing in order to retain control over migrants.658 Another way 
to conceive of containment strategies is as a way for the EU to physically try to confine migrants 
to spaces that are beyond official detention facilities.659 These strategies of containment are 
imposed upon claimants and refugees in the name of fighting against smuggling and trafficking.660  
4.3 Containment and Non-Refoulement 
International refugee law is premised upon the protection against refoulement.661 Non-refoulement 
is the bare minimum standard with which States Parties to the Refugee Convention must comply 
in order to fulfill their international law obligations.662 Although relevant international human 
rights law norms such as the prohibition against torture and the prohibition against ill-treatment 
are also relevant customary and jus cogens norms with which States Parties must comply, non-
refoulement is the most crucial standard of international protection under refugee law.663 The 
UNHCR has confirmed the principle’s status as the minimum standard for the treatment of 
refugees and thus constitutes the cornerstone of international protection for claiming refugee 
status.664 The explanatory theory of containment is closely linked with the principle of non-
 
657 Tazzioli and Garelli supra note 565. 
658 Ibid.  
659 Ibid.  
660 Moreno-Lax and Giuffré supra note 633 at 14.  
661 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at introductory note. 
662 Ibid.  
663 Ibid; CAT supra note 9 at art 3; ICCPR supra note 22 at arts 6 and 7; Committee Against Torture, “Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: General Comment No. 2”, 24 
January 2008, UN Doc CAT/C/GC/2 at para 1.  
664 Ibid.  
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refoulement and this link is a significant one with important implications for asylum claimants and 
refugees. This section describes how the theory of containment is related to the principle of non-
refoulement by using the examples of the ‘safe’ third country concept and the use of the Eurodac 
Regulation to contain and to enforce migrant entries and exits.  
As described above, ‘safe’ third country agreements are used by EU Member States to send 
migrants back to those countries in certain circumstances. This is also knowns as a ‘protection 
elsewhere’ regime.665 Under international refugee law, countries to which claimants are sent 
should permit them to have adequate access to international protection for claiming refugee status, 
including having access to fair and efficient asylum procedures as well as access to the asylum 
country’s territory.666 The access to the asylum country’s territory may be temporary, but 
nonetheless must be available under international law, so that the process of claiming and 
examining one’s asylum application is possible.667 In practice, however, claimants sent back to 
third States to access international protection for claiming refugee status there often cannot do so 
for a number of reasons.668 These reasons may include poor asylum systems in the third States, 
such as not having fair and timely access to asylum procedures.669 As well, when claimants are 
screened through accelerated procedures which do not consider the merits of their applications 
before they are returned to a third country deemed ‘safe’, they are not provided the chance to argue 
that return to their originating state will amount to refoulement.670 In third States with poor human 
 
665 See, for example: Michelle Foster, “Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek 
Protection in Another State” (2007) 28:2 Michigan Journal of International Law 223-286 [Foster MJIL].  
666 See, for example: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient 
Asylum Procedures)”, 31 May 2001, UN Doc EC/GC/01/12, 
https://www.unhcr.org/protection/globalconsult/3b389254a/asylum-processes-fair-efficient-asylum-procedures.html 
at para 25. 
667 Vincent Chetail, International Migration Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019) at 192.  
668 Ibid at para 11. 
669 Ibid at para 5.  
670 Asylum Procedures Directive supra note 24 at art 38.  
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rights records, claimants are especially vulnerable to having their human rights curtailed, and, 
without due process, to being sent onward to countries in which they may be persecuted or 
tortured.671  
The ‘safe’ third country concept under Article 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) 
works in the following way: first, there are procedural safeguards which seek to ensure that the 
competent authorities are satisfied that a person seeking international protection for claiming 
refugee status will be treated in accordance with those procedures. Second, the Asylum Procedures 
Directive (recast) requires a connection between the person seeking asylum and the third country 
to which this claimant is to be sent on the basis that it would be reasonable for that person to go to 
that third country.672 In the view of the UNHCR, this connection means a ‘meaningful link’ based 
on having ‘comparable asylum systems and standards’ as the sending State.673 Links that would 
be considered to fulfill the requirement of a ‘meaningful link’ would include family links or links 
to the broader community, previous residence such as previous long-term visits or studies, and 
linguistic or cultural links, in addition to simple transit through the country.674 Additionally, the 
Danish Refugee Council calls for the use of ‘safe’ third country concepts to be based on ‘a genuine 
assessment of the capacity and willingness of receiving countries to adhere to international and 
European human rights safeguards’.675 Amnesty International makes a similar point, specifically 
warning that the application of Article 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive: 
requires an individual assessment of whether the previous state will readmit the 
person, grant the person access to a fair and efficient procedure, and accord the 
 
671 Ibid at para 50(p). 
672 Asylum Procedures Directive supra note 24 at art 38; Refworld, “The Safe Third Country Concept (Article 27)” 
https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=4bab55e22 at 18 [Refworld].  
673 Refworld supra note 672 at 18. 
674 Ibid.  
675 Ibid.  
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person standards of treatment commensurate with the Refugee Convention and 
international human rights standards, including protection from non-refoulement.676 
Moreover, Amnesty International is of the view that the individual being considered for return 
through ‘safe’ third country agreements should be given the right to be heard and the ability to 
rebut the presumption that he or she will be treated with relevant international human rights 
standards of protection upon return.677  
The establishment of rules pursuant to the Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) is subject to 
national legislation and ‘on the methodology by which the competent authorities satisfy 
themselves that the safe third country concept may be applied to a particular country or particular 
applicant’ on a case-by-case basis consideration ‘of the safety of the country for a particular 
applicant and/or national designation of countries considered to be generally safe’.678 Despite these 
procedural safeguards codified within the Asylum Procedures Directive (recast), in practice, 
Member States may not comply with these provisions when they are not transposed into domestic 
legislation.679  
The sending State’s reliance upon the diplomatic assurances which the receiving third State 
undertakes to commit is sometimes based on erroneous assurances, leading to instances where 
there is no guarantee that the undertaking in the form of diplomatic assurances is in fact complied 
with by the receiving State.680 Where such undertaking has not been complied with, there is a 
 
676 Amnesty International, European Institutions Office, “The Proposed Dublin Reform”, 25 November 2016 at 2 
[Amnesty International Report].  
677 Ibid. 
678 Ibid at 12.  
679 For example, in the case of Germany, the Asylum Procedures Directive is not transposed into domestic German 
law, leading to instances where these provisions are not followed.  
680 The Committee Against Torture has specifically warned against the misuse of diplomatic assurances and to avoid 
using them as a ‘loophole’ to circumvent non-refoulement obligations in: Committee Against Torture, “General 
Comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22”, 4 September 
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potential that non-refoulement may be breached, especially when the receiving third State does not 
have proper asylum procedures in place or has a poor human rights record.681 The UNHCR has 
specifically stated that the onus is upon the sending State:  
to establish, prior to implementing any removal measure, that the person whom it 
intends to remove from its territory or jurisdiction would not be exposed to a danger 
of serious human rights violations […] Where the receiving State has given 
diplomatic assurances with regard to a particular individual […] [s]uch assurances 
do not, however, affect the sending State’s obligations under customary 
international law as well as international and regional human rights treaties to which 
it is party.682 
When Member States do not heed the UNHCR’s direction on diplomatic assurances, the risk of 
violating non-refoulement upon return of the claimant rises. 
Additionally, specific ‘safe’ third country agreements raise concern, particularly the agreement 
with Turkey described above. The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) critiqued 
the EU-Turkey statement on its adoption as an example of ‘the approach taken [by the EU] which, 
if implemented, risks violating international refugee law, EU asylum law and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, and would lead to a policy of containment and chain refoulement of persons 
in need of protection’.683 First, the ECRE cautioned that the policy put in place vis-à-vis the EU-
 
2018, UN CAT/C/GC/4 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CAT/CAT-C-GC-4_EN.pdf at para 20; See 
also the discussion of this topic in Chapter Three. 
681 See, for example: Human Rights Watch, “‘Diplomatic Assurances’ against Torture – Questions and Answers” at 
7, where it was emphasized that ‘receiving states that provide diplomatic assurances are already under a duty not to 
torture or ill-treat detainees, and most have ratified legally binding treaties promising to refrain from such abuse. In 
light of this, the UN special rapporteur on torture stated in August 2005 that diplomatic assurances ‘therefore do not 
provide additional protection to the deportees’”.  
682 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances and International 
Refugee Protection”, August 2006 at para 19.  
683 Ibid.  
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Turkey statement involving the return of all ‘irregular migrants arriving in Greece’ is incompatible 
with established international and EU law and is in complete dereliction of the principle of non-
refoulement.684 Further, its expressed concern that the EU-Turkey statement does not comply with 
the procedural safeguards laid down in Article 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, which 
requires that applicants must be protected from refoulement in the ‘safe’ third country and that the 
possibility exists to request and receive protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention.685 
The ECRE warns that the Joint EU-Turkey Action Plan reveals ‘a policy of containment in Turkey 
on behalf of the EU, which can trigger the complicity of Member States in chain refoulement’.686  
While the practice of containment itself is not a violation of non-refoulement, the curtailment of 
the human rights of those seeking refuge through the use of these containment policies can lead to 
refoulement, for the reasons outlined above.687 In addition, Article 3(2) of the Convention Against 
Torture states that the consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights would 
constitute a breach of the prohibition of torture and the principle of non-refoulement.688 Therefore, 
as demonstrated, the use of containment policies within the CEAS by EU Member States lead to 
human rights concerns, including the potential for non-refoulement obligations to be violated by 
these countries. First, the obligation of non-refoulement is the bare minimum safeguard for which 
all asylum claimants and refugees should be protected under international human rights law. 
Second, the misuse or abuse of the ‘safe’ third country concept by sending claimants to third 
countries outside of the EU to contain or constrain their movements has the potential to violate 
non-refoulement where adequate procedural mechanisms are not in place to ensure their safety.  
 
684 Ibid.  
685 Ibid at 1-2; European Council on Refugees and Exiles, “ECRE strongly opposes legitimising push-backs by 
declaring Turkey a ‘safe third country’, 29 January 2016, https://www.ecre.org/ecre-strongly-opposes-legitimising-
push-backs-by-declaring-turkey-a-safe-third-country [ECRE EU-Turkey]  
686 ECRE EU-Turkey supra note 685 at 2.  
687 See also Vera Gowlland-Debbas (ed) The Problem of Refugees in the Light of Contemporary International Law 
Issues (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994) at 66 [Gowlland-Debbas].  
688 CAT supra note 9 at art 3(2).  
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The use of the Eurodac Regulation to force irregular migrants to provide their fingerprints 
wherever they enter an EU Member State may potentially increase the risk of refoulement when 
the claimant refuses to be fingerprinted and thus faces a removal order.689 Some nongovernmental 
organizations and human rights organizations in Europe are concerned with the mandatory 
requirement imposed by the Eurodac Regulation on asylum seekers and refugees to provide their 
fingerprints or risk removal.690 Fundamental rights are implicated when asylum seekers and 
refugees are forced to either provide fingerprints or risk removal: in particular, their non-
refoulement protection and their right against being deprived of their liberty.691 On the protection 
against being refouled, the European Agency for Fundamental Rights is concerned that the actions 
taken by EU Member States to require and to enforce the taking of fingerprints at the border to 
identify asylum seekers and refugees may interfere with a number of rights guaranteed under the 
EU Charter.692 Regarding the deprivation of liberty, EU Member States’ use of detention as a tool 
to force asylum claimants and refugees to provide fingerprints at the border is a major interference 
 
689 See, also: Redress, “Mass Refugee Influxes, Refoulement and the Prohibition Against Torture”, 3-50, 
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5800ecd14.pdf at 45, which states: ‘Eurodac regulations requiring fingerprinting of 
persons arriving within the EU, when considered alongside the Dublin regulation has resulted in ill-treatment. Several 
reports and a study based on interviews with asylum seekers have highlighted the excessive use of force by personnel 
seeking to take fingerprints which may amount to ill-treatment […] While the regulations make clear that states are 
bound to apply them in accordance with their relevant human rights obligations, the regulations lack specific guidance 
on the use of force’.  
690 See, for example: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Fundamental Rights Implications of the 
Obligations to Provide Fingerprints for Eurodac”, https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2015-
fingerprinting-focus-paper_en.pdf at 1 [FRA Eurodac].  
691 Ibid at 1, which states: ‘[there is a concern that the] deprivation of liberty to pressure persons to give their 
fingerprints must be an exceptional measure which should not be used against vulnerable people’. 
692 Ibid at 4, which states: ‘Interferences may involve absolute rights – such as the principle of non-refoulement and 
the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment of [sic] punishment – form which no derogations are 
possible’; Further, that: ‘Interferences can, however, also involve rights that can be limited, for example, the right to 
liberty (Article 6 of the Charter and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or the protection 
of personal data and private life set forth in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and in Article 8 of the ECHR’.  
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with the right to liberty set forth in Article 6 of the EU Charter and Article 5 of the ECHR.693 Most 
importantly, the ECHR warrants that an individual cannot be punished for refusing to provide their 
fingerprints at the border nor can the person be coerced in giving their fingerprints to authorities 
as enumerated under Article 5(1)(b) of the ECHR.694 
The UNHCR is concerned that the requirement laid down under the Eurodac Regulation, which 
obliges EU Member States to collect and store fingerprint data from all irregular migrants 
including asylum claimants, creates significant pressure among the Member States.695 These 
Member States may face challenges of a technical nature to collect, store, and remit fingerprint 
data in the Eurodac database while complying with fundamental rights obligations such as the ‘best 
interests of the child’ international standard.696 The UNHCR cautions that the requirement to 
register the fingerprint of all irregular arrivals, including children, through the Eurodac database 
should ‘be coupled with sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure compliance with fundamental 
rights and international protection obligations, including respect of the principle of non-
refoulement’.697  
The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights also cautions that EU Member States’ patrolling vessels 
do not, in principle, have jurisdiction to ‘stop other vessels in third-country territorial waters or to 
 
693 Ibid at 6, which states: ‘Under EU law, any limitation on the right to liberty must be in line with the requirements 
of Article 52(1) of the Charter, namely: limitations must be provided for by law, must genuinely meet objectives of 
general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others, respect the essence 
of the right, and be proportionate’; Further, it states: ‘Taken together, under EU law and the ECHR, deprivation of 
liberty for immigration-related reasons can only be a measure of last resort, and an assessment needs to be made in 
each individual case to determine whether all pre-conditions required to prevent arbitrary detention are fulfilled’.  
694 Ibid at 6; See, also: A and Others v the United Kingdom, Application No 3455/05, 19 February 2009 at para 171.  
695 Ibid; See, also: Eurodac Regulation supra note 643. 
696 See, generally: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Separated Children in Europe Programme: 
Statement of Good Practice, Third Edition”, 2004, 2-47 https://www.unhcr.org/4d9474399.pdf.  
697 Ibid. 
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intercept migrants who want to leave the third state’.698 Where an EU Member State knows, or 
should have known, that the intercepted migrants face a real risk of ill-treatment once they are 
returned to the third country or are handed over to third-country authorities, it would result in a 
violation of the principle of non-refoulement.699 The requirement of non-refoulement is such that 
it places a positive duty upon the sending EU Member State to ‘be aware of the situation in the 
host country and [must] assess the risks the intercepted people face in the host country’.700 In 
assessing that future-oriented risk posed to the returnee, the EU Member State must ascertain 
whether such a risk may consist of the absence of a well-functioning asylum system in the third 
State and whether there is a real risk of ill-treatment or onward removal in the third State upon 
return.701  
The principle of non-refoulement is a cornerstone of international refugee law. The principle is 
also safeguarded under international human rights law as the prohibition against torture, inhuman 
or cruel treatment or punishment, and is codified in a number of European law instruments such 
as the EU Charter and the ECHR. This principle must be rigorously observed by EU Member 
States including in their interpretation and implementation of European obligations within the 
CEAS. This chapter has demonstrated that several concerns have been raised by leading scholars 
and nongovernmental organizations in the asylum law field, including the use of ‘safe’ third 
country concepts and the Eurodac Regulation to enforce fingerprints against claimants as a policy 
of containment. The use of containment strategies to contain, restrict, and prevent the movement 
of asylum claimants and refugees has been shown to heighten breaches of the principle of non-
refoulement. In particular, under international law, non-refoulement can be circumvented when 
‘safe’ third country concepts are misused or abused by EU Member States to deflect their 
responsibility to process asylum applicants to third countries where procedural safeguards are not 
 
698 Ibid at 30.  
699 Ibid.  
700 Ibid.  
701 Ibid; See, also: Maarten Den Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) at 243-
244.  
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necessarily in place to permit claimants to access procedures and international protection. Finally, 
enforcement of the Eurodac Regulation requiring fingerprints from claimants and refugees at the 
border cannot also be used as a non-refoulement ‘loophole’ through forcible removal of those who 
refuse.  
4.4 Concluding Remarks  
Containment through migration control seeks to control, divide, and discipline ‘unruly’ 
migration.702 ‘Unruly’ migration, as perceived by States, occurs when migrants try to manage 
where they seek asylum, including by irregular means to evade the requirement to register their 
fingerprints under the Eurodac Regulation.703 Techniques to identify and select migrants by 
categorizing, partitioning, and channeling them serve as methods to dominate and constrain the 
‘disobedience’ of migrants.704  
While rarely applied within public international law and specifically international refugee law, the 
theory of containment holds particular significance as an explanatory theory for these fields today. 
First, the theory suggests that policies of containment are methods used by EU Member States to 
elude their international refugee law and human rights law obligations. Second, the theory suggests 
that containment provides the underlying rationale for violations of non-refoulement by EU 
Member States. Thus, containment theory highlights the gaps between the law, such as the robust 
conception of the principle of non-refoulement under international and regional refugee and human 
rights law, and the interpretation and application of that law through policies within the EU.  
This chapter explained the relevance of the theory of containment as an explanatory theory of EU 
migration policies and practices. The first part of this chapter outlined the contours of the theory 
of containment, particularly as it is articulated in the fields of human and spatial geography and 
migration studies. It explained that containment theory is a theory of control: control of mobility 
and immobility within a particular space, and that this space could be legal as well as being 
 
702 Tazzioli Journal supra note 579 at 2765.  
703 Ibid; See, generally: Eurodac Regulation supra note 643 at 1. 
704 Tazzioli Journal supra note 579 at 2765, 2770-2771.  
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physical. The second section of the chapter explained containment theory in action within the 
CEAS, through several means: use of Dublin transfers, ‘safe’ third country agreements, the 
interception of asylum seekers prior to reaching Europe, migrant tracking, narrow interpretations 
of the Refugee Convention, and deterrence policies. The third part of this chapter considered the 
connection between CEAS containment policies as the principle of non-refoulement. All together, 
these explanations show that, while containment may be facilitated by law, containment occurs 
not because of the law itself, but because of the policies and practices around the application of 
that law.  
The theory of containment provides a framework of explanation for the rest of the thesis, including 
the doctrinal analysis that takes place in the following chapters. In particular, it provides crucial 
context for the recommendations articulated in Chapter Seven. The following chapter details the 
evidence for containment policies within the CEAS as demonstrated by practice within the United 
Kingdom. Chapter Five explains the UK’s domestic asylum system and shows how certain aspects 
of that asylum system are premised upon policies of containment, leading to negative implications 
for the principle of non-refoulement and its compliance.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The United Kingdom and Non-Refoulement 
5. Introduction 
The previous chapters detailed how international law is standard-setting, while regional asylum 
systems such as the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in the EU implement those 
international law norms and have their own regional variations in qualification standards, asylum 
procedures, and reception conditions for applicants claiming international protection for refugee 
status. Domestic asylum systems interpret and implement these international and European law 
standards according to applicable national law. In the United Kingdom (UK), the interpretation 
and implementation of important norms such as the principle of non-refoulement greatly affect the 
lives of those who are in search of refuge within the country. Despite common minimum standards 
set by both international and European law, a worrying trend has developed: a narrower 
interpretation of non-refoulement, revealing policies of containment.   
In 2018, the UK received 37,730 asylum applications for international protection. Around 15% of 
this number (5,510) constituted Dublin transfers.705 That means, in at least 15% of the cases when 
transfers outside of the UK take place, there may be non-refoulement concerns, depending on the 
destination country. This chapter therefore considers the UK’s law and practice with respect to the 
principle of non-refoulement. The UK exited the EU on January 31, 2020. While it is no longer 
officially a part of the EU, the UK is currently in a transition period until December 31, 2020, 
during which time the CEAS rules and Dublin transfers still apply.706 As well, the UK remains 
part of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the ECHR, which addresses non-
refoulement. Until it left the EU, the UK was one of the top recipients of asylum applicants in the 
EU. Among EU countries in 2018, Germany received the most asylum seekers: 184,180 applicants 
 
705 See Table 5.1 below with specific data on UK’s Dublin transfers.  
706 Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European 
Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, at Article 32 and Chapter 6, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12019W/TXT(02)&from=EN.  
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or 29% of the EU total.707 France (120,425, 19%), Greece (66,965, 10%), Italy (59,950, 9%), Spain 
(54,050, 8%) and the United Kingdom (37,730, 6%) followed.708 Together, these countries 
received 81% of all asylum applications across the EU.709 By examining Germany in the next 
chapter, and the UK in this chapter, it is possible to identify domestic trends on the law and practice 
of non-refoulement within two powerful countries with significant refugee inflows - that is, the 
highest and the sixth highest refugee-receiving countries in Europe and the highest civil and 
common law refugee-receiving countries.710 These trends are important: even though they come 
from two different legal systems, common and civil law, both countries have adopted 
interpretations of the principle of non-refoulement that narrow the protections available to asylum 
claimants.  
The table below illustrates the data gathered by EuroStat on the number of Dublin transfers under 
the Dublin III Regulation in 2018 by the top six countries in the order of outgoing transfers (Table 
5.1): 
 
  
 
707 The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford (analyzing Eurostat data), 8 November 2019 
https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migration-to-the-uk-asylum/#kp7.   
708 Ibid; In comparison to the countries listed, 6% is still a significant number as it represents over 37,000 asylum 
applications and of those applications, around 15% constitute Dublin transfers – a situation in which concerns about 
non-refoulement are heightened.  
709 Ibid.  
710 While the UK was within the EU, it and Germany were both considered to be politically and economically 
influential: they both have strong economies, significant Gross Domestic Products, and significant political clout on 
the regional and world stage.  
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Dublin Transfers by Country (2018) 
 Incoming 
Requests 
Implemented Percentage 
Accepted 
Outgoing 
Requests 
Implemented Percentage 
Returned 
Germany 25,005 7,580 30% 54,906 9,209 17% 
France 8,744 1,837 21% 45,358 3,533 8% 
Netherlands 5,042 835 17% 8,619 1,849 21% 
Belgium 3,871 678 18% 8,384 897 11% 
Switzerland 6,054 1,292 21% 5,941 1,313 22% 
United 
Kingdom 
1,940 1,215 63% 5,510 209 4% 
Table 5.1: Dublin transfers by country in the order of outgoing requests (2018).711 
As Table 5.1 shows, the outgoing requests in the United Kingdom totaled 5,510 in 2018, which is 
the sixth highest total number of requests in the EU plus Switzerland for transfers outside of the 
EU to another EU country. This data suggests that non-refoulement is still a concern, as all 
outgoing requests (5,510) should require a non-refoulement assessment prior to transfer while all 
implemented transfers (209) should require a post-transfer monitoring mechanism to prevent 
further onward refoulement.712  
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to explain the UK’s domestic asylum system, particularly 
how it addresses non-refoulement of individuals. This chapter evaluates the UK’s interpretation of 
non-refoulement in light of its obligations under EU law, ECHR law, and international law.713 It 
demonstrates that the UK’s domestic application of the principle of non-refoulement evidences a 
concerning trend: that policies of containment are at work within the UK and, by extension, the 
CEAS. This chapter begins by explaining the UK’s domestic asylum laws, including the status of 
non-refoulement in the UK and the UK’s obligations under EU law and ECHR law. This is done 
in order to provide the context for the UK’s asylum system, which is examined in the next section. 
 
711 House of Commons Library, “What is Dublin III Regulation? Will it be affected by Brexit?”, 
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/home-affairs/immigration/what-is-the-dublin-iii-regulation-will-it-be-
affected-by-brexit; See, also: EuroStat, “Dublin III Transfers 2018 by Country”, 2018. 
712 An example of assessment or evaluation required by EU law is under Dublin III Regulation supra note  at art 46, 
where periodic monitoring is required.  
713 ECHR supra note 114; The term ‘European law’ refers to both EU and ECHR law. 
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Finally, this chapter considers how the UK’s interpretation of non-refoulement through its 
domestic practice is demonstrative of containment theory in action. 
5.1 UK Refugee Law  
As international and European law set the standards upon which UK domestic law interprets and 
applies its non-refoulement obligations, it is vital to consider the relationship between each type 
of law.714 The interplay between international, EU, ECHR, and UK national law is complex, as 
they have a push and pull effect on each other. For example, international law standards inform 
the minimum standards for EU, ECHR, and UK national law standards: they are considered to 
exert a ‘pull’ factor, in that both the EU and Member States are pulled towards compliance with 
international law standards.715 At the same time, international law is influenced by State practice 
and national consensus on issues of asylum: this is considered a  ‘push’ factor, in that Member 
State practice and consensus in turn pushes reform of international standards.716 While the UK has 
exited the EU, it is still currently bound to EU law on asylum through the Withdrawal Agreement 
until the end of 2020. The end of the UK’s transition period will clearly affect the interaction 
between international, European and UK refugee law. However, its influence with respect to non-
refoulement will still echo through the EU for some time, since it remains part of the ECHR and 
will likely continue to contribute jurisprudence on non-refoulement within the ECtHR.  
It is important to begin by first considering the EU and ECHR law applicable to the UK, and then 
the UK’s domestic law on non-refoulement, because both the EU and ECHR law have informed 
the UK’s law in the past. EU law will continue inform the UK’s understanding of the content of 
its own domestic law until its exit from the CEAS at the end of 2020, and ECHR law will continue 
to bind the UK past that time.  
 
714 This has been recognized by the House of Lords in House of Lords, European Union Committee, “Brexit: Refugee 
Protection and Asylum Policy”, 11 October 2019 at paras 12, 16, 54. 
715 See, generally: Sarah Toucas, “Push and Pull Factors Towards and Against a Common European Migration Policy: 
France, Britain, and Their Approach to Irregular Migration”, December 2008, 
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cadbury1.pdf.  
716 Ibid. 
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As described in Chapter 3, the starting point for EU law on non-refoulement is Article 78(1) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which imposes legally binding obligations upon EU Member 
States to comply with international standards set by the Refugee Convention, including the non-
refoulement obligation found under Article 33(1). Since the international law standard established 
by the Refugee Convention and other international human rights instruments provides the bare 
minimum standard with which States must comply, if EU law and ECHR law provide broader 
protection than the international standard, that is relevant to UK national law.717 
EU asylum law holds primacy under UK national asylum law when the UK judicial system is 
applying EU asylum law provisions.718 The ‘principle of primacy’ states that UK national law is 
secondary to EU law when UK national law is applying EU law provisions, which is also known 
as ‘direct effect’ under EU law.719 However, when the protection standard granted by UK national 
law is broader than that granted under EU law, the UK can apply the broader standard pursuant to 
its national law (rather than the narrower EU law standard).720 
While the ‘principle of primacy’ governs the EU-UK law relationship at the moment, the ‘principle 
of subsidiarity’ governs the relationship between ECHR law and UK national law.721 Even though 
 
717 See, for example, a discussion on the interplay between interpretation of EU and ECHR, and international and 
national law in European Asylum Support Office, “An Introduction to the Common European Asylum System for 
Courts and Tribunals: A Judicial Analysis”, August 2016 at 70 [EASO Handbook]; For non-refoulement as a norm in 
international law, see Chapter Two; For non-refoulement as a norm in European law, see Chapter Three. 
718 See, for example, the determination of the CJEU in holding that EU Member States, when applying national law, 
must conform with EU law standards in Stefano Melloni v Ministrio Fiscal, CJEU Case C-399/11, Judgment of 26 
February 2013 at para 63.  
719 Jeremy F v Premier Ministre, CJEU Case C-168/13 PPU, Judgment of 20 May 2013: ‘It is settled case-law that, 
by virtue of the principle of primacy of EU law, which is an essential feature of the EU legal order […] rules of 
national law, even of a constitutional order, cannot be allowed to undermine the effectiveness of EU law on the 
territory of that State’; For more, see EASO Handbook supra note 717 at 77. 
720 EU Charter supra note 45 at art 53. 
721 ECHR supra note 114 at art 1. 
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the UK will exit the CEAS at the end of 2020, it remains a State Party to the ECHR. Therefore, it 
is bound to this principle, which states that ‘[the] machinery of protection established by the 
[ECHR] is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights […] [The EU institutions] 
become involved only through contentious proceedings and once all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted’.722 This means that the UK is expected to implement and respect ECHR law, including 
the provisions of the ECHR applicable to non-refoulement.723 If it does not, however, then affected 
parties may pursue domestic remedies, failing which a complaint can be laid before the ECtHR. 
That said, ECtHR Judge Villiger, in his concurring opinion in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, held  
that, despite the ‘principle of subsidiarity’, the ECtHR should play a more restrictive role ‘in light 
of the cardinal provision such as Article 3 [of the ECHR] in view of the central importance of the 
applicant’s refoulement for this case’.724 In other words, cardinal principles such as non-
refoulement should be respected and protected at the international level, and are not to be 
undermined by domestic judicial interpretations of UK national courts where such interpretation 
may limit the scope of protection available to individuals the principle aims to protect. 
The UK’s non-refoulement obligations under EU law are affected by the EU law instruments that 
the UK has ratified, including the Qualification Directive of 2004/83 and Protocol 21, until the 
UK’s exit from the CEAS. The UK has opted-out of the Qualification Directive (recast) of 13 
December 2011, but currently remains bound by the Qualification Directive of 2004/83 of 29 April 
2004, and Protocol 21 annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU.725 The UK did 
not accept the Qualification Directive (recast) and therefore is not bound by it or subject to its 
 
722 Ibid. 
723 As described in Chapter Three, these provisions include Article 3 of the ECHR formulated as the prohibition against 
torture.  
724 MSS supra note 308. 
725 Qualification Directive supra note 276 at recital 50; See also: Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland in Respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (Consolidated Version), 26 October 2012, OJ L326/47-326/390, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/52303e8d4.html [Protocol 21]; TEU supra note 337. 
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application.726 On non-refoulement, although not bound by Article 21 of the Qualification 
Directive (recast) on ‘protection from refoulement’ under EU law, the UK is bound by the same 
Article under the Qualification Directive of 2004/83 containing the exact same text.727  
The UK is also currently bound by the non-refoulement requirements of the post-Treaty of 
Amsterdam asylum directives (known as Phase I of the CEAS).728 Phase I of the CEAS includes 
several key directives, namely the: Eurodac Regulation (2000); Temporary Protection Directive 
(2001); Dublin II Regulation (2003); Reception Conditions Directive (2003); Qualification 
Directive (2004); and Asylum Procedures Directive (2005).729 The UK is also currently bound by 
non-refoulement obligations found (or inherent) in certain of the Phase II CEAS instruments, 
namely the Dublin III Regulation and the Eurodac Regulation (recast).730 The UK has additionally 
opted into the Dublin III Regulation, which governs Dublin transfers.731 
 
726 Qualification Directive recast supra note 276 at recital 50.  
727 Ibid at art 21; For a description of the United Kingdom’s duties under international law and customary international 
law norm of non-refoulement, please see Chapter 2; See also: Qualification Directive recast supra note 276 at art 21: 
‘1. Member States shall respect the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with their international obligations. 2. 
Where not prohibited by the international obligations mentioned in paragraph 1, Member States may refoule a refugee, 
whether formally recognised or not, when: (a) there are reasonable grounds for considering him or her as a danger to 
the security of the Member State in which he or she is present; or (b) he or she, having been convicted by a final 
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that Member State. 3. Member 
States may revoke, end or refuse to renew or to grant the residence permit of (or to) a refugee to whom paragraph 2 
applies’. 
728 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Related Acts OJ C340/1, 10 November 1997, http://www.refworld.org/docid/51c009ec4.html.  
729 European Asylum Support Office, “An Introduction to the Common European Asylum System for Courts and 
Tribunals: A Judicial Analysis”, August 2016 
https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/BZ0216138ENN.PDF at 15.   
730 Ibid at 19; See also: Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at arts 8, 9, 10; For a discussion of the implications of 
first and second phase instruments on Member States’ compliance with non-refoulement, see Chapter Three.  
731 Costello Policy Primer supra note 396 at 5.  
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The UK’s obligations under EU law to prohibit refoulement are complemented by its obligations 
under ECHR law. As a Member State of the Council of Europe, the UK is automatically a States 
Party to the ECHR, meaning that it is bound by ECHR provisions.732 The UK’s non-refoulement 
obligations under ECHR law are articulated through Article 3 of the ECHR on the prohibition 
against torture, which prohibits torture, including returning an individual to a situation in which 
he or she is at risk of torture or cruel treatment.733  
The ECtHR has interpreted the Article 3 prohibition against torture in various cases, including in 
cases in which the UK was implicated. For instance, in the case of Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 
the ECtHR held that the UK violated Article 3 of the ECHR in that there were substantial grounds 
for believing that there was a real risk that the return of the claimant would have exposed him to 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.734 Therefore, the court held that the UK violated the 
principle of non-refoulement as defined under international human rights law, despite arguing that 
the claimant posed a national security threat to the country if he remained.735 Similarly, in UK 
cases the ECtHR confirmed the absolute nature of the Article 3 right, indicated that the harm can 
be inflicted by the State or non-State actors, and outlined the meaning of terms such as ‘inhuman’ 
or ‘degrading’ treatment or punishment.736 On the question of the risk to the claimant, the ECtHR 
stressed in UK cases that a ‘mere possibility’ of ill-treatment in another country does not meet the 
threshold of ‘real risk’, and that the risk is future-oriented.737 The Court has also specified in UK-
related cases Soering v. the United Kingdom, Vilvarajah and Others v. The United Kingdom and 
 
732 Ibid.  
733 ECHR supra note 114 at art 3. 
734 Chahal supra note 307.  
735 Ibid at para 161(1); For more discussion on non-refoulement as defined under international human rights law, see 
Chapter Two.  
736 Ibid at paras. 80-81; Soering supra note 307 at para 88; Ahmed supra note 308 at paras 167-175; A and Others v 
The United Kingdom at para 127; D v The United Kingdom, No. 30240/96, Judgment of 2 May 1997, at para 49; Sufi 
and Elmi v The United Kingdom, Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, Judgment of 28 June 2011 at paras 282, 291. 
737 Vilvarajah supra note 307 at para 111; Chahal supra note 307 at para 86. 
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Babar Ahmed and Others v. The United Kingdom that the non-refoulement norm applies to all 
forms of removal of an individual to another state: it does not matter whether the removal is done 
by deportation, expulsion or extradition.738 Sometimes, the Court found, the UK might not be able 
to remove any person to a particular state without risking refoulement due to the general situation 
of violence in that country.739 Additionally, UK-related jurisprudence has found that indirect 
refoulement is not permitted, and that the UK could be held responsible for the subsequent 
treatment of the claimant after that person is sent to a third state.740 This is true even if the third 
state is a fellow EU Member State.741  
Having described the EU and ECtHR legislation and jurisprudence which inform the UK’s 
domestic interpretation of non-refoulement, it is important to examine how the principle is 
understood in UK domestic legislation and case law, as it is this law which is applied on a day-to-
day basis within the UK’s asylum system. The UK is a dualist legal system, meaning that 
international treaties must be transformed into domestic law in order to have domestic legal effect. 
The UK ratified the Refugee Convention in 1954 and acceded to the Protocol in 1968.742 The UK 
transformed the obligation on non-refoulement under Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention into 
 
738 Soering supra note 307 at para 91, Vilvarajah supra note 307 at para 103, and Ahmed supra note 308 at para 168. 
739 NA v The United Kingdom, No. 25904/07, Judgment of 17 July 2008 at para 115; Sufi and Elmi v The United 
Kingdom, Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, Judgment of 28 June 2011 at paras 241 (listing criteria such as whether the 
parties to the conflict were either employing methods and tactics of warfare targeting civilians, whether these tactics 
were widespread, whether the fighting was widespread, and the number of civilians killed, injured and displaced by 
the fighting) and 293. 
740 TI supra note 16 at 15; The ECtHR confirmed this approach in KRS supra note 309. 
741 TI supra note 16 at 15.  
742 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol” at 4, http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/states-parties-1951-
convention-its-1967-protocol.html.  
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domestic law through paragraph 334 of the Immigration Rules.743  
Apart from the Immigration Rules, here are several key pieces of legislation governing UK 
immigration and asylum processes and soft law instruments that provide guidance to asylum 
officials.744 These are: the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002); the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act (2004); and guidance instruments - Revocation of 
Refugee Status (2016); Exclusion Article 1F and Article 33 of the Refugee Convention (2016); 
Restricted Leave and Discretionary Leave (2015 & 2016), and Humanitarian Protection (2017).  
The purpose of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act is to ‘make provision about 
nationality, immigration and asylum; to create offences in connection with international traffic in 
prostitution; to make provision about international projects connected with migration; and for 
connected purposes’.745 For the purpose of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, an 
‘asylum seeker’ means ‘a person a) who is at least 18 years old, b) who is in the United Kingdom, 
c) who has made a claim for asylum at a place designated by the Secretary of State, d) whose claim 
has been recorded by the Secretary of State, and e) whose claim has not been determined’.746 
According to this definition, therefore, an individual claiming asylum outside of the territory of 
the UK or someone who has not yet reached the territory of the UK is not deemed an ‘asylum 
seeker’ for the purpose of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act. However, Section 8(3) of 
the same Act is a saving provision.  
Section 8(3) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act states that: 
 
743 United Kingdom Home Office, “Immigration Rules Part 11: Asylum”, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-
rules/immigration-rules-part-11-asylum at para 334 [Immigration Rules].  
744 These include asylum policy guidance (instructions) found on the UK Visas and Immigration office website (which 
is part of the UK Home Office): United Kingdom, Visas and Immigration Office, 
www.gov.uk/government/collections/asylum-decision-making-guidance-asylum-instructions.  
745 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act [2002] c 41 at preamble, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/41/introduction [NIAA]. 
746 Ibid at s 18(1). 
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(3) A claim for asylum is a claim by a person that to remove him from or require 
him to leave the United Kingdom would be contrary to the United Kingdom’s 
obligations under (a) the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at 
Geneva on 28th July 1951 and its Protocol, or (b) Article 3 of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms agreed by the Council 
of Europe at Rome on 4th November 1950.747 
In other words, even where an individual claiming asylum does not fall under the definition 
provided by Section 8(1), such as an individual who has not yet entered the territory of UK or such 
claim has not yet formally commenced, where that individual’s return may constitute refoulement 
as per Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention or Article 3 of the ECHR, then such a claim will 
constitute a claim for asylum for the purpose of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act.748 
Section 8(3) is also important because it indicates the UK’s intention to be bound by the Refugee 
Convention and the ECHR as per the words ‘would be contrary to the United Kingdom’s 
obligations under […]’.749 
Curiously, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act does not have a provision which deals 
with the situation of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum, despite this scenario becoming 
increasingly common. Instead, the term ‘dependent child’ is used, and the provisions which 
concern the ‘dependent child’ are used not as the primary rights holder, but as a dependent of an 
asylum seeker, i.e. ‘failed asylum-seeker with dependent child’.750  
Other important provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act are Sections 72 to 80, 
regarding removal. The most important of these is Section 72. It should be noted at the outset that 
not all removals amount to refoulement. It is only when removals are to persecution, death, torture 
 
747 Ibid at s 18(3). 
748 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 33(1); ECHR supra note 114 at art 3. 
749 NIAA supra note 745 at s 8(3). 
750 See, for example: NIAA supra note 745 at s 7A(1)(a)(i); Immigration and Asylum Act [1999] c 33 s 95(1)(b), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/33/section/95.  
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or other cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment, or other massive violations of human 
rights, that a violation of refoulement will take place.751 Section 72, relating to ‘serious criminals’, 
provides for the construction and application of Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention where 
the refugee is excluded from non-refoulement protection. It should be noted that Section 72 must 
be read in conjunction with Section 8(3) above. Section 72 permits the return of a refugee to 
refoulement where he or she is deemed to be a danger to the UK community or a national security 
threat to UK but only where that return does not breach the Section 8(3) prohibition of return to 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or gross, flagrant or mass 
violations of human rights.752 
The purpose of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act is to ‘make 
provision about asylum and immigration.753 Sections 33 to 35 are important to a consideration of 
non-refoulement because they focus on the ‘removal and detention’ of asylum claimants. In 
particular, Section 33 concerns removal of asylum claimants to ‘safe third countries’ and therefore 
invokes the ‘safe third country’ concept as it is currently understood in EU law. The ‘safe third 
country’ concept creates a duty on the sending State: the duty to ensure that the recipient State has 
adequate asylum procedures - including procedures prohibiting onward refoulement to other 
countries - for claimants to initiate their asylum applications. It is debatable whether the safe third 
country concept has any foundation in international law.754 Schedule 3 of the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act lists ‘safe third countries’ to which asylum 
claimants are permitted under UK national law to be sent where it is considered ‘safe’ for these 
 
751 For non-refoulement obligations under international law, see Chapter Two; For non-refoulement obligations under 
European law, see Chapter Three. 
752 CAT supra note 9 at art 3. 
753 Asylum and immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act [2004] c 19 at preamble, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/19/introduction [Treatment of Claimants Act]. 
754 For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter Three, section on safe third countries. 
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claimants to commence formal asylum procedures.755 The list of countries designated as ‘safe’ 
under this Schedule are:  
Austria, Belgium, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.756  
This list contains countries – such as Greece - with inadequate asylum procedures as deemed by 
ECHR case law – and they remain on the list despite the ECtHR’s rulings.757 Part 2 of Schedule 3 
also specifies that any person who has made an asylum claim or human rights claim may be 
removed from the UK ‘to a State of which he is not a national or citizen’.758 Under the Act, that 
State (the ‘safe third country’) shall be treated as a place ‘from which a person will not be sent to 
another State in contravention of his Convention rights’ (i.e. refoulement).759  
Part 11 of the Immigration Rules concerns asylum and also contains relevant provisions which 
implicates the UK’s obligation of non-refoulement.760 For instance, paragraph 334 outlines the 
requirements for an individual to be granted refugee status in the UK, including that ‘they are in 
the United Kingdom or have arrived at a port of entry in the United Kingdom’.761 According to 
 
755 Treatment of Claimants Act supra note 7453 at schedule 3 part 2. 
756 Ibid at schedule 3 part 2(2). 
757 It has been held, for example, by the ECtHR that Greece does not have adequate asylum procedures in place to 
facilitate proper examination of asylum claims, so that States such as the UK, may be held in violation of indirect 
refoulement when asylum claimants are nonetheless sent to Greece to have their claims processed in MSS v Belgium 
and Greece supra note 308. For an in-depth discussion of the implications of indirect refoulement, see Chapter Three. 
758 Treatment of Claimants Act supra note 7453 at schedule 3 part 2(3)(1)(b). 
759 Ibid at schedule 3 part 2(3)(2)(b). 
760 Immigration Rules supra note 743. 
761 Ibid at para 334(i). 
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nongovernmental organizations, this is concerning: it seems to require presence in the UK, even 
though non-refoulement can potentially occur where the individual can be shown to be under the 
‘effective authority and control’ of the UK, but nonetheless outside of the physical territory of the 
UK, such as in transit zones.762 This interpretation of the UK’s international law obligations is 
narrower than what is provided for under international law, as international law prohibits the 
refoulement of any individual to territories where they may face ill-treatment or threats of life 
regardless of whether the person has access to the territory of a State.763  
Additionally, paragraph 345A to 345D of the Immigration Rules allows asylum claims to be 
declared inadmissible as a result of the claimant having made an earlier asylum claim in another 
country (a first country of asylum) or a ‘safe’ third country.764 If these circumstances apply, the 
stories of asylum claimants themselves will not be substantively considered.765 Although there are 
specific provisions precluding the asylum claimant’s removal to his or her first country of asylum 
or ‘safe’ third country where non-refoulement obligations are not followed by those countries, 
permitting caseworkers to dismiss an application without having first substantively considered the 
application itself is already a breach of UK’s international and European law obligations.766 The 
 
762 Ibid.  
763 For the extraterritorial application of non-refoulement, see: Paulina Tandiono, “The Extraterritoriality of the 
Principle of Non-Refoulement: A Critique of the Sale case and Roma case”, 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/humanrights/2016/02/09/the-extraterritoriality-of-the-principle-of-non-refoulement-a-critique-
of-the-sale-case-and-roma-case; See, also: Hirsi supra note at 231. 
764 Ibid at paras 345A to 345E. 
765 Ibid at paras 345B and 345C. 
766 The asylum claimant cannot be removed to his or her first country of asylum or ‘safe’ third country where non-
refoulement obligations are not followed by those countries, see, for instance, CAT supra note 9 at art 3; ICCPR supra 
note 22 at arts 6 and 7; Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 33(1); An example of the breach of the UK’s obligation 
is: not properly considering the claims on their merits, especially when much is at stake for the asylum claimant who 
may be removed to a first country of asylum or a ‘safe’ third country where the asylum system may be deficient. The 
European Court of Human Rights has held this to be in violation of non-refoulement obligations indirectly, in MSS 
supra note 308; For more on how the principle of non-refoulement may be violated indirectly under European law, 
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Immigration Rules also permit caseworkers to ‘decline to substantively consider an asylum claim 
if the applicant is transferable to another country in accordance with the Dublin Regulation’.767 
Preventing caseworkers from considering the merits of a claim by dismissing the application where 
Dublin Transfers may take place increases the risk of rejecting an asylum application at face value, 
without seriously considering the potential refoulement consequences if an asylum claimant is sent 
back.768  
Although UK legislation does not have specific protection or provisions for unaccompanied 
minors seeking asylum, the Immigration Rules clearly address this group and obliges caseworkers 
to give ‘particular priority and care […] to the handling of their cases’.769 It is useful to note, 
however, that the international and European standard of using the ‘best interests of the child’ test 
is not used in UK domestic legislation.770 Further, there is no mention of using the ‘best interests 
of the child’ test to assess the asylum application of an unaccompanied child in the Immigration 
Rules.771 
The Immigration Rules’ prohibition on refoulement is supposed to be applied at the various stages 
 
see Chapter Three. Further, permitting the transfer of asylum claimants to their first country of asylum or a ‘safe’ third 
country is a way for the UK to evade its responsibility for processing the asylum applicant. This method of 
responsibility shifting within the EU is inherently dangerous because it encourages asylum claimants who are 
otherwise not able to have their applications processed through legal channels to attempt illegal methods of getting to 
safety, including attempting perilous journeys across the Mediterranean Sea. 
767 Immigration Rules supra note 743 at para 345E. 
768 For a more in-depth discussion on Dublin Regulations and Dublin Transfers and how they are problematic, see: 
Chapter Three.  
769 Immigration Rules supra note 743 at para 350. 
770 United Kingdom Home Office, “Asylum Policy Instruction: Revocation of Refugee Status: Version 4.0” at 1.4, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/493918/revocation_of_refugee_status
_v4_0_EXT.pdf [Revocation of Refugee Status].  
771 Immigration Rules supra note 743 at paras 350 to 352ZF. 
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of the asylum process outlined below.772 However, this does not always occur. For example, when 
an asylum claimant is rejected at first instance, there is a potential for refoulement to occur and 
therefore this potential should be assessed.773 The guidance provided to asylum officers, or 
‘caseworkers’, by the Home Office, reinforces this as an overarching approach, stating that ‘the 
consideration of asylum claims deserves the greatest care - ‘anxious scrutiny’ as the UK courts 
express it - so that just and fair decisions are made and protection granted to those who need it’.774 
In other words, the Home Office recognizes that the core principal obligation for signatory States 
of the Refugee Convention is not to return (‘refoule’) refugees. Even so, the UK has repeatedly 
been found to be in violation of the non-refoulement prohibition.775  
There is a possibility that non-refoulement may be breached at each stage of the five different 
asylum procedures detailed below, which evidences containment practices of the UK. For 
example, during the accelerated procedure, the applicant’s claim may be deemed by the asylum 
officer as either unfounded or manifestly unfounded. Where the claimant’s application is deemed 
to be inadmissible as a result of being either unfounded or manifestly unfounded, non-refoulement 
considerations may arise. The Home Office’s guidance towards deportation considers refoulement 
risks.776 Another procedure where non-refoulement is implicated is the admissibility procedure. 
 
772 See, for example: Home Office, “Inadmissibility: EU grants of asylum, first country of asylum and safe third 
country concepts: Version 4.0”, 1 October 2019 at 21.  
773 Immigration Rules supra note 743. 
774 Home Office, “Asylum Policy Instruction: Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status: Version 9.0”, 6 January 2015, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/397778/ASSESSI
NG_CREDIBILITY_AND_REFUGEE_STATUS_V9_0.pdf at 4.  
775 See, for example: TI supra note 16, which recognized that, in cases where the UK sends the asylum claimant back 
to Germany, where there is a high likelihood that the asylum claimant would be sent back to Sri Lanka to face torture 
contrary to Art 3 ECHR, the UK would be in violation of indirect refoulement; See, also: NS/ME supra note 296, 
which recognized that, where the UK sends the asylum claimant back to Greece, where claimant’s application would 
not be properly processed, it would contribute to the claimant’s risk of refoulement from Greece.  
776 Home Office, “Inadmissibility: EU grants of asylum, first country of asylum and safe third country concepts: 
Version 4.0”, 1 October 2019,  
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As guaranteed by Rule 345A(i) of the Immigration Rules, ‘asylum inadmissibility decisions 
already made or being made in respect of removal to the EU, Iceland, Norway or Switzerland’ 
must be certified against ‘any human rights claim that relates to the risk of refoulement from the 
proposed country of removal under Part 2 Schedule 3 (paragraph 5(1) and 5(3))’.777 Rules 345B 
and 345C, on the other hand, concern decisions ‘already made or being made in respect of removal 
to any other country’.778 In order to be removed, the caseworker must consider ‘the human rights 
claim, including any protection issues regarding the country of removal and the risk of refoulement 
with specific reference to objective information regarding the conditions of removal’.779 While 
these explicit protections against refoulement at these stages of the asylum process are positive, 
the actual application of the principle has been mixed and, at times, restrictive. 
The case law of the UK interprets the principle of non-refoulement in a manner that is illustrative 
of a concerning trend: the narrowing of the norm to indicate that the room for protecting vulnerable 
asylum claimants is shrinking. This trend of a narrow interpretation of non-refoulement suggests 
that containment policies are at work in the UK. It has been held by the UK courts that the focus 
on determining whether there is a chance of the claimant being refouled should be based on 
‘systemic risks’ rather than examining the individual’s actual circumstances. For example, in the 
case of Pour et al, the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court) held 
that there is no real risk that the applicants, if returned to Iran from Cyprus, would be refouled by 
the UK.780 The Court found that the inclusion of Cyprus on the list of ‘safe’ third countries involved 
no incompatibility with the ECHR and, unlike the ECtHR, the Court sided with the CJEU in 
holding that non-refoulement claims should be evaluated based wholly on systemic risks, rather 
 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/835342/Inadmissi
bility-guidance-v4.0ext.pdf at 23 [Home Office Inadmissibility].   
777 Ibid; See, also: Immigration Rules supra note 743 at Part 2, Schedule 3 at para 5(1) and 5(3).  
778 Home Office Inadmissibility supra note 776 at 23.  
779 Ibid; See, also: Immigration Rules supra note 743 at Rules 345B and 345C.  
780 Ibid. 
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than particular individual circumstances.781 Another case, Medhanye R, considered the proposed 
removal of an applicant from the UK to Italy under the Dublin II Regulation.782 The UK High 
Court applied the judgments of both M.S.S. and K.R.S. and held that the evidence used by the 
claimant to rebut the presumption of mutual trust when contemplating removal must reveal a 
‘systemic failure on a significant scale’ for that presumption to be rebutted.783 The High Court held 
that particular weight will be given to the UNHCR and other intergovernmental bodies with 
appropriate mandates, while little or no weight would usually be given to expert reports in such 
cases.784 As explained in Chapter Three, this focus on systemic issues in the transfer country raises 
serious concerns as to whether claimants’ individual circumstances will be adequately evaluated 
against the potential for refoulement (as opposed to a blanket evaluation of general risk of 
refoulement of everyone sent to that country). As described in Chapter Two, under international 
law, an evaluation of the risk for refoulement is meant to be individualized. 
Another example of a constricted understanding of the principle of non-refoulement can be seen 
in generous considerations of the presumption of mutual trust. This practice of restrictive 
interpretation of non-refoulement again demonstrates that containment policies are at work in the 
UK. In the case of Tabrizagh et al, the claimant was being contemplated for removal from the UK 
to Italy. The UK High Court of Queen’s Bench (Administrative Court) considered the Secretary 
of State’s denial of the claimants’ right of appeal against removal to Italy under the Dublin II 
Regulation.785 The claimants argued that removal to Italy would expose them to real risk of a 
 
781 Esmaiel Mohammed Pour (1), Seid Jafar Hasini Hersari (2), Majid Ghulami (3) v The Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2016] EWHC 401 (Admin).  
782 Medhanye, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2011] EWHC 3012 (Admin) 
[Medhanye]. 
783 Ibid. 
784 Ibid.  
785 The Queen on the Application of Mr Mohsen Pourali Tabrizagh, Mr Tahir Syed, Mr Saeed Ali, Mr Ali Omar 
Mohammed, Mr Edmond Karaj, AB (Sunda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWHC 1095.  
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breach of Article 3 of the ECHR on the prohibition against torture.786 The Court held that there 
was no evidence to rebut the presumption that Italy would comply with its obligations under EU 
laws or of special vulnerability in personal circumstances of any of the claimants.787 This was 
despite the widespread breach by Italy of its obligations under EU laws at that time. In the case of 
MS, NA, SG, the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court) ruled that 
the presumption that Italy remains in compliance with its EU and international law obligations 
related to reception and integration of the asylum claimant and beneficiaries of international 
protection had not been rebutted.788 Thus, the Court found, the asylum claimant and beneficiaries 
of international protection suffering from severe psychological trauma could be returned to Italy 
with no real risk of breaching Article 3 of the ECHR or Article 4 of the EU Charter, due to the 
presumption that Italy’s reception capabilities has not been exceeded, and that while effective 
medical treatment is available under the same terms as Italian nationals.789 Again, this ruling, 
which was also in 2015 - the height of the influx of migrants into Italy - was contrary to the actual 
conditions on the ground in Italy, where refugee systems were virtually inoperative.790  
The UK courts’ interpretation of non-refoulement also considered the usage of ‘safe’ third country 
concepts by the Home Office as well as the UK’s interpretation of EU secondary law provisions 
such as the Qualification Directive. The case of Ex Parte Adan R considered the case of asylum 
claimants originally from Somalia and Algeria who were concerned that, if they were transferred 
to another EU country, they would be refouled to their originating state: the UK argued that, in 
assessing whether a State is a ‘safe’ third country, it may determine whether the foreign State’s 
 
786 Ibid.  
787 Ibid. 
788 The Queen on the Application of MS, NA, SG and the Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2015] EWHC 
1095. 
789 Ibid. 
790 Asylum Information Database, “Country Report: Italy”, December 2015, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/italy. 
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interpretation of the Refugee Convention is reasonable.791 It was held by the UK Court of Appeal 
that the Secretary of State for the Home Department had to be satisfied that the foreign State 
applied the ‘one true interpretation’ of the Refugee Convention decided by UK Courts rather than 
a narrower interpretation which could lead to refoulement.792 This understanding of the principle 
of non-refoulement as having a fixed international meaning that cannot be undermined by other 
states’ restrictive interpretations seems positive on its face. However, the approach of ‘one true 
interpretation’ of the Refugee Convention makes UK courts more likely to find a violation of non-
refoulement can take place only within specific parameters that are predefined by the court, rather 
than allowing for potential new cases such as those related to health, which can also potentially 
violate the norm.  
In another case, EN (Serbia), the UK Court of Appeal considered the exception to non-refoulement 
under Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, where ‘there are reasonable grounds for regarding 
[the claimant] as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been 
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the 
community of that country’, as implemented in the Qualification Directive Article 14.4(a).793 The 
Court rejected the view that Article 33(2) must be interpreted narrowly and restrictively so as to 
give maximum effect to non-refoulement: such an interpretation adds an ‘unjustified gloss’ to 
Article 33(2), and the imposition of a rebuttable presumption that the claimant is a danger to the 
community is acceptable,794 Similarly, the case of Dudaev et al concerned the removal of a 
Chechnyan claimants from the UK to Sweden under the Dublin II Regulation, where the claimants 
argued that there was a real risk that they would be refouled to Russia if returned to Sweden.795 
 
791 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Adan R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex 
Parte Aitseguer, R v. [2000] UKHL 67. 
792 Ibid. 
793 EN (Serbia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2009] EWCA Civ 630. 
794 Ibid at paras 40-43, 80. 
795 Musud Dudaev, Kamila Dudaev and Denil Dudaev v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2015] EWHC 
1641. 
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The UK High Court of Queen’s Bench Division found that the presumption of mutual trust in 
Sweden - the presumption that Sweden would comply with its international legal obligations 
(including not to refoule) - was not rebutted and that ‘judicial comity between the courts of two 
democratic states’ supported this, even though it recognized a lack of legal assistance for the 
claimants in Sweden.796 In other words, in cases involving claims of risk of refoulement, the 
presumption of mutual trust is wide, involving judicial deference to the courts of another 
democratic EU State.  
As considered above, certain case law of the UK suggests a concerning narrowing of the 
interpretation of the UK’s non-refoulement obligations, thus evidencing containment policies. 
First, the cases of Pour et al and Medhanye R (citing MSS and KRS) examined how UK courts’ 
interpretation of the presumption of mutual trust focused on ‘systemic risks’ rather than ‘individual 
assessments’. This suggests that UK courts are predominately concerned with whether a given 
Member State has adequate procedures rather than considering the individual’s circumstances to 
see if they may be more prone to non-refoulement risks. This is concerning because refugee status 
involves an individualized assessment of subjective fear of risk and therefore any assessment 
involving non-refoulement risks should include an assessment of the individual circumstances 
experienced by the claimant. The cases of EN (Serbia), MS, NA & SG, Tabrizagh, and Dudaev 
also indicate a restrictive interpretation of non-refoulement. For example, the case of MS, NA & 
SG reveals that Dublin transfers can occur even where the individual claimant is exposed to severe 
psychological trauma if transferred to a Member State. According to the UK court, such a transfer 
would not be considered a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR. This reasoning is problematic as it 
strengthens the European concept of the presumption of mutual trust among Member States 
without due regard to the individual’s exposure to risk that can rise to the level of ill-treatment or 
torture, constituting a violation of non-refoulement in human rights law. As a result, these cases 
have demonstrated the UK courts’ concerning trend towards a more restrictive interpretation of 
non-refoulement.  
Finally, the case of Ex Parte Adan R suggests that UK courts are accustomed to a ‘one true 
interpretation’ of the Refugee Convention, including restrictive interpretations of what fits within 
 
796 Ibid.  
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that interpretation. By restricting non-refoulement to a specific ‘true’ interpretation, the UK courts 
may be less likely to recognize novel breaches of non-refoulement where these violations have not 
been previously recognized by UK case law.  
5.2 The UK Domestic Asylum System: Institutional Structure 
International and European law both set the standards upon which the UK’s domestic asylum 
system is based. Those standards are applied through asylum procedures: these procedures are 
essentially the manner in which the law becomes operationalized. This section therefore examines 
the different roles played by various actors - namely the government, courts, tribunals, and 
immigration officers - and the interaction of these roles within the UK domestic asylum system.  
The UK Visas and Immigration division is part of the Home Office and is responsible for ‘making 
millions of decisions each year about who has the right to visit or stay in the country, with a firm 
emphasis on national security and a culture of customer satisfaction for people who come here 
legally’.797 The UK Visas and Immigration division prioritizes securing borders and reducing 
immigration, cutting crime and protecting citizens from terrorism.798 The division is also 
responsible for issuing ‘soft law’ guidance instruments, such as instructions for asylum officials 
in their day-to-day decision-making.799 The immigration officers responsible for examining 
asylum claims are termed ‘caseworkers’ by the UK Visas and Immigration division.800 The 
Asylum Intake and Casework unit is housed under a department of the UK Visas and Immigration 
division and is responsible for ‘all aspects of immigration and asylum: entry, in-country 
 
797 United Kingdom Office of Visas and Immigration, “What We Do”, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-visas-and-immigration.  
798 United Kingdom Office of Visas and Immigration, “Our Priorities”, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-visas-and-immigration/about#our-priorities. 
799 United Kingdom Office of Visas and Immigration, “Asylum Policy”, https://www.gov.uk/topic/immigration-
operational-guidance/asylum-policy.   
800 Ibid.  
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applications for leave to remain, monitoring compliance with immigration conditions, and 
enforcement including detention and removal’.801  
The administrative and judicial system addressing asylum issues is multifaceted. The First-Tier 
Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum) is responsible for handling appeals made by the Home Office 
in relation to permission to stay in the UK, deportation from the UK, and entry clearance to the 
UK, as well as immigration bail from individuals held in custody by the Home Office relating to 
immigration matters.802 The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) handles appeals 
by the First-Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum) which relate to visa applications, asylum 
applications, and the right to enter or stay in the UK.803 The Upper Tribunal also hears judicial 
review cases referred by the Home Office relevant to immigration, asylum and human rights 
claims.804 Decisions of the Upper Tribunal may be appealed to the relevant higher court: the Court 
of Appeal in England and Wales, the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland or the Court of Session 
in Scotland.805 Decisions of the Court of Appeal may be appealed to the UK Supreme Court with 
leave from the lower court which handed down the judgment.806 The UK Supreme Court hears 
 
801 Asylum Information Database, “Short Overview of the Asylum Procedure: UK”, 
https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/united-kingdom/asylum-procedure/general/short-overview-
asylum-procedure [UK Overview].  
802 United Kingdom Office of Visas and Immigration, “First-Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum)”, 
https://www.gov.uk/courts-tribunals/first-tier-tribunal-immigration-and-asylum.  
803 United Kingdom Office of Visas and Immigration, “Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)”, 
https://www.gov.uk/courts-tribunals/upper-tribunal-immigration-and-asylum-chamber.  
804 Ibid. 
805 United Kingdom Office of Visas and Immigration, “Appeal a Decision by the Immigration and Asylum Tribunal”, 
https://www.gov.uk/upper-tribunal-immigration-asylum/the-tribunals-decision.  
806 UK Supreme Court, “How to Appeal”, https://www.supremecourt.uk/procedures/how-to-appeal.html.  
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appeals against certain decisions by the Court of Appeal where it concerns the greatest public and 
constitutional importance.807  
As the above has shown, the asylum procedure in the UK involves multiple actors, including the 
UK Visas and Immigration division, various levels of courts and tribunals, and immigration 
officers. The importance of interpreting and applying international and European law accurately 
therefore is clear from the top of the hierarchy to the bottom; from the decision-making of the UK 
Visas and Immigration division offering directions through guidance instruments for immigration 
officers adjudicating individual asylum cases, to the interpretation of the actions taken by the State 
by the relevant courts and tribunals.  
5.3 Claiming Asylum in the UK 
The UK’s asylum system is under constant strain ever since the onset of the Syrian civil war in 
2011. Between 2018 and 2019, UK has, on average, 7,860 asylum applications per quarter, which 
is over 30,000 asylum applications per year.808 This picture suggests that examining the asylum 
procedure as well as safeguards within the UK is important, given the large number of asylum 
claimants affected.   
This section therefore details the procedures involved in claiming asylum in the UK. It explains 
the UK’s Immigration Rules, followed by the administrative process for numerous stages of the 
asylum determination process. The process itself is multi-layered and complex, which is why this 
section also includes a flowchart providing a visual representation of the system.  
The UK’s Immigration Rules create the foundation of the UK asylum system. They represent 
directions issued by the UK Home Office for immigration officers to follow when adjudicating 
 
807 UK Supreme Court, “Role of the Supreme Court”, https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/role-of-the-supreme-
court.html.  
808 UK Refugee Council, “Quarterly Asylum Statistics”, August 2019, https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/Asylum-Statistics-Aug-2019.pdf at 1.  
185 
 
asylum applications.809 These Rules specify the criteria to determine whether an asylum claimant 
may be granted refugee status in the UK.810 Mirroring the provisions under international and 
European law, paragraph 334 of the Immigration Rules provides the criteria for determining the 
grant of refugee status in the UK.811 This paragraph in the Immigration Rules incorporates the 
definition of refugee from the Refugee Convention as incorporated into the Qualification 
regulations, as well as other aspects of the Refugee Convention, such as the ‘danger to security’ 
issue, and, most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, the prohibition on non-refoulement 
in (v).812 
Most of the rules within the Immigration Rules concern procedure rather than substance of the 
asylum determination decision process,813 but they do provide some guidance to decision-makers.  
For example, the Rules include factors immigration officers should consider when determining the 
 
809 United Kingdom, Home Office, “Immigration Rules”, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-rules.    
810 Ibid at para 334.  
811 Ibid, which states: ‘i) they are in the United Kingdom or have arrived at a port of entry in the United Kingdom; (ii) 
they are a refugee, as defined in regulation 2 of The Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection 
(Qualification) Regulations 2006; (iii) there are no reasonable grounds for regarding them as a danger to the security 
of the United Kingdom; (iv) having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, they do not 
constitute a danger to the community of the United Kingdom; and (v) refusing their application would result in them 
being required to go (whether immediately or after the time limited by any existing leave to enter or remain) in breach 
of the Refugee Convention, to a country in which their life or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group’. 
812 Ibid at para 334(v).  
813 Part 11 of the Immigration Rules deals with the consideration of admissible applications for asylum and 
humanitarian protection: Immigration Rules, Part 11 at para 326A. In particular, paragraphs 328 to 333 within the 
Immigration Rules specify that all asylum applications are determined by the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department in accordance with the Refugee Convention: Ibid at para 328. Paragraph 331 of the Immigration Rules 
describes the procedures for the immigration officer in the situation where a claimant is refused asylum: Ibid at para 
331. In this case, the immigration officer will consider whether to grant or refuse permission to enter UK territory 
without interviewing the claimant further: Ibid. Where the immigration officer decides that a further interview is 
required, the examination of the application for asylum will be resumed pursuant to the Immigration Rules: Ibid. 
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credibility of the claimant, such as age, gender, and variations in the capacity of human memory.814 
Also, the claimant is expected to ‘demonstrate a reasonable depth of personal experience and 
knowledge, allowing for any underlying factors’.815 As well, the Rules indicate the timeline 
required for the Secretary of State for the Home Department to make a decision on a claimant’s 
application for international protection for refugee status: the decision must be issued within six 
months from the date it was recorded.816 
The asylum procedures in the UK determine the methods for granting and withdrawing of 
international protection for refugee status.817 Responsibility for the asylum process in the UK rests 
with the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who allocates asylum decision-making to 
the UK Visas and Immigration division and the Asylum Intake and Casework Directorate.818  
At first instance, an interview takes place where biometric data is collected, and information 
regarding health and family, details of the travel route, as well as a broad outline of the reasons for 
claiming asylum are collected from the claimant.819 After the initial screening stage where the 
claimant’s fingerprint and health information is gathered by the Home Office, the claimant is then 
 
814 UK Overview supra note  ; See, also: Home Office, “Asylum Policy Instruction: Assessing Credibility and Refugee 
Status: Version 9.0”, 6 January 2015, which states: ‘age; gender; variations in the capacity of human memory; physical 
and mental health; emotional trauma; lack of education; social status and cultural traditions; feelings of shame; painful 
memories; particularly those of a sexual nature’,  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/397778/ASSESSI
NG_CREDIBILITY_AND_REFUGEE_STATUS_V9_0.pdf at 14 [Assessing Credibility Guidance].  
815 Assessing Credibility Guidance supra note 814 at 14.  
816 Immigration Rules supra note 743 at para 333A.  
817 Asylum Procedures Directive supra note 24.    
818 Asylum Information Database, “Country Report: United Kingdom”, 2017 at 15 [AIDA UK Report].  
819 Ibid.  
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directed into one of five different possible procedures: the regular procedure, accelerated 
procedure, admissibility procedure, Dublin procedure, or border procedure.820  
In general, an individual’s asylum application will go through the regular procedure. This involves 
prioritizing the asylum claimant if he or she belongs to a vulnerable group of individuals such as 
unaccompanied minors, pregnant women, or individuals who are disabled.821 The regular 
procedure involves ‘straightforward’ and ‘non-straightforward’ cases where the former would 
have a time-sensitive deadline of six months, or 182 days, while the latter is designated as ‘non-
straightforward’ by the Home Office simply on the basis that the 182-day deadline was not met.822 
Vulnerable groups such as unaccompanied minors are referred to a specialized group of decision-
makers.823 Where the asylum claimant does not belong to a vulnerable group, the asylum officer 
considers – based on the information collected at this stage - whether to apply the accelerated 
 
820 Ibid at 19. 
821 Asylum Information Database, “Country Report: United Kingdom”, 2019 Update, 
https://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_uk_2019update.pdf [AIDA UK Report 
2019].  
822 Ibid at 22-23; See, also: The Parliament of the United Kingdom, “Asylum: Applications: Written Question – 
220305”, 18 February 2019, which states: ‘Until recently, our aim was to decide 98% of straight forward asylum 
claims within six months of the date of claim. However, many asylum claims are not straight-forward, which meant 
it was not always possible to make an initial decision within six months of the date of claim. Many of these cases had 
a barrier that needed to be overcome to make the asylum decision and many of these barriers were outside of the Home 
Office’s control. To promote a greater understanding and transparency of the asylum system, we have prioritised 
deciding older claims and those made by more vulnerable individuals, whose claims are more complex. This has 
resulted in a reduction in the proportion of claims decided within 6 months’, 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-
question/Commons/2019-02-12/220305.  
823 Ibid; For instance, s 55 of the Borders Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 requires that the ‘voice of the child 
is heard in the proceedings, and this was reiterated by the Supreme Court, affirming that the wishes and feelings of 
the child must be taken properly in to account by decision makers’ in AIDA UK Report supra note 818 at 49; ZH 
(Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4, 1 February 2011. 
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procedure, under which where the application may be deemed to be unfounded or manifestly 
unfounded.824 
During the admissibility procedure, the claimant will be sent to the Third Country Unit if he or she 
has passed through a ‘safe’ third country on the way to claiming asylum in the UK.825 The asylum 
application will be declared inadmissible where: 
the applicant has been granted a refugee status from another EU Member State, 
comes from a first country of asylum, comes from a ‘safe’ third country, has been 
granted a status equivalent to refugee status in the UK; or is allowed to remain in 
the UK and is protected from refoulement pending the outcome of a safe third 
country procedure.826  
There are two procedures related to transfers during the admissibility procedure: Dublin transfers 
and ‘safe’ third country transfers. The Dublin procedure initiates where the Member State 
responsible for examining the asylum application is not ascertained.827 The Home Office then 
 
824 Ibid at 42-43; Where ‘unfounded’ means ‘a caseworker must be satisfied that the claim cannot, on any legitimate 
view, succeed’; The term ‘manifestly unfounded’ means ‘a claim which is so clearly without substance that it is bound 
to fail’ and ‘it is possible for a claim to be manifestly unfounded even if it takes more than a cursory look at the 
evidence to come to a view that there is nothing of substance in it’; Factors for asylum officers to consider when 
determining whether a case is ‘manifestly unfounded’ include: ‘the factual substance and detail of the claim’, ‘how it 
stands with the known background data’, ‘in the round whether it is capable of belief’, ‘whether some part is capable 
of belief’, ‘whether, if eventually believed in whole or part, it is capable of meeting the requirements of the Refugee 
Convention’, see: Home Office, “Certification of protection and human rights claim under section 94 of the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims)”, Version 4.0, 12 February 2019, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/778221/certificati
on-s94-guidance-0219.pdf at 11; Asylum Procedures Directive supra note 24 at art 31(8). 
825 Ibid at 39.  
826 Ibid; See, also: Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit, “Briefing paper on the experiences of children from the 
Calais camp in the north west of England”, March 2017, https://gmiau.org/briefing-paper-experiences-children-calais-
camp-north-west-england.  
827 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 3(2).  
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applies the Dublin criteria to determine the EU Member State responsible for processing the 
asylum application.828 Based on the hierarchy of responsibility criteria laid down in Article 7 of 
the Dublin III Regulation, the UK may deem itself as the responsible Member State, in which case 
no transfer takes place.829 The Dublin III Regulation specifies that the Dublin State where the claim 
for asylum is first lodged will send a request to the Dublin State it deems responsible according to 
certain criteria.830 Thus, the UK will send a request to the country it identifies as responsible and, 
upon acceptance (provided actively or by default), the Home Office will initiate a ‘take back’ 
request, wherein the Member State responsible for processing the asylum application will be 
requested to ‘take charge’ of the claimant pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation.831  
Individuals being contemplated for return to a ‘safe’ third country will undergo the ‘safe’ third 
country procedure under UK domestic law and their files will be assigned to the Third Country 
 
828 Ibid; The Dublin criteria is as follows: ‘For example, if an asylum claimant arrives in a member state, the asylum 
official first determines the category under which the applicant for international protection falls, such as, whether he 
or she is a minor and/or has family member(s) in another member state, in order to determine the member state 
responsible for processing the asylum application. Next, the asylum official considers whether the applicant is in 
possession of a visa or residence permit in a member state, and whether the applicant has entered the EU irregularly 
or regularly. In processing the asylum application, in certain countries, the asylum official would consider whether 
the criteria for transferring the applicant to a safe third country apply pursuant to the Asylum Procedures Directive 
(2013/32/EU). If the criteria for safe third country do not apply, and the applicant for international protection does not 
qualify for refugee status, then the asylum official will consider granting subsidiary protection pursuant to the 
Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU). The asylum official will also consider whether humanitarian and compassionate 
grounds apply, for example, in order to bring together family members, relatives or any other family relations’, see: 
Jenny Poon, “ESIL Reflections: The EU Commission on ‘Dublin IV’: Sufficient Safeguards for Asylum Claimants?” 
(2016) 5(9) European Society of International Law Reflection Series 1-10 at 2.  
829 United Kingdom, Home Office, “Dublin III Regulation, Version 1.0”, 2 November 2017 at 22 [UK DRIII].  
830 Ibid; See, also: Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 3(2). 
831 UK DRIII supra note 829 at 22; Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at arts 18 and 20; See, also: Asylum 
Information Database, “The Implementation of the Dublin III Regulation in 2018”, March 2019, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/aida_2018update_dublin.pdf at 11-13. 
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Unit within the UK Visas and Immigration division.832 Where the Third Country Unit has certified 
that the individual claiming asylum came from a ‘safe’ third country on the way to claiming asylum 
in the UK, his or her asylum application will not be decided in the UK.833 Instead, the individual 
will be returned to the ‘safe’ third country that he or she has passed through, where a connection 
may be established between the applicant and the third country deemed ‘safe’.834 The Immigration 
Rules specify the connection criteria necessary in order to remove an individual back to the ‘safe’ 
third country through which he or she has passed.835 The Immigration Rules set out a list of non-
exhaustive criteria for establishing such a connection, these include: 
a. Time spent in the country; b. Relations with persons in that country, who may be 
nationals of that country, habitually resident non-nationals, or family members 
seeking protection there; c. Family lineage, regardless of whether family is present 
in that country; and d. Any cultural or ethnic connections.836 
If an individual has made an asylum claim upon arriving at the UK border, as opposed to within 
the UK, the substance of the claim is not examined – this is because, in the UK, ‘there is no 
provision for asylum decisions to be taken at the border’.837 During the border procedure, 
immigration officers may carry out the screening interview, but then refer the claim to the regular 
 
832 AIDA UK Report supra note 818 at 15. 
833 Ibid at 54-55. 
834 Ibid; Immigration Rules Part 11 supra note 743 at para 345D.  
835 AIDA UK Report supra note 818. 
836 Ibid at 55.  
837 Ibid at 41. 
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procedure; the officers have the power to grant temporary admission to territory or immigration 
bail to permit the claim to be made.838  
The following flowchart reproduces the asylum procedure that takes place in the UK from 
registration to appeal:839  
 
Figure 5.1 UK Asylum Procedures 
 
 
838 Ibid; See, also: Home Office, “Immigration Bail: Version 5.0”, 28 February 2020, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/869352/Immigrati
on-bail-v5.0ext.pdf.  
839 AIDA UK Report supra note 818 at 13; Where UASC stands for Unaccompanied Asylum-Seeking Child.  
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As the above description and flowchart show, the asylum procedure within the UK is a complex 
one which involves different stages and procedures depending on the situation of the claimant. The 
principle of non-refoulement is to be applied at each of these stages.  
5.4 Containment by the UK through Procedural Methods and Evidentiary 
Thresholds 
Apart from the restricted understanding of non-refoulement in UK case law discussed above, non-
refoulement protection is also constricted through procedural and evidentiary means. For example, 
although there are provisions within the Dublin III Regulation which require asylum claimants to 
be interviewed so they can tell their stories to decision-makers, in practice, the merits of the 
applications of claimants being contemplated for transfer are often not examined.840 Steps where 
interviews are not permitted in the UK’s asylum procedure were outlined above. These practices 
not only raise the risk that a claimant will be refouled without being able to raise the argument of 
fear of persecution on return, they also run counter to the case of M.S.S. In that case, the ECtHR 
noted that Belgium did not give M.S.S. the chance to say why he should not be sent to Greece (due 
to no personal interview), and this was a contributing factor in finding that Belgium did not fulfill 
its responsibilities to M.S.S. under the ECHR.841  
The gap between the non-refoulement principle and practice in UK asylum practice is also evident 
in the requirement that asylum claimants who wish to challenge transfer cases must present an 
‘arguable case’ in which they must meet a high burden of proof. This is an issue, first, when asylum 
claimants are being contemplated for a Dublin transfer to another EU Member State, and second, 
when an asylum claimant is being contemplated for transfer under a ‘safe’ third country agreement. 
The UK requires asylum claimants to satisfy a higher evidentiary threshold than is expected under 
 
840 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 5. 
841 MSS supra note 308. 
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international law.842 As a consequence, the high evidentiary threshold acts as a form of control 
under the containment theory described in Chapter Four. 
If asylum claimants are being considered for Dublin transfers to other EU Member States, these 
claimants can only challenge the transfer if they successfully rebut the presumption of mutual 
trust.843 As described in Chapter Three, this presumption assumes that all EU Member States 
comply with their international and European law obligations. Case law from both the ECtHR and 
the CJEU - particularly a trilogy of cases from 2009-2013 - establishes the requisite threshold 
necessary to determine whether the asylum claimant has satisfactorily rebutted the presumption of 
mutual trust, so that they are not subjected to Dublin transfers.844 This case law was described in 
detail in Chapter Three’s discussion of the presumption of mutual trust, and will be briefly 
reviewed here in order to provide context for the discussion of the UK. These cases indicated that 
the initial onus, or burden of proof, is placed upon the claimant to satisfy the Member State that 
the presumption of mutual trust permitting a Dublin transfer has been rebutted by presenting an 
‘arguable case’ that his or her return to a country deemed ‘safe’ will place the claimant at risk of 
threats to life or liberty on any ECHR ground.845 Where the claimant is unable to discharge the 
 
842 Hemme Battjes and Evelien Brouwer, “The Dublin Regulation and Mutual Trust: Judicial Coherence in EU Asylum 
Law” (2015) 8(2) Review of European Administrative Law 182-214 at 191, which states: ‘the ‘systemic breaches’ 
requirement, developed by the CJEU in the NS v. SSHD judgement and incorporated into the Dublin III Regulation, 
has been criticized by several authors not only as being too high a threshold for rebutting trust, but also because of the 
lack of precise standards on the basis of which national courts must consider trust as rebutted’ [Battjes]; See, also: 
Evelien Brouwer, “Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU and the 
Burden of Proof” (2013) 9(1) Utrecht Law Review 135-147; For critiques on the high threshold of proof by other 
scholars, see: Elspeth Guild, Cathryn Costello, Madeline Garlick and Violeta Moreno-Lax, “Enhancing the Common 
European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin”, CEPS Paper No 83, September 2015,  
http://www.epgencms.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/upload/983a50a5-69d6-48b1-a0bd-
2b34cced9e36/Sessions_1_and_2_-_Study_European_Asylum_System_and_Alternatives_to_Dublin.pdf.  
843 YB (Eritrea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 360 at para 27 [Eritrea]. 
844 MSS supra note 308; KRS supra note 309; NS/ME supra note 296. 
845 Saadi v Italy, App no 37201/06 (ECHR, 28 February 2008) at para 129; VT (Dublin Regulation: Post-Removal 
Appeal) Sri Lanka [2012] UKUT 00308 (IAC) at 1-2 [VT]; This is pursuant to the relevant provision listed under 
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burden of proof on a standard of an ‘arguable case’, then paragraph 6, Schedule 3 of the UK’s 
2004 Treatment of Claimants Act will apply, without qualification.846 Paragraph 6 states: 
A person who is outside the United Kingdom may not bring an immigration appeal 
on any ground that is inconsistent with treating a State to which this Part applies as 
a place - (a) where a person’s life and liberty are not threatened by reason of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, (b) from which a person will not be sent to another State in contravention 
of his Convention rights, and (c) from which a person will not be sent to another 
State otherwise than in accordance with the Refugee Convention (emphasis added).  
Where the claimant is unable to discharge his or her burden of proof, he or she will be ordered 
returned to the country without the possibility of appeal, thereby potentially raising the same 
refoulement risks enumerated under this provision.847 If the claimant presents an ‘arguable case’, 
then the burden of proof is then reversed to the Member State applying the Dublin transfer 
procedure to ‘dispel any doubts’.848  
The first case in the trilogy was the 2008 ECtHR judgment in K.R.S. v. United Kingdom.849 In that 
case, the asylum claimant from Iran had travelled through Greece before making an asylum claim 
in the UK.850 The UK made a request for Greece to accept responsibility for considering the 
applicant’s asylum claim under the Dublin II Regulation, which Greece accepted.851 The UK 
 
paragraph 6, Schedule 3 of 2004 Act. See also Treatment of Claimants Act supra note 753 at para 6, schedule 3, and 
Battjes supra note 842 at 16. 
846 Ibid at 2 para 4.  
847 Treatment of Claimants Act supra note 753 at para 6(a), schedule 3. 
848 Saadi supra note 300 at para 129. 
849 KRS supra note 309; Eritrea supra note 843 at para 28.  
850 KRS supra note 309 at 2.  
851 Ibid at 3. 
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declared the asylum claim inadmissible and directed his transfer to Greece.852 The claimant 
challenged his Dublin transfer back to Greece before the ECtHR on the basis that he would likely 
be refouled to Iran from there.853 The claimant relied upon several reports that had raised serious 
concerns with the situation of asylum seekers in Greece, including documents from Amnesty 
International, the Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers, the Norwegian Helsinki 
Committee, Greek Helsinki Monitor and notably, the UNHCR.854 The UNHCR had issued a 
position paper advising EU Member States to refrain from returning asylum seekers to Greece 
under the Dublin Regulation until further notice.855 The ECtHR found that, while the UNHCR’s 
‘reliability and objectivity are […] beyond doubt’, the reports of all of the organizations listed did 
not help the claimant to satisfy his burden of proof.856 This is because Greece was not sending 
individuals back to Iran and therefore the claimant could not be refouled to Iran, and, in the absence 
of any proof to the contrary, it was to be presumed that Greece would comply with its other EU 
obligations to asylum seekers on its territory (including not to mistreat such individuals).857 Thus, 
the claimant did not have an ‘arguable claim’ that he would be subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.858 Many commentators, including the UNHCR, have critiqued 
the presumption made in this case that Greece would not mistreat the claimant (in other words that 
refoulement could not happen from the UK to Greece).859 As well, many expressed concerns at the 
 
852 Ibid at 2. 
853 Ibid at 3. 
854 Ibid at 12-14.  
855 Ibid at 11. 
856 Ibid at 16.  
857 Ibid at 18.  
858 Ibid.   
859 See, for example: Alexander Orakhelashvili, “N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department” (2012) 106(3) 
American Journal of International Law 616-624 at 621 [Orakhelashvili], which states: ‘Even though significant 
problems in the situation of asylum seekers in Greece and the risk of refoulement had been pointed out by the United 
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high bar the claimant must meet in order to make an ‘arguable claim’ that an EU Member State 
could subject an asylum claimant to the sort of treatment prohibited by the principle of non-
refoulement.860 
The second case was the 2011 judgment of the ECtHR in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.861 In that 
case, an Afghan asylum seeker entered the EU through Greece and continued on to Belgium, where 
he applied for asylum.862 Belgium undertook a Dublin transfer to send the asylum claimant back 
to Greece.863 The claimant was detained in Greece.864 He put forward reports by international 
organizations, including the UNHCR, and numerous nongovernmental organizations to support 
his claim that the detention was in degrading conditions, and that there was a real risk of him being 
refouled to Afghanistan.865 In this case, the ECtHR accepted that the claimant had made an 
‘arguable claim’ on both counts.866 Additionally, Belgium could not rely on Greece’s diplomatic 
assurances, which did not relate to this specific claimant.867 The ECtHR held that:  
seeking assurances from the Greek government that the applicant faced no risk of 
treatment contrary to ECHR was not sufficient to ensure adequate protection against 
 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Court was confident that, as an EU member state, Greece 
would respect all relevant rules, including those pursuant to the ECHR. The Human Rights Court declared the 
application inadmissible, finding that were any claim to arise under the Convention, it should be pursued first with the 
Greek domestic authorities and thereafter in an application to the Court’; See, also: KRS supra note 309.  
860 Ibid.  
861 MSS supra note 308 at paras 9-11; Eritrea supra note 843 at para 29. 
862 MSS supra note 308 at para 9.  
863 Ibid at para 17. 
864 Ibid at paras 44-45. 
865 Ibid at para 27.  
866 Ibid at para 297.  
867 Ibid at para 354.  
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the risk where reliable sources had reported practices that were tolerated by the 
authorities and which were manifestly contrary to the principles of the Convention 
(emphasis added).868 
The ECtHR therefore considered that the diplomatic assurances did not displace the evidence put 
forward by the claimant. In particular, the ECtHR found that the Belgian authorities knew or ought 
to have known that the claimant had no guarantee that the Greek authorities would seriously 
examine his asylum application, and therefore could not presume that the applicant would be 
treated in conformity with ECHR obligations, including the prohibition on refoulement.869 This 
judgment is positive for claimants: the ECtHR decided that ‘reliable sources’ could include, for 
example, UNHCR reports, and that the presumption of mutual trust in Greece was not automatic 
in the face of the transferring state being aware of serious violations of the rights of asylum 
claimants in Greece. This approach is consistent with the views of the Committee Against Torture, 
expressed in a complaint against the UK, in which the Committee expressed concern about the 
UK’s reliance on diplomatic assurances in cases involving transfers of claimants to third 
countries.870  
 
868 Ibid at para 353; See, also: Saadi supra note 300 at para 147. 
869 MSS supra note 308 at para 358.  
870 Ibid at paras 18-20; The Committee Against Torture has warned States Parties against the misuse of diplomatic 
assurances. In its 2013 country report on the UK, the Committee stated that it: ‘[…] notes with concern the [UK’s] 
reliance on diplomatic assurances to justify the deportation of foreign nationals suspected of terrorism related offences 
to countries in which the widespread practice of torture is alleged’, see: Committee Against Torture, ‘Concluding 
observations on the fifth periodic report of the United Kingdom, adopted by the Committee at its fiftieth session (6-
31 May 2013): Advanced Unedited Version” at para 18; The Committee urged the UK to ‘refrain from seeking and 
relying on diplomatic assurances ‘where there are substantial grounds [to believe] that [the person] would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture’’, see: CAT supra note 9 at art 3; In the situation of transfers of detainees to another 
country, the Committee recommended that the UK ‘ensure [that] in practice[,] the transfer […] is clearly prohibited 
when there are substantial grounds for believing that [the detainee] would be in danger of being subjected to torture’, 
see: Ibid at para 19; The Committee further recommended that the UK ‘recognize that diplomatic assurances and 
monitoring arrangements will not be relied upon to justify transfers when such substantial risk of torture exists’. 
Moreover, the Committee was of the view that the UK should ‘observe safeguards ensuring respect for the principle 
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M.S.S. is a significant judgment of the ECtHR. The Court clearly affirms that EU Member States, 
in undertaking Dublin transfers, cannot simply presume that the claimant will be treated in line 
with ECHR obligations.871 Rather, ‘States must make sure that the intermediary country’s asylum 
procedure affords sufficient guarantees to avoid an asylum seeker being removed, directly or 
indirectly, to his country of origin’ in a manner risking refoulement.872 In other words, the sending 
Member State must ensure an individual assessment of the claimant’s situation if the claimant is 
subjected to the Dublin transfer.873 This judgment assisted in countering the negative implications 
of K.R.S. on the burden of proof in Dublin transfer cases by requiring an individualized evaluation 
 
of non-refoulement […] indicating that the asylum-seeker might be in danger of torture or ill-treatment upon 
deportation’, see: Ibid at para 20; The Committee called upon the UK to ‘submit situations covered by article 3 of the 
[CAT] to a thorough risk assessment, notably by taking into consideration evidence from [the country of destination] 
whose post removal torture claim were found credible, and revise its country guidance accordingly’, see: Ibid; 
Therefore, the Committee was of the view that the UK should not rely upon diplomatic assurances when contemplating 
returns of claimants to third countries.  
871 MSS supra note 308; See, also: European Database of Asylum Law, “ECtHR – M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece 
[GC], Application No. 30696/09”, 21 January 2011, https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/ecthr-mss-v-
belgium-and-greece-gc-application-no-3069609.  
872 Ibid at para 342. 
873 Ibid at 91 (Concurring Opinion of Judge Rozakis), which states: ‘The existence of those international obligations 
of Greece –and notably, vis-à-vis the European Union – to treat asylum seekers in conformity with these requirements 
weighed heavily in the Court’s decision to find a violation of Article 3. The Court has held on numerous occasions 
that to fall within the scope of Article 3 ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this 
minimum is relative and it depends on all the circumstances of the case (such as the duration of the treatment, its 
physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim). In the circumstances 
of the present case the combination of the long duration of the applicant’s treatment, coupled with Greece’s 
international obligation to treat asylum seekers in accordance with what the judgment calls current positive law, 
justifies the distinction the Court makes between treatment endured by other categories of people – where Article 3 
has not been found to be transgressed – and the treatment of an asylum seeker, who clearly enjoys a particularly 
advanced level of protection’.  
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of each Dublin transfer.874 The M.S.S. case was also relied upon by the CJEU in the next case of 
concern, N.S. 
The third case in the trilogy is the joint case of N.S. & M.E., which involved an Afghan asylum 
claimant seeking to resist his removal from the UK to Greece under the Dublin II Regulation.875 
Under Article 17 of the Dublin II Regulation, UK authorities informed Greece to ‘take charge’ of 
the applicant, N.S., as the responsible Member State.876 N.S. challenged the decision by the UK to 
have him sent back to Greece before the UK courts by arguing that the return to Greece would 
expose him to risks that infringe his fundamental rights.877 The applicants in M.E. were five asylum 
claimants from Afghanistan, Iran and Algeria, and involved the examination of the legal 
responsibilities of the transferring Member States under the Dublin  II Regulation, EU Charter, 
and the Asylum Procedures Directive.878 The five asylum claimants entered the EU through Greece 
 
874 See, for example: Tarakhel v Switzerland, Application No 29217/12 (ECHR, 4 November 2014), which states: 
‘The source of the risk does nothing to alter the level of protection guaranteed by the Convention or the Convention 
obligations of the State ordering the person’s removal. It does not exempt that State from carrying out a thorough and 
individualised examination of the situation of the person concerned and from suspending enforcement of the removal 
order should the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment be established’ at para 104; The case of E-6629 of the Swiss 
Federal Administrative Court also cites Tarakhel in seeking assurances prior to the transfer decision, see: Maria 
Hennessy, “Vulnerability, the Right to Asylum and the Dublin System”, 14 April 2015, 
http://www.reflaw.org/vulnerability-the-right-to-asylum-and-the-dublin-system; See, also: European Database of 
Asylum Law, “ECtHR – Tarakhel v. Switzerland, Application No. 29217/12”, 
https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/ecthr-tarakhel-v-switzerland-application-no-2921712.  
875 NS/ME supra note 292 at para 47; See, also: Cathryn Costello, “Dublin-case NS/ME: Finally, an end to blind trust 
across the EU?” (2012) 2 A&MR 83-92 at 86 [Costello NS/ME].  
876 Orakhelashvili supra note 859 at 617.  
877 Ibid.  
878 Costello NS/ME supra note 875 at 86.  
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and traveled to Ireland, where they claimed asylum.879 Both the UK courts and the High Court of 
Ireland separately referred the case to the CJEU, which heard the case jointly.880 
The legal issues examined by the CJEU for the joint case of N.S. & M.E. were: a) whether the 
exercise of the ‘sovereignty clause’ falls within the scope of EU law and b) whether the transfer 
under the Dublin II Regulation was prohibited.881 The CJEU stated that: 
Member states may not transfer an asylum seeker to the responsible member state 
where they ‘cannot be unaware’ that systemic deficiencies in that country’s asylum 
procedure provide substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would 
face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the 
meaning of Charter Article 4.882  
The CJEU also found that that ‘systemic flaws’ in the asylum procedure and reception conditions 
for asylum applicants in the Member State responsible resulted in inhuman or degrading treatment 
and raised the risk of refoulement, and therefore a Dublin transfer should not occur.883 This 
confirmed the approach in M.S.S. and indicated that the claimant can bring evidence of the 
‘systemic flaws’ in order to rebut the presumption of mutual trust between EU Member States. 
The CJEU’s judgment has significance for the interpretation of fundamental rights for EU Member 
States as well as the threshold to rebut the presumption of mutual trust. For example, in considering 
the threshold to rebut the presumption of mutual trust, the CJEU placed heavy emphasis on 
 
879 Orakhelashvili supra note 859 at 618.  
880 Ibid. 
881 Ibid at 87.  
882 NS/ME supra note 296 at para 106; See, also: Orakhelashvili supra note 859 at 619.   
883 NS/ME supra note 296 at para 86.  
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M.S.S.884 Furthermore, as stated in M.S.S., the ECtHR asserted the importance of human rights 
protection for asylum claimants the need for EU Member States to safeguard the fundamental 
principle of non-refoulement.885 Scholars have argued that the test created by N.S. on the threshold 
for rebutting the presumption of mutual trust is a more difficult threshold for the asylum claimant 
to meet if it is an additional requirement for the claimant to be met.886 Further, there is reason to 
suggest that the N.S. judgment ‘only deals with treatment contrary to Article 4 EUCFR [on the 
prohibition of torture]. The extent to which breaches of other EU fundamental rights should 
prevent removal remains to be seen’.887  
According to the UK Court of Appeal in Eritrea in 2008, it was the N.S. case which set the test for 
establishing the necessary threshold for claimants to rebut the presumption of mutual trust, ‘which 
exists nowhere else in refugee law’.888 On appeal, the Supreme Court was of the view that Member 
States should be presumed to be complying with their international and EU law obligations, but 
 
884 Orakhelashvili supra note 859 at 620, which states: ‘The ECJ placed considerable reliance on M.S.S., which 
concerned an Afghan national who had illegally entered he Union from Turkey via Greece and had then been detained 
in Greece’.  
885 MSS supra note 308 at para 216, which states: ‘the confinement of aliens, accompanied by suitable safeguards for 
the persons concerned, is acceptable only in order to enable States to prevent unlawful immigration while complying 
with their international obligations, in particular under the Refugee Convention and the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). States’ legitimate concern to foil the increasingly 
frequent attempts to circumvent immigration restrictions must not deprive asylum seekers of the protection afforded 
by these conventions’.  
886 Costello NS/ME supra note 875 at 89.  
887 Ibid at 90. 
888 Ibid at para 39; Eritrea supra note 843 at para 61, the case concerns the difference that exists between sur place 
activities pursued by political dissident against his or her government in the country where he or she is seeking asylum 
which may expose him or her to risk of ill-treatment or persecution versus activities that were pursued solely with 
motive of creating such a risk; The Court of Appeal held that it requires an assessment of whether authorities in the 
country of origin are likely to observe the claimant’s activities and the fear of consequent ill-treatment not well-
founded. 
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that presumption may be rebutted in one of two ways.889 One way is if the claimant presents 
‘sufficient evidence of substantial operational difficulties’ in the receiving State. Another way is 
where ‘on the individual facts of the case viewed against the overall situation […] there were 
substantial grounds for believing that there would be a real risk [to the claimant of refoulement] 
on return’.890 At the same time, the Court reaffirmed the ECtHR’s position that the UK, like all 
EU Member States, must make an individualized assessment of a claimant’s situation prior to 
being subjected to a Dublin transfer, rather than relying on a blanket assessment.891  
In 2013, the UK Court of Appeal reconsidered the issue of the burden of proof on asylum claimants 
wishing to argue against Dublin transfers, in the case of E.M. & MA.892 In that case, the Court of 
Appeal considered the question of whether it is arguable that the return of any claimants to Italy 
would entail a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.893 
The Court of Appeal held that: ‘the assessment of risk on return is seen by the Strasbourg court as 
depending on a combination of personal experience and systemic shortcomings which in total may 
suffice to rebut the presumption of compliance’.894 It then formulated a new test. This new test 
seems to be a compromise between the approaches of the ECtHR and the CJEU. Unfortunately, a 
mixed approach combining both the ECtHR’s ‘individual assessments’ test in M.S.S. and the 
 
889 Eritrea supra note 843 at para 67; See, also: R (on the application of Ibrahimi) Abasi v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2016] EWHC 2049 at para 71 [Ibrahimi], which concerns an application against the decision of 
the Secretary of State refusing to consider merits of claimants’ contentions on the basis that Hungary was a ‘safe’ third 
country that would presumably comply with its EU and international law obligations; The High Court was of the 
opinion that the risk of refoulement to Iran if removed to Hungary would breach Article 3 of the ECHR; It was held 
that if removed, claimants would have a real risk of chain refoulement to Iran.  
890 Ibid.  
891 Ibid. 
892 EM/MA supra note 532.  
893 Ibid at para 1.  
894 Ibid at para 39. 
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CJEU’s ‘systemic deficiencies’ test in N.S. does not reconcile the inherent differences between the 
two thresholds and may, in fact, be more difficult for UK adjudicators to implement.  
The N.S. case demonstrated that, of the interveners to the case before the CJEU, the views 
regarding the burden of proof to rebut the presumption of mutual trust are divergent: on the one 
hand, the applicants, Amnesty International, and the AIRE Centre argued that ‘the transferring 
state was obliged to assess compliance with Article 18 EUCFR [European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights], the Asylum Directives, and DR and indeed, all the EUCFR provisions’, on 
the other hand, Member States including Belgium, Germany, France, the European Commission, 
and the UNHCR all argued that ‘there was a presumption of compliance with EU law, although it 
was rebuttable’.895 This divergence in views show that there is a lack of consensus among EU 
Member States themselves as to how high or low the threshold to rebut the presumption of mutual 
trust should be, and the case law provided by the ECtHR and the CJEU on this point is unclear.896 
The Advocate General of the CJEU was of the view that there is a ‘wide gulf’ between the legal 
standards of EU law on the one hand, and the actual practice of EU law, on the other hand.897 
Another important impact of N.S. on asylum law in Europe is that it reveals what the ECtHR and 
the CJEU both agreed upon: ‘Blind trust between governments is incompatible with fundamental 
 
895 NS/ME supra note 296 at paras 41-42; The divergence extends beyond the mentioned parties, namely: ‘The Irish, 
Italian, Netherlands, Czech, Polish and Finnish governments all argued against a duty to examine compliance with the 
named sources, with Greece and Portugal going so far as to contend that it would be contrary to EU law for one 
Member State to review the conformity of the actions of another with EU law’, see: Costello NS/ME supra note 875 
at 91. 
896 Costello NS/ME supra note 875 at 84; See, also: Court of Justice of the EU, “Opinion of Advocate General 
Trstenjak delivered on 22 September 2011”, Case C-493/10, M.E., A.S.M., M.T., K.P., E.H. v Refugee Applications 
Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/sep/ecj-m-e-
case-493-advocate-general-opinion.pdf at para 51, which states: ‘The referring court asks these questions because it 
has clear evidence that there is a wide gulf between the European Union rules applicable to Greece as regards the 
organisation of its asylum system and its asylum procedure, on the one hand, and the actual treatment of asylum 
seekers in Greece, on the other, such that there may even be a risk that asylum seekers’ fundamental rights will be 
violated if they are transferred to Greece’ (emphasis added).  
897 Ibid.  
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rights’.898 In other words, to protect asylum claimants and their fundamental rights, EU Member 
States cannot rely on blind trust in the transfer of applicants from Member State to Member State 
through Dublin transfers.899 Despite the potential significance of N.S. to EU refugee law, the CJEU 
failed to resolve the most important issue at bar, namely that the standard for rebutting the 
presumption of compliance or mutual trust is not ascertained.900 Scholars have rightly pointed out 
that the premise of the Dublin system should not be based on the presumption of blind trust 
between Member States, but that the ‘trust between Member States would be better sustained by 
ensuring checks for fundamental rights protection, rather than permitting governments to turn a 
blind eye to the others’ shortcomings’.901 
The UK High Court suggested in a subsequent judgment, Tabrizagh, that the UK Supreme Court’s 
decision was consistent with N.S.902 In the relevant paragraph, and citing reasons of judicial 
dialogue between the CJEU and ECtHR, the UK High Court proceeded to ‘assume that the 
 
898 Costello NS/ME supra note 875 at 92.  
899 Ibid, Costello is also of the view that: ‘NS/ME is an important legal vindication of the rights of asylum seekers, 
with Luxembourg bolstering the Strasbourg ruling’.  
900 Costello NS/ME supra note 875 at 92; Further, the CJEU ‘explicitly left it up to the national systems to establish 
the rules on the burden and standard of proof’ in establishing a rebuttal against the presumption of mutual trust for 
asylum claimants.  
901 Ibid at 90; See, also: Olivier de Schutter, “The Promotion of Fundamental Rights by the Union as a contribution to 
the European Legal Space (I): Mutual Recognition and Mutual Trust in the Establishment of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice”, RefGov Working Paper, 2006.  
902 Tabrizagh et al v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 1914 (Admin) at para 152 [Tabrizagh], 
which states: ‘For its part, the Supreme Court has interpreted the decision in NS, for the benefit of litigants and courts 
in the United Kingdom. The Supreme Court cannot depart from the decision in NS, or encourage the courts here to do 
so. For present purposes I must assume that the decision of the Supreme Court is consistent with the decision of the 
CJEU in NS. The approach of the ECtHR in the admissibility decisions is also to follow NS. I must, and the FTT 
[First-Tier Tribunal of the Asylum and Immigration Chamber] would be bound to, assume that, all three courts, have 
adopted the same approach; and that is, the approach in NS as interpreted by the Supreme Court in EM (Eritrea)’.  
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decision of the Supreme Court is consistent with the decision of CJEU in NS’.903 The case concerns 
the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department in refusing the asylum claimant’s 
appeal against being removed to Italy under the Dublin Regulation.904 Tabrizagh is an Iranian 
national who fled Iran and entered the UK through Italy.905 He was fingerprinted in Italy through 
the Eurodac system but did not claim asylum there.906 The issue before the UK High Court of 
Justice, Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative) Court was whether: a) the claimants have an 
arguable claim pursuant to Article 3 of the ECHR as a result of the Secretary of State’s intention 
to return them to Italy; and b) whether the evidence which the claimants have relied upon satisfy 
the test envisioned by Article 3 of the ECHR.907 The UK court noted that there is a presumption 
of mutual trust in favour of Italy, wherein claimants who have passed through there who could 
have claimed asylum but did not can be returned to Italy through the procedure enumerated by the 
Dublin II Regulation.908 In referencing the ECtHR in M.S.S., the court held that Article 3 of the 
ECHR does not entail a corresponding right to grant asylum claimants with accommodation or a 
particular standard of living.909 Therefore, a failure to provide an adequate standard of living would 
not reach the level of severity required to breach Article 3 of the ECHR.910 The court also examined 
the case of EM (Eritrea) and noted that the removal decision through a Dublin transfer would 
 
903 Ibid. 
904 European Database of Asylum Law, “UK – The Queen on the application of Mr Mohsen Pourali Tabrizagh, Mr 
Tahir Syed, Mr Saeed Ali, Mr Ali Omar Mohammed, Mr Edmond Karaj, AB (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department”, https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/uk-queen-application-mr-mohsen-pourali-
tabrizagh-mr-tahir-syed-mr-saeed-ali-mr-ali-omar at 1 [EDAL Tabrizagh].  
905 Ibid; See, also: Tabrizagh supra note 902 at para 1.  
906 Ibid.  
907 Tabrizagh supra note 902 at para 3.  
908 EDAL Tabrizagh supra note 902 at 2.  
909 Ibid at 3; Tabrizagh supra note 902 at paras 173-175.  
910 Ibid. 
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depend on the circumstances of the country of removal and, in order to establish an Article 3 
breach, the systemic shortcomings must be a ‘widespread problem’ known to exist in the country 
of removal.911  
The challenge for claimants is that lower courts have interpreted these attempts to either marry the 
M.S.S. and N.S. approaches or to choose to interpret N.S. in a restrictive manner. This was evident 
in the Ibrahimi decision of the UK High Court, Queen’s Bench, which articulated a  three-prong 
test for claimants to meet in order to overcome the presumption of mutual trust in a Dublin 
transfer.912 The first step is that the claimant must establish that the flaws or weaknesses will lead 
to n ECHR human rights violation which would entail examining any potential refoulement chain 
reaction.913 The second step is that the claimant must demonstrate that there is a risk of prospective 
refoulement to a third State.914 Third, the claimant must show ‘substantial’ grounds for believing 
that the risk will eventuate, where ‘substantial’ means ‘real’ - not fanciful or de minimis - and it 
requires an overall and thorough review of the facts and evidence.915  
Similarly, the lower courts have created certain barriers to the type of evidence claimants can rely 
upon when attempting to rebut the presumption of mutual trust. In particular, the UNHCR,916 
 
911 Tabrizagh supra note 902 at para 87, which states: ‘It would not be open to the FTT to find that they show either, 
that there are systemic deficiencies in Italy’s asylum system (as explained in EM (Eritrea), that is, omissions on a 
widespread or substantial scale, or substantial operational problems)’.  
912 Ibrahimi supra note 889 at para 50.  
913 Ibid.  
914 Ibid.  
915 Ibid.  
916 The opinions of the UNHCR have been regarded by the ECtHR in M.S.S. as ‘pre-eminent and possibly decisive’, 
and have been cited by the UK Court of Appeal in Eritrea as having ‘unique and unrivalled expertise […] in the field 
of asylum and refugee law’: MSS supra note 308 at para 41; Eritrea supra note 839 at paras 71 and 73. Further, the 
unique position of the UNHCR, as compared to courts, permits the UNHCR to ‘assemble and monitor information 
from year to year and to apply to it standards of knowledge and judgment which are ordinarily beyond the reach of a 
court’: MSS supra note 308 at para 41. The expertise of UNHCR in this context has also been affirmed in the decision 
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International Organization for Migration, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watchare 
considered to be ‘reliable sources’. 917 However, the UK High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench, 
Administrative Court has indicated that independent expert reports are not.918 As well, as was 
found in Medhanye, reports from reputable nongovernmental organizations may not be sufficient 
for a claimant to meet the burden of proof.919 Further, it is up to the national adjudicators to 
determine whether the test of ‘reliable sources’ has been met by the claimant.920 Thus, for cases 
involving assessment of a future risk of refoulement to ill-treatment, the threshold of ‘reliable 
sources’ precludes the application of independent expert reports but relies heavily upon published 
reports from highly-regarded bodies, though nongovernmental reports might not be sufficient.921  
As the above has shown, the UK jurisprudence surrounding the claimant’s burden in rebutting the 
presumption of mutual trust leaves the claimant with a significant burden, one which, in practice, 
is exceedingly hard to meet.922 For instance, as compared with the ECtHR on the test of rebutting 
the presumption of mutual trust, the CJEU’s test involves the specific wording of ‘cannot be 
unaware’ that ‘systemic deficiencies’ exist in the asylum procedures and reception conditions of 
the Member State to which the applicant would be transferred but for rebuttals that justify his or 
her non-removal.923 Another foreseeable issue with the requirement for the claimant to rebut the 
 
of the UK Supreme Court in I.A. (Iran): IA (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 6 at 
para 44. 
917 R (on the application of Elayathamby) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 2182 (Admin) 
at para 42(i) [Elayathamby]. 
918 Ibid at para 59. 
919 Medhanye supra note 782 at para 40.  
920 NS/ME supra note 296 at para 135.  
921 Elayathamby supra note 917 at para 59; Medhanye supra note 782 at paras 35 and 40.  
922 Costello NS/ME supra note 875 at 89.  
923 The wording of the CJEU judgment is tantamount to this analysis: ‘Member States, including national courts, may 
not transfer asylum seekers to the responsible State where they ‘cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the 
asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial 
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presumption of mutual trust between EU Member States is the Advocate General’s opinion that 
‘the precise working of the procedure for rebutting the presumption ‘were a matter for the legal 
orders of the individual Member States’.924 These create additional procedural barriers for 
claimants to access international protection for refugee status in the UK and accordingly increase 
the probability that the UK will shift its responsibility for processing asylum applications to 
another Member State in situations which create risk for mistreatment or onward refoulement, thus 
reinforcing the EU’s containment policies.  
In sum, the UK’s threshold for rebutting the presumption of mutual trust is a high one. A high 
threshold for rebutting the presumption means that the UK uses a blanket assumption and applies 
it broadly across all Member States - without procedural safeguards to ensure the country is, in 
fact, in compliance with international and European law. A containment policy is therefore 
demonstrated in the UK’s practice of returning asylum claimants to another Member State deemed 
to be in compliance with its international and European law obligations. First, this containment 
policy shows the UK’s attempts at shifting its responsibility for processing asylum applications to 
another Member State. Second, this same policy demonstrates that the UK is evading international 
law by placing the burden of proving an ‘arguable case’ upon the claimant to discharge. Third, the 
UK’s efforts at containing asylum claimants to other Member States means that, where the 
claimant is unable to rebut the presumption, his or her return to the country will be without 
qualification.925 Finally, an inability to rebut the presumption by a claimant may result in severe 
 
grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman and degrading 
treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter’, see: NS/ME supra note 296 at paras 86, 94, and 106.  
924 Costello NS/ME supra note 875 at 88; See, also: Court of Justice of the EU, “Opinion of Advocate General 
Trstenjak delivered on 22 September 2011”, Case C-411/10, N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/sep/ecj-n-s-case-opinion-advocate-general.pdf at para 135, which states: ‘f the 
Member States thus decide to introduce the rebuttable presumption that the asylum seeker’s human rights and 
fundamental rights will be observed in the Member State which is primarily responsible, the asylum seekers must be 
given the possibility, procedurally, actually to rebut that presumption. Having regard to the principle of effectiveness, 
the specific form of the available evidence and the definition of the rules and principles governing the assessment of 
evidence are, in turn, a matter for the national legal orders of the individual Member States’ (emphasis added).   
925 VT supra note 845 at 2 para 4; See, also: Treatment of Claimants Act supra note 753 at schedule 3, para 6.  
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consequences for him or her, including an increased risk of being returned to face persecution in 
violation of non-refoulement. This inability to rebut the presumption of mutual trust by the 
claimant may violate international law and European law when it prevents the claimant from 
accessing international protection as a result of lacking procedural safeguards against removal to 
refoulement - i.e. by not permitting the claimant an opportunity to rebut the case against him or 
her.  
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
Despite the departure of UK from the EU, the legacy of the EU will continue in UK asylum law 
for some time, given its transformation of EU law into its system and case law and its continued 
obligations under the ECHR. On the other hand, UK law has diverged from EU law to adopt a 
narrower approach which benefits the State in either Dublin or ‘safe’ third country transfers, and 
in certain procedures which do not allow the claimant to be heard about risks of refoulement.  
In a world where there is an increasing number of those forcibly displaced as a result of conflicts 
occurring elsewhere, the need for a coordinated response from the international community is 
necessary.926 This is also true from the standpoint of international organizations such as the 
UNHCR, which has called for solidarity and cooperation among States in order to tackle mass 
influx situations as well as to ‘reinforce support for the institution of asylum and international 
refugee protection’.927 However, despite these attempts and calls for coordinated response from 
the international community, responsibility-sharing has become increasingly difficult especially 
in the CEAS when both the deficiencies of the system itself and the inconsistent interpretation and 
implementation of the system among Member States contribute towards further instability.928 Most 
notably, inconsistencies in the interpretation and application of the Dublin System by the UK are 
 
926 Eritrea supra note 843 at para 40.  
927 Vulker Turk and Madeline Garlick, “From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The Comprehensive 
Refugee Response Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees” (2016) 28:4 International Journal of Refugee Law 
656-678 at 673 [Turk and Garlick].  
928 For more on the deficiencies of the Dublin System, as well as inconsistent interpretation and implementation by 
Member States, see: Chapter Three.  
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revealed in its domestic jurisprudence, which incorporates references to both ECtHR and CJEU 
decisions. There are several inconsistencies which are transposed from regional European 
frameworks to the UK’s domestic jurisprudence, including the threshold for rebutting the 
presumption of mutual trust and the source of evidence that may be relied upon by Member States 
in rebutting the presumption of mutual trust. 
This chapter explored the principle of non-refoulement in the UK. It demonstrated that the UK is 
showing a concerning trend: that the interpretation of the norm in UK domestic law has become 
narrower and more restrictive. For instance, on the threshold to establish a rebuttal to the 
presumption of mutual trust to prevent Dublin transfers, UK has not shown consistency with the 
approach taken towards the standard of proof for the asylum claimant. In referring to ECtHR and 
CJEU case law, UK has not been able to ascertain its own interpretation of the presumption of 
mutual trust threshold. Rather, UK is prone to compromise between the two supranational courts’ 
approaches, leading to more inconsistency and difficulty in implementation for national 
adjudicators.  
This chapter also examined the procedures for claiming asylum in the UK, including how 
applicants for international protection for refugee status qualify for international protection, how 
their international protection is granted or withdrawn, and the points in the system during which 
the possibilities of refoulement are considered. 
The final part of this chapter outlined the UK’s domestic jurisprudence and how it demonstrates 
that the country is actually following a policy of containment in three key respects. A trilogy of 
cases established the threshold to determine the standard by which claimants can rebut the 
presumption of mutual trust in the UK. The threshold on ‘reliable sources’ which claimants must 
prove to establish an ‘arguable case’ requires the use of reports or observations from reputable 
international organizations such as the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration 
and well-respected human rights monitoring bodies such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch – but sometimes even that is not enough. Finally, the problem with the rebuttable 
presumption is that the onus is placed upon the claimant and is detrimental to the claimant where 
he or she is unable to discharge such a heavy burden, potentially being returned to face risks of 
persecution, violating non-refoulement. The Committee Against Torture has recognized the risks 
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in the UK’s approach – for example, cautioning the UK against the use of diplomatic assurances 
(as part of mutual trust) when contemplating the deportation of claimants to third countries.929 The 
Committee recommends that the UK adopt a clear policy and to ensure that the transfer of 
claimants, including detainees, to another country is strongly prohibited in situations where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that their transfer would expose them to a real risk of 
torture.930 
The next chapter examines the gaps between the law and practice on non-refoulement in Germany, 
which makes for an interesting comparison with the UK approach, as another important refugee-
receiving country in Europe.  
  
 
929 See above section of the presumption of mutual trust for explanation.  
930 Ibid.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Germany and Non-Refoulement 
6. Introduction 
In 2019, Germany received 165,615 asylum applications for international protection, down from 
a high of 745,160 in 2016, and 222,565 and 184,180 in 2017 and 2018 respectively.931 Year over 
year since significant refugee influxes began in 2012, Germany has received the highest number 
of asylum applications within the EU.932 ‘Germany’s desirability as a destination for asylum 
seekers is long standing: over the past 30 years it received a reported 30 percent of all asylum 
applications in Europe - a greater share than any other country.’933 As a result of the high number 
of asylum claimants, Germany has increased its efforts to transfer asylum claimants from Germany 
to other EU Member States, particularly the Member State deemed responsible for processing the 
asylum application pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation (known as ‘Dublin transfers’).934 While 
Dublin transfers have been temporary halted due to COVID-19-related travel restrictions, 
Germany transferred 8,423 asylum applicants under this system in 2019, particularly to Italy and 
France.935 Similarly, in 2018, Germany returned the highest number of asylum claimants through 
Dublin transfers to Italy, raising concerns about their treatment in Italy and fears of onward 
 
931 EuroStat: Asylum and first time asylum applicants - annual aggregated data (rounded), 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00191&plugin=1. 
932 As compared to Germany, France received 128,940 claims, Spain received 117,800 claims, while Italy received 
43,770 claims in 2019, see, ibid. 
933 Stefan Trines, “Lessons From Germany’s Refugee Crisis: Integration, Costs, and Benefits”, 
https://wenr.wes.org/2017/05/lessons-germanys-refugee-crisis-integration-costs-benefits. 
934 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, “Germany Steps Up Dublin Transfers Putting Asylum Seekers at Risk”, 
21 March 2019, https://www.ecre.org/germany-steps-up-dublin-transfers-putting-asylum-seekers-at-risk. [ECRE 
News].  
935 European Council on Refugees and Exiles News, “Germany: Temporary Suspension of Dublin Returns Due to 
COVID-19”, https://www.ecre.org/germany-temporary-suspension-of-dublin-returns-due-to-covid-10/.  
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refoulement to countries of origin.936 As part of this trend, Germany has also reversed policy on 
‘church asylum’, under which asylum claimants subject to Dublin transfers who sought shelter in 
German churches for fear of onward refoulement are removed and forcibly transferred.937 These 
increased efforts of Germany to use Dublin transfers has led to criticism. According to the 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles, this practice puts asylum claimants at risk of human 
rights violations and exacerbates deficiencies in the domestic German asylum procedures by 
creating an additional heavier burden upon claimants to disprove the presumption of mutual 
trust.938 Members of Parliament from the German parliamentary faction Die Linke have 
commented that this practice, which is permitted within the Dublin System, is ‘unjust in principle 
as it tends to shift the responsibility for processing asylum claims to countries that have suffered 
from EU austerity measures and treated asylum seekers like tradeable goods’.939 Ultimately, 
Germany’s approach raises similar concerns with respect to refoulement as highlighted in the 
previous chapter’s case study of the United Kingdom. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how Germany’s domestic asylum system addresses the 
principle of non-refoulement. This chapter therefore analyzes and evaluates Germany’s domestic 
asylum system as well as Germany’s interpretation and implementation of the principle of non-
refoulement. This chapter also situates Germany’s interpretation and implementation of non-
refoulement within the European legal framework on asylum issues and within the CEAS. First, 
the chapter begins by explaining the German refugee law system. Next, it explains the German 
domestic asylum system. This is done in order to provide the legal and procedural context within 
 
936 ECRE News supra note 930; See, also: European Council on Refugees and Exiles, “Italy: Vulnerable Dublin 
Returnees at Risk of Destitution”, 14 December 2018, https://www.ecre.org/italy-vulnerable-dublin-returnees-at-risk-
of-destitution.  
937 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Germany: Dublin Transfer to Denmark despite Church Asylum, 
https://www.ecre.org/germany-dublin-transfer-to-denmark-despite-church-asylum/. Previously, German authorities 
did not forcibly remove individuals subject to Dublin transfers from the churches in which they sought ‘Church 
asylum’.   
938 Ibid.  
939 ECRE News supra note 934. 
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which German refugee law, including on non-refoulement, is applied. The chapter then outlines 
Germany’s interpretation and implementation of non-refoulement. The chapter ends by discussing 
responsibility-sharing and examples of containment policies in Germany. This chapter concludes 
that, first, Germany’s interpretation of the principle of non-refoulement is mixed and, in some 
cases, becoming narrower. Second, Germany’s reliance on the presumption of mutual trust in 
Dublin transfers furthers the EU’s containment policies by shifting the responsibility to process 
asylum applications elsewhere - outside of Germany to another EU Member State deemed 
responsible or to a third country deemed ‘safe’ under the Asylum Procedures Directive (recast). 
6.1 German Refugee Law 
German refugee law is informed by three types of law: international treaty law, EU and ECHR 
law, and domestic law. This section will explore each of these types of law in turn.  
Germany acceded to the Refugee Convention on November 5, 1969 and ratified it on December 
1, 1953.940 Germany also acceded to, and ratified, the 1967 Protocol on September 4, 1990, with 
the geographical and temporal limitations imposed by the Refugee Convention in Article 1A 
removed.941 Germany has not made any reservations to the Refugee Convention.942 Germany is a 
monist country which implements international treaties directly within domestic law, particularly 
through Article 25 of the Basic Law; therefore, the content of the Refugee Convention forms part 
 
940 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol”, http://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/states-parties-1951-convention-
its-1967-protocol.html.   
941 United Nations, “Depositary: Status of Treaties – 5. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees”, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-5&chapter=5&lang=en.   
942 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “2. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Geneva, 28 
July 1951”, http://www.unhcr.org/protection/convention/3d9abe177/reservations-declarations-1951-refugee-
convention.html.  
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of German domestic law.943 That said, the Bundesverfassungsgerricht (BverG) - the German 
Federal Constitutional Court - has shown tendencies towards the dualist model.944 In particular, 
the Basic Law states:  
Treaties that regulate the political relations of the Federation or relate to subjects 
of federal legislation shall require the consent or participation, in the form of a 
federal law, of the bodies responsible in such a case for the enactment of federal 
law. In the case of executive agreements the provisions concerning the federal 
administration shall apply, mutatis mutandis (emphasis added).945 
The German approach means that, in theory, asylum claimants are able to rely directly upon the 
Refugee Convention in domestic courts. However, in reality, such direct application may not be 
determinative. 
Germany, as a Member State of the Council of Europe, has also ratified the ECHR and is legally 
bound by it.946 This means, for example, that the non-refoulement provisions of the ECHR are 
directly incorporated into Germany’s domestic law since Article 3 of the ECHR prohibits 
torture.947 Since the ECHR has been implemented domestically by Germany into its domestic 
 
943 However, some scholars contend that ‘the provisions of the Basic Law neither conforms nor deny the proposition 
that Germany is a monist system’, see: Daniel Lovric, “A Constitution Friendly to International Law: Germany and 
its Volkerrectsfreundlichkeit” (2006) 25 Australian Yearbook of International Law 75-104 at 81-82.  
944 Ibid at 82; Furthermore, the BverG was of the view that, in accordance with Article 59(2) of the Basic Law, it 
serves as a bridge between international treaty law and German domestic law, and also adopts a ‘dualist approach to 
international treaty law’, see: Frank Hoffmeister, “Germany: Status of European Convention on Human Rights in 
Domestic Law” (2006) 4(4) I-CON, 722-731 at 726-727 [Hoffmeister]. 
945 Deutscher Bundestag, Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, last amended 28 March 2019, 
https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf at  art 59(2) [Basic Law].  
946 ECHR supra note 114 at 5.  
947 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Basic Liberties, 7 August 1952, BGBl.II at 685; See, also: 
Hoffmeister supra note 944 at 724, which states: ‘the ECHR enjoys the status of a federal statute in Germany since 
the German parliament (the Bundestag) adopted it in 1952 by law, according to article 59(2) of the Basic Law. Having 
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legislation, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence therefore serves as ‘interpretative tools of German norms 
of a constitutional nature’.948 Also, while the ECHR has been implemented domestically in 
Germany, the principle of subsidiarity of the ECtHR jurisprudence suggests that the ECtHR is a 
court of last resort and that domestic remedies must have been exhausted before national courts 
may refer a case to the ECtHR.949 In particular, the principle of subsidiarity requires national courts 
to ‘have the opportunity to consider and redress the alleged violation(s)’.950 In the Case No. 2 BvR 
1481.04 before the BverG, the court held that ‘the responsible authorities or courts must 
discernibly consider the decision and, if necessary, justify understandably why they nevertheless 
do not follow the international-law interpretation of the law’.951 This judgment signals to the 
national courts that the BverG’s view of ECtHR judgments - including those on refugee law - do 
not oblige German national courts to follow the ECtHR’s judgments in all circumstances, where 
they can put forward reasons for deviating from the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.952 However, it was 
subsequently held by the BverG that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence must be considered by German 
national courts in a ‘methodologically sound manner, but only as long as this did not lead to a 
weakening of the Basic Law’s standard of constitutional protection’.953 
 
become part of German domestic law, the Convention had to be applied by German courts, like other federal statutes, 
“in the framework of accepted methods of interpretation”’.  
948 Ibid at 724; See, also: Case No 2 BvR 1481/04, October 14, 2004.  
949 Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, “The European Court of Human Rights: Questions & Answers for 
Lawyers”, 2014, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_ECHR_lawyers_ENG.pdf at 4. 
950 Ibid. 
951 BverG, Judgment of 14 October 2004 – BverG 2 BvR 1481/04 at para 50.  
952 Birgit Peters, “Germany’s Dialogue with Strasbourg: Extrapolating the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Relationship 
with the European Court of Human Rights in the Preventive Detention Decision” (2012) 13:6 German Law Journal 
758-722 at 760.  
953 Ibid at 763; BverG, Judgment of 4 February 2010 – BverG 2 BvR 2307/06 at para 21. 
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As a Member State of the EU, Germany is bound by EU law, especially when implementing EU 
law in its domestic legislation.954 The regulations and directives are automatically binding upon 
Germany on the date they enter into force and directives must be incorporated by EU countries 
into their domestic legislations.955 Germany did not opt out of any of the relevant EU directives 
and regulations on asylum.956 Germany has transposed key CEAS instruments into its domestic 
legislation. For instance, Qualification Directive (recast) has been transposed as the Act for the 
Transposition of the Directive 2011/95/EU, the Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) as the 
Asylum Procedures Acceleration Act, the Reception Conditions Directive (recast) as the Act on 
classification of further states as safe countries of origin and on the facilitation of access to the 
labour market for asylum seekers and tolerated foreigners, and the Dublin III Regulation as the 
Act on the redefinition of the right to stay and on the termination of stay.957  
In terms of Germany’s responsibilities under EU law for responsibility-sharing, the Dublin III 
Regulation applies to determine the Member State responsible for processing asylum 
applications.958 The relevant sections in the Dublin III Regulation have been transposed in German 
law under Section 71a(1) of the Asylum Act (described further below) and Sections 51(1) to 51(3) 
 
954 European Union, “Countries”, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en#the-28-member-countries-
of-the-eu. As an EU Member State, Germany is bound by the EU Charter pursuant to Article 6 of the TEU and relevant 
EU directives and regulations: European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C-326/13, 
26 October 2012 at art 6. 
955 Ibid.  
956 See, for example, where the UK and Ireland has opted-out of the Qualification Directive of 2011/95/EU pursuant 
to Protocol 21 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty in European Union, Protocol No 21, OJ C-202/295.  
957 Asylum Information Database, “Annex I – Transposition of the CEAS in National Legislation: Germany”, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/annex-i-%E2%80%93-transposition-ceas-national-
legislation.   
958 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 3(2); See also: BVerWG, Judgment of 16 November 2015 – BVerWG 1 
C 4.15 at para 2.3.  
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of the Administrative Procedure Act.959 The  Asylum Act specifies additional asylum procedures 
to be carried out if Germany is deemed to be the responsible Member State to process the 
claimant’s application for asylum and the Administrative Procedure Act sets out the conditions 
upon which these asylum procedures are to take place.960 
Turning now to domestic German law, there are two sources of German law: statute law (Gesetz) 
and customary law (Gewohnheitsrecht).961 The Constitution of Germany, the Basic Law, is the 
highest law of Germany.962 Next in the hierarchy of the Gesetz are regulations 
(Rechtsverordnungen) and bylaws (Satzungen).963 German refugee law is generally found in the 
Gesetz, particularly in its regulations. The courts function to interpret law but the judicial decisions 
are not binding upon lower courts.964 This means that, although a certain case may be helpful to 
protect claimants from refoulement in Germany, it does not create binding precedent and therefore 
lower courts may decide differently, even against the claimant’s protection. 
The Basic Law applies to ‘the entire German people’.965 However, the language of the Basic Law 
uses repeatedly the terms ‘every person’, ‘all persons’, and ‘persons’,966 whereas other parts of the 
 
959 Asylum Act supra note 24 at s 71a(1); Baden-Württemberg State Administrative Procedure Act 
(Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, VwVfG), 25 May 1976, Federal Law Gazette I, 102, as amended at s 51(1), 51(2) and 
51(3) [Administrative Procedure Act].  
960 Ibid.  
961 Raymond Youngs, Sourcebook on German Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2002) at 4 [Youngs]. 
962 Ibid. 
963 Ibid. 
964 Ibid at 5. 
965 Basic Law supra note 945 at 13.  
966 See, for example: Ibid at arts 2, 3(1), and 12(a)(3).  
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Basic Law refer to ‘all Germans’.967 This distinction is important for asylum claimants, who have 
certain rights under certain parts of the Basic Law as a result. 
Most relevant to the interpretation of international law is Article 25 of the Basic Law, which 
provides for the ‘primacy of international law’.968 It states: ‘the general rules of international law 
shall be an integral part of federal law.969 They shall take precedence over the laws and directly 
create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory’ (emphasis added).970 This 
provision signifies that the Basic Law, as the constitution and the highest law of the land, deems 
Germany as a monist system, under which general principles of international law directly become 
national law, without the need for separate domestic implementation, as dualist systems require.971  
The ‘right of asylum’ is guaranteed to ‘persons persecuted on political grounds’ pursuant to Article 
16(a)(1) of the Basic Law.972 However, this ‘right of asylum’ is not invoked where, pursuant to 
Article 16(a)(2), the person ‘enters the federal territory from a member state of the European 
Communities or from another third state in which application of the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms is assured’.973 In other words, asylum claimants who pass through an EU Member State 
on their way to Germany or who pass through a third country where the Refugee Convention and 
ECHR are enforced, cannot invoke the ‘right of asylum’. On this basis, Germany draws on the 
 
967 Ibid at art 8(1).  
968 Ibid at art 25. 
969 Ibid. 
970 Ibid. 
971 Ibid; See a brief discussion above regarding the dualist model employed by the BverG in its case law interpretation 
of international law.  
972 Ibid at art 16(a)(1); This ‘right of asylum’ is fundamental to, and reflects the importance of, Germany’s view on 
political asylum as reflected in the UDHR, where many of the provisions are considered customary international law, 
see: UDHR supra note 27 at art 14. 
973 Basic Law supra note 945 at art 16(a)(2).  
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presumption of mutual trust which assumes the safety of the third country for the specific asylum 
claimant being contemplated for return. 
The Basic Law is interpreted by the BverG, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany.974 The 
main duty of the court is to interpret the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (the 
Grundgesetz or the Basic Law), and to ensure that it is obeyed.975 The Basic Law is the most 
relevant law when it comes to refugee law, given its emphasis on fundamental rights.976 The 
decisions of the BverG are final and all other German government institutions are bound by its 
case law.977 The BverG’s jurisdiction extends to any conflicts which arise in the interpretation of 
the Basic Law.978 The BverG has the power to declare a law unconstitutional based on its 
interpretation of the Basic Law.979 Unlike ordinary courts in Germany, the BverG is vested with 
the power to declare German laws and statutes unconstitutional, void, or reverse a decision to 
remand the matter to a competent court, including the competence to enforce fundamental rights 
as provided for under the Basic Law.980 The BverG cannot, however, issue awards in damages or 
initiate criminal proceedings.981  
 
974 Bundesverfassungsgericht, “Court and Constitutional Organ”, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Das-
Gericht/Gericht-und-Verfassungsorgan/gericht-und-verfassungsorgan_node.html.   
975 Ibid. 
976 Bundesverfassungsgericht, “The Court’s Duties”, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Das-
Gericht/Aufgaben/aufgaben_node.html.   
977 Ibid. 
978 Ibid. 
979 Ibid. 
980 Ibid.  
981 Ibid. 
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As a constitutional court, the BverG sees itself as part of the international legal order, where it 
maintains judicial dialogue with other national and international courts.982 Any person may lodge 
a complaint alleging that their fundamental rights as provided for under the Basic Law has been 
violated by a public authority.983 The BverG is a court of last resort, meaning that all other legal 
remedies must have been exhausted before the BverG will consider a complaint.984   
There are two methods of application used by the BverG in its interpretation of international law 
norms - including refugee law norms - in domestic German case law. The first involves a ‘static 
interpretation’ of international law norms, namely through determining Article 16(2) of the Basic 
Law according to the contents of international law.985 Another method involves a ‘dynamic 
interpretation’ of international law norms through the consideration of the content of such an 
international law norm as it is applied by German organs.986 The German legislature has made 
clear that it would not follow the dynamic interpretation of international law norms, meaning that 
international law norms should be interpreted only according to the content of international law 
 
982 Bundesverfassungsgericht, “International Perspectives”, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Das-
Gericht/Internationale-Perspektiven/internationale-perspektiven_node.html.  
983 Bundesverfassungsgericht, “How to Lodge a Constitutional Complaint”, 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Homepage/_zielgruppeneinstieg/Merkblatt/Merkblatt.html.   
984 Ibid. 
985 Rainer Hofmann, “Recent Jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court on Asylum Law” in 
Gudmundur Alfredsson and Peter Macalister-Smith (eds) The Living Law of Nations: Essays on refugees, minorities, 
indigenous peoples and the human rights of other vulnerable groups in memory of Atle Grahl-Madsen (Germany: NP 
Engel Publisher, 1996) at 101.  
986 Ibid. 
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rather than how they have been applied by German organs.987 German case law is also not binding 
upon lower courts and previous decisions of a court are not binding upon the same court.988  
Apart from the Basic Law, the Asylgesetz or, the Asylum Act of Germany (Asylum Act) is a key 
aspect of German refugee law. The Asylum Act contains 90 chapters and two annexes which apply 
to foreigners. The Asylum Act defines a ‘refugee’ in the same way as the Refugee Convention.989 
The Asylum Act allows for three outcomes: a grant of refugee status, a grant of subsidiary 
protection as defined under the Qualification Directive, or denial of the claim.990  
With regards to the ‘safe’ third country concept, the Asylum Act provides under Article 26 that: 
any foreigner who has entered the federal territory from a third country within the 
meaning of Article 16(2), first sentence of the Basic Law (safe third country) […] 
shall not be granted asylum.991  
However, the provision on ‘safe’ third country does not apply where: ‘the Federal Republic of 
Germany is responsible for processing an asylum application based on European Community law 
or an international treaty with the safe third country’ and ‘[i]n addition to the Member States of 
the European Union, safe third countries are those listed in Annex I’.992 The ‘safe’ third countries 
 
987 Jasper Finke, “Granting Asylum and Protection from Deportation to Civil War Refugees under German 
Constitutional Law and the German Aliens Act: The Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 10 
August 2000” (2000) 43 German Yearbook of International Law 283-297 at 292.  
988 See, for example: Administrative Court of Potsdam, 4 September 2015, Case No. 4 L 810/15.A.  
989 Ibid at s 3. 
990 Asylum Act of Germany, 2 September 2008 (Federal Law Gazette I, p 1798), last amended by art 2 of Act 11 March 
2016 (Federal Law Gazette I, p 394) at s 1(1) [Asylum Act].  
991 Ibid at s 26(a)(1).  
992 Ibid at s 26(a)(1)(2) and 26(a)(2).  
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listed in Annex I are Norway and Switzerland.993  This means that Germany unequivocally accepts 
and applies the concept of ‘safe’ third countries in its refugee law.994 
The principle of proportionality guides judicial decision-making in Germany, including decisions 
involving asylum claims. The principle is primarily derived from Articles 2(1) and 14 of the Basic 
Law, and this principle was also later incorporated into EU law.995 The principle of proportionality 
places fundamental rights as set out under the Basic Law at the centre of German law, including 
the right of asylum, with other laws carefully balanced so as to protect those rights.996 The principle 
of proportionality states that: ‘the law must be appropriate for attaining its objectives, it must be 
necessary in the attainment of its objectives, and its purpose and method should be weighed against 
each other in a proportionate manner so that there is minimal interference in the fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the Basic Law’.997 
In the context of asylum decision-making, German courts have held that the principle of 
proportionality is violated when a ‘blanket approach in the absence of a case by case examination’ 
is used, in particular to justify detention of asylum claimants deemed to be flight risks.998 The 
BverG has also held that the principle of proportionality requires that limitations of fundamental 
rights as guaranteed under the EU Charter are permitted only if these limitations are ‘necessary 
 
993 Ibid at Annex I.  
994 See, for example: Kathleen Marie Whitney, “Does the European Convention on Human Rights Protect Refugees 
from “Safe” Countries” (1997) 26 Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 375-407 at 386, which states: 
‘Germany is an example of a Contracting State that has adopted use of the “safe” country concept to create a cordon 
sanitaire around its borders”.  
995 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft GmbH v EV St, C-11/70, 17 December 1970 at 1128. 
996 Youngs supra note 961 at chapter 3. 
997 Ibid.  
998 European Asylum Law Database, “Germany – Administrative Court of Oldenburg, 12th Chamber, 2 October 2015, 
12 A 2572/15”, http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/germany-administrative-court-oldenburg-12th-
chamber-2-october-2015-12-257215. [EDAL Oldenburg]. 
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and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union’.999 The principle of 
proportionality is transposed into Section 34a of the Asylum Procedure Act, which also requires 
that transfers of asylum claimants under the Dublin procedures be in compliance with the Dublin 
III Regulation, and in accordance with the functions of the CEAS.1000 The Baden-Württemberg 
State Administrative Procedure Act also stated that, in instances of decision-making (including on 
asylum matters), the executive authority must apply a method that is least likely to interfere with 
the individual concerned and the general public.1001 
In the context of allocating responsibility for determining an asylum application, the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BverWG), or the Federal Administrative Court of Germany, held in 
Case No. 1 C 26.14 that, where an asylum claimant has decided to apply for asylum in Germany 
and the decision on the Member State responsible for the processing of the asylum application is 
against him or her, the claimant must first lodge an appeal to the Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge (BAMF), or the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees of Germany, before he or 
she may initiate a second action in court against the responsible authority issuing the rejection.1002  
The BAMF is a federal authority within the Federal Ministry of the Interior which makes decisions 
on asylum applications.1003 The BAMF works on the basis of interpreting the Asylum Act, as well 
as relevant EU directives and regulations such as the Dublin III Regulation.1004 The decisions of 
the BAMF can be appealed to the courts. The BAMF produces various ‘soft law’ guidance 
 
999 BVerWG, Judgment of 17 September 2015 – BverWG 1 C 26.14 at para 3(a) [Case No 1 C 26.14]; See, also: EU 
Charter supra note 224 at art 52(1). 
1000 Asylum Procedure Act (Asylverfahrensgesetz, AsylVfG), 2 September 2008, Federal Law Gazette I, 1798, as 
amended at s 34a. 
1001 Administrative Procedure Act supra note 959 at s 19(2). 
1002 Case No 1 C 26.14 supra note 999 at para 3b. 
1003 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “The Authority”, 
http://www.bamf.de/EN/DasBAMF/Aufgaben/Beh%C3%B6rde/die-behoerde-node.html.  
1004 Asylum Act supra note 990.   
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instruments, including official instructions and working guidelines for decision-makers.1005 These 
guides aim to ensure uniform assessment of asylum applications but do not replace individual 
examinations and assessments of asylum applications by adjudicators.1006 The guides reflect the 
current policy of the BAMF and there is an ongoing dialogue between the BAMF and courts in 
the practice of asylum decision-making.1007 These ‘soft law’ guidance instruments are not available 
to the public and are considered internal documents.1008  
Having considered the sources of German refugee law and methods of interpreting German law 
that are relevant to asylum cases, the next section turns to the structure of the German domestic 
asylum system.  
6.2 The German Domestic Asylum System 
Germany’s domestic asylum system is structured quite differently from that of the United 
Kingdom. Asylum cases are handled by regular administrative courts, rather than specialized 
tribunals similar to the ones in the UK.1009 Decisions of the regular administrative courts may be 
appealed to the High Administrative Court of the relevant state in Germany, such as Bavaria and 
North Rhine-Westphalia, which deal with questions of both fact and law.1010 At the top of the 
appeals hierarchy is the BverWG, the Federal Administrative Court of Germany, which is 
responsible for the administrative claims of refugee claimants and only decides on questions of 
 
1005 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “Procedure Management and Quality Assurance”, 
http://www.bamf.de/EN/Fluechtlingsschutz/VerfahrenssteuerungQualitaetssicherung/verfahrenssteuerung-
node.html.  
1006 Ibid.  
1007 Ibid.  
1008 Ibid.  
1009 Justice Harald Dörig, “Germany: The Handling of Leading Asylum Cases by National Courts” (2013) 25:2 
International Journal of Refugee Law 373-376 at 373. 
1010 Ibid at 373.  
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law and not of fact.1011 On the other hand, the BverG, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 
can also rule on issues of asylum because the ‘right of asylum’ is guaranteed in the Basic Law.1012 
The BverWG may deviate from the BverG’s ruling on asylum issues only where the BverWG’s 
ruling concerns EU law, which prevails over German national law.1013 The BverWG can also refer 
cases to the CJEU on questions related to interpretation of EU law and has done so on previous 
occasions pursuant to Article 267 of the TFEU.1014  
There are five main steps in the German asylum process: first instance screening; determination of 
the applicable procedure (accelerated, regular or Dublin); substantive interview for refugee 
determination; decision on refugee determination; and appeal (if applicable).1015 Each of these 
steps will be described in turn. The authority responsible for the domestic processing of asylum 
applications in Germany is the BAMF, unless the application for asylum took place at the border, 
in which case the German border police will be the competent authority to handle the 
application.1016  
The first step in the Germany asylum process is first instance screening, which can take place at 
the border, at the airport or within German territory. Individuals begin this process by indicating 
that they wish to apply for international protection for refugee status. They are then briefly 
questioned to determine certain facts, such as where they are from and how they got to Germany 
from their country of origin, including the countries they have passed through to arrive at Germany. 
 
1011 Ibid.  
1012 Ibid at 374. 
1013 Ibid.  
1014 Ibid; See, also: TFEU supra note 18 at art 267: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction 
to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts 
of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union’. 
1015 Asylum Information Database, “Country Report: Germany”, 2017 at 14 [AIDA Country Report Germany]. See 
also the chart below. 
1016 AIDA Country Report Germany supra note 1015 at 18-42. 
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For asylum claimants who arrive at the border trying to enter Germany without the requisite 
landing documents such as passports, their entry to German territory will be denied by the border 
police on the grounds that they have traveled to Germany through a ‘safe’ third country to which 
they should return and from where they should have applied for asylum.1017 Thus, these individuals 
are immediately diverted outside of the system by being considered ‘inadmissible’ on the basis of 
having passed through a ‘safe’ third country.1018 If, however, they have documentation, then they 
are instead permitted to continue to the second step of the asylum process. If an individual applies 
for asylum either at the border or at an international airport in Germany, the applicant will be 
accommodated in an ‘initial reception centre’ (Aufnahmeeinrichtung) for up to 6 months during 
the first stage of his or her asylum procedures.1019 These ‘initial reception centres’ are located on 
the premises of the BAMF, but subsequent to the initial reception period of 6 months, for the 
remainder of their time, claimants will be sent to decentralized reception centres for appeal 
procedures, if applicable.1020 If a person makes an asylum claim while they are already within 
Germany territory, then he or she will be sent to the responsible authority (such as the BAMF) to 
determine his or her asylum application.1021  
The second step in the asylum process involves determining the correct procedure to follow. At 
this stage, claimants are briefly interviewed in order to be evaluated against a series of 
considerations: is the claimant from a ‘safe’ country of origin? Has the claimant misled German 
authorities? Did the claimant act in bad faith in making the application, including attempting to 
deceive the asylum official or trying to conceal the truth? Has the claimant filed a subsequent 
 
1017 Ibid at 15.  
1018 Ibid at 60, which states: ‘Asylum seekers can be sent back to safe third countries with neither an asylum 
application, nor an application for international or national protection being considered […] Furthermore, Federal 
Police shall immediately initiate removal to a safe third country if an asylum seeker is apprehended at the border 
without the necessary documents’.  
1019 Ibid.  
1020 Ibid.  
1021 Ibid.  
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application for asylum in another country after leaving Germany? Has the claimant applied for 
asylum to frustrate the process, such as applying for the purpose of causing procedural delays? Did 
the claimant refuse to be fingerprinted as required under the Eurodac Regulation at the point of 
arrival in the EU or in Germany? Has this claimant ever been expelled from Germany on national 
security grounds? If the answer to any of these questions is ‘yes’ at this preliminary stage, then the 
claimant is subjected to the accelerated procedure. If the answer is ‘no’ to all of these questions, 
then the individuals is processed through the regular procedure.  
The accelerated procedure is a procedure which takes place in an abbreviated period of time, in 
comparison to the regular procedure. Under the accelerated procedure, the BAMF, which is the 
office that carries out the procedure, has seven calendar days to decide on a claimant’s 
application.1022 During the accelerated procedure, claimants are detained at ‘special reception 
centres’.1023 As mentioned, asylum claimants may undertake the accelerated procedure if they are 
deemed to be from a ‘safe country of origin’, which is defined as:  
a country where, on the basis of the legal situation, the application of the law within 
a democratic system, and the general political circumstances, it can be shown that 
there is generally and consistently no persecution as defined in Art. 9 of Directive 
2011/95/EU (Recast Qualification Directive), no inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of 
international or internal armed conflict.1024 
Asylum claimants may also be required to undertake the accelerated procedure where they were 
found to have deliberately misled the German authorities about their identity.1025 The accelerated 
procedure is also used where applicants have acted in bad faith, filed a subsequent application after 
 
1022 Ibid at 48.  
1023 Ibid. 
1024 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, “Safe Country of Origin”, https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/content/safe-country-origin-0_en.  
1025 AIDA Country Report Germany supra note 1015 at 15.   
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they left Germany and their initial asylum application had concluded, made an application for the 
purpose of causing procedural delay, refused to provide their fingerprints, or were expelled from 
Germany due to serious reasons of public security or for constituting a danger to the community 
of Germany.1026 These claimants are accommodated in ‘special reception centres’ (besondere 
Aufnahmeeinrichtung) where they stay for the duration of the accelerated procedure.1027 
The regular procedure differs from the accelerated procedure in that there is not a set time limit 
for the BAMF, the responsible authority, to decide on an application.1028 Claimants who are 
directed into the regular procedure are evaluated to see if they travelled through a ‘safe’ third 
country prior to arriving in Germany. If the answer is that the claimant travelled through a ‘safe’ 
third country which is not an EU country, then Germany’s stance is that the individual should have 
applied for asylum in that country. Germany will not consider that person for the granting of 
asylum and instead will initiate the ‘safe’ third country transfer process.1029 This is the case even 
where it is impossible to return the individual to the ‘safe’ third country (i.e. where there is lack of 
information provided by the applicant).1030 Germany uses ‘safe’ third country lists, which include 
non-EU countries such as Norway and Switzerland.1031  
If, during the personal interview at the competent branch office of the BAMF, the claimant is 
determined to have travelled through an EU Member State before filing the asylum claim in 
 
1026 Ibid at 47-48.  
1027 Ibid.  
1028 Ibid at 20, which states: ‘If no decision has been taken within 6 months, the BAMF has to notify asylum seekers 
upon request about when the decision is likely to be taken’. 
1029 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Asylum Seeking Process”, 
https://help.unhcr.org/germany/asylum-in-germany/asylum-seeking-process [UNHCR Asylum Process]. 
1030 Ibid.  
1031 Ibid.  
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Germany, then that individual will be considered for a potential Dublin transfer.1032 During this 
preliminary interview, the applicant is ‘informed […] about the procedure and asked to state any 
reasons why he or she should not be transferred to another Member State’.1033 The content of this 
interview is to determine the competent Member State responsible for examining the application 
for the claimant and to examine any procedural barriers to deporting the claimant under the Dublin 
III Regulation.1034 Germany then evaluates whether it is the responsible Member State or not. If it 
determines that it is not the responsible Member State, then German authorities do not conduct a 
substantive interview of the claimant, raising the risk of refoulement as the individual is not 
provided with a chance to address the situation regarding the State determined to be responsible 
for processing his or her claim.1035 Where another Member State is determined, under the Dublin 
III Regulation, to be the responsible Member State, Germany will submit a ‘take charge’ request 
to the responsible Member State to undertake responsibility for the claimant.1036 Where the 
responsible Member State approves the ‘take charge’ request from Germany, the BAMF will find 
the application inadmissible in Germany and order the deportation of the claimant to the 
responsible Member State.1037 Under the Dublin procedure, Germany is not permitted to transfer 
the applicant to another EU Member State where the applicant’s spouse or minor children are 
already recognized as a refugee or are entitled to subsidiary protection in Germany; the applicant’s 
spouse or minor children have applied for asylum and the responsible Member State is Germany; 
the applicant is an unaccompanied minor and does not have parents or siblings in the Dublin 
responsible State; the applicant is seriously ill and the illness can be worsened with the transfer; 
 
1032 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “The stages of the German asylum procedure”, 2/2019, 
https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/AsylFluechtlingsschutz/Asylverfahren/das-deutsche-
asylverfahren.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=12 at 16 [BAMF Asylum Procedures]. 
1033 Ibid.  
1034 Ibid.  
1035 UNHCR Asylum Process supra note 1029. 
1036 BAMF Asylum Procedures supra note 1032 at 17.  
1037 Ibid.  
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or Germany decides to invoke the ‘sovereignty clause’ under Article 3(2) of the Dublin III 
Regulation to ‘take charge’ of the applicant.1038 Germany is required to transfer the applicant to 
the responsible Member State within six months of the agreement of the Member State under the 
Dublin III Regulation.1039 
If the applicant is not subject to a ‘safe’ third country or Dublin transfer, then that individual will 
be sent to the third step in Germany’s asylum process: the substantive interview, in which case 
their refugee status will be determined in Germany.1040 At this step, the substantive interview is 
conducted in order to consider whether the claimant fits within the required definition of ‘refugee’. 
Under domestic German law, persons who are subjected to serious human rights violations when 
they are returned to their country of origin are entitled to asylum where they are able to demonstrate 
that they have been persecuted on a number of grounds consisting of: race, nationality, political 
opinion, fundamental religious conviction, or membership of a particular social group, without 
having access to protection against persecution or an alternative form of refuge in the country of 
origin.1041 Examples of acts which may be regarded as persecution under domestic German law 
include: 
[The] use of physical or psychological violence, including sexual coercion; legal, 
administrative, police and/or judicial measures which as such are discriminatory, or 
are applied in a discriminatory manner; disproportionate or discriminatory 
prosecution or punishment; refusal to provide judicial legal protection, leading to 
 
1038 Handbook Germany, “Dublin Procedure”, https://handbookgermany.de/en/rights-laws/asylum/dublin-
procedure.html.  
1039 BAMF Asylum Procedures supra note 1032 at 17. 
1040 Ibid at 18-19.  
1041 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “Entitlement to Asylum”, 1 October 2016, 
http://www.bamf.de/EN/Fluechtlingsschutz/AblaufAsylv/Schutzformen/Asylberechtigung/asylberechtigung-
node.html;jsessionid=B5FDF16C53BC807E0861D803C0F4BCED.2_cid368 [BAMF Asylum Entitlement]; See, 
also: Basic Law supra note 945 at art 16a.  
232 
 
disproportionate or discriminatory punishment [and] acts linked to sexuality or which 
target children.1042 
Under German law, only persecution from the State is considered for asylum applications.1043 In 
cases where the persecution was carried out by a non-State actor, Germany will only - in 
exceptional circumstances - consider granting asylum when the non-State persecution is 
attributable to the State.1044  
If the determination of refugee status is negative, then claimants may enter the appeal procedure 
and submit their appeal to a regular administrative court (Verwaltungsgericht).1045 Appeals that 
take place have ‘suspensive effect’ or ‘suspensive recourse’, meaning that for the duration of the 
appeal procedure, applicants are entitled to stay on German territory until the outcome of their 
appeal decision is made known.1046 However, in cases where it has been deemed that the asylum 
application is rejected as ‘manifestly unfounded’ or ‘inadmissible’, applicants will have one week 
to seek leave from the court to restore the suspensive effect so that they may remain on German 
territory for a determined period of time.1047  
 
1042 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “Refugee Protection”, 1 October 2016, 
http://www.bamf.de/EN/Fluechtlingsschutz/AblaufAsylv/Schutzformen/Fluechtlingsschutz/fluechtlingsschutz-
node.html.   
1043 BAMF Asylum Entitlement supra note 1041. 
1044 Ibid.  
1045 Ibid at 16.  
1046 Ibid.  
1047 Ibid.  
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There are certain procedural guarantees for those exercising their right to suspensive recourse in 
Germany.1048 For example, the asylum claimant seeking to exercise his or her suspensive recourse 
must be given the benefit of the doubt and this must be balanced against the public interest to 
deport the applicant.1049 The factors upon which to assess whether the applicant’s interest in 
remaining in the present Member State pending a decision on appeal are whether there is a lack of 
knowledge about the actual living conditions of refugees in the third country to which the applicant 
is being sent, and whether there are any negative public reports regarding such living conditions 
in the country of destination.1050 In the case where there is such a lack of knowledge of the living 
conditions and the presence of negative public reports regarding those living conditions, the 
applicant’s right to remain in the Member State where the asylum is sought will prevail.1051  
The flowchart below depicts the process of claiming asylum in Germany from registration to 
appeal:1052   
 
1048 For cases involving suspensive recourse in Germany, see: Administrative court of Potsdam, C 6L 87/16.A, 4 
February 2016; High Administrative Court, C Az.1A 11020/14, 5 August 2015; Administrative Court of Luneburg, C 
6B 64/13, 16 December 2013.  
1049 Ibid.  
1050 Ibid. 
1051 Ibid.  
1052 Adapted from: Asylum Information Database, “National Country Report: Germany”, May 2014 at 11.  
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Figure 6.1 Germany Asylum Procedures  
The next subsection discusses the current practice of non-refoulement in Germany. It demonstrates 
that Germany’s interpretation and application of non-refoulement reveals and reinforces the EU’s 
containment policies.  
6.3 Non-Refoulement in Germany 
As one of the more powerful and well-resourced Member States in the EU, and as a significant 
refugee-receiving country, Germany’s interpretation and application of the fundamental principle 
of non-refoulement sets a pattern for other EU Member States. The purpose of this section is to 
describe how Germany has interpreted the non-refoulement obligation.  
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Under German law, the principle of non-refoulement is formulated as the prohibition against 
torture, which is also found under Article 3 of the ECHR.1053 Article 3 of the ECHR is implemented 
in German law in Section 53 of the Act Concerning the Entry and Residence of Aliens in the 
Territory of the Federal Republic (Aliens Act).1054 Section 53(1) of the Aliens Act prohibits return 
to torture, which is a direct implementation of Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture.1055 
Section 53(2) prohibits expulsion to a State where the alien is sought for a crime in which the death 
penalty applies, while Section 53(4) forbids expulsion if it would be contrary to the ECHR.1056 
Obligations within the ECHR have been interpreted by various levels of court within Germany, 
including local administrative courts, the BverWG, the Federal Court of Justice, and the BverG.1057 
The EU laws on non-refoulement are implemented in Germany through several domestic laws. 
The principle of non-refoulement is codified in Section 51 of the 1990 Aliens Act  (now Section 
53(6)) which ‘forbids deportation to states where asylum-seekers’ lives or freedom would be 
threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a 
 
1053 Act Concerning the Entry and Residence of Aliens in the Territory of the Federal Republic (English Translation), 
1 January 1991, as amended, at s 53. 
1054 Ibid; (1) An alien may not be expelled to a State in which there is actual danger of his being subjected to torture. 
(2)  An alien may not be expelled to a State in which he is being sought for a criminal act and there is a risk of capital 
punishment. In such cases, the provisions on extradition will apply. (3)  Where another State has made a formal request 
for extradition, or for arrest in connection with notification of a request for extradition, the alien may not be expelled 
to that State until a decision has been made on the extradition. (4)  An alien may not be expelled if the expulsion is 
inadmissible under the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, of 4 November 
1950 (BGBl. 1952 II, p. 686). 
1055 Ibid; See, also: Bertold Huber, “The Application of Human Rights Standards by German Courts to Asylum-
Seekers, Refugees and Other Migrants”, (2001) 3 European Journal of Migration and Law 171-184 at 176 [Huber].  
1056 Ibid at s 53(2) and 53(4); Huber supra note 1055 at 176.  
1057 See, for example: Administrative Court of Oldenburg, Case No 12A 2572/15, 2 October 2015.  
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particular social group’.1058 However, the provision has been critiqued by scholars as ‘lesser 
asylum’, wherein the letter of the law protects asylum claimants from refoulement, but does not 
provide corresponding protection to asylum claimants with refugee status. Non-refoulement 
obligations found under the CEAS’ key instruments therefore bind Germany and the relevant 
provisions which protect asylum claimants from torture and cruel treatment also apply to 
Germany.1059   
It should be noted, however, that Germany has a ‘margin of discretion’ in its interpretation of the 
EU laws on non-refoulement.1060 The CJEU has recognized this discretion in the case of Germany 
v. Leifer, where it held that ‘Member States have discretion in invoking the security exception to 
Community legislation which generally bars the introduction of unilateral sanctions on third 
states’.1061 This means that, where there is a threat to public security, national authorities enjoy a 
‘scope of discretion’ adjudicating matters of EU law.1062 Other CJEU cases involving Germany 
have also recognized the ‘margin of discretion’ doctrine, as well as its limitations, including with 
respect to non-refoulement.1063 In the Case No. 21 K 3263/07.A, the Administrative Court of 
Düsseldorf, North Rhine-Westphalia, the court rejected the deportation of an asylum claimant back 
 
1058 Ausltindergesetz § 51, v. 9.7.1990 (BGB1. I S.1354, 1356), zuletzt geandert durch Art. 3 Geetz, v,15.07.93 (BGB1. 
H S.1010) [Aliens Law of July 9, 1990 as amended]; See, also: Maryellen Fullerton, “Failing the Test: Germany Leads 
Europe in Dismantling Refugee Protection” (2001) 36 Texas International Law Journal 231-275 at 266.  
1059 See, for example: Qualification Directive supra note 1 at art 15(b); See, also: EU Charter supra note 224 at art 4.  
1060 Germany v Leifer, C-83/94 [1995] ECR I-3231 [Leifer]. 
1061 Yuval Shany, “Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?” (2006) 16:5 European 
Journal of International Law 907-940 at 927.  
1062 Leifer supra note 1060 at summary.  
1063 See, for example: Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer Verlag, C-
368/95 [1997] ECR I-3689 at 3716; Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE (ERT) v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis (DEP), 
C-260/89 [1991] ECR I-2925 at 2960; Dory v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-186/01 [2003] ECR I-2479 at para 36; 
Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-285/98 [2000] ECR I-69 at 105; R v Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex 
parte Santillo, C-131/79 [1980] ECR 1585 at 1600–1611; R v Henn, C-34/79 [1979] ECR 3795 at 3818-3814.  
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to Jordan because of the risk of refoulement in that country.1064 Although Germany sought and 
received diplomatic assurances from Jordan, the court held in the case that the assurances were 
inadequate to prevent refoulement.1065 In another case regarding diplomatic assurances, the 
Administrative Court in Düsseldorf held that an asylum claimant cannot be refouled back to 
Tunisia because of the risks of torture and other ill-treatment upon return.1066 The court held that 
the diplomatic assurances guaranteed by Tunisia were ‘not legally binding […] and by nature 
hardly trustworthy or verifiable’.1067 Again, the courts recognized that Germany’s discretion does 
not extend to receiving assurances from third States that are not reliable interlocutors in terms of 
non-refoulement. Similarly, German national courts such as the Administrative Court of Hannover 
in Case No. 1 B 5946/15 held that, for cases involving humanitarian considerations, there may be 
no room for discretion by the BAMF.1068 As in the previous cases of diplomatic assurances, where 
the court has held that returning the claimant would be too risky and could potentially expose him 
or her to risks of refoulement, the court in Case No. 1 B 5946/15 took a cautious approach towards 
interpreting humanitarian cases. Humanitarian cases include cases where the individual is being 
contemplated for protection other than refugee status but on humanitarian and compassionate 
grounds. This could include, for instance, situations where the claimant may be at risk of facing 
serious harm below the threshold of non-refoulement but nonetheless requiring protection.1069 This 
 
1064 Administrative court Düsseldorf, 21 K 3263/07.A, 16 January 2009; See, also: Amnesty International, “Germany: 
Briefing to Committee Against Torture, October 2011”, Index EUR 23/002/2011 at 26.  
1065 Ibid.  
1066 Administrative Court Düsseldorf, 11 K 4716/07.A, 4 March 2009. 
1067 Ibid; This judgment was affirmed in Higher Administrative Court North Rhine-Westphalia, 17 May 2010, 11 A 
960/09 A.  
1068 European Database of Asylum Law, “Germany – Administrative Court (of) Hannover, Case No. 1 B 5946/15, 7 
March 2016”, http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/germany-administrative-court-hannover-case-no-1-b-
594615-7-march-2016.  
1069 Migration and Home Affairs, “Subsidiary Protection”, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/subsidiary-protection_en.  
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is despite the BAMF’s enjoyment of discretionary powers when applying Article 17(1) of the 
Dublin III Regulation.1070 Article 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation provides that a Member State 
of the EU may elect to examine the application of the claimant without being deemed, under the 
Dublin rules, to be the responsible Member State.1071 This provision is known as the ‘sovereignty 
clause’.1072 The potential for risks of refoulement can occur over the use of the ‘sovereignty clause’ 
due to the discretion granted to Member States to elect themselves as the responsible Member 
State. German courts have taken a broadly protective approach in such cases. 
Germany’s domestic law, therefore, reflects the broad nature of the principle of non-refoulement 
as expressed in European law. German law indicates it applies at all times to all people under a 
country’s control, as is the case under international and ECHR human rights law.1073 It also 
specifically protects asylum claimants as a group under the Aliens Act.1074 The prohibition against 
refoulement in the Aliens Act is enumerated under Section 53 on the ‘grounds for refusing to 
expel’.1075 More specifically, refoulement is prohibited unless the asylum claimant is ‘threatened 
 
1070 Administrative Court of Hannover, Case No 1 B 5946/15, 7 March 2016.  
1071 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 17(1), the relevant paragraph states: ‘By way of derogation from Article 
3(1), each Member State may decide to examine an application for international protection lodged with it by a third-
country national or a stateless person, even if such examination is not its responsibility under the criteria laid down in 
this Regulation’. 
1072 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, “The Dublin System in the First Half of 2019”, 
https://www.asylumineurope.org/news/27-08-2019/dublin-system-first-half-2019.  
1073 The exception that exists in German law prohibiting the application of the rights enshrined in the Aliens Act must 
be in accordance with established German law, see: Refworld, “Germany: Act Concerning the Entry and Residence 
of Aliens in the Territory of the Federal Republic (Aliens Act)”, 1 January 1991, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b55a0.html [Aliens Act]. 
1074 Ibid.  
1075 Ibid at s 53.  
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with criminal prosecution and punishment in another State’, which ‘will not constitute a bar to 
expulsion’.1076 
This fulsome approach within the letter of the law is not, however, always reflected in the 
interpretation of the principle by German courts, which have a mixed record in this respect. This 
is the case in two main ways: first, with respect to the question of the future-looking nature of the 
threat to life and well-being, and second, with respect to the question of undertaking Dublin 
transfers.  
As was discussed in Chapter 2, non-refoulement is understood as future-oriented in terms of the 
assessment made of the risk to harm. For instance, non-refoulement forbids the return of asylum 
claimants to territories where they may face a future risk of torture, ill-treatment or mass violations 
of human rights.1077 That said, Germany courts have narrowed the application of the future-
oriented approach. In Case No. 10 C 27.07, which concerns the interpretation of Article 28(2) of 
the Asylum Procedure Act regarding post-flight decisions which the claimant has deliberately 
made after fleeing persecution, the BverWG held that the prohibition against refoulement ‘does 
not confer any particular status on a foreigner threatened with political persecution elsewhere, but 
merely guarantees protection against deportment for the duration of the threat’ (emphasis 
added).1078 This interpretation of non-refoulement by the BverWG is a narrow one because it places 
a time limit on protecting the claimant from deportation towards a threat, whether perceived or 
real. This is contrary to international law, which considers the application of non-refoulement 
protection to be a future-oriented one, including protection from future threats that need not have 
actually occurred.1079  
 
1076 Ibid at s 53(5), which states: ‘A general risk that an alien may be threatened with criminal prosecution and 
punishment in another State and, unless otherwise determined by paragraphs 1 to 4, a specific risk of a statutory 
penalty pursuant to the laws of another State, will not constitute a bar to expulsion’. 
1077 CAT supra note 9 at art 3; ICCPR supra note 22 at arts 6 and 7; Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 33(1).  
1078 BVerWG, Judgment of 18 December 2008 – BVerWG 10 C 27.07 at para 2c [Case No 10 C 27.07]. 
1079 For instance, the prohibition against torture as considered by the CAT Committee does not consider whether the 
‘the applicant would be tortured if returned, but rather whether there are substantial grounds for believing that he or 
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On the other hand, the idea that non-refoulement protection must be guaranteed after the granting 
of international protection was affirmed in Case No. A 11 S 2151/16 of the Administrative Court 
of Justice Baden-Württemberg.1080 In that case, the Administrative Court of Justice held, regarding 
the transfer of a beneficiary of international protection to the responsible Member State, that 
effective and humane refugee protection must be guaranteed not only during the period of applying 
for international protection but also after such period.1081 This interpretation of non-refoulement 
protection is in line with relevant international refugee law.1082  
Another example of the mixed record of German courts on non-refoulement can be seen in cases 
addressing Dublin transfers. This is evident in a case involving an unaccompanied minor who 
applied for asylum in Belgium and then travelled to Germany to do the same. Germany deported 
the minor back to Belgium as the responsible State under the Dublin transfer system. The minor 
appealed in the case of Case No. 1 C 4.15. The BVerWG held that Germany was the Member State 
responsible for the processing of the asylum application and not Belgium.1083 This is based on 
three reasons. First, Germany cannot evade its responsibilities for the processing of the asylum 
application through the use of the ‘safe’ third country concept by requesting that Belgium ‘take 
back’ the applicant for processing.1084 Second, Germany is the responsible Member State for the 
 
she would be in danger of being tortured’ in Weissbrodt and Hörtreiter supra note 449 at 14; The duty of States to 
evaluate future-oriented risk includes ‘not whether a given event happened but the extent of future risk. This depends 
upon an evaluation of the evidence of the appellant’s conduct against a broad range of facts which they may interact’, 
see: Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153, [2001] UKHL 47 at para 56.  
1080 European Database of Asylum Law, “Germany – Administrative Court of Justice Baden-Württemberg, 15 March 
2017, A 11 S 2151/16”, http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/germany-%E2%80%93-administrative-court-
justice-baden-w%C3%BCrttemberg-15-march-2017-11-s-215116; Administrative Court of Justice Baden-
Württemberg, 15 March 2017, A 11 S 2151/16. 
1081 Ibid.  
1082 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at preamble. 
1083 Case No 1 C 4.15 at paras 4 and 7.  
1084 Ibid at paras 4 and 22; The CJEU has also held that mere acceptance of a request to take charge or take back of an 
applicant does not in itself result in a transfer of responsibility for the processing of an asylum application, see: CJEU, 
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processing of asylum applications in this case because Germany is the last country of presence of 
the minor applicant where he filed his asylum application.1085 Third, although Belgium is the 
Member State where the minor applicant had first filed his asylum application, Belgium cannot be 
the responsible Member State to process his claim because the minor applicant falls under special 
considerations pursuant to Article 6(2) of the (then) Dublin II Regulation.1086 In the event that there 
are competing asylum applications being made by the individual who falls under special 
considerations, for unaccompanied minors, the responsible Member State is not the Member State 
of first application, but rather, the Member State where the minor was last present where the 
application was filed.1087 In sum, the court indicated that a Member State cannot evade its 
responsibility for processing asylum applications and shift that responsibility to another Member 
State because special considerations must be in place for vulnerable persons such as 
unaccompanied minors. This is particularly the case when considerations given to unaccompanied 
minors would involve the ‘best interests of the child’ test, which precludes returns to situations 
where the child is not able to access ‘suitable care, housing, education, language support and health 
care’.1088  
 
R, on the application of MA, BT, DA v Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-648/11, 6 June 2013 [MA et 
al]; See, also: Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national, OJ L50/1, 25 February 2003 at arts 18(7) and 20(1)(d) [Dublin II Regulation]. 
1085 Ibid.  
1086 Dublin II Regulation supra note 1084 at art 6(2); See also Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 3(1).   
1087 Dublin II Regulation supra note 1086 at art 8.  
1088 EMN Focussed Study 2017, “(Member) States’ Approaches to Unaccompanied Minors Following Status 
Determination: Common Template for EMN Focussed Study 2017: Final Version”, https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/29a_norway_unaccompanied_minors_2017_en_0.pdf at 27; See, also: United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Guidelines on Determining the Best Interests of the Child”, 
https://www.unhcr.org/4566b16b2.pdf at 70, which states: ‘voluntary repatriation cannot be considered to be in the 
child’s best interests “if it would lead to a “reasonable risk” that such return would result in the violation of 
fundamental human rights of the child” (General Comment No. 6 by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
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A second case echoes the concerns raised by the applicant in the first case. In Case No. 1 C 4.16, 
the BverWG held that the Dublin III Regulation governs the responsibility for the processing of 
asylum applications lodged in an EU Member State, and Member States may only refuse an 
application as inadmissible on the grounds listed in German domestic law: Section 29(1)(5) of the 
Asylum Act. Section 29(1)(5) of the Asylum Act states: 
An application for asylum shall be inadmissible if […] in the case of follow-up 
applications pursuant to Section 71 or secondary applications pursuant to Section 
71a, another asylum application is not to be conducted.1089 
The BverWG held in the case that, pursuant to Section 71a(1) of the Asylum Act, where an 
applicant of international protection for refugee status applied unsuccessfully in a ‘safe’ third 
country before applying for asylum in Germany, Germany is deemed not responsible (through its 
domestic law) for the processing of that individual’s application.1090 Under domestic German law, 
Germany will not be responsible for a further asylum procedure involving examination of 
admissibility and a subsequent procedure of substantive examination of the merits of the 
application unless Germany is deemed the responsible Member State to process the asylum 
application pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation.1091 In this case, the applicant was an Afghan 
national who entered German territory in 2012 and applied for asylum.1092 Upon his arrival, his 
fingerprint showed up as a ‘positive hit’ in the Eurodac system, indicating that he traveled through 
Hungary before arriving to claim asylum in Germany.1093 Germany determined that he should have 
applied for asylum in Hungary but did not and requested Hungary to ‘take charge’ of the 
 
paragraph 84). Similarly, return would not be in the child’s best interests if adequate care arrangements are not 
available upon return’.  
1089 Asylum Act supra note 990 at s 29(1)(5).  
1090 Ibid at s 71a(1).  
1091 Ibid; See, also: Case No 1 C 4.16 at para 24.  
1092 BverWG 1 C 4.16, 14 December 2016 [English-Translated Version] at para 1. 
1093 Ibid at para 2. 
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applicant.1094 Hungary consented to ‘take back’ the applicant. In this case, the claimant was 
concerned that he would be exposed to a real risk of refoulement if returned to Hungary because 
of the deficient asylum system there.1095 However, the transfer was still deemed acceptable. 
Two recent cases heard by the BverG also illustrate the mixed record of German courts with respect 
to Dublin transfers and non-refoulement. In a case involving the transfer of a female asylum 
claimant from Somalia and her infant, the BverG stopped the Dublin transfer of the claimants to 
Italy.1096 Even though Italy had provided a blanket assurance in January 2019 that asylum seekers 
returned to Italy would be provided with due process and adequate living conditions, the court 
found that this was not enough in cases of very vulnerable claimants.1097 The BverG had evidence 
indicating that the mother and baby would likely be rendered homeless for a period of time on 
arrival in Italy, and without access to health care for the baby.1098 This creates peril for the baby in 
particular and amounts to a prospective violation of the baby’s fundamental rights and therefore 
the transfer must be halted.1099 The second case involved an asylum seeker from Afghanistan 
ordered to be sent by Dublin transfer back to Greece. He had registered as an asylum seeker in 
Greece before travelling on to Germany and making another asylum claim.1100 The BverG ruled 
that the transfer must be paused because of the risk of inhuman and degrading treatment in 
 
1094 Ibid.  
1095 See, for example: European Council on Refugees and Exiles, “Hungary: Dublin Transfers Suspended by 
Germany”, https://www.asylumineurope.org/news/29-08-2017/hungary-dublin-transfers-suspended-germany.  
1096 European Council on Refugees and Exiles, “Germany: Constitutional Court Strengthens Rights of Asylum Seekers 
Subject to Dublin”, https://www.ecre.org/germany-constitutional-court-strengthens-rights-of-asylum-seekers-
subject-to-dublin; BVerfG 2 BvR 1380/19; BVerG 2 BvR 721/19.  
1097 BverfG 2 BvR 1380/19 supra note 1096 at paras 5 and 21. 
1098 Ibid at para 18. 
1099 Ibid at para 27. 
1100 BVerG 2 BvR 721/19 supra note 1096 at para 1. 
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Greece.1101 The lower court decisions denying both requests to freeze the Dublin transfers can be 
contrasted with Germany’s highest court’s recognition of the dangers inherent in these transfers. 
A legal loophole exists in the Dublin III Regulation which could permit Member States to evade 
their responsibility for processing asylum applications during the use of Dublin transfers.1102 The 
legal loophole works by requiring that only one Member State be the responsible Member State to 
process asylum applications, granting Member States the option of requesting a ‘take charge’ or 
‘take back’ of an applicant, and not requiring a substantive review of an asylum application before 
making the decision to send that individual back to a third country he or she passed through which 
is deemed ‘safe’. It raises three concerns.  
First, the Dublin III Regulation requires that only one EU Member State is responsible for the 
processing of asylum applications.1103 This Member State is, pursuant to the regular Dublin 
procedure (where not falling under the special considerations criteria), the Member State where 
the applicant first lodges his or her asylum application.1104 This may make sense in terms of the 
situation of some applications, but for other applicants this may create difficulties and dangers.  
Second, under the Dublin procedures, Member States have the option of requesting a ‘take charge’ 
or ‘take back’ of an applicant where they deem another Member State to be responsible for 
processing the asylum application.1105 The rules for ‘take charge’ apply when the requirements of 
Articles 16(1)(c), (d), or (e) of the (then) Dublin II Regulation are not met, for example when a 
person has stayed in another Member State before entering the Member State in which he first 
 
1101  Ibid at paras 22 and 24. 
1102 See above cases: 1C 4.15 and 1C 4.16. 
1103 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 3(1). 
1104 Ibid. 
1105 Ibid at Chp V. 
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applied for asylum.1106 In contrast, the rules for ‘take back’ apply if one of the conditions under 
Article 16(1)(c), (d), or (e) of the (then) Dublin II Regulation is met, such as when the asylum 
applicant has already applied for asylum in another Member State.1107 Although the CJEU has held 
that the mere request of a ‘take charge’ or ‘take back’ request of a Member State is not a transfer 
of responsibility, in practice, as seen through Cases No. 1 C 4.15 and 1 C 4.16 above, the Member 
State that made such a request (including Germany) often presumes that responsibility has been 
transferred and deportations of that applicant will follow.1108  
German case law consistently holds that an applicant subjected to a Dublin transfer must have, and 
be seen to have, a right to a personal interview.1109 This interview must take into account the 
subjective circumstances of the applicant and the authorities must conclude that there are no 
obstacles to the transfer decision.1110 However, in reality, there is no consistent practice for 
interviews in Dublin procedures in Germany.1111 Compounding this is the fact that, in Germany, 
the Dublin procedures are part of admissibility assessment - meaning that, once another Member 
 
1106 Dublin II Regulation supra note 1084 at art 16(1)(c), (d) and (e); BverWG, 1 C 26.14, 17 September 2015 at para 
32; For more cases on ‘take back’ and ‘take charge’ requests in Germany, see: BverG, 1 C 22.15, 27 April 2016; 
Higher Administrative Court of Saxony, C 5 B 259/15.A, 5 October 2015; BverWG, 1 C 32.14, 1 C 33.14, 1 C 34.14, 
27 October 2015; BverWG, 1C 24.15, 27 April 2016: ‘Where a Member State responsible for carrying out the asylum 
procedure pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation, an applicant may invoke that Member State’s responsibility for 
processing his or her asylum application if it has not been positively established that another Member State is willing 
to take charge of him or her. In this case, the object and purpose of the Dublin System would require that the individual 
applicant is entitled to have his/her asylum application reviewed by the responsible Member State’. 
1107 Ibid.  
1108 MA et al supra note 1084. 
1109 Administrative Court of Düsseldorf, C 12L 4591/17.A, 26 October 2017; BverG, C 2 BvR 1795/14, 17 September 
2014; Administrative Court of Wiesbaden, C 6L 4438/17.WI, 15 September 2017; Administrative Court of Minden, 
C 10L 314/16.A, 29 March 2016; BverG, 1 C 26.14, 17 September 2015; BverWG, C 2 BvR 746/15, 30 April 2015; 
Administrative Court of Freiburg, C A 1K 3128/14, 14 January 2015. 
1110 Ibid; Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 5.  
1111 AIDA Country Report Germany supra note 1015 at 31-32.  
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State is deemed responsible for the processing of the claimant’s application, the application in 
Germany will immediately be deemed ‘inadmissible’, and the claimant transferred to the 
responsible Member State without the chance of a substantive interview.1112 This deportation will 
take place ‘as soon as it has been ascertained that the deportation can be carried out’.1113 
Third, where the asylum applicant has passed through a ‘safe’ third country, the Asylum 
Procedures Directive permits the Member State to send the applicant back to that country deemed 
‘safe’ without requiring that the sending Member State undertake an examination of admissibility 
or substantive examination.1114 Indeed, this is exactly how the German asylum process is 
structured. This creates the possibility that the applicant may be sent back to a country that is 
deemed ‘safe’ pursuant to the domestic law of the Member State, but that country may in fact be 
unsafe based on the individual circumstances of the applicant.1115  
The principle of non-refoulement is at risk of being violated in instances such as these - when 
responsibility for the processing of the asylum application is shifted elsewhere - where a proper 
examination of either the admissibility or the substance of the asylum application does not take 
place, before a decision to send the claimant back is made.  
Having indicated the law and judicial practice with respect to non-refoulement in Germany, the 
next section argues that Germany’s interpretation and application of its non-refoulement 
obligations in conjunction with the threshold on the presumption of mutual trust during Dublin 
transfers is problematic and demonstrates that the EU’s containment policies are at work in 
Germany.  
 
1112 Asylum Act supra note 990 at s 29; AIDA Country Report Germany supra note 1015 at 32.  
1113 Ibid.  
1114 Asylum Procedures Directive supra note 24 at art 38.  
1115 For an illustrative example, see: Gloria Fernández Arribas, “The EU-Turkey Agreement: A Controversial Attempt 
at Patching up a Major Problem” (2016) 1:3 European Papers 1097-1104; Recall that international law requires that 
individual circumstances be considered in establishing a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ and that an individual 
interview must be granted pursuant to Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention in expulsion situations.   
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6.4 Containment in Germany as Illustrated by the Presumption of Mutual Trust 
The presumption of mutual trust is the key to permitting Dublin transfers between Member States 
as it is the basis upon which Member States may transfer claimants from one Member State to the 
Member State deemed responsible for processing the asylum application. The presumption of 
mutual trust is an assumption that all Member States of the EU are compliant with relevant 
international and European law and this is the basis upon which claimants may be transferred from 
one Member State to another Member State without the substance of their claims examined.1116  
This section therefore details Germany’s interpretation of the presumption of mutual trust during 
Dublin transfers. It begins by comparing the interpretation by domestic German courts of the 
presumption of mutual trust against the CJEU and the ECtHR’s interpretations. It then connects 
the presumption of mutual trust as interpreted by German courts with the principle of non-
refoulement. Next, it discusses some examples of containment policies at work within the German 
domestic asylum system and ends by drawing conclusions on Germany’s interpretations of the 
principle of non-refoulement in domestic law.  
The Administrative Court of Oldenburg, 12th Chamber, discussed the presumption of mutual trust 
in Case No. 12 A 2672/15.1117 The case concerned an Iraqi national who appealed the decision of 
the BAMF to transfer him from Germany to Hungary through the Dublin transfer procedures.1118 
The Administrative Court of Oldenburg found that the transfer of the applicant from Germany to 
Hungary is contrary to Article 4 of the EU Charter as a result of there being a real risk of exposing 
the applicant to treatment substantially likely to be inhuman or degrading.1119 The applicant’s 
exposure to ill-treatment is also a result of ‘systemic flaws’ in the Hungarian asylum system and 
 
1116 Battjes supra note 842 at 10.   
1117 Administrative Court of Oldenburg, 12th Chamber, 2 October 2015, 12 A 2572/15. 
1118 EDAL Oldenburg supra note 998 at 696. 
1119 Ibid. 
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reception conditions.1120 Most notably, the Administrative Court of Oldenburg cited the ECtHR’s 
decision in M.S.S., where the ECtHR held that:  
The Court considers treatment to be “inhuman” when it was “premeditated, was 
applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense 
physical or mental suffering”. Treatment is considered to be “degrading” when it 
humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, 
his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable 
of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance.1121 
The Administrative Court of Oldenburg referred to the ECtHR’s decision in M.S.S., and in 
particular, the definitions of ‘inhuman’ and ‘degrading’ to find that the applicant would be at risk 
of inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 4 of the EU Charter.1122 In its decision, the 
Administrative Court of Oldenburg also referred to the CJEU’s decision in Puid and N.S., where 
the CJEU held: 
Member States may not transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State which the 
criteria set out in Chapter III of the Regulation indicate is responsible, where they 
cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the 
conditions for the reception of asylum seekers in that Member State provide 
substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of 
being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (emphasis added).1123 
 
1120 Ibid. 
1121 MSS supra note 308 at para 220.  
1122 EDAL Oldenburg supra note 998.  
1123 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Kaveh Puid, C-4/11, Judgment of 14 November 2013 at para 30 [Puid]; See also, 
corresponding paragraphs in NS/ME supra note 296 at paras 94 and 106.  
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In addition to the relevant paragraphs cited in M.S.S. and Puid above, the Administrative Court of 
Oldenburg held that ‘systemic flaws’:  
can be rooted in the national asylum system itself which affects asylum seekers in 
a manner that is neither accidental nor isolated and is objectively predictable or may 
arise due to an implementation of the system which in practice renders partially or 
wholly inoperable.1124 
It has also been held by the Administrative Court of Minden that ‘systemic flaws’ are: 
structural, significant malfunctions that may be rooted in any stage of the asylum 
procedure. According to the court, the personal experiences of the Applicant are 
irrelevant to assessing systemic flaws, however, they must be taken into account in 
the context of the overall assessment (emphasis added).1125 
The Administrative Court of Minden’s interpretation of ‘systemic flaws’ seems to contradict the 
ECtHR’s ‘individual assessment’ criterion. The Administrative Court of Magdeburg, Chamber, 
regarded ‘systemic deficiencies’ to require that: 
the asylum procedure or the terms of reception conditions in the member state 
concerned are regularly so deficient that it may be presumed that there is a 
considerable likelihood that the person seeking asylum is at risk of suffering from 
inhuman or degrading treatment.1126 
 
1124 EDAL Oldenburg supra note 998.  
1125 European Database of Asylum Law, “Germany – Administrative Court of Minden, 2 October 2015, Case No. 10 
L 923/15.A”, http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/germany-administrative-court-minden-2-october-2015-
case-no-10-l-92315a.  
1126 European Database of Asylum Law, “Germany – Administrative Court of Magdeburg, Chamber, 26 January 2016, 
Case No 8 A 108/16”, http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/germany-%E2%80%93-administrative-court-
magdeburg-chamber-8-26-january-2016-8a-108-16.  
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The Administrative Court of Magdeburg deviated from the well-cited threshold established by the 
Committee Against Torture in deciding whether the claimant would be at risk of being subjected 
to torture as defined in Article 1 of the CAT, by using the threshold of ‘considerable likelihood’, 
rather than ‘substantial grounds for believing’.1127 While there may not be a universal 
understanding or definition of ‘considerable likelihood’, the Committee Against Torture has 
proposed a number of non-exhaustive questions as relevant for determining what constitutes 
‘substantial grounds for believing’.1128 This is important because the threshold for the asylum 
claimant to establish ‘substantial grounds for believing’ is essential for determining whether the 
claimant is at risk of being exposed to torture upon return.  
The presumption of mutual trust is connected with responsibility-sharing in the CEAS. The 
presumption is the basis upon which Dublin transfers are premised: responsibility-sharing in the 
EU is based on the reciprocal concept that, in order to share responsibility, there must be mutual 
trust among the Member States.1129 In fact, the entire Dublin System is based on the presumption 
that all Member States in the EU are safe countries which ‘[respect] the principle of non-
refoulement [and] are considered safe countries for third country nationals’.1130 
 
1127 CAT Committee, “General Comment No. 1: Communications concerning the return of a person to a State where 
there may be grounds he would be subjected to torture (article 3 in the context of article 22)”, UN Doc A/53/44, annex 
IX at 52 (1998) at para 1. 
1128 Ibid at para 8: ‘(a) Is the State concerned one in which there is evidence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant 
or mass violations of human rights (see article 3, pare. 2)? (b) Has the author been tortured or maltreated by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity in 
the past? If so, was this the recent past? (c) Is there medical or other independent evidence to support a claim by the 
author that he/she has been tortured or maltreated in the past? Has the torture had aftereffects? (d) Has the situation 
referred to in (a) above changed? Has the internal situation in respect of human rights altered? (e) Has the author 
engaged in political or other activity within or outside the State concerned which would appear to make him/her 
particularly vulnerable to the risk of being placed in danger of torture were he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited 
to the State in question? (f) Is there any evidence as to the credibility of the author? (g) Are there factual inconsistencies 
in the claim of the author? If so, are they relevant?’. 
1129 Battjes supra note 842 at 2.2. 
1130 Ibid. 
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Responsibility-sharing in the context of Germany’s non-refoulement obligations also entails 
following one of the core aims of the Dublin System, which is to ‘set up clear, workable and fair 
criteria for responsibility so as to guarantee that the persons concerned have rapid and effective 
access to a substantive review’.1131 The intent and purpose of the Dublin System also call for ‘a 
general effect protecting the individual’ and to prevent ‘the situation of [a] ‘refugee in orbit’’.1132 
Other cases in German domestic jurisprudence also demonstrate the tensions between the CJEU 
and ECtHR’s tests on assessing whether an applicant may be able to rebut a decision to have him 
or her transferred to the Member State responsible for processing the asylum application.1133 These 
series of cases illustrate that Germany follows the CJEU approach in determining whether an 
applicant’s transfer decision should be rebutted. For example, the German domestic case law 
suggests that there is a pattern for determining whether a Dublin transfer of the applicant may be 
permissible is whether there are ‘systemic deficiencies’ or ‘systemic flaws’ in the asylum 
procedure and reception conditions, which would put the applicant at a serious risk of suffering 
inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the EU Charter and Article 3 
of the ECHR.1134 The standard upon which to evaluate whether a Dublin transfer would result in 
‘systemic flaws’ is based on a standard of ‘substantive grounds for believing’ whether the transfer 
would result in a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 4 of the EU Charter or Article 3 of the 
ECHR.1135 The assessment involves asking whether the ‘systemic flaws’ within the asylum system 
 
1131 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at recitals 4 and 5.  
1132 BVerWG, Judgment of 27 April 2016 – BVerWG 1 C 24.15 at para 2.3 [Case No 1 C 24.15]; The term ‘refugee 
in orbit’ means the situation where a refugee is in legal limbo - turned away from his or her country of origin yet at 
the same time not received in the country of asylum. 
1133 Administrative Court of Hannover, C 10A 5157/15, 5 November 2015; Administrative Court of Oldenburg, C 12A 
2572/15, 2 October 2015; Administrative Court of Düsseldorf, C 22L 2944/15A, 3 September 2015; Administrative 
Court of Düsseldorf, C 12L 4591/17.A, 26 October 2017; Administrative Court of Aachen, C Az. 8K 658/15.A, 17 
November 2015. 
1134 Ibid.  
1135 Ibid. 
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of the Member State in question would pose a real risk of infringement of Article 4 of the EU 
Charter.1136  
By analogy, the Committee Against Torture jurisprudence also sheds light on the tensions between 
‘systemic deficiencies’ and ‘individual assessments’ tests when deciding on Article 3 of the CAT. 
Recall from the Committee Against Torture jurisprudence that the risk of ill-treatment or 
prohibition against torture is a personal one, meaning that the test for determining whether an 
individual would be at risk of being subjected to torture is an assessment about whether the 
complainant would be ‘personally at risk’.1137 This means that, for the complainant to defend the 
allegation against the State that he or she would be subjected to torture if returned, the threshold 
is on ‘a foreseeable, real and personal risk’ standard.1138 At the same time, where ‘a consistent 
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights’ exists in the destination country, such 
a pattern is indicative of the possibility or even probability of torture.1139 However, it has also been 
held by the Committee Against Torture that even the existence of such a pattern of gross, flagrant 
or mass violations of human rights may not, in the specific case of the complainant, amount to 
torture for that particular complainant.1140 Therefore, taking into account the Committee Against 
Torture’s assessment of the application of Article 3 of the CAT by States Parties, the Committee 
seems to side in favour of an ‘individual assessments’ test rather than a ‘systemic deficiencies’ 
test. In other words, when assessing whether Article 3 of the CAT is engaged, whether the risk of 
torture is particularized for the individual is of more concern to the Committee than whether the 
risk of torture is a systemic one in the destination country.  
This section discussed Germany’s approach when interpreting the threshold to rebut the 
presumption of mutual trust to prevent a Dublin transfer. It also demonstrated that the presumption 
 
1136 Ibid. 
1137 Committee Against Torture, MAK, 5 May 2004, UN Doc CAT/C32/D/214/2002 [MAK].  
1138 Ibid.  
1139 Ibid.  
1140 Ibid.  
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of mutual trust is linked with responsibility-sharing within the CEAS, as the Dublin System is 
premised upon mutual trust among Member States in the allocation of responsibility for processing 
asylum applications. However, the tensions between the CJEU and the ECtHR’s interpretations of 
the threshold to rebut the presumption of mutual trust are not resolved by Germany’s domestic 
jurisprudence. Unlike the UK, Germany does not have a new approach to interpreting the threshold 
to rebut the presumption; instead, Germany seems to agree with the CJEU’s test of ‘systemic 
deficiencies’. Lastly, the Committee Against Torture’s observations were also drawn upon to 
compare and contrast the international standard with the CJEU and Germany’s domestic approach 
to the threshold to rebut the presumption of mutual trust. In sum, German jurisprudence is mixed 
on non-refoulement protections. The fact that there is no clear baseline protection in practice in all 
circumstances - including, and perhaps especially, with respect to Dublin transfers - is concerning.  
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
As demonstrated in this chapter, Germany’s non-refoulement obligations entail an understanding 
of Germany’s asylum system as it is situated in the CEAS. Regular administrative courts of 
Germany, through their cases, have interpreted and applied EU law and ECHR law relevant to 
assessing the scope of non-refoulement.1141 Case law of Germany’s administrative courts have 
shown the tendency to sometimes interpret non-refoulement obligations narrowly, including 
deciding that non-refoulement obligations would apply only during the ‘duration of a threat’.1142 
Based on all of the positive case law that is covered above, a pattern emerges indicating that many 
German courts adopt a broad interpretation of non-refoulement. The mixed nature of the cases with 
negative decisions at the administrative and lower court levels did not adopt as wide a view of 
non-refoulement as do other courts. Intrinsically linked to this evaluation of non-refoulement 
obligations is the presumption of mutual trust and Germany’s interpretation of this presumption. 
Unlike the UK courts, the administrative courts of Germany consistently agree with the CJEU’s 
approach of ‘systemic deficiencies’ in assessing whether the presumption of mutual trust is 
 
1141 See, for example: Case No 10 C 27.07.  
1142 Ibid; As non-refoulement is customary international law, it binds all States and is applicable wherever a State 
exercises jurisdiction.  
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rebuttable.1143 Responsibility-sharing in Germany, therefore, reveals a narrower interpretation of 
non-refoulement obligations as well as a discrepancy with UK and ECHR jurisprudence in the 
interpretation of the threshold for rebutting the presumption of mutual trust.1144  
The first part of this chapter examined German refugee law, including its relation to international 
and European law. The Basic Law is the supreme law of the land in Germany and provides for the 
‘primacy of international law’, which integrates international law as an integral part of federal 
German law. The Asylum Act is the main legislation that codified the ‘right of asylum’ for 
foreigners. It provides for the definition of a ‘refugee’, the ‘safe’ third country concept, and the 
possible outcomes in a refugee status determination procedure. The BAMF is responsible for 
making decisions on asylum applications. These decisions may be appealed to the regular 
administrative courts and the BverWG or the BverG depending on whether the question is an 
administrative or constitutional one.  
The second part of this chapter examined the procedures for claiming asylum in Germany. First, 
it explained the procedures for applicants to qualify for international protection. Next, it discussed 
the procedures for applicants to be granted or have their international protection withdrawn. 
Finally, it ended with outlining the reception conditions for applicants of international protection.  
The third part of this chapter examined Germany’s non-refoulement obligations. It was 
demonstrated through case law that many German courts’ interpretation of its non-refoulement 
obligations is twofold. First, these courts seem to have a more liberal reading of non-refoulement 
law than UK; Second, the case law on the interpretation of the principle suggests that the mixed 
jurisprudence requires fine-tuning for a more streamlined, consistent approach to interpreting the 
norm.  
The final part of this chapter reviewed evidence of containment theory at work in Germany. It 
detailed Germany’s interpretation of the presumption of mutual trust in Dublin transfers. It ended 
with examples of containment policies in the German domestic asylum system and explained how 
 
1143 See, for example: Administrative Court of Minden, 2 October 2015, Case No. 10 L 923/15.A. 
1144 For a deeper analysis, see the UK Chapter. 
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a legal loophole within the Dublin III Regulation permits Member States such as Germany to evade 
their responsibility to process asylum applications and shift that responsibility elsewhere, which 
further reinforced the idea that the CEAS is premised upon the EU’s containment policies. 
This chapter provides important context for the final chapter of this thesis, which compares the 
national cases between the UK and Germany as well as provides an analysis on the future direction 
of non-refoulement within the EU. That chapter proposes adopting a new framework that would 
enhance interpretations of non-refoulement protection and ends with an analysis of the 
implications of this finding, including predictions for the future direction of non-refoulement in 
the international refugee law regime.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion: Protecting Non-Refoulement 
7. Introduction 
This thesis has focused on what has been described as the ‘paradox’ at the heart of refugee law 
and policy: the disjuncture between the commitments made by EU Member States to a robust 
understanding of asylum rights, including non-refoulement, and the actual implementation of these 
commitments as narrowed and constrained through containment efforts.1145 This thesis has 
intentionally taken a wide lens - from the international to the domestic, from legal 
conceptualization to actual practice - in examining the norm of non-refoulement. Each chapter 
provided elucidation on an aspect of the understanding of non-refoulement.  
Chapter Two explained the origins and sources of international refugee law, including a brief 
history of the treaty negotiations which took place in the drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
resulting in the present-day Article 33(1) on non-refoulement protection. It explained the 
subsequent dual life of the non-refoulement norm, existing simultaneously in international refugee 
law and international human rights law. In refugee law, non-refoulement protection benefits both 
asylum claimants and refugees, while in human rights law, its scope is widened to include 
protection from torture for everyone. Under refugee law, the principle of non-refoulement is not 
guaranteed to everyone without limits. For instance, those who have been deemed to be a danger 
to the community of the country of refuge do not benefit from non-refoulement protection. 
However, this exception does not exist in international human rights law as the prohibition against 
torture protects everyone regardless of their legal or political status. Within both international 
refugee and human rights law, the principle applies both territorially as well as outside of the 
territories of a State, including over persons or areas where the State can exercise its ‘effective 
authority and control’.  
 
1145 Dallal Stevens and Maria O’Sullivan, ‘States, the Law and Access to Refugee Protection: Concluding Reflections’, 
in in Maria O’Sullivan and Dallal Stevens (eds) States, the Law and Access to Refugee Protection: Fortresses and 
Fairness (Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2017) at 297 [Stevens].  
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Under EU law, the principle of non-refoulement is found under the EU Charter, the Dublin III 
Regulation, as well as key directives, and largely reflects international refugee law’s approach. 
However, with the application of ECHR law, the principle is codified under Article 3 as the 
prohibition against torture. This means that the law on non-refoulement within Europe is quite 
robust, reflecting the simultaneous application of both international refugee law and international 
human rights law approaches. That said, the actual practice with respect to this norm has been the 
opposite: constrained and contained. This is explored further in Chapters Three and Four. 
Chapter Three explained the EU law applicable to the principle of non-refoulement, including its 
multi-layered aspects. It also examined how two European courts - the ECtHR and the CJEU - 
have interpreted and applied the prohibition against refoulement. The legislative and 
jurisprudential picture that emerged confirmed what had been indicated in Chapter Two: that non-
refoulement is a relatively robust norm under European law. However, this chapter also indicated 
that the actual practice of some EU Member States has been to adopt a narrower understanding of 
non-refoulement, one that is limited through domestic interpretation as a result of the ‘margin of 
discretion’ allowed to Member States when transposing directives, and limited through the 
presumption of mutual trust when transferring asylum claimants to other (‘responsible’) States.  
Chapter Four described the theory of containment, derived from the fields of human and spatial 
geography and migration studies. Containment through migration control seeks to control, divide, 
and discipline ‘unruly’ migration (as perceived by states) – that is, migration in which migrants 
try to manage where they seek asylum. Techniques to identify and select migrants by categorizing, 
partitioning, and channeling them serve as methods to dominate and constrain the ‘disobedience’ 
of migrants. While rarely applied within public international law and specifically international 
refugee law, the theory of containment holds particular significance as an explanatory theory for 
these fields. The theory suggests that policies of containment are methods used by EU Member 
States to circumvent their international refugee law and human rights law obligations. It also 
provides the underlying rationale for violations of non-refoulement by EU Member States. In other 
words, containment theory provides a rationale for the gaps between the fulsome statements of 
non-refoulement law in, for example, treaties and the actual interpretation and application of that 
law through policies within the EU. These gaps were illustrated through explanations of Dublin 
transfers, ‘safe’ third country agreements, the interception of asylum seekers prior to reaching 
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Europe, migrant tracking, narrow interpretations of the Refugee Convention, and deterrence 
policies. The chapter concluded that, while containment may be facilitated by law, containment 
occurs not because of the law itself, but because of the policies and practices around the application 
of that law.  
Chapter Five on the United Kingdom examined the domestic law and procedures for claiming 
asylum in the UK, including how applicants for international protection for refugee status qualify 
for international protection, how their international protection is granted or withdrawn, and the 
points in the system during which the possibilities of refoulement are considered. It also explored 
how the principle of non-refoulement has been interpreted in the UK in a narrow, restrictive 
manner, particularly with respect to the presumption of mutual trust and the burden placed on the 
claimant to rebut that presumption.  
Chapter Six on Germany examined domestic German refugee law, including on non-refoulement, 
and the procedures for claiming asylum in Germany. German legislation appears to have a more 
liberal reading of non-refoulement than the UK, but the mixed jurisprudence suggests that the 
application of non-refoulement requires fine-tuning for a more streamlined, consistent approach to 
interpreting the norm. The final part of this chapter reviewed evidence of containment theory at 
work in Germany, including Germany’s interpretation of the presumption of mutual trust in Dublin 
transfers.  
The purpose of this chapter is to reiterate the centrality of non-refoulement as a cardinal principle 
of refugee protection, and to analyze changes that should be made within the CEAS to better 
conform to that principle. In other words, this chapter aims to reduce the disjuncture between the 
law of non-refoulement and the practice of that law. This discussion begins with a focus on the 
domestic level, comparing the UK and Germany’s practices on non-refoulement, particularly ‘safe’ 
third country concepts and Dublin transfers. It then considers recommended changes at the 
regional level that would help to align the expansive norm on non-refoulement with the actual 
application of the principle at the domestic and regional levels.  
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7.1 Situating Non-Refoulement within the Domestic: Comparing UK and German 
Practices 
In order to consider improvements to the system that would better protect against refoulement, this 
section compares and contrasts the practices of the UK and Germany on the ‘safe’ third country 
concept and Dublin transfers. These practices are the focal point of this chapter because they 
evidence containment policies in both countries which have the potential to undermine non-
refoulement protection when misused - and, as shown in Chapters Five and Six, case law has 
demonstrated that this has, in fact, occurred in the past. In particular, the misuse of these concepts 
can occur when the substance of the claimant’s application is not examined prior to returning him 
or her back to a third country deemed ‘safe’. Another way that these concepts can be misused is 
when an EU Member State relies upon a blanket declaration that the responsible Member State is 
in compliance with relevant international and European law obligations, or blanket assurances to 
this effect, in order to return a claimant via a Dublin transfer without an individualized assessment 
of whether this is correct vis-à-vis the claimant. 
This section therefore begins by explaining how the UK and German practices on ‘safe’ third 
country concepts are similar and different. Then, it explores and compares the UK and German 
practices on Dublin transfers. This method of comparison between the UK and Germany on the 
‘safe’ third country concept and Dublin transfers reveals implications for the future of non-
refoulement in the region. 
Both the UK and Germany have different domestic asylum procedures for determining whether an 
asylum claimant may be removed to a third country deemed ‘safe’ based on their legislation. For 
the UK, in order to initiate the ‘safe’ third country procedure, first the Third Country Unit of the 
UK Visas and Immigration division must certify that the asylum claimant came from a ‘safe’ third 
country.1146 A ‘safe’ third country is a country which the UK has deemed to be safe and is listed 
 
1146 See, for example: Esmaiel Mohammed Pour et al v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWHC 
401 (Admin) [Pour]; Asylum Information Database, “Safe Third Country: UK”, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/united-kingdom/asylum-procedure/safe-country-concepts/safe-
third-country.  
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in the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004.1147 This Act lists all EU 
Member States (except Croatia), Norway, Iceland and Switzerland.1148 Additionally, other 
countries can be designated as ‘safe’ on a case-by-case basis, such as Canada and the United 
States.1149 Once the Secretary of State for the Home Department has certified that the asylum 
claimant has come from a ‘safe’ third country and that the claimant’s application is therefore 
‘clearly unfounded’,1150 the applicant may be removed to the third country deemed ‘safe’ unless, 
‘on a legitimate view of the facts, a tribunal properly directing itself could conclude that there were 
substantial grounds for believing that the return of [the claimant] to [the third country] would 
involve a real risk of a flagrant breach of [Article 3 of the ECHR] or a flagrant breach of other 
relevant rights applying [the ECtHR] jurisprudence’.1151 Where a tribunal finds that there are 
substantial grounds for believing that removing the claimant to a third country deemed ‘safe’ 
would expose him or her to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR, such a removal is not 
 
1147 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act, 2004 c 19. 
1148 Ibid at Schedule 3 Part 2. 
1149 Asylum Information Database, “Safe Third Country: United Kingdom”, 
https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/united-kingdom/asylum-procedure/safe-country-concepts/safe-
third-country. 
1150 Under the procedure to determine whether an individual asylum claimant may be removed to a ‘safe’ country of 
which he or she is not a national, the Secretary of State for the Home Department must certify that such a claim is 
‘clearly unfounded’ under paragraph 5(4) of Part 2 of Schedule 3 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of 
Claimants etc.) Act 2004 c 19; In order to prove that an asylum application is ‘clearly unfounded’, the caseworker 
must be satisfied that the claim cannot, on any legitimate view, succeed: United Kingdom, Home Office, “Certification 
of Protection and Human Rights Claims under Section 94 of Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly 
unfounded claims): Version 4.0”, 12 February 2019 at 11. Under the guidance notes issued by the Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, caseworkers may consider that an asylum application is ‘manifestly unfounded’ where: the 
claim is so clearly without substance that it is bound to fail, and it is possible to declare an asylum application to be 
‘manifestly unfounded’ even where ‘it takes more than a cursory look at the evidence to come to a view that there is 
nothing of substance in it’: Ibid; See, also: Ex Parte Thangarasa and Ex Parte Yogathas [2002] UKHL 36 [Ex P 
Thangarasa]; ZL and VL v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 25. 
1151 Esmaiel Mohammed Pour supra note 1142 at paras 26 and 169. 
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permitted as being contrary to the ECHR.1152 In other words, the UK’s certification system acts as 
a double-check that claimants will be able to properly access the asylum system in the ‘safe’ third 
State. 
For Germany, once an asylum claimant has applied for asylum at the border or at an international 
airport and it has been established that the claimant has passed through a ‘safe’ third country on 
his or her way to Germany, the claimant will be removed without any further assessment.1153 The 
individual’s asylum application will not be considered and that individual will not be granted 
asylum.1154 However, exceptions to this general rule may be permitted where the claimant fits 
within one of three grounds: first, when the claimant has a residency permit in Germany at the 
time he or she entered the ‘safe’ third country; second, when Germany is deemed to be the 
responsible Member State pursuant to the Dublin III Regulation or an international treaty with the 
‘safe’ third country; and third, when the claimant has not been refused entry or removed pursuant 
to a Section 18(4) No. (2) order by the Federal Ministry of the Interior on humanitarian grounds, 
for reasons of international law, or in the political interests of Germany.1155  
 
1152 Ibid at para 9. 
1153 See, for example: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “Entitlement to Asylum”, 1 October 2016, 
http://www.bamf.de/EN/Fluechtlingsschutz/AblaufAsylv/Schutzformen/Asylberechtigung/asylberechtigung-
node.html [Entitlement to Asylum]. The ‘safe’ third country concept is applicable where the asylum claimant has 
passed through a ‘safe’ third country on the way to Germany, has arrived at Germany, and makes an asylum request 
at the border: Asylum Information Database, “Safe Third Country: Germany”, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/asylum-procedure/safe-country-concepts/safe-third-
country.  
1154 Asylum Information Database, “Safe Third Country: Germany”, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/asylum-procedure/safe-country-concepts/safe-third-
country; See also: Asylum Act (Federal Law Gazette, p 1798), 2 September 2008, last amended by Article 2 of the 
Act of 11 March 2016 (Federal Law Gazette I, p 394) at s 26a. 
1155 Ibid at s 26a(1). 
262 
 
Germany’s Asylum Act defines all EU Member States as well as non-EU countries such as Norway 
and Switzerland as ‘safe’ third countries.1156 This blanket designation means that there is no 
individualized evaluation to determine whether that individual will be safe upon return to those 
countries. This raises the risk that onward refoulement may occur when the individual is returned 
to one of these countries deemed ‘safe’.1157 In this respect, the UK provides a stronger safeguard 
against refoulement through its certification process, which Germany lacks. Germany does have 
some protections, however: German law indicates that asylum claimants cannot receive protection 
from a third country when that country is either not listed as ‘safe’ third country or there is not 
sufficient information to determine whether it is ‘safe’.1158 This means that Germany will not return 
claimants to third countries where there is insufficient information about the third country.  
Both the UK and Germany incorporate ‘safe’ third country lists into their domestic legislation. 
These ‘safe’ third country lists are lists of countries which are deemed to be ‘safe’ under the 
domestic law of both the UK and Germany and, as such, are destinations predetermined to be ‘safe’ 
to which claimants may be sent to on arrival in the UK or Germany. For the UK, the determination 
of whether a third country is deemed to be ‘safe’ is based on a determination of whether that 
countries’ domestic asylum procedures comply with the UK’s criteria under Rule 345C of the 
Immigration Rules.1159 The text of Rule 345C states: 
A country is a safe third country for a particular applicant if: (i) the applicant’s life 
and liberty will not be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion in that country; (ii) the 
principle of non-refoulement will be respected in that country in accordance with the 
Refugee Convention; (iii) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to 
 
1156 Ibid; Asylum Act supra note 990 at Annex I. 
1157 Ibid. 
1158 Entitlement to Asylum supra note 1153. 
1159 United Kingdom, Home Office, “Inadmissibility: EU Grants of Asylum, First Country of Asylum and Safe Third 
Country Concepts: Version 2.0”, 15 October 2018 at 12. 
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freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in 
international law, is respected in that country; (iv) the possibility exists to request 
refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with 
the Refugee Convention in that country; (v) there is a sufficient degree of connection 
between the person seeking asylum and that country on the basis of which it would 
be reasonable for them to go there; and (vi) the applicant will be admitted to that 
country.1160 
Criterion (v) on ‘sufficient degree of connection’ is further defined under the Immigration 
Rules:1161 to determine whether an applicant has the requisite ‘sufficient degree of connection’ 
with the third country deemed ‘safe’ for removal, the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
must be satisfied that he or she has spent time in the third country, has relationships with citizens 
or habitually resident non-citizens of the third country, or has other close family ties or cultural or 
ethnic connections with the third country.1162 The significance of the ‘sufficient degree of 
connection’ rule cannot be understated, as, although not required under international law, without 
such a connection, it would become unreasonable and unsustainable for a person to claim asylum 
in the third country.1163 The UNHCR is of the view that having a ‘sufficient degree of connection’ 
with the third country increases: 
 
1160 Ibid. 
1161 Ibid at 345D: ‘In order to determine whether it is reasonable for an individual to be removed to a safe third country 
in accordance with paragraph 345C(v), the Secretary of State may have regard to, but is not limited to: (i) any time 
the applicant has spent in the third country; (ii) any relationship with persons in the third country which may include: 
a. nationals of the third country; b. non-citizens who are habitually resident in the third country; c. family members 
seeking status in the third country; (iii) family lineage, regardless of whether close family are present in the third 
country; or (iv) any cultural or ethnic connections’. 
1162 Ibid. 
1163 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Legal considerations regarding access to protection and a 
connection between the refugee and the third country in the context of return or transfer to safe third countries”, April 
2018 at para 6 [STC Legal Considerations]. 
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the viability of the return or transfer from the viewpoint of both the individual and 
the state. As such, it reduces the risk of irregular onward movement, prevents the 
creation of ‘orbit’ situations and advances international cooperation and 
responsibility-sharing.1164 
The UNHCR cautions, however, that transfers to third countries should be ‘aimed at enhancing 
burden- and responsibility-sharing and international/regional cooperation, and not be burden 
shifting’.1165 
For Germany, the determination of whether a third country is deemed ‘safe’ is based on a set of 
criteria established by the BverG in a 1996 landmark decision.1166 In the decision in Case No. 2 
BvR 1938/93, the BverG held that the ‘safe’ third country rule in the Basic Law and the German 
domestic Asylverfahrensgesetz (Asylum Procedure Act) is compatible with the Basic Law.1167 The 
BverG relied upon a newly-created concept of ‘normative establishment of certainty’ (normative 
Vergewisserung), according to which whether a third country is deemed ‘safe’ is based on criteria 
set by legislators.1168 This presumption of ‘safety’ in third countries does not need to be 
individually rebuttable nor is it possible for claimants to challenge it.1169 This judgment is 
problematic: it essentially permits the return of asylum claimants to third countries even though 
 
1164 Ibid; See, also: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, EXCOM Conclusion No 87 (L), 1999 at para 
I: ‘asylum seekers and refugees must be [treated] in accordance with the highest possible standards of protection’.  
1165 STC Legal Considerations supra note 1163 at para 6. 
1166 2 BvR 1938/93. 
1167 “Five Case Abstracts” (1997) 9:2 International Journal of Refugee Law 292-307 at 293 [Five Cases]. 
1168 Ibid at 294. 
1169 Ibid; Note that the a non-rebuttable presumption of safety for ‘safe’ third countries may mean that the 
constitutional ‘right to asylum’ in German law does not extend to an asylum claimant who comes to Germany through 
a ‘safe’ third country and that such a person therefore does not have access to an asylum procedure in Germany. 
However, after BverG’s 1996 decision, the APD including its recast has come into place, meaning that Germany must 
aim to achieve the goals set out in the APD. 
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there is no opportunity to rebut the presumption of safety or to review the grounds which determine 
whether a third country is ‘safe’.1170 Additionally, access to asylum procedures within Germany is 
denied to these claimants.1171 
The practice of the UK with respect to ‘safe’ third countries clearly reveals two key points of 
divergence from the practice of Germany. First, the UK has a certification system in place that acts 
as a double-check that claimants will be able to access the asylum system in the ‘safe’ third state, 
and Germany does not. Second, the UK has a cumulative list that is considered when designating 
countries as ‘safe’, which includes consideration of whether the claimant has a ‘sufficient degree 
of connection’ with the third country. Germany’s blanket approach to designation precludes this 
consideration.1172   
While the UK’s certification process provides an additional safeguard that Germany does not 
possess, it should be pointed out that it does not necessarily provide complete protection against 
refoulement. As noted by Foster in a compelling analysis, an evaluation of whether or not a third 
country is ‘safe’ must - under international refugee law - consider three factors. First, ‘the sending 
state must be satisfied that the third (receiving) State has an adjudication procedure in place to 
assess refugee status’ and that this procedure is ‘adequate’.1173 The UK certification procedure 
considers this through application of Rule 345C(iv), set out above. Second, ‘the third (receiving) 
state must guarantee access to that system for refugees in question: thus, for example, the sending 
 
1170 2 BvR 1938/93 
1171 Five Cases supra note 1167 at 293-294. 
1172 European Commission, “The Law and Practice on Safe Country Principles Against the Background of the 
Common European Asylum System and the Goal of a Common Asylum Procedure: Final Report”, DG JAI-
A2/2002/04 at 97, which states: ‘In Germany, the criteria for a ‘sufficient link’ are to be found in case law: It is not 
necessary to prove from which particular country the applicant came from, as long as the third country is a listed 
country. The main criterion in this respect seems to be whether there is a reasonable opportunity to submit the case to 
the third country’ [Law and Practice].  
1173 Michelle Foster, “Responsibility Sharing or Shifting? “Safe” Third Countries and International Law” (2008) 25:2 
Refuge, 64-78 at 70 [Foster]; Michelle Foster is a well-known refugee law scholar.  
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state must ensure that refugees are not barred from the system by procedural rules or other 
impediments’.1174 It is not prima facie obvious from legislation or practice that this evaluation 
forms a standard part of the UK’s certification process, though UK case law has considered the 
actual ability of claimants to access the third country’s asylum system.1175 Third, ‘the sending state 
must be satisfied that the receiving state interprets the Refugee Convention in a manner that 
respects the “true and autonomous meaning” of the definition in Article 1 of the Convention’.1176 
This means that, if a person is likely to be recognized as a refugee in the UK but, due to significant 
differences in interpretation, is unlikely to be recognized as such in the third state, then ‘the sending 
state is prohibited from transferring the applicant to the third state’.1177 This requirement has been 
recognized by UK courts as serving as part of the UK’s analysis.1178 While this analysis indicates 
that the UK’s process reflects best practices, as identified by Foster, there is an area of concern 
related to the UK’s method of assessment. An individualized assessment of the risk of refoulement 
is required1179 - something more than an ‘initial assessment’1180 - but, as described in Chapter 5, 
the UK asylum procedures preclude a truly individualized assessment because the ‘safe’ third 
country determination occurs prior to the substantive interview phase. Therefore, the UK’s 
 
1174 Ibid. 
1175 See, for example: EM (Eritrea), where the Court of Appeal stated that ‘the situation in Italy is in no way 
comparable to that of Greece and that a general ban on returns to Italy cannot be justified’; With regards to returns to 
Greece and Hungary, returns under the Dublin III Regulation has been suspended as a result of the ‘systemic 
deficiencies’ in those countries, see, for example: AIDA UK Report 2019 supra note 818 at 34. 
1176 Foster supra note 1173 at 71. 
1177 Ibid at 71. 
1178 R. (Yogathas) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 A.C. 920 at para 9; See also: R. (ex parte 
Adan) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 A.C. 477; (2001) 2 W.L.R. 143. 
1179 Foster supra note 1173 at 71-72. 
1180 Ibid at 72 
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certification process is not based on a substantive understanding of the claimant’s case.1181 As the 
individualized assessment does not consider enough facts, the full story has not been gathered yet 
from the claimant during this stage in the procedure.  
There is another concern with the UK’s practice: the lack of monitoring of an individual’s outcome 
after transfer to the third state. The lack of proper post-transfer monitoring in the UK is evident in 
the judgment of Ex Parte Thangarasa. In the case, Lord Bingham of Cornhill was of the opinion 
that: 
the Home Secretary and the courts should not readily infer that a friendly sovereign 
state which is party to the Geneva Convention will not perform the obligations it 
has solemnly undertaken. This consideration does not absolve the Home Secretary 
from his duty to inform himself of the facts and monitor the decisions made by a 
third country in order to satisfy himself that the third country will not send the 
applicant to another country otherwise than in accordance with the convention 
(emphasis added).1182 
Furthermore, in Adan and Aitsegur, the UK Court of Appeal held that, unless the Secretary of State 
for the Home Department can be satisfied that ‘the third country would apply the Refugee 
Convention’s “international meaning” or “core values” then he could not return asylum seekers to 
 
1181 See, for example: AIDA UK Report 2019 supra note 821 at 17, which states: ‘Potential safe third country cases 
are referred to the third country unit of the Home Office, which decides whether to issue a certificate initiating a return 
to a safe third country, including to another EU Member State in the context of the Dublin Regulation. In this case the 
claim is not substantively considered in the UK. This decision can only be challenged by judicial review, an application 
made to the Upper Tribunal, which can only be made with permission of that tribunal.10 Judicial review proceedings 
do not consider the merits of a decision, but only whether the decision maker has approached the matter in the correct 
way’.  
1182 Ex P Thangarasa supra note 1150 at para 9; Lord Bingham goes on to state that: ‘the [Geneva] convention is 
directed to a very important but very simple and very practical end, preventing the return of applicants to places where 
they will or may suffer persecution. Legal niceties and refinements should not be allowed to obstruct that purpose. It 
can never, save in extreme circumstances, be appropriate to compare an applicant's living conditions in different 
countries if, in each of them, he will be safe from persecution or the risk of it’.  
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that country as a safe country’.1183 In contrast with the UK, in order to be eligible to be considered 
as a safe country on Germany’s ‘safe’ third country list, German law requires that the country be 
a signatory to and have ratified the Refugee Convention and the ECHR.1184 However, it is unclear 
how Germany ensures that these countries considered ‘safe’ are in fact observing their 
international law obligations as required under these international instruments.1185 
The practice of the UK and Germany with respect to Dublin transfers also differs. For the UK, the 
procedure involves a separate consideration by the Third Country Unit, which is a unit housed 
within the UK Visas and Immigration division that also considers ‘safe’ third country procedures 
for claimants who have passed through a third country deemed ‘safe’ before entering the UK to 
claim asylum.1186 For Germany, the Dublin procedure is part of the admissibility assessment 
conducted in the regular procedure.1187  
For the UK, once the Dublin transfer case has been transferred from the National Asylum 
Allocation Unit to the Third Country Unit for determination, the Third Country Unit will consider 
whether the Secretary of State for the Home Department should decline to examine the asylum 
claim substantively before issuing a ‘safe third country’ or ‘asylum’ certificate under Schedule 3 
of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.1188 In considering whether 
 
1183 Adan and Aitsegur [1999] 3 WLR 1569; Law and Practice supra note  at 99, which states: ‘the Secretary of State 
owed a duty under the then section 2(2)(c) of the AIA to examine the practice in the third country to ensure that it was 
consistent with the Convention’s true interpretation. There was a margin of discretion by the signatory States in their 
application of the Refugee Convention, but a signatory had to apply the Refugee Convention, whose very purpose was 
to offer international protection to people falling within objectively defined classes’.  
1184 Law and Practice supra note 1172 at 99. 
1185 Ibid.  
1186 AIDA UK Report supra note 818 at 26; United Kingdom, Home Office, “Dublin III Regulation: Version 1.0”, 2 
November 2017 at 22. 
1187 AIDA Country Report Germany supra note 1015 at 29. 
1188 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act [2004] Ch 19 at Schedule 3. 
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there are any family members present in a Dublin State, the caseworkers rely on the asylum 
claimant to show that they have family connections in those Member States.1189 
For Germany, the Dublin procedure is part of the admissibility assessment as part of the regular 
procedure.1190 When an asylum claimant is apprehended at the border by the border police, and 
where there is an indication that another Member State may be responsible for carrying out the 
examination of the asylum application, the border police will inform the Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees (BAMF).1191 The Dublin procedure is then carried out by the BAMF, 
which has the power to issue a deportation order as a result of the Dublin procedure.1192 The border 
police is then tasked with the forcible return of the asylum claimant or have the option of requesting 
a detention order from a court if it is deemed that the asylum applicant is a flight risk.1193 
In comparing how Member States designate a third country as ‘safe’, under German law, the 
designation of a third country as ‘safe’ is done by way of a predetermined list.1194 The claimant 
may challenge the designation of the third country as ‘safe’ by taking the matter to the BverG 
 
1189 The Dublin States cover 32 countries – The ‘Dublin countries’ are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Solvenia, Spain, Sweden, UK and 4 countries 
‘associated’ with the Dublin system: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein in UK Visas and Immigration, 
“Asylum Claims and the Dublin Regulations”, 29 December 2014, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/asylum-claims-and-the-dublin-regulations.  
1190 AIDA Country Report Germany supra note 1015 at 29. 
1191 Ibid. 
1192 Ibid. 
1193 Ibid. 
1194 Law and Practice supra note 1172 at 40, which states: ‘EU member states are qualified by the Basic Law itself, 
art. 16a (2) GG. Additional safe countries are specified by an Act of Parliament in accordance with art. 16a (1) of the 
Basic Law (§ 26a (2) Annex I AsylVfG). These provisions aim at giving effect to standards laid down in the Geneva 
Convention and the ECHR’. 
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through a constitutional challenge.1195 The designation itself is made through an Act of Parliament 
in accordance with Article 16a(1) of the Basic Law.1196 In the UK, the designation of a third 
country as ‘safe’ is only challengeable by way of judicial review under Section 80 of the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002).1197 In the UK, ‘safe’ third countries are 
designated as ‘safe’ countries to which asylum claimants can be returned to through the Dublin III 
Regulation which provides a mechanism for determining which Member State is responsible for 
determining the asylum application.1198 Further, a claimant can challenge the legality of the ‘safe’ 
third country transfer on the grounds of his or her individual circumstances.1199 
The chart below summarizes the similarities and differences between the ‘safe’ third country and 
Dublin transfer procedures in the UK and Germany outlined above: 
 
 
 
UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY 
  ‘Safe’ Third Country Concept 
1. Competent 
Authority 
- Third Country Unit - BAMF 
2. Certification 
Procedure 
- ‘A tribunal directing itself properly could conclude that there 
were substantial grounds for believing that the return of the 
claimant to Cyprus would involve a real risk of a breach of 
Article 3, or a flagrant breach of other relevant rights applying 
[ECtHR] jurisprudence’ (Esmaiel Mohammed Pour et al. v. 
SSHD [2016] EWHC 401 (Admin), para 26) 
- Claimants can be sent back to 
‘safe’ third countries with neither 
an asylum application, nor an 
application for international or 
national protection being 
considered 
 
1195 Basic Law supra note 945 at art 93.  
1196 Ibid at art 16a(1), which states: ‘Persons persecuted on political grounds shall have the right of asylum’.  
1197 Law and Practice supra note 1172 at 76; This section of the Act has been repealed by section 33(3)(a) of the 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimant, etc.) Act 2004 where Schedule 3 maintains a list of countries known 
to protect refugees and to respect human rights (‘safe’ third country list). 
1198 Law and Practice supra note 1172 at 76.  
1199 Ibid at 77; See, also: Adan and Aitsegur (i.e. ‘Country X is not a safe third country because it does not interpret 
the 1951 Convention in an acceptable manner’).  
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3. ‘Safe’ Third 
Country List  
- All EU Member States (except Croatia) as well as Norway, 
Iceland and Switzerland 
- All EU Member States as well as 
Norway and Switzerland 
  Dublin Transfer 
1. Legal Basis  - Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 - Asylum Act (Asylgesetz) 
2. Interview - Yes (Art 5 Dublin III Regulation) - Yes, but no consistent practice 
(Art 5 Dublin III Regulation) 
3. Interview 
Factors 
- Family details in the UK and other Dublin States 
- Travel routes taken on the way to UK 
- Previous asylum claims 
- Travel routes of the claimant on 
the way to Germany 
- Existence of relatives in 
Germany 
4. Competent 
Authority 
- Third Country Unit - ‘Dublin division’ of the BAMF 
5. Certification 
Procedure 
- ‘Safe’ Third Country or Asylum certificate 
(Schedule 3 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of 
Claimants) Act 2004) 
  
- Border police may initiate 
removal procedure immediately to 
a ‘safe’ third country if an asylum 
claimant is apprehended at the 
border without necessary 
documents 
6. Unaccompanied 
Minors  
- Best interests of the child considerations - Conducted by special officers 
- No specific training for special 
officers dealing with vulnerable 
groups 
7. Take Charge 
Requests 
- As quickly as possible and within 3 months from the date 
which the application for asylum was lodged in UK 
  
- Starts from the moment that a 
Member State becomes aware of 
an asylum claimant’s intention to 
apply for asylum 
- Where the Member State fails to 
submit a request within the time 
limits defined in DRIII, this 
Member State becomes 
responsible for carrying out the 
procedure 
(CJEU, Case C-670/16, 
Mengesteab, 26 July 2017) 
8. Take Back 
Requests 
- As quickly as possible and within 2 months of receiving a 
fingerprint ‘hit’ on the Eurodac 
- As quickly as possible and within 3 months of the date 
which asylum claim was lodged in the UK 
Table 7.1 Comparing United Kingdom and German Practices  
The two examples above illustrate that different states – in this case, the UK and Germany – take 
different approaches to implementing the ‘safe’ third country concept and Dublin transfers, 
therefore creating gaps at different points of the process which raise the risk of refoulement, such 
as the lack of substantive personal interviews prior to the decision on transfer. As raised in previous 
chapters, this is an example of the exercise of the ‘margin of discretion’, but also of the lack of a 
cohesive and comprehensive approach to the practice within the EU to protecting against 
refoulement. The next section considers how these gaps and differences might be remedied within 
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countries throughout the EU (and the UK, despite its impending separation from the European 
asylum system).  
7.2 The Future of Non-Refoulement Protection in International Refugee Law 
EU Member states have codified a fulsome understanding of the principle of non-refoulement in 
regional treaty and domestic laws. At the same time, the EU is following a policy of 
‘extraterritorialization’ as a form of containment, in its ‘attempts to regulate migration flows’.1200 
El-Anany has characterized EU practices in reinforcing external border controls to counteract 
migrant movement as ‘one of the greatest exclusionary projects of today’.1201 The reliance of EU 
countries on migration control methods such as ‘safe’ third country or Dublin transfers 
demonstrate attempts by Member States to shift their responsibility for processing asylum 
applications elsewhere - outside of the EU (to, for example, Turkey), and within the EU 
(particularly to countries on the Mediterranean Sea boundary of the EU, such as Greece and 
Italy).1202 While the transfer of applicants within or outside of the EU is not in itself a violation of 
international law, it is a violation of international law when a Member State evades its 
responsibility to process asylum applications without any or with few procedural safeguards to 
ensure that claimants are not at risk of onward refoulement. These ongoing patterns of evading 
responsibility for processing asylum applications through reliance on ‘safe’ third country concepts 
are not only found within the EU: they can also be seen internationally, including in offshore 
processing practices in Australia, and in the Safe Third Country Agreement signed between 
 
1200 Tom de Boer and Marjoleine Zieck, “The Legal Abyss of Discretion in the Resettlement of Refugees: Cherry-
Picking and the Lack of Due Process in the EU” (2020) 32:1 International Journal of Refugee Law 54-85 at 56 [Boer]. 
1201 Nadine El-Enany, ‘Asylum in the Context of Immigration Control: Exclusion by Default or Design?’ in Maria 
O’Sullivan and Dallal Stevens (eds), States, the Law and Access to Refugee Protection: Fortresses and Fairness (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford: 2017) 29 at 34. 
1202 See, for example: European Council, “Statement of the EU Heads of State or Government, 07/03/2016”, 8 March 
2016, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/08/eu-turkey-meeting-statement.  
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Canada and the United States.1203 This is incredibly concerning: it means that there are likely 
asylum claimants being sent back from EU countries to persecution and torture. 
This thesis therefore proposes four main ways to address and to counteract containment policies 
in order to strengthen the implementation of the non-refoulement norm: strengthening procedural 
guarantees in order to ensure access to asylum justice; reshaping the determination of mutual trust; 
re-evaluating the use of diplomatic assurances in transfer cases; and the implementation of periodic 
review coupled with a judicial review mechanism. Each proposal is explained and evaluated in 
turn.  
7.2.1 Strengthening Procedural Guarantees 
The first recommendation for strengthening implementation of the fulsome legal understanding of 
non-refoulement is the addition or reinforcement of procedural safeguards where they are currently 
limited or do not exist. The question of access to due process in this manner has ‘not been 
sufficiently discussed in the literature’, but yet is fundamental to increasing ‘access to asylum 
justice’.1204 The procedural safeguards that require fortification are those aimed at ensuring that 
claimants received individualized attention to their specific situations and concerns at key 
junctures. Individualization is built into refugee status determination, which is based on assessing 
the individual’s circumstance and the subjective fear faced by the person fleeing persecution.1205 
 
1203 See, generally: Daniel Ghezelbash, Refuge Lost: Asylum Law in an Interdependent World (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018); Offshore processing and non-refoulement obligations was further explored in: Jenny Poon, 
“Non-Refoulement Obligations in Offshore Detention Facilities”, E-International Relations Blog, 16 October 2018, 
https://www.e-ir.info/2018/10/16/non-refoulement-obligations-in-offshore-detention-facilities.  
1204 The term ‘access to asylum justice’ was introduced by O’Sullivan and Stephens: Maria O’Sullivan and Dallal 
Stevens, ‘Access to Refugee Protection: Key Concepts and Contemporary Challenges’ in Maria O’Sullivan and Dallal 
Stevens (eds), States, the Law and Access to Refugee Protection: Fortresses and Fairness (Hart Publishing, Oxford: 
2017) 3 at 20 [O’Sullivan and Stevens, ‘Access’]. The lack of scholarly focus on access to due process is discussed 
by Dallal Stevens and Maria O’Sullivan, ‘States, the Law and Access to Refugee Protection: Concluding Reflections’ 
in Maria O’Sullivan and Dallal Stevens (eds), States, the Law and Access to Refugee Protection: Fortresses and 
Fairness (Hart Publishing, Oxford: 2017) 297 at 298 [Stevens and O’Sullivan, ‘Concluding Observations’]. 
1205 UNHCR Handbook supra note 36 at para 11. 
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In the Hirsi ECtHR judgment, Judge Albuquerque clearly and cogently articulated basic 
requirements of individualization in a fair asylum process: 
(1) a reasonable time-limit in which to submit the asylum application, (2) a personal 
interview with the asylum applicant before the decision on the application is taken, 
(3) the opportunity to submit evidence in support of the application and dispute 
evidence submitted against the application, (4) a fully reasoned written decision by 
an independent first-instance body, based on the asylum seeker’s individual 
situation and not solely on a general evaluation of his or her country of origin, the 
asylum seeker having the right to rebut the presumption of safety of any country in 
his or her regard, (5) a reasonable time-limit in which to appeal against the decision 
and automatic suspensive effect of an appeal against the first-instance decision, (6) 
full and speedy judicial review of both the factual and legal grounds of the first 
instance decision, and (7) free legal advice and representation and, if necessary, 
free linguistic assistance at both first and second instance, and unrestricted access 
to the UNCHR or any other organisation working on behalf of the UNHCR.1206 
Under Judge Albuquerque’s approach, implementing individualization at various points in the 
asylum system - through a personal interview, the opportunity to personally respond to evidence, 
the receipt of a decision taking into account the claimant’s personal situation, and assistance by 
experts - assists in preventing refoulement. Individualization requires States to evaluate the 
individual situation of the claimant at various stages in enough depth to understand the nature of 
the claimant’s fear of return to his or her original state or to a third State. This includes informing 
the claimant of any adverse information.1207  
These individualized procedural safeguards must be implemented from the earliest point at which 
a state becomes liable for non-refoulement. While this would usually be at the border or when an 
individual applies for asylum in-country, this could be as early as at the point of interdiction of a 
boatload of presumptive asylum seekers at sea (before these individuals explicitly make an 
 
1206 Judge Albuquerque in Hirsi ECtHR, separate opinion, at 75. 
1207 O’Sullivan and Stephens, ‘Access’, supra note 1204 at 25. This is part of ‘procedural fairness’: ibid. 
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application for international protection).1208 At any of these points of contact, under EU law 
individuals must be proactively informed of the ability to submit reasons as to why they fear 
refoulement if transferred to a third country or their country of origin.1209 The problem is not the 
law, which requires an individualized procedural safeguard at the point of first contact to protect 
against refoulement. Rather, as been argued throughout this thesis, the problem is in the gap 
between the law and its implementation: as Pollet observes, ‘the gap between legal safeguards in 
the law and the actual practice at the borders could not be greater’.1210 
The procedural safeguards can and should take several forms: for example, requiring that claimants 
have access to information on how and where to apply for international protection, including 
protection against refoulement;1211 requiring that claimants have access to information about the 
Member State deemed responsible in Dublin transfer cases or the third state in ‘safe’ third country 
 
1208 Hirsi supra note 231; also Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
May 2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation 
coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union, at Article 4: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/ALL/?uri=celex:32014R0656; and , Kris Pollet, ‘Accessing Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures in the 
EU: Legal Safeguards and Loopholes in the Common European Asylum System’ in Maria O’Sullivan and Dallal 
Stevens (eds), States, the Law and Access to Refugee Protection: Fortresses and Fairness (Hart Publishing, Oxford: 
2017) 137 at 141 [Pollet]. 
1209 As Pollet notes, this obligation stems from a number of sources, including Articles 3 and 13 of the ECHR, under 
which, ‘as soon as a person comes within the jurisdiction and effective control of an EU Member State, authorities are 
bound by their obligation to ‘proactively’ ensure compliance with the principle of non-refoulement’, Pollet supra note 
1208 at 143-144; See also Hirsi Jamaa: there must be a procedure made available to persons intercepted at sea under 
which they ‘obtain sufficient information to enable them to gain effective access to the relevant procedures and to 
substantiate their complaints’: Hirsi supra note 231 at para 204. 
1210 Pollet, supra note 1208 at 144. 
1211 Ibid at 147-148. 
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transfers, and the ability to submit refoulement concerns prior to decisions on transfers;1212 and 
access to a quality personal interview and an accurate record of that interview.1213  
Of these procedural safeguards, access to a quality personal interview is absolutely central to an 
individualized process, as such an interview provides the information necessary for countries to 
make an informed evaluation on the risk of refoulement. The centrality of personal interviews to a 
fair asylum process is already recognized in Article 14(1) of the EU’s Asylum Procedures 
Directive (recast): ‘Before a decision is taken by the determining authority, the applicant shall be 
given the opportunity of a personal interview on his or her application for international protection 
with a person competent under national law to conduct such an interview’.1214 This requirement 
applies both with respect to decisions on admissibility and decisions on the substance of the 
claimant’s application.1215 The individuals conducting the personal interviews must be properly 
 
1212 As Pollet notes, this means that anyone who is likely to register an asylum claim (police authorities, border guards 
and immigration authorities) must receive the necessary training and instructions to inform applicants of the procedural 
safeguards: Pollet supra note 1208 at 151. 
1213 Pollet supra note 1208 at 154-158. Another procedural safeguard is access to well-researched and supported 
country of origin and third country information. Access to current and reliable country of origin information is 
important because it is used by claimants to support their individual claim of a well-founded fear of persecution under 
the definition of ‘refugee’ and any fears of refoulement if returned. It is also used by decision-makers to assess the 
credibility of the claimant’s application: Pollet supra note 1208 at 152-153. Country of origin and third country 
information comes from sources such as the European Asylum Support Office, UNHCR and ‘relevant international 
human rights organizations’: Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) at art 10(3)(b). Decision-makers must protect the 
fact that the claimant has made an asylum application, so as to ensure that agents of persecution in the country of 
origin do not take actions that ‘would endanger the applicants’ or his or her dependents’ or family members’ safety 
and physical integrity’: Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) at art 30. 
1214 Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) supra note 24 at art 14(1).  
1215 Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) supra note 24 at arts 14(1) and 34(1), which states: ‘Member States shall 
allow applicants to present their views with regard to the application of the grounds referred to in Article 33 in their 
particular circumstances before the determining authority decides on the admissibility of an application for 
international protection. To that end, Member States shall conduct a personal interview on the admissibility of the 
application’. 
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trained and competent.1216 The interviews must be conducted by a same-sex interviewers and 
interpreter where possible, in a child-friendly manner, and taking into account the claimant’s 
cultural origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or vulnerabilities.1217 During the 
interview, the claimant must be able to clarify his or her statements, to ensure that the record is as 
accurate as possible, and either a transcript or a ‘thorough and factual report containing all 
substantive elements’ must be made of the personal interview.1218  
Personal interviews are clearly vitally necessary in order to properly assess a claimant’s 
admissibility and the substance of his or her application to determine if there are refoulement 
concerns, but the Asylum Procedures Directive 2005 - the version prior to the current recast version 
- permitted Member States to avoid personal interviews in a wide range of circumstances 
(including that the person was from a ‘safe’ country of origin or a ‘safe’ third country).1219 There 
are Member States not currently bound by the recast Asylum Procedures Directive, and there are 
Member States not conducting personal interviews at the admissibility or substantive decision 
stages, raising serious concerns about how such states could make informed decisions on the risk 
of refoulement to that individual.1220  
 
1216 Ibid at arts 4(1) and 4(3). 
1217 Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) supra note 24 at art 15(3)(c), which states: ‘select an interpreter who is able 
to ensure appropriate communication between the applicant and the person who conducts the interview. The 
communication shall take place in the language preferred by the applicant unless there is another language which he 
or she understands and in which he or she is able to communicate clearly. Wherever possible, Member States shall 
provide an interpreter of the same sex if the applicant so requests, unless the determining authority has reasons to 
believe that such a request is based on grounds which are not related to difficulties on the part of the applicant to 
present the grounds of his or her application in a comprehensive manner’. 
1218 Asylum Procedures Directive (recast) supra note 24 at art 17. This is important, as a number of EU Member States 
use small inconsistencies in these statements as a reason to deny asylum: UNHCR, ‘Beyond Proof – Credibility 
Assessment in EU Asylum Systems (May 2013) at 164, https://www.unhcr.org/51a8a08a9.pdf. 
1219 Asylum Procedures Directive 2005 supra note 24 at art 12(2)(c). 
1220 One of the concerns expressed by the ECtHR in the MSS case is that Belgium did not provide any chance for 
claimants to explain why they should not be transferred to another EU country (where they fear refoulement): MSS 
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An example of a State not fulfilling the personal interview requirement is Germany, which lacks 
a consistent practice of requiring an interview with claimants identified for Dublin transfers before 
a removal decision is made.1221 This is despite the requirement under EU law and specifically 
under the Dublin III Regulation that an interview must take place prior to an applicant being 
subjected to a Dublin transfer.1222 As EU law provides the common minimum standards with which 
all EU Member States are to comply, and a ‘regulation’ under EU law is binding in its entirety on 
Member States, Germany’s inconsistent practice in interviewing Dublin returnees is 
problematic.1223 Inconsistency in interviewing Dublin returnees makes access to asylum justice for 
those who are being contemplated for return inequitable: there is individualization for some, and 
not for others.1224 As well, inconsistency in interviewing Dublin returnees means that some 
applicants are able to exercise their right to be heard while others are not, which is contrary to 
Article 32(2) of the Refugee Convention, regulating expulsion of claimants: 
except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee 
shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be 
represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or persons 
specially designated by the competent authority.1225 
 
supra note 304 at para 351; Asylum Information Database, ‘Not There Yet: An NGO Perspective on Challenges to a 
Fair and Effective Common European Asylum System’ (Annual Report 2012-2013) at 57-58.  
1221 AIDA Country Report Germany supra note 1015 at 31-32. 
1222 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at art 5.  
1223 European Union, “Regulations, Directives and other acts”, 7 March 2019, https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-
law/legal-acts_en.  
1224 Access to justice means ‘having a case heard in a court of law’ in European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
“Access to Justice”, https://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/access-justice; EU Charter supra note 45 at art 47. 
1225 Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 32(2); Note that this provision is applicable in cases of expulsion of a 
refugee lawfully in the territory of the country of asylum. 
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Similarly, in making a ‘take back’ or ‘take charge’ request1226 to another EU Member State for a 
Dublin transfer, Germany presumes that responsibility for the applicant has already transferred 
and that deportation of the applicant will then occur without providing the applicant with a 
substantive review.1227 The lack of substantive review means that the claimant has no chance to 
rebut any allegations against him or her.1228 Germany is therefore an example of a state where 
procedural guarantees should be strengthened in order to permit greater individualization of the 
Dublin transfer process, so individuals identified for transfer can express any fears of either direct 
or indirect refoulement and therefore take steps to appeal the transfer.  
Stevens and O’Sullivan identify two branches of access to asylum justice. The first branch is the 
one just discussed: providing claimants with access to quality asylum procedures,1229 including 
access to quality personal interviews. The second branch is providing claimants with access to 
territory, whether by removing unnecessary physical impediments (such as fences and interdiction 
at sea) or by removing unnecessary legal roadblocks.1230 The fact that the CEAS provides for 
certain legal impediments to access to territory has been discussed throughout this thesis, 
particularly with respect to Dublin transfers and ‘safe’ third country transfers. These impediments 
include the threshold for claimants to rebut a Dublin transfer, and the use of diplomatic assurances 
to facilitate ‘safe’ third country transfers, explored in more detail in the next subsection. 
 
 
1226 A ‘take back’ request refers to a request by the sending Member State to the Member State responsible to ‘take 
back’ the applicant who has withdrawn the application under examination or whose application has been rejected and 
who has made an application in another Member State. A ‘take charge’ request refers to a request by the sending 
Member State to the Member State responsible to ‘take charge’ of the applicant who has lodged an application in a 
different Member State, see: Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at chp V.  
1227 MA et al supra note 1084. 
1228 The Refugee Convention provides that refugees must be guaranteed a right to be heard in the case of expulsions 
and to answer the case against him or her, see: Refugee Convention supra note 7 at art 32(2). 
1229 Stevens and O’Sullivan, ‘Concluding Observations’, supra note 1204 at 297. 
1230 Ibid at 297-298. 
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7.2.2 Reshaping the Presumption of Mutual Trust 
Within the CEAS, the presumption of mutual trust is the presumption that EU Member States are 
‘safe’ destinations to which claimants can return, as explained in Chapter Three. The premise 
underlying the presumption of mutual trust is that EU Member States all have asylum systems that 
are compliant with EU fundamental rights. However, as discussed in previous chapters, not all EU 
Member States are, in fact, compliant with EU refugee law.1231 Despite this, the courts of Member 
States place the onus on claimants, rather than the EU Member State wishing to transfer the 
claimant, to rebut the presumption of mutual trust in order to successfully challenge a Dublin 
transfer. This subsection discusses ways in which the presumption of mutual trust can be 
reshaped1232 in order to promote access to asylum justice for claimants and increased compliance 
with the principle of non-refoulement by EU Member States. 
As outlined in Chapter Three, two European courts have diverged on the threshold to rebut the 
presumption of mutual trust. First, in 2011, the CJEU in N.S. held that the test for determining 
whether an asylum claimant has met the threshold for rebutting the presumption of mutual trust to 
prevent removal via Dublin transfers is demonstration of ‘systemic deficiencies’ in the receiving 
country’s asylum system.1233 In the same year, the ECtHR in M.S.S. referred to the CJEU’s 
judgment in N.S., but instead of following the CJEU’s ‘systemic deficiencies’ test, it established 
its own test of ‘individual assessments’.1234 For the first test of ‘systemic deficiencies’, the onus is 
upon the asylum claimant to prove that the presumption of mutual trust can be rebutted where there 
are ‘systemic deficiencies’ in the asylum procedures and reception conditions of the Member State 
 
1231 Juss has critiqued this assumption, arguing that the Dublin system is ‘still anchored in the mind-set of colonial 
Europe. It assumes that every area in Europe – from Sicily in the south to Scandinavia in the north – is a safe territory 
for a refugee to access protection once he or she gets there’: Satvinder S. Juss, ‘The Post-Colonial Refugee, Dublin II, 
and the end of non-refoulement’ (2013) 20 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights at 310. 
1232 Vicini argues for reshaping the presumption of mutual trust, albeit in a different way than proposed here: Vicini 
supra note 518. 
1233 NS/ME supra note 296 at para 86. 
1234 MSS supra note 308. 
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receiving the claimant.1235 For the second test of ‘individual assessments’, the ECtHR instead took 
the view that the particular circumstance and situation faced by the individual claimant at the 
moment in time when he or she is being contemplated for transfer back to the responsible Member 
State should be the proper test.1236 The CJEU and ECtHR have therefore established different 
approaches in interpreting the threshold to rebut the presumption of mutual trust in the cases of 
M.S.S. and N.S. The ‘systemic deficiencies’ test, in fact, creates a higher, more ‘restrictive’ 
threshold for a claimant to meet in order to rebut the presumption of mutual trust.1237 This is 
because only the ‘presence of major operational problems’, as opposed to individual human rights 
violations, can serve to rebut the presumption of mutual trust.1238 This approach was further 
entrenched within the CJEU in subsequent case law.1239 In contrast, the ECtHR has reconfirmed 
its ‘individual assessments’ approach in Tarakhel.1240  
The UN Committee Against Torture has also entered the debate, indicating that the threshold to 
rebut the presumption of mutual trust should be based on an individual’s real risk of facing torture 
upon return, which aligns with the ECtHR’s approach of the ‘individual assessments’ test.1241 The 
standard of protection envisioned by both the Committee Against Torture and the ECtHR entails 
the examination of an applicant’s individual and subjective risk to torture.1242 When the applicant 
is able to prove, on an ‘arguable case’, that he or she may be subjected to a real risk of torture upon 
 
1235 Ibid.  
1236 Ibid.  
1237 Vicini supra note 584 at 57. 
1238 Ibid at 60, interpreting para 85 of NS/ME supra note 296. 
1239 Abdullahi v Bundesasylamt [2013] CJEU at para 62, confirming that the assessment of the claimant’s individual 
situation is not necessary or sufficient to rebut the presumption of mutual trust; and Puid [2013].   
1240 Tarakhel supra note 528 at para 59. 
1241 Administrative Court of Magdeburg, Case No. 8 A 108/16, 26 January 2016. 
1242 Ibid; MSS supra note 308.  
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return based on ‘individual risk’ or ‘individual assessments’, the presumption that the EU Member 
State is in compliance with relevant international and European law is rebutted.1243  
Clearly, the test of ‘systemic deficiencies’ is not individualized, unlike the ‘individual 
assessments’ threshold, and has been critiqued for this reason as violating fundamental human 
rights and the individualization approach of the Refugee Convention. Vicini has argued that the 
‘individual assessments’ approach is more widely protective of the principle of non-refoulement 
because the application of Article 3 of the ECHR (under which non-refoulement falls) is triggered 
in the presence of an individual risk, while the ‘systemic deficiencies’ approach does not 
automatically trigger Article 4 of the European Charter (under which non-refoulement also 
falls).1244 In other words, the ECtHR’s approach to the threshold to rebut the presumption against 
mutual trust creates a lower test for non-refoulement protection, and less of a barrier for the 
claimant.1245 Under the ‘systemic deficiencies’ approach, non-refoulement prohibits any removal 
from an EU Member State to another EU Member State where there are ‘systemic deficiencies’ 
that make it highly likely that the claimant may be exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment 
upon return.1246 This interpretation of the non-refoulement principle for claimants is narrower in 
scope than returns to any territory where ‘substantial grounds for believing’ that a real risk of 
torture would occur.1247  
 
1243 Ibid. 
1244 Vicini supra note 518 at 65. 
1245 Ibid at 66. 
1246 Ibid.   
1247 This test as created by the CJEU in Abdullahi referring to Article 4 of the EU Charter is narrower in scope than 
the ECHR’s Article 3 because the former refers only to removal which does not require the presence of an individual 
risk, see: Vicini supra note 518 at 64-65. 
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Some scholars also argue that ‘by requiring the standard of a “systemic deficiency” to be met, 
individual suffering, or local, non-institutionalized abuse of power loses its relevance’.1248 Further 
to the lack of clarity and consistency of the legal threshold of ‘systemic deficiency’, scholars have 
contended that, by creating a legal standard of ‘systemic deficiency’, ‘a hierarchy of suffering [is 
created and only the] suffering of some asylum seekers and refugees is recognised as grievable’.1249  
This lack of consistency between the interpretations of the two regional European courts 
essentially forces Member States to exercise their ‘margin of discretion’ at the domestic level.1250 
Some have selected between the two approaches, choosing the higher-threshold approach as 
Germany did,1251 or adopting a compromise approach, as was done in the UK.1252 Given that this 
 
1248 Eliana Barrera and Friederike Vetter, “‘Systemic Deficiency’: Legal Standard Setting, Human Rights, and Its 
Effect on the Individual in the Common European Asylum System” SPECTRA Journal, 
https://spectrajournal.org/articles/10.21061/spectra.v2i2.210.  
1249 Ibid; The authors go on to discuss the E.M. case, in which the appellants would be exposed again to their previous 
suffering if their grievances are not seen to be caused by ‘systemic deficiencies’.   
1250 For a discussion of the ‘margin of discretion’ or ‘margin of appreciation’ in international law, see generally: Yuval 
Shany, “Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?” (2006) European Journal of 
International Law 907-940. 
1251 The Administrative Court of Minden in Germany ruled against the test of ‘individual assessments’ established by 
the ECtHR and instead agreed with the CJEU’s test of ‘systemic deficiencies’: Administrative Court of Minden, Case 
No. 10 L 923/15.A, 2 October 2015. Adopting the approach of the CJEU rather than the approach of the ECtHR means 
that the individual circumstances of the applicant is not the focal point of the requirement to rebut the presumption of 
mutual trust. Instead, the CJEU approach focuses on determining whether there are deficiencies, of a systemic kind, 
in the asylum procedures and reception conditions of the destination Member State for the applicant. 
1252 The UK has combined the approach of both the CJEU and the ECtHR in the judgment of E.M. and M.A.: EM/MA 
supra note 532 at para 39. In that case, the UK Court of Appeal held that rebutting the presumption of mutual trust 
requires both an assessment of ‘systemic deficiencies’ and ‘individual assessments’: Ibid. While the UK approach to 
the threshold for rebutting the presumption of mutual trust incorporates both ‘systemic deficiencies’ and ‘individual 
assessments’, it is not yet a best practice as a result of the requirement to prioritize individual circumstances in refugee 
status decision-making: Ibid; See, also: UNHCR Handbook supra note 36. 
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margin is wide, Member States have adopted inconsistent approaches, some with weaker 
procedural protections, thereby increasing the possibility of refoulement.  
What is the solution for the lack of consistency regarding the threshold the claimant must meet to 
rebut the presumption of mutual trust? The solution is three-fold. First, there should be a uniform 
assessment within the EU for the presumption of mutual trust - a standard which either adopts the 
individualized ECtHR test as more consistent with the individualized nature of refugee 
determination, or that harmonizes the tests established by the ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence in 
a manner providing some individualization.1253 Second, the presumption of mutual trust should be 
reversed so that the presumption is one that is against its use rather than for its use.1254 The 
presumption against its use means that the Member State deemed not responsible for the 
processing of the asylum application will be required to actively evaluate, in its decision to send 
the claimant to the responsible Member State, whether that Member State is in fact in compliance 
with its international and European law obligations.1255 Third, the presumption of mutual trust 
should be a rebuttable presumption where the burden of proof must be upon the sending Member 
 
1253 Koen Bovend’Eerdt, “The Joined Cases Aranyosi and Caldararu: A New Limit to the Mutual Trust Presumption 
in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice?” (2016) 32:83 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 
112-121 at 118. 
1254 See Stefano Montaldo, “On a Collision Course! Mutual Recognition, Mutual Trust and the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in the Recent Case-Law of the Court of Justice” (2016) 1 European Papers 3, 965-996 at 978-
980. 
1255 MSS supra note 308 at paras 352 and 358. 
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State, rather than the claimant, to discharge.1256 A corollary of this is that the sending state would 
have the obligation to evaluate future risks to the claimant when deciding upon transfer.1257  
While this threefold approach would radically change the current application of the presumption 
of mutual trust, ‘shifting the burden of proof onto the national authorities […] seems fair especially 
where it concerns the implementation of the Dublin system, as a decision to transfer an asylum 
seeker to another Member State falls completely outside the control or influence of the asylum 
seeker’.1258 As Brouwer argues, this approach ‘seems justified to require the transferring state to 
substantiate that this transfer does not violate the fundamental rights of the asylum seeker’ when 
the state, but not the claimant, may be aware of the systemic and rights-depriving problems in the 
asylum procedure and reception conditions in the receiving State.1259 An alternate expression of 
this is that there is no ‘equality of arms’ between claimants and the sending state: shifting the onus 
to the sending state simply helps to equalize the information available, assisting in the evaluation 
of the non-refoulement concerns of the claimant and the opposing arguments of the State. 
The UNHCR comes at the issue of Dublin transfers and the problems with the presumption of 
mutual trust in a completely different manner: it recommends that EU Member States afford 
asylum claimants an opportunity to choose the option of voluntary transfer to another Member 
 
1256 Ibid; See, also: Brouwer supra note 502 at 142: ‘As the general situation was known, the ECtHR held that ‘the 
applicant should not be expected to bear the entire burden of proof’ and a more active role of the transferring state 
was required: ‘[I]t was in fact up to the Belgian authorities (…) not merely to assume that the applicant would be 
treated in conformity with the Convention standards but, on the contrary, to first verify how the Greek authorities 
applied their legislation on asylum in practice’. Of course, the swapping of the burden of proof goes against the 
‘general principle underlying asylum law procedures that the primary responsibility lies with the asylum seeker to 
submit grounds to the effect that his or her transfer to another Member State would result in a violation of his or her 
rights under Article 4 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights’: Brouwer supra note 502 at 143. 
1257 Ibid. 
1258 Brouwer supra note 502 at 143. 
1259 Ibid at 143-144. 
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State under the Dublin procedures.1260 The emphasis under this recommendation is the word 
‘voluntary’, so that claimants would have the option of choosing whether to undertake the Dublin 
transfer procedures, rather than, as is currently the case under EU law, that such transfers take 
place involuntarily.1261 Barring this approach, however, the UNHCR recommends that the EU 
Member State undertaking the Dublin transfer ensure that claimants are able to contest the 
decision1262 and that the claimant be provided with proper legal representation pursuant to Article 
13 of the ECHR on the right to effective remedy.1263 The UNHCR also recommends that EU 
Member States suspend transfers to other Member States which do not have proper asylum 
procedures in place.1264 This last recommendation has been followed in certain cases - for example, 
Dublin transfers to Hungary have been suspended by Member States due to worsening conditions 
for asylum claimants in the country and a high risk of onward refoulement to claimants being sent 
from Hungary to another country.1265 
While there are different options for reshaping the presumption of mutual trust, this thesis 
recommends the approach that best balances the human rights of asylum seekers and the duties of 
EU Member States (and therefore provides access to asylum justice): articulation of a uniform 
threshold assessing in some manner the individual situation of the claimant, a reversal of the 
 
1260 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Left in Limbo: UNHCR Study on the Implementation of the 
Dublin III Regulation: Recommendations”, August 2017 at 9 [UNHCR Recommendations].  
1261 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at chp 5. 
1262 UNHCR Recommendations supra note 1260. 
1263 Ibid at 9; See, also: ECHR supra note 114 at art 13.  
1264 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “The Dublin Regulation: Asylum in Europe”, 
https://www.unhcr.org/4a9d13d59.pdf.  
1265 European Council on Refugees & Exiles, “Germany follows UNHCR call for suspension of Dublin transfers to 
Hungary”, 14 April 2017, https://www.ecre.org/germany-follows-unhcr-call-for-suspension-of-dublin-transfers-to-
hungary; See, also: European Council on Refugees & Exiles, “Case Law Fact Sheet: Prevention of Dublin Transfers 
to Hungary”, January 2016, http://statewatch.org/news/2016/jan/eu-ecre-factsheet-dublin-transfers-to-hungary-1-
16.pdf.  
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presumption against its use rather than for its use, and placement of the burden of proof for the 
use of the presumption on the sending state, and not on the claimant. 
7.2.3 Re-evaluating the Use of Diplomatic Assurances to Facilitate ‘Safe’ Third 
Country and Dublin Transfers 
As explained in Chapter Four, another containment method used by EU Member States to control 
the movement of asylum seekers is to send them back to third countries deemed ‘safe’ or to transfer 
them internally. Since the principle of non-refoulement does not permit individuals to be sent to 
countries where they are at risk of serious human right violations, EU Member States - including 
Germany and the UK (while it was within the EU) - have adopted the practice of relying on 
diplomatic assurances from third or EU countries as proof that they properly evaluated the 
refoulement risk prior to transfer. These assurances have been used to presume that the receiving 
country’s human rights record and access to asylum procedures both comply with relevant 
international and European law standards. Seeking these assurances is permitted within the EU, as 
is using them as one mode of evaluation.1266 As explained in previous chapters, however, this 
presumption of compliance based on a diplomatic assertion is problematic when it does not 
correspond to reality and when courts take these presumptions at face value without delving 
deeper. According to the ECtHR jurisprudence and, in particular, in Tarakhel, the ECtHR’s 
practice has been that diplomatic assurances should be obtained before a transfer decision is taken 
under the Dublin III Regulation.1267 This is so that ‘the individuals concerned have the opportunity 
 
1266 Diplomatic assurances are permitted in the CEAS and can be one piece of evidence of the situation in the third 
country but should not be the entirety of the evidence. However, as stated in MSS supra note 304 at para 354, 
diplomatic assurances are not a sufficient guarantee; See, also: European Commission, “Presentation of ECtHR case 
Tarakehel vs. Switzerland and the relevant legal and jurisprudential context” at slide 13, 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeetingDoc&docid=13083.  
1267 Tarakhel supra note 528; See, also: Abu Qatada v UK, Application No 8139/09 (ECHR, 17 January 2012) at para 
189.  
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to ask for a comprehensive risk assessment, including of the assurances, by the domestic Courts 
under Article 3 ECHR’.1268  
International organizations and nongovernmental organizations have pressed EU Member States 
(and all States) to restrict their reliance on diplomatic assurances. They urge sending states to carry 
out a multi-faceted evaluation by taking positive steps to evaluate any potential future risks to the 
claimant of serious human rights violations and examining the human rights record of the receiving 
State before the transfer takes place.1269 When diplomatic assurances are used, these organizations 
recommend that there should be a presumption against reliance upon these assurances.1270 The 
concern here is that requiring claimants to rebut a presumption in favour of mutual trust of those 
assurances would put an unnecessary (and additional) evidentiary burden on the claimants.1271 
Similarly, these commentators argue that diplomatic assurances should only be used in favour of 
the asylum claimant so that the burden to discharge the presumption against the use of diplomatic 
 
1268 Fanny De Weck, Non-Refoulement under the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Convention 
Against Torture (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2017) at 183.  
1269 It has been suggested that de jure compliance with the Refugee Convention, including being a signatory to the 
Refugee Convention does not in itself indicate that the third country is ‘safe’ for the claimant to be sent to. Further, 
the question of whether the same third country has ratified the Refugee Convention is an irrelevant consideration, as 
it is not in itself indicative of whether the provisions within the Refugee Convention have been complied with 
domestically, see: Michelle Foster, “Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring Refugees to Seek 
Protection in Another State” (2007) 28 Michigan Journal of International Law 2, 223-286 at 239 [Protection 
Elsewhere].  
1270 See, for example: Columbia Law School Human Rights Initiative, “Promises to Keep: Diplomatic Assurances 
Against Torture in US Terrorism Transfers”, December 2010 at 23: ‘For immigration cases, establish a presumption 
against the resort to assurances unless there are compelling reasons for removal, e.g. the deportee poses a danger to 
the community’.  
1271 Ibid. 
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assurances should be a burden for the receiving Member State to discharge, rather than an onus 
for the claimant to prove.1272 The UNHCR has reiterated that diplomatic assurances, when used: 
should not result in the denial of access to asylum procedures […] Diplomatic 
assurances are concerned with treatment of the individual concerned in the receiving 
State, and thus affect the substance of the person’s asylum application. They could 
not, therefore, give rise to a declaration of inadmissibility.1273 
Additionally, they propose that, when diplomatic assurances are relied upon, post-transfer 
monitoring should be in place to ensure that the receiving Member State has, in fact, complied 
with its relevant international and European law obligations.1274 It has been suggested that post-
transfer monitoring can ‘help [to] improve refugee policy in at least three ways: firstly, by enabling 
the provision of support to asylum seekers who are deported; secondly, by helping to identify and 
document where the fears of forcibly returned asylum seekers are well-founded; and thirdly, by 
 
1272 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances and International 
Protection”, August 2006 at para 19: ‘Under the above-mentioned obligations, the sending State has a duty to 
establish, prior to implementing any removal measure, that the person whom it intends to remove from its territory or 
jurisdiction would not be exposed to a danger of serious human rights violations such as those mentioned above. 
Where the receiving State has given diplomatic assurances with regard to a particular individual, or where there are 
assurances in the form of clauses concerning the treatment of persons transferred under a general agreement on 
deportations or other forms of removal, these form part of the elements to be assessed in making this determination. 
Such assurances do not, however, affect the sending State’s obligations under customary international law as well as 
international and regional human rights treaties to which it is party’ (emphasis added) [Note on Diplomatic 
Assurances]. 
1273 Ibid at para 42.  
1274 Foster supra note 1173 at 72: ‘The final point to note is that it is not sufficient for a state to rely on a written 
agreement, written assurances, or an initial assessment that transfer to a third country complies with the Refugee 
Convention. Rather the state must monitor the treatment of refugees in the receiving state to assess on an ongoing 
basis whether transfers can continue to be undertaken in accordance with international law’.  
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providing valuable insights for Country of Origin Information reports’.1275 Further, the Human 
Rights Committee is of the view that: ‘When a State party expels a person to another State on the 
basis of assurances as to that person’s treatment by the receiving State, it must institute credible 
mechanisms for ensuring compliance by the receiving State with these assurances from the 
moment of expulsion’.1276 
As is evident, these organizations strongly argue that reliance upon diplomatic assurances must 
only be used with great caution.1277 The UNHCR has issued a note on the use of diplomatic 
assurances and the importance of observing the principle of non-refoulement during their use.1278 
In that note, the UNHCR warns that the assessment in determining the weight attached to 
diplomatic assurances ‘must be made in light of the general human rights situation in the receiving 
State at the relevant time’.1279 Further, the Committee Against Torture has reiterated the need to 
prohibit the use of diplomatic assurances ‘as a loophole to undermine the principle of non-
refoulement as set out in Article 3 of the [Convention Against Torture], where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he/she would be in danger of being subjected to torture in that State’.1280 
The Committee Against Torture has also stressed that the ‘procurement of diplomatic assurances 
cannot be used by States to escape their absolute obligation to refrain from non-refoulement (Agiza 
v. Sweden)’.1281 The UN Secretary-General has also affirmed that diplomatic assurances are 
 
1275 Jill Alpes, Charlotte Blondel, Nausicaa Preiss and Meritxell Sayos Monras, “Post-Deportation Risks for Failed 
Asylum Seekers’ (2017) Forced Migration Review 1-3. 
1276 Protection Elsewhere supra note 1269 at 284. 
1277 Note on Diplomatic Assurances supra note 1272. 
1278 Ibid at 4-11.  
1279 Ibid at para 21. 
1280 CAT NR Comment supra note 245 at para 20. 
1281 United Nations General Assembly, “Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: Note 
by the Secretary-General”, 7 August 2015, UN Doc A/70/303 at para 40; Committee Against Torture, Agiza v Sweden, 
24 May 2005, UN Doc CAT/C/34/D/233/2003. 
291 
 
‘‘unreliable and ineffective’ in the protection against torture and other ill-treatment, with post-
return monitoring mechanisms doing little to mitigate the risk of torture’.1282 Further, the UN 
General Assembly stated that: 
States cannot resort to diplomatic assurances as a safeguard against torture and ill-
treatment where there are substantial grounds for believing that a person would be in 
danger of being subjected to such treatment.1283 
Based on these warnings from the UNHCR, the Committee Against Torture, the UN Secretary-
General and the UN General Assembly, the presumption in favour of diplomatic assurances should 
be removed, so that diplomatic assurances cannot be relied upon by States Parties to the Refugee 
Convention as a method to approve transfers to receiving countries deemed ‘safe’. 
It has also been suggested by the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), and affirmed in India v. Badesha, that the weight to be given to 
diplomatic assurances involves considering multiple factors.1284 These factors include: 
the human rights record of the government giving the assurances, the government’s 
record in complying with its assurances, and the capacity of the government to fulfill 
the assurances, particularly where there is doubt about the government’s ability to 
control its security forces.1285 
 
1282 United Nations General Assembly, “Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: Note 
by the Secretary-General”, 30 August 2005, UN Doc A/60/316 at para 51. 
1283 United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 60/148”, 21 February 2006, UN Doc A/RES/60/148 at para 8.  
1284 India v Badesha [2017] 2 SCR 127 at para 48 [Badesha]. 
1285 Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 SCR 3 at para 125 [Suresh]; It has also been 
argued by the Human Rights Watch that ‘Diplomatic assurances, however, do nothing to mitigate that risk. As a result, 
relying on diplomatic assurances, an ineffective safeguard against torture, to effect such deportations in fact would 
place the Canadian government within the terms of the Suresh "exception" and would violate the absolute prohibition 
against torture and refoulement’, see: Human Rights Watch, “Still at Risk: Diplomatic Assurances No Safeguard 
Against Torture”, 15 April 2005, https://www.refworld.org/docid/42c3bd400.html.  
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Further, the ECtHR in Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom has created a non-exhaustive 
list of factors for courts in different jurisdictions to consider:  
Whether the assurances are specific or are general and vague; Who has given the 
assurances and whether that person can bind the receiving state; If the assurances 
have been issued by the central government of the receiving state, whether local 
authorities can be expected to abide by them; Whether the assurances concern 
treatment which is legal or illegal in the receiving state; The length and strength of 
bilateral relations between the sending and receiving states, including the receiving 
state’s record in abiding by similar assurances; Whether compliance with the 
assurances can be objectively verified through diplomatic or other monitoring 
mechanisms, including providing unfettered access to the individual’s lawyers; 
Whether there is an effective system of protection against torture in the receiving 
state, including whether it is willing to cooperate with international monitoring 
mechanisms (including international human rights NGOs) and whether it is willing 
to investigate allegations of torture and to punish those responsible; and whether the 
individual has previously been ill-treated in the receiving state.1286 
As State practice from other countries outside of the EU has shown, diplomatic assurances should 
be used with caution and must involve the assessment of the situation in the receiving country.1287 
This assessment requires the consideration of multiple factors - including those set out by the 
ECtHR and courts in Canada and India - and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.1288 Under 
 
1286 Ibid. 
1287 See: Suresh and Badesha at footnotes 1285 and 1284 respectively.  
1288 See: Suresh supra note 1281; Badesha supra note 1284 at para 48: ‘The reliability of diplomatic assurances 
depends crucially on the circumstances of the particular case’; Suresh supra note 1285 at para 45: ‘Deportation to 
torture, for example, requires us to consider a variety of factors, including the circumstances or conditions of the 
potential deportee, the danger that the deportee presents to Canadians or the country’s security, and the threat of 
terrorism to Canada. In contexts in which the most significant considerations are general ones, it is likely that the 
balance will be struck the same way in most cases. It would be impossible to say in advance, however, that the balance 
will necessarily be struck the same way in every case’.  
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this approach, countries such as the UK and Germany should both amend their approaches to 
diplomatic assurances, to ensure that such assurances are not taken at face value; rather, any 
diplomatic assurances given by the receiving country should be thoroughly investigated and not 
be used as a loophole to circumvent non-refoulement obligations.1289  
7.2.4 Periodic Monitoring and Judicial Review of Transfers  
The Dublin III Regulation has a built-in monitoring and evaluating mechanism. This mechanism 
requires the ‘effective monitoring of the application of [the] Regulation […] at regular 
intervals’.1290 What the provision does not specify is how often that monitoring and evaluation 
occurs, as well as what type of evaluation takes place by the European Commission.1291 Another 
similar provision is found under Article 46 of the Dublin III Regulation, which requires Member 
States to ‘forward to the Commission all information appropriate for the preparation of that 
report’.1292 In practice, the European Commission publishes a report detailing an evaluation of the 
implementation of the Dublin III Regulation.1293 In these reports, the European Commission 
highlighted the low percentage rate (8%) of the total number of ‘take back’ and ‘take charge’ 
requests in physical transfers under the Dublin III Regulation.1294 That means, according to 
European Commission statistics, the final stage of the actual physical transfer of the individual 
 
1289 Committee Against Torture, “General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 of the Convention 
in the context of article 22”, 9 February 2018 at para 19. 
1290 Dublin III Regulation supra note 25 at recital para 38.  
1291 Ibid at art 46 
1292 Ibid.    
1293 European Commission, “Evaluation of the Dublin III Regulation: Final Report”, 4 December 2015, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-
applicants/docs/evaluation_of_the_dublin_iii_regulation_en.pdf [DRIII 2015 Report]; European Commission, 
“Evaluation of the Implementation of the Dublin III Regulation: Final Report”, 18 March 2016, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-
applicants/docs/evaluation_of_the_implementation_of_the_dublin_iii_regulation_en.pdf [DRIII 2016 Report].  
1294 DRIII 2015 Report supra note 1293 at 6. 
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after a Member State requests a ‘take charge’ request from the Member State responsible often 
does not occur as a result of non-acceptance by the Member State responsible. Other potential 
explanations can be partly due to delays caused by Dublin transfers or the suspensive effect of the 
Dublin transfer pending results of appeal.1295  
The reports were published in December 2015 and March 2016 and they reiterated the law 
governing EU Member States in their domestic implementation of the Dublin III Regulation rather 
than providing a critical evaluation of the application of that law.1296 Thus, they do not, in actuality, 
provide monitoring or evaluation of how well Member States’ transfers comply with CEAS law. 
There was also a report by the European Parliament on the “Dublin Regulation on International 
Protection Applications: European Implementation Assessment”, which highlighted the structural 
deficiencies of the Dublin III Regulation.1297 These highlights were no more than a repeat of the 
Dublin IV Proposal language calling for stronger coherence in the implementation of the Dublin 
III Regulation on transfers among Member States and did not amount to monitoring or evaluation 
of EU countries’ laws and practices, nor did they discuss potential solutions or policy 
recommendations. Instead, a form of monitoring and evaluation of transfers was done in reports 
by international organizations and nongovernmental organizations including the UNHCR.1298 
 
1295 Ibid. 
1296 Ibid; According to the Europe External Policy Advisors, the European Commission highlighted the shortcomings 
of the Dublin Regulation through three studies – 2015, 2016, and a 2018 study that has yet to be produced: ‘The 
European Commission published one study on the evaluation of the Regulation in 2015 and another on its 
implementation by member states in 2016. The next evaluation of the Dublin Regulation was planned in 2018 but has 
not yet been produced. In addition to the official Commission evaluations, a number of other actors, such as the 
European Parliament, have published studies about the Regulation. The European Implementation Assessment is the 
most recent of such studies. Since the evaluation in 2015 until now, weaknesses were described within the Dublin 
Regulation; recent evaluations show that rather than improving, these weaknesses have increased’.  
1297 European Parliament, “Dublin Regulation on International Protection Applications: European Implementation 
Assessment”, February 2020, 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/642813/EPRS_STU(2020)642813_EN.pdf. 
1298 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Left In Limbo: UNHCR Study on the Implementation of The 
Dublin III Regulation: Executive Summary”, https://www.refworld.org/docid/59d5dd1a4.html; Asylum Information 
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The proposal to reform the Dublin III Regulation, termed the Dublin IV Proposal, has also 
specified a monitoring requirement which states: ‘on an annual basis Member States will report on 
the implementation of the multiannual programme’ and they must ‘set up a Monitoring Committee 
to which the Commission may participate in advisory capacity’.1299 This monitoring requirement 
pertains to the implementation of the Dublin Regulation as a whole in the Member State rather 
than a monitoring and evaluation tool to specifically observe the conduct of Member States during 
transfer or post-transfer of claimants. Thus, it is unclear how much attention this monitoring 
mechanism, once implemented, will pay to Dublin and ‘safe’ third country transfers.   
The UNHCR has recommended that States adopt a ‘variety of measures which have proven 
effective in preventing unlawful or irregular removal of refugees and asylum-seekers’.1300 These 
measures include: ‘establishing a monitoring and reporting mechanism, and conducting regular 
checks […] to monitor the safety and well-being of the individuals concerned, and responding to 
any threats identified’.1301 These monitoring mechanisms can include the involvement of 
independent and impartial international and nongovernmental organizations to periodically 
evaluate the relevant Member States’ removal record - to ensure that non-refoulement obligations 
are complied with in each case.1302 Further, monitoring mechanisms can include not only a stronger 
role from both international organizations and civil society to participate in Member State 
monitoring but also the involvement of governments from each Member State in consultation with 
each other on best practices.1303  
 
Database, “The Implementation of the Dublin III Regulation 2018”, March 2019, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/aida_2018update_dublin.pdf.  
1299 Dublin IV Proposal supra note 494 at 101.  
1300 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Guidance Note on Safeguards Against Unlawful or Irregular 
Removal of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers”, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/530afbd84.pdf at para 6.  
1301 Ibid at para 6(vi).  
1302 See, for example: Michelle Foster, “Responsibility Sharing of Shifting? “Safe” Third Countries and International 
Law”, 25(2) Refuge 64-78 at 70. 
1303 See, for example: R (Yogathas) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 AC 920 at para 9.  
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Problematic application of Dublin transfers and ‘safe’ third country agreements as containment 
policies can be counteracted by coupling the existing law (the Dublin III Regulation and its 
domestic implementation) with regular and focused review that goes beyond the Commission’s 
reporting. In particular, the creation of a periodic monitoring mechanism for the CEAS focused 
specifically on Dublin and ‘safe’ third country transfers would permit rights-violating patterns and 
practices within EU Member States to be highlighted and corrected, thereby leading to more 
consistency within CEAS processes. Such monitoring reports could also be valuable to those 
carrying out the certification process within the UK ‘safe’ third country evaluations.      
A domestic judicial review mechanism focused directly on Dublin and ‘safe’ third country 
transfers could serve as an important second and complementary form of monitoring, providing 
individual asylum seekers the chance to challenge these transfers, including the chance to raise 
arguments regarding the implementation of non-refoulement protections. This would help to 
correct the problems that exist in a number of domestic EU systems, such as in Germany, in which 
truly individualized assessments in the form set out above are not currently available. The subject-
matter expertise that is available at a specialized tribunal may offer insights and critiques that a 
general court does not and cannot provide. This can potentially lead to faster and more informed 
decisions for procedures related to asylum claims and related adjudication. The establishment of 
an office or an appeals tribunal similar to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal in Ireland, 
which reviews Ireland’s decisions on the Dublin System, might provide a good exemplar for such 
a domestic mechanism.1304 This Tribunal can serve as a role model for other Member States 
because, similar to the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, the International Protection 
Appeals Tribunal in Ireland issues Chairperson’s guidelines to assist members in interpreting 
asylum law, including with respect to issues of relevance to non-refoulement and transfers.1305 For 
example, the guidance on taking evidence indicates practices to ensure the fulsome capturing of 
 
1304 International Protection Appeals Tribunal, Ireland, “About Us”, 
http://www.protectionappeals.ie/website/rat/ratweb.nsf/page/about_the_tribunal-en.  
1305 International Protection Appeals Tribunal, Ireland, “Publications”, 
http://www.protectionappeals.ie/website/rat/ratweb.nsf/page/Publications-en.  
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an individual’s information, which assists in individualization, discussed above.1306 These 
guidelines can serve to enhance procedural safeguards for claimants as they provide much needed 
direction for asylum officers.  
As considered by the European Policy Centre, the lack of monitoring mechanisms in place is 
detrimental to claimants who are being contemplated for return either through a ‘safe’ third country 
agreement or through Dublin transfers. Potential benefits of monitoring mechanisms for returnees 
include providing information for Member States to correct any action or inaction leading to a 
heightened risk of refoulement, the possibility of incorporating non-refoulement safeguards in 
current or future third country partnership agreements, and future evaluation of return procedures 
for claimants.1307  
A supranational judicial review mechanism within one of the regional European courts might be a 
viable addition or alternative to the domestic mechanism proposed immediately above. It could 
allow asylum claimants who have been ordered to be removed to be able to seek judicial review 
of the transfer decision of the government. While currently the ECtHR does offer an avenue for 
asylum claimants to bring their cases forward, a sub-committee or a tribunal with specialization 
on removal orders and expertise in non-refoulement protection could significantly add to the 
strength of the process and counteract containment policies.  
 
1306 See, for example: The International Protection Appeals Tribunal, “Chairperson’s Guideline No. 2019/1 on 
Taking Evidence from Appellants and Other Witnesses”, 
http://www.protectionappeals.ie/website/rat/ratweb.nsf/page/MXKY-B9KK4514334220-
en/$File/Guideline%202019-
1%20on%20Taking%20Evidence%20from%20Appellants%20and%20Other%20Witnesses.pdf and “Chairperson’s 
Guideline No: 2018/1: Application of ‘Compelling Reasons’ in the consideration of refugee status appeals originally 
submitted to the Tribunal pursuant to s.16(1) of the Refugee Act 1996, prior to the commencement of the 
International Protection Act 2015”, http://www.protectionappeals.ie/website/rat/ratweb.nsf/page/MJOF-
AXAA8J7595728-en/$File/IP%20Guideline%202018-1%20on%20Compelling%20Grounds.pdf.  
1307 Olivia Sundberg Diez, “Diminishing safeguards, increasing returns: Non-refoulement gaps in the EU return and 
readmission system”, 4 October 2019 at 14. 
298 
 
In sum, the four proposals for strengthening access to justice set out in this section aim to address 
and counteract containment policies in order to strengthen the implementation of the non-
refoulement norm. The proposals are mutually reinforcing, in that strengthened procedural 
guarantees (through individualization) to ensure access to asylum justice can also be backstopped 
by the implementation of periodic review and judicial review on Dublin and ‘safe’ third country 
transfers. Similarly, reshaping the determination of mutual trust involves a re-evaluation of the use 
of diplomatic assurances in transfer cases.  
7.3 Conclusion: Future Directions for Non-Refoulement   
‘The drive for detailed common standards of the CEAS has not prevented the simultaneous drive 
by states to restrict asylum’ through legal, administrative and political measures.1308 In fact, these 
methods to contain the ‘unwanted’ have become a globalized trend.1309 The EU’s containment 
policies as demonstrated in the CEAS and State practices of both the UK and Germany show that 
the principle of non-refoulement is at risk of - and is - being eroded. When the cornerstone of 
refugee protection is no longer safeguarded, the human rights of those who benefit from this 
principle - asylum claimants and refugees under refugee law, and everyone under human rights 
law - are jeopardized. 
 
1308 Stevens and O’Sullivan supra note 1204 at 302.  
1309 See, for example: “EU laws designed to deter refugees”, The New Humanitarian, 27 January 2016, 
http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2016/01/27/eu-laws-designed-deter-refugees; On the Canada-United 
States Safe Third Country Agreement, see: The Washington Post, “Canadian court says sending asylum seekers back 
to U.S. violates their rights”, 22 July 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/canadian-court-
says-border-agreement-with-us-violates-asylum-seekers-rights/2020/07/22/a8b3e908-cc3a-11ea-91f1-
28aca4d833a0_story.html; The Conversation, “Canadian court correctly finds the U.S. is unsafe for refugees”, 24 July 
2020, https://theconversation.com/canadian-court-correctly-finds-the-u-s-is-unsafe-for-refugees-143239; Global 
News, “Federal Court rules Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement unconstitutional”, 22 July 2020, 
https://globalnews.ca/news/7205230/federal-court-rules-canada-u-s-safe-third-country-agreement-unconstitutional; 
On Australia’s offshore processing practices, see: Camilia Ioli, “Australia’s Offshore Processing System: An 
Exemplar for the EU?”, January 2018, https://www.asyluminsight.com/c-camilla-ioli#.XyQiGzV7mUk;  Madeline 
Gleeson, Offshore: Behind the wire on Manus and Nauru (Australia: NewSouth Publishing, 2016).  
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As international law sets the standard upon which regional asylum systems, including the CEAS, 
carry out important safeguards for asylum claimants and refugees, these standards must be 
complied with and interpreted in a manner that continues to protect the integrity of the institution 
of asylum, particularly the cardinal principle of non-refoulement. To counteract measures of 
containment, the incorporation of additional procedural safeguards, a reshaped approach to the 
presumption of mutual trust, a re-evaluated approach to diplomatic assurances and periodic 
monitoring plus judicial review mechanisms will enhance non-refoulement protection for 
claimants. These recommendations require Member States to take active steps to provide access 
to individualized asylum justice and to seriously consider multiple factors before issuing transfer 
decisions.  
Much more work needs to be done in order to improve the CEAS, including harmonizing common 
European standards on asylum procedures and enhancing efficiency in the processing of asylum 
applications. While there is no overnight solution to ongoing problems of the CEAS, the human 
rights of asylum claimants and refugees need to be at the forefront of the agenda for each EU 
Member State. The work that must be done requires the cooperation of all countries including 
Member States, governments, civil society, international organizations, as well as private actors. 
Now more than ever, the principle of non-refoulement must be safeguarded against erosion and 
the rights of asylum claimants and refugees championed above State interests. 
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